IBRARY   I 

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OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


GIFT  OF 

Mrs.   Bartlett  Heard. 


Astral   Efrttmt 


IE       ASTRAL        EDITION        HAS         BEEN          EXTRA 
ILLUSTRATED       AND       BOUND       BY 

KE  L.L.E  R  -  FARM  E  R      COMPANY 
NEW     YOR  K 


Astral  Edition 


LIMITED       TO        TWELVE        STAR        COPIES 


Thomas  Hart  Benton 


Thomas  Hart  Benton 


UNIFORM  EDITION 


TH?  STORY  o 


By 

THEODORE  ROOS 


PHILADELPHIA 

IE  AND  COMPANY 
1903 


T hernias,  ti  art 


UNIFORM  EDITION 


THOMAS  HART  BENTON 

THE  STORY  OF  His  LIFE  AND  WORK 


By 
THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


PHILADELPHIA 

GEBBIE  AND  COMPANY 
1903 


Copyright,  1886 
Copyright,  1899 

by 
THEODORE    ROOSEVELT 


Copyright,  1899 
Copyright,  1903 

by 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 


This  edition  of  "Thomas  Hart  Benton  "  is  issued  under  special 
arrangement  with  HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 


GIF! 


PREFACE 


L340 

B'/-~R7 
IQ  n  3 

1  '  (J  O 


THE  rugged  figure  of  Thomas  Hart  Benton 
has  never  been  given  its  proper  place  in  the 
American  political  pantheon.  His  public 
career  covered  a  period  during  which  the  leaders 
of  our  political  thought  were  more  often  to  be 
found  in  the  Senate  than  even  in  the  presidential 
chair,  and  his  name  has  been  dimmed  because  of 
its  association  with  the  great  names  of  Clay,  Cal- 
houn,  and  Webster.  He  was  not,  like  Calhoun, 
the  leader,  and  almost  the  embodiment,  of  a  move 
ment  which  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  became  of 
ever-increasing  importance  in  our  national  poli 
tics,  until  it  broke  in  the  bloody  crash  of  the  Civil 
War.  He  was  not,  like  Webster  or  Clay,  the  idol 
and  leader  of  a  great  wing  of  his  own  party.  In 
point  of  ability  he  was  not  the  equal  of  any  one  of 
these  three  men ;  but  none  the  less  he  was  a  very 
able  man,  and  in  rugged  force  of  character,  in 
unwavering  intensity  of  purpose,  and  in  honorable 
and  disinterested  devotion  to  the  good  of  the 
country  as  he  saw  it,  he  was  not  surpassed  by 
any  of  his  associates,  and  he  was  equaled  by  but 
very  few. 

iii 


IV 


Preface 


The  man  who  represented  Missouri  when  she 
was  the  westernmost  State,  with  all  the  frontier 
virtues,  but  also  with  all  the  frontier  limitations 
and  narrow  prejudices,  could  not  well  avoid 
making  what,  by  our  standard,  we  should  call 
mistakes;  but  we  cannot  refuse  the  meed  of 
generous  praise  to  a  man  who  was  always  entirely 
honest  and  entirely  courageous.  Even  at  the 
present  day  we  have  plenty  of  statesmen  and 
publicists  who  can  study  with  advantage  a  public 
career  which  had  for  its  cardinal  points  the  belief 
in  sound  money,  and  stern  devotion  to  the  wel 
fare  of  the  entire  Union,  without  regard  to  sec 
tional  prejudices. 

During  the  years  when  the  West  first  rose  to 
prominence — under  the  lead  of  those  western- 
middle  States,  which  were  called  the  border  States 
because  they  came  between  the  North  and  the 
South,  though  nearer  to  the  latter — Benton 
shared  with  Clay  and  Jackson  the  leadership  of 
the  new  forces  which  were  actively  engaged  in 
transforming  the  political  no  less  than  the  social 
structures  of  American  life.  When  the  West 
broke  into  North  and  South,  as  the  East  had 
before  broken,  and  when  the  tide  of  disunion 
rose  rapidly  from  the  Gulf  northward  to  the 
Potomac  and  the  Missouri,  Benton  sternly  refused 
to  abandon  his  principles,  and  went  down  beneath 
the  flood  without  a  sign  either  of  yielding  or  of 


Preface  v 

complaint.  He  belongs  in  that  group  of  men  to 
whom  our  country,  in  the  second  great  crisis  of 
its  existence,  owes  most;  for  his  name  must  be 
numbered  among  the  names  of  the  Southern  men 
who,  when  the  South  went  wrong,  stood  by  the 
nation  as  against  their  own  section.  It  was  easy 
enough  for  the  Northerner,  in  1860  and  the  years 
immediately  preceding  it,  to  stand  for  national 
union,  because  all  the  people  round  about  him  so 
stood.  In  like  manner  it  was  not  very  difficult 
for  a  Northerner  to  favor  the  abolition  of  slavery. 
But  it  was  a  very  different  thing  for  a  Southerner 
to  take  such  a  stand  at  that  moment.  Just  as 
infinitely  more  credit  attaches  to  a  Southerner 
who  stood  on  the  slave  question  where  Birney 
and  Cassius  M.  Clay  stood  than  can  possibly 
attach  to  any  of  their  Northern  colleagues  in  the 
work,  so  the  statesmen  and  soldiers  who  deserved 
best  of  the  country  were  those  who,  against  the 
feeling  of  their  localities,  upheld  the  National 
Union.  During  the  Civil  War  these  men  were 
typified  by  soldiers  like  Thomas  and  sailors  like 
Farragut;  in  the  years  that  led  up  to  the  war 
they  were  typified  by  statesmen  like  Benton  of 
Missouri. 


WASHINGTON,  April,  1898. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 

PAQR 

THE  YOUNG  WEST    .  i 


CHAPTER  II 
BENTON'S  EARLY  LIFE  AND  ENTRY  INTO  THE  SENATE.  .  .      22 

CHAPTER  III 
EARLY  YEARS  IN  THE  SENATE 45 

CHAPTER  IV 
THE  ELECTION  OF  JACKSON,  AND  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM.  .  .      66 

CHAPTER  V 
THE  STRUGGLE  WITH  THE  NULLIFIERS 84 

CHAPTER  VI 
JACKSON  AND  BENTON  MAKE  WAR  ON  THE  BANK   .  .  .    109 

CHAPTER  VII 
THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  SURPLUS    136 

CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  SLAVE  QUESTION  APPEARS  IN  POLITICS    149 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  CHILDREN'S  TEETH  ARE  SET  ON  EDGE 174 

vii 


viii  Contents 

CHAPTER  X 

PAOB 

LAST  DAYS  OP  THE  JACKSONIAN  DEMOCRACY 198 

CHAPTER  XI 
THE  PRESIDENT  WITHOUT  A  PARTY    225 

CHAPTER  XII 
BOUNDARY  TROUBLES  WITH  ENGLAND    246 

CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    ABOLITIONISTS    DANCE    TO    THE    SLAVE    BARONS' 

PIPING    275 

CHAPTER  XIV 
SLAVERY  IN  THE  NEW  TERRITORIES 300 

CHAPTER  XV 
THE  LOSING  FIGHT 322 

INDEX 347 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


THOMAS  HART  BENTON         .         .         .     Frontispiece 
From  an  Engraving  by  J.  Rogers. 

ROGER  B.  TANEY I2^ 

From  a  Daguerreotype  by  Bennett. 

JOHN  C.  FREMONT         .....          267 
From  a  Photograph  by  Brady. 

SAMUEL  HOUSTON 310 

From  a  Daguerreotype  by  B.  P.  Page. 


ix 


THOMAS  HART  BENTON 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    YOUNG    WEST. 

EVEN  before  the  end  of  the  Revolutionary 
War  the  movement  had  begun  which  was 
to  change  in  form  a  straggling  chain  of 
seaboard  republics  into  a  mighty  continental 
nation,  the  great  bulk  of  whose  people  would  live 
to  the  westward  of  the  Appalachian  Mountains. 
The  hardy  and  restless  backwoodsmen,  dwelling 
along  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Alleghanies,  were 
already  crossing  the  mountain  crests  and  hewing 
their  way  into  the  vast,  somber  forests  of  the 
Mississippi  basin ;  and  for  the  first  time  English- 
speaking  communities  were  growing  up  along 
waters  whose  outlet  was  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
and  not  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Among  these 
communities  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were  the 
earliest  to  form  themselves  into  States;  and 
around  them,  as  a  nucleus,  other  States  of  the 
woodland  and  the  prairie  were  rapidly  developed, 


2  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

until,  by  the  close  of  the  second  decade  in  the 
present  century,  the  region  between  the  Great 
Lakes  and  the  Gulf  was  almost  solidly  filled  in, 
and  finally,  in  1820,  by  the  admission  of  Missouri, 
the  Union  held  within  its  borders  a  political  body 
whose  whole  territory  lay  to  the  west  of  the  Mis 
sissippi. 

All  the  men  who  founded  these  States  were  of 
much  the  same  type;  they  were  rough  frontiers 
men,  of  strong  will  and  adventurous  temper,  ac 
customed  to  the  hard,  barren,  and  yet  strangely 
fascinating  life  of  those  who  dwell  as  pioneers  in 
the  wilderness.  Moreover,  they  were  nearly  all 
of  the  same  blood.  The  people  of  New  York  and 
New  England  were  as  yet  filling  out  their  own 
territory;  it  was  not  till  many  years  afterward 
that  their  stock  became  the  predominant  one  in 
the  Northwestern  country.  Most  of  the  men  who 
founded  the  new  States  north  of  the  Ohio  came 
originally  from  the  old  States  south  of  the  Poto 
mac;  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  were  the  first 
of  the  original  thirteen  to  thrust  forth  their  chil 
dren  in  masses,  that  they  might  shift  for  them 
selves  in  the  then  untrodden  West. 

But  though  these  early  Western  pioneers  were 
for  the  most  part  of  Southern  stock,  they  were  by 
no  means  of  the  same  stamp  as  the  men  who  then 
and  thereafter  formed  the  ruling  caste  in  the  old 
slaveholding  States.  They  were  the  mountaineers, 


The  Young  West  3 

the  men  of  the  foothills  and  uplands,  who  lived  in 
what  were  called  the  backwater  counties.  Many 
of  them  were  themselves  of  northern  origin.  In 
striking  contrast  to  the  somewhat  sluggish  and 
peaceful  elements  going  to  make  up  the  rest  of 
its  heterogeneous  population,  Pennsylvania  also 
originally  held  within  its  boundaries  many  mem 
bers  of  that  most  fiery  and  restless  race,  the 
Scotch-Irish.  These  naturally  drew  toward  the 
wilder,  western  parts  of  the  State,  settling  along 
the  slopes  of  the  numerous  inland  mountain  ridges 
running  parallel  to  the  Atlantic  coast;  and  from 
thence  they  drifted  southward  through  the  long 
valleys,  until  they  met  and  mingled  with  their 
kinsfolk  of  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas,  when  the 
movement  again  trended  toward  the  West.  In 
a  generation  or  two,  all,  whether  their  forefathers 
were  English,  Scotch,  Irish,  or,  as  was  often  the 
case,  German  and  Huguenot,  were  welded  into> 
one  people ;  and  in  a  very  short  time  the  stern  and 
hard  surroundings  of  their  life  had  hammered  this 
people  into  a  peculiar  and  characteristically  Amer 
ican  type,  which  to  this  day  remains  almost  un 
changed.  In  their  old  haunts  we  still  see  the 
same  tall,  gaunt  men,  with  strongly  marked  faces 
and  saturnine,  resolute  eyes ;  men  who  may  pass 
half  their  days  in  listless  idleness,  but  who  are  also 
able  to  show  on  occasion  the  fiercest  intensity  of 
purpose  and  the  most  sustained  energy  of  action. 


4  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

We  see  them,  moreover,  in  many  places,  even 
across  to  the  Pacific  coast  and  down  to  the  Rio 
Grande.  For  after  thronging  through  the  gaps 
and  passes  of  the  Appalachians,  and  penetrating 
the 'forest  region  to  the  outskirts  of  the  treeless 
country  beyond,  the  whilom  mountaineers  and 
woodsmen,  the  wielders  of  the  axe  and  rifle,  then 
streamed  off  far  to  the  West  and  South  and  even 
to  the  Northwest,  their  lumbering,  white-topped 
wagons  being,  even  to  the  present  moment,  a 
familiar  sight  to  those  who  travel  over  the  prairies 
and  the  great  plains ;  while  it  is  their  descendants 
who,  in  the  saddle  instead  of  afoot,  and  with  rope 
and  revolver  instead  of  axe  and  rifle,  now  form 
the  bulk  of  the  reckless  horsemen  who  spend  their 
lives  in  guarding  the  wandering  cattle  herds  that 
graze  over  the  vast,  arid  plains  of  the  "  Far  West." 
The  method  of  settlement  of  these  States  of  the 
Mississippi  valley  had  nothing  whatever  in  com 
mon  with  the  way  in  which  California  and  the 
Australian  colonies  were  suddenly  filled  up  by  the 
promiscuous  overflow  of  a  civilized  population, 
which  had  practically  no  fear  of  any  resistance 
from  the  stunted  and  scanty  native  races.  It  was 
far  more  closely  akin  to  the  tribe  movements  of 
the  Germanic  peoples  in  time  past ;  to  that  move 
ment,  for  example,  by  which  the  Juttish  and  Low 
Dutch  sea-thieves  on  the  coast  of  Britain  worked 
their  way  inland  at  the  cost  of  the  Cymric  Celts. 


The  Young  West  5 

The  early  settlers  of  the  territory  lying  immedi 
ately  west  of  the  Alleghanies  were  all  of  the  same 
kind ;  they  were  in  search  of  homes,  not  of  riches, 
and  their  actions  were  planned  accordingly,  except 
in  so  far  as  they  were  influenced  by  mere  restless 
love  of  adventure  and  excitement.  Individuals 
and  single  families,  of  course,  often  started  off  by 
themselves ;  but  for  the  most  part  the  men  moved 
in  bands,  with  their  wives  and  their  children,  their 
cattle  and  their  few  household  goods ;  each  settler 
being  from  the  necessity  of  the  case  also  a  fighter, 
ready,  and  often  forced,  to  do  desperate  battle  in 
defense  of  himself  and  his  family.  Where  such  a 
band  or  little  party  settled,  there  would  gradually 
grow  up  a  village  or  small  town;  for  instance, 
where  those  renowned  pioneers  and  heroes  of  the 
backwoods,  Boon  and  Harrod,  first  formed  per 
manent  settlements  after  they  had  moved  into 
Kentucky,  now  stands  the  towns  of  Boonsboro  and 
Harrodsburg. 

The  country  whither  these  settlers  went  was  not 
one  into  which  timid  men  would  willingly  venture, 
and  the  founders  of  the  West  were  perforce  men 
of  stern  stuff,  who  from  the  very  beginning  formed 
a  most  warlike  race.  It  is  impossible  to  under 
stand  aright  the  social  and  political  life  of  the 
section,  unless  we  keep  prominently  before  our 
minds  that  it  derived  its  distinguishing  traits 
largely  from  the  extremely  militant  character 


6  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

acquired  by  all  the  early  settlers  during  the  long 
drawn  out  warfare  in  which  the  first  two  genera 
tions  were  engaged.  The  land  was  already  held 
by  powerful  Indian  tribes  and  confederacies,  who 
waged  war  after  war,  of  the  most  ferocious  and 
bloody  character,  against  the  men  of  the  border,  in 
the  effort  to  avert  their  inevitable  doom,  or  at  least 
to  stem  for  the  time  being  the  invasion  of  the 
swelling  tide  of  white  settlement.  At  the  present 
time,  when  an  Indian  uprising  is  a  matter  chiefly 
of  annoyance,  and  dangerous  only  to  scattered, 
outlying  settlers,  it  is  difficult  to  realize  the  for 
midable  nature  of  the  savage  Indian  wars  waged 
at  the  end  of  the  last  and  the  beginning  of  the 
present  centuries.  The  red  nations  were  then 
really  redoubtable  enemies,  able  to  send  into  the 
field  thousands  of  well-armed  warriors,  whose 
ferocious  bravery  and  skill  rendered  them  quite  as 
formidable  antagonists  as  trained  European  sol 
diers  would  have  been.  Warfare  with  them  did 
not  affect  merely  outlying  farms  or  hamlets;  it 
meant  a  complete  stoppage  of  the  white  move 
ment  westward,  and  great  and  imminent  danger 
even  to  the  large  communities  already  in  exis 
tence, — a  state  of  things  which  would  have  to 
continue  until  the  armies  raised  among  the  pio 
neers  were  able,  in  fair  shock  of  battle,  to  shatter 
the  strength  of  their  red  foes.  The  victories  of 
Wayne  and  Harrison  were  conditions  precedent 


The  Young  West  7 

to  the  opening  of  the  Ohio  valley ;  Kentucky  was 
won  by  a  hundred  nameless  and  bloody  fights, 
whose  heroes,  like  Shelby  and  Sevier,  afterward 
rose  to  prominent  rank  in  civil  life;  and  it  was 
only  after  a  hard-fought  campaign  and  slaughter 
ing  victories  that  the  Tennesseeans  were  able  to 
break  the  power  of  the  great  Creek  confederacy, 
which  was  thrust  in  between  them  and  what  were 
at  that  time  the  French  and  Spanish  lands  lying 
to  the  south  and  southwest. 

The  founders  of  our  Western  States  were  val 
iant  warriors  as  well  as  hardy  pioneers,  and  from 
the  very  first  their  fighting  was  not  confined  to 
uncivilized  foes.  It  was  they  who  at  King's  Moun 
tain  slew  gallant  Ferguson,  and  completely  de 
stroyed  his  little  army;  it  was  from  their  ranks 
that  most  of  Morgan's  men  were  recruited,  when 
that  grizzled  old  bush-fighter  smote  Tarleton  so 
roughly  at  the  battle  of  the  Cowpens.  These  two 
blows  crippled  Cornwallis,  and  were  among  the 
chief  causes  of  his  final  overthrow.  At  last,  dur 
ing  the  War  of  1812,  there  was  played  out  the 
final  act  in  the  military  drama  of  which  the  West 
had  been  the  stage  during  the  lifetime  of  a  genera 
tion.  For  this  war  had  a  twofold  aspect :  on  the 
seaboard  it  was  regarded  as  a  contest  for  the 
rights  of  our  sailors,  and  as  a  revolt  against  Great 
Britain's  domineering  insolence ;  west  of  the  moun 
tains,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  simply  a  renewal 


8  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

on  a  large  scale  of  the  Indian  struggles,  all  the 
red-skinned  peoples  joining  together  in  a  great  and 
last  effort  to  keep  the  lands  which  were  being 
wrested  from  them;  and  there  Great  Britain's 
part  was  chiefly  that  of  ally  to  the  savages,  help 
ing  them  with  her  gold  and  with  her  well-drilled 
mercenary  troops.  The  battle  of  the  Thames  is 
memorable  rather  because  of  the  defeat  and  death 
of  Tecumseh  than  because  of  the  flight  of  Proctor 
and  the  capture  of  his  British  regulars;  and  for 
the  opening  of  the  Southwest  the  ferocious  fight 
at  the  Horseshoe  Bend  was  almost  as  important 
as  the  far  more  famous  conflict  of  New  Orleans. 

The  War  of  1812  brought  out  conspicuously  the 
solidarity  of  interest  in  the  West.  The  people 
there  were  then  all  pretty  much  of  the  same  blood ; 
and  they  made  common  cause  against  outsiders  in 
the  military  field,  exactly  as  afterward  they  for 
some  time  acted  together  politically.  Farther 
eastward,  on  the  Niagara  frontier,  the  fighting 
was  done  by  the  troops  of  New  York  and  New 
England,  unassisted  by  the  Southern  States ;  and 
in  turn  the  latter  had  to  shift  for  themselves  when 
Washington  was  burned  and  Baltimore  menaced. 
It  was  far  otherwise  in  the  regions  lying  beyond 
the  Appalachians.  Throughout  all  the  fighting  in 
the  Northwest,  where  Ohio  was  the  State  most 
menaced,  the  troops  of  Kentucky  formed  the  bulk 
of  the  American  army,  and  it  was  the  charge  of 


The  Young  West  9 

their  mounted  riflemen  which  at  a  blow  won  the 
battle  of  the  Thames.  Again,  on  that  famous 
January  morning,  when  it  seemed  as  if  the  fair 
Creole  city  was  already  in  Pakenham's  grasp,  it 
was  the  wild  soldiery  of  Tennessee  who,  lolling 
behind  their  mud  breastworks,  peered  out  through 
the  lifting  fog  at  the  scarlet  array  of  the  English 
veterans,  as  the  latter,  fresh  from  their  long  and 
unbroken  series  of  victories  over  the  best  troops 
of  Europe,  advanced,  for  the  first  time,  to  meet 
defeat. 

This  solidarity  of  interest  and  feeling  on  the 
part  of  the  trans-Appalachian  communities  is  a 
factor  often  not  taken  into  account  in  relating 
the  political  history  of  the  early  part  of  this  cen 
tury;  most  modern  writers  (who  keep  forgetting 
that  the  question  of  slavery  was  then  not  one- 
tenth  as  absorbing  as  it  afterward  became) 
apparently  deeming  that  the  line  of  demarcation 
between  North  and  South  was  at  that  period,  as 
it  has  since  in  reality  become,  as  strongly  defined 
west  of  the  mountains  as  east  of  them.  That  such 
was  not  the  case  was  due  to  several  different 
causes.  The  first  comers  into  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky  belonged  to  the  class  of  so-called  poor 
whites,  who  owned  few  or  no  slaves,  and  who  were 
far  less  sectionally  Southern  in  their  feelings  than 
were  the  rich  planters  of  the  low,  alluvial  plains 
toward  the  coast  of  the  Atlantic;  and  though  a 


io  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

slave-owning  population  quickly  followed  the  first 
pioneers,  yet  the  latter  had  imprinted  a  stamp  on 
the  character  of  the  two  States  which  was  never 
wholly  effaced, — as  witness  the  tens  of  thousands 
of  soldiers  which  both,  even  the  more  southern  of 
the  two,  furnished  to  the  Union  army  in  the  Civil 
War. 

If  this  immigration  made  Kentucky  and  Ten 
nessee,  and  afterward  Missouri,  less  distinctively 
Southern  in  character  than  the  south  Atlantic 
States,  it  at  the  same  time,  by  furnishing  the  first 
and  for  some  time  the  most  numerous  element  in 
the  population  of  the  States  north  of  the  Ohio, 
made  the  latter  less  characteristically  Northern 
than  was  the  case  with  those  lying  east  of  them. 
Up  to  1 8 io  Indiana  kept  petitioning  Congress  to 
allow  slavery  within  her  borders ;  Illinois,  in  the 
early  days,  felt  as  hostile  toward  Massachusetts 
as  did  Missouri.  Moreover,  at  first  the  Southern 
States  west  of  the  mountains  greatly  outweighed 
the  Northern,  both  in  numbers  and  importance. 

Thus  several  things  came  about.  In  the  first 
place,  all  the  communities  across  the  Alleghanies 
originally  felt  themselves  to  be  closely  knit  to 
gether  by  ties  of  blood,  sentiment,  and  interest; 
they  felt  that  they  were,  taking  them  altogether, 
Western  as  opposed  to  Eastern.  In  the  next  place, 
they  were  at  first  Southern  rather  than  Northern 
in  their  feeling.  But,  in  the  third  place,  they  were 


The  Young  West  n 

by  no  means  so  extremely  Southern  as  were  the 
southern  Atlantic  States.  This  was  the  way  in 
which  they  looked  at  themselves ;  and  this  was  the 
way  in  which  at  that  time  others  looked  at  them. 
In  our  day  Kentucky  is  regarded  as  an  integral 
portion  of  the  solid  South ;  but  the  greatest  of  her 
sons,  Clay,  was  known  to  his  own  generation,  not 
as  a  Southern  statesman,  but  as  "Harry  of  the 
West."  Of  the  two  presidents,  Harrison  and  Tay 
lor,  whom  the  Whigs  elected,  one  lived  in  Ohio 
and  one  in  Louisiana ;  but  both  were  chosen  sim 
ply  as  Western  men,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  both 
were  born  in  Virginia.  Andrew  Jackson's  victory 
over  Adams  was  in  some  slight  sense  a  triumph  of 
the  South  over  the  North,  but  it  was  far  more  a 
triumph  of  the  West  over  the  East.  Webster's 
famous  sneer  at  old  Zachary  Taylor  was  aimed  at 
him  as  a  "frontier  colonel;"  in  other  words, 
though  Taylor  had  a  large  plantation  in  Louisiana, 
Webster  and  many  others  besides  looked  upon 
him  as  the  champion  of  the  rough  democracy  of 
the  West  rather  than  as  the  representative  of  the 
polished  slaveholders  of  the  South. 

Thus,  during  the  first  part  of  this  century,  the 
term  "Western"  was  as  applicable  to  the  States 
lying  south  of  the  Ohio  as  to  those  lying  north  of 
it.  Moreover,  at  first,  the  Central,  or,  as  they 
were  more  usually  termed,  the  Border  States,  were 
more  populous  and  influential  than  were  those  on 


12  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

either  side  of  them,  and  so  largely  shaped  the  gen 
eral  tone  of  Western  feeling.  While  the  voters 
in  these  States,  whether  Whigs  or  Democrats,  ac 
cepted  as  their  leaders  men  like  Clay  in  Kentucky, 
Benton  in  Missouri,  and  Andrew  Jackson  in  Ten 
nessee,  it  could  be  taken  for  granted  that  on  the 
whole  they  felt  for  the  South  against  the  North, 
but  much  more  for  the  West  against  the  East, 
and  most  strongly  of  all  for  the  Union  as  against 
any  section  whatsoever.  Many  influences  came 
together  to  start  and  keep  alive  this  feeling;  but 
one,  more  potent  than  all  the  others  combined,  was 
working  steadily  and  with  ever-increasing  power 
against  it ;  and  when  slavery  finally  brought  about 
a  break  between  the  Northern  and  Southern  States 
of  the  West  as  complete  as  that  in  the  East,  then 
the  Democrats  of  the  stamp  of  Jackson  and  Benton 
disappeared  as  completely  from  public  life  as  did 
the  Whigs  of  the  stamp  of  Clay. 

Benton's  long  political  career  can  never  be 
thoroughly  understood  unless  it  is  kept  in  mind 
that  he  was  primarily  a  Western  and  not  a  South 
ern  statesman ;  and  it  owes  its  especial  interest  to 
the  fact  that  during  its  continuance  the  West  first 
rose  to  power,  acting  as  a  unit,  and  to  the  further 
fact  that  it  was  brought  to  a  close  by  the  same 
causes  which  soon  afterward  broke  up  the  West 
exactly  as  the  East  was  already  broken.  Benton 
was  not  one  of  the  few  statesmen  who  have  left  the 


The  Young  West  13 

indelible  marks  of  their  own  individuality  upon 
our  history ;  but  he  was,  perhaps,  the  most  typical 
representative  of  the  statesmanship  of  the  Middle 
West  at  the  time  when  the  latter  gave  the  tone  to 
the  political  thought  of  the  entire  Mississippi  val 
ley.  The  political  school  which  he  represented 
came  to  its  fullest  development  in  the  so-called 
Border  States  of  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Mis 
souri,  and  swayed  the  destinies  of  the  West  so  long 
as  the  States  to  the  north  as  well  as  the  States  to 
the  south  were  content  to  accept  the  leadership 
of  those  that  lay  between  them.  It  came  to  an 
end  and  disappeared  from  sight  when  people  north 
of  the  Ohio  at  last  set  up  their  own  standard,  and 
when,  after  some  hesitation,  the  Border  States 
threw  in  their  lot  with  the  other  side  and  con 
cluded  to  follow  the  Southern  communities,  which 
they  had  hitherto  led.  Benton  was  one  of  those 
public  men  who  formulate  and  express,  rather  than 
shape,  the  thought  of  the  people  who  stand  behind 
them  and  whom  they  represent.  A  man  of  strong 
intellect  and  keen  energy,  he  was  for  many  years 
the  foremost  representative  of  at  least  one  phase  of 
that  thought ;  being,  also,  a  man  of  high  principle 
and  determined  courage,  when  a  younger  genera 
tion  had  grown  up  and  the  bent  of  the  thought  had 
changed,  he  declined  to  change  with  it,  bravely 
accepting  political  defeat  as  the  alternative,  and 
going  down  without  flinching  a  hair's  breadth 


14  Thomas  Hart  Ben  ton 

from  the  ground  on  which  he  had  always  stood. 
To  understand  his  public  actions  as  well  as  his 
political  ideas  and  principles  it  is,  of  course,  neces 
sary  to  know  at  least  a  little  of  the  men  among 
whom  he  lived  and  from  whom  he  sprang, — the 
men  who  were  the  first  of  our  people  to  press  out 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  thirteen  old  States ;  who 
filled  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Arkansas,  and  Mis 
souri,  and  who  for  so  long  a  time  were  the  domi 
nant  class  all  through  the  West,  until,  at  last, 
the  flood  of  Northeastern  immigration  completely 
swamped  their  influence  north  of  the  Ohio,  while 
along  the  Gulf  coast  the  political  control  slipped 
from  their  hands  into  the  grasp  of  the  great  planter 
class. 

The  wood-choppers,  game-hunters,  and  Indian- 
fighters,  who  first  came  over  the  mountains,  were 
only  the  forerunners  of  the  more  regular  settlers 
who  followed  them ;  but  these  last  had  much  the 
same  attributes  as  their  predecessors.  For  many 
years  after  the  settlements  were  firmly  rooted,  the 
life  of  the  settlers  was  still  subject  to  all  the  perils 
of  the  wilderness.  Above  all,  the  constant  war 
fare  in  which  they  were  engaged  for  nearly  thirty- 
five  years,  and  which  culminated  in  the  battle  of 
New  Orleans,  left  a  deep  and  lasting  imprint  on 
their  character.  Their  incessant  wars  were  waged 
almost  wholly  by  the  settlers  themselves,  with 
comparatively  little  help  from  the  federal  govern- 


The  Young  West  15 

ment,  and  with  hardly  any  regular  troops  as  allies. 
A  backwoods  levy,  whether  raised  to  meet  an 
Indian  inroad  or  to  march  against  the  disciplined 
armies  of  the  British,  was  merely  a  force  of  volun 
teers,  made  up  from  among  the  full-grown  male 
settlers,  who  were  induced  to  join  either  from 
motives  of  patriotism,  or  from  love  of  adventure, 
or  because  they  felt  that  their  homes  and  belong 
ings  were  in  danger  from  which  they  could  only 
extricate  them  by  their  own  prowess.  Every  set 
tler  thus  became  more  or  less  of  a  soldier,  was 
always  expert  with  the  rifle,  and  was  taught  to 
rely  upon  his  own  skill  and  courage  for  his  pro 
tection.  But  the  military  service  in  which  he 
was  from  time  to  time  engaged  was  of  such  a 
lawless  kind,  and  was  carried  on  with  such  utter 
absence  of  discipline,  that  it  did  not  accustom 
him  in  the  least  to  habits  of  self-command,  or 
render  him  inclined  to  brook  the  exercise  of 
authority  by  an  outsider;  so  that  the  Western 
people  grew  up  with  warlike  traditions  and  habits 
of  thought,  accustomed  to  give  free  rein  to  their 
passions,  and  to  take  into  their  own  hands  the 
avenging  of  real  or  supposed  wrongs,  but  without 
any  of  the  love  for  order  and  for  acting  in  concert 
with  their  fellows  which  characterize  those  who 
have  seen  service  in  regular  armies.  On  the 
contrary,  the  chief  effect  of  this  long-continued 
and  harassing  border  warfare  was  to  make  more 


16  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

marked  the  sullen  and  almost  defiant  self-reliance 
of  the  pioneer,  and  to  develop  his  peculiarly  Amer 
ican  spirit  of  individual  self-sufficiency,  his  im 
patience  of  outside  interference  or  control,  to  a 
degree  not  known  elsewhere,  even  on  this  conti 
nent.  It  also  gave  a  distinct  military  cast  to  his 
way  of  looking  at  territory  which  did  not  belong 
to  him.  He  stood  where  he  was  because  he  was 
a  conqueror;  he  had  wrested  his  land  by  force 
from  its  rightful  Indian  lords;  he  fully  intended 
to  repeat  the  same  feat  as  soon  as  he  should  reach 
the  Spanish  lands  lying  to  the  west  and  southwest ; 
he  would  have  done  so  in  the  case  of  French  Louis 
iana  if  it  had  not  been  that  the  latter  was  pur 
chased,  and  was  thus  saved  from  being  taken  by 
force  of  arms.  This  belligerent,  or,  more  properly 
speaking,  piratical  way  of  looking  at  neighboring 
territory,  was  very  characteristic  of  the  West,  and 
was  at  the  root  of  the  doctrine  of  "  manifest 
destiny." 

All  the  early  settlers,  and  most  of  those  who 
came  after  them,  were  poor,  living  narrow  lives 
fraught  with  great  hardship,  and  varying  between 
toil  and  half -aimless  roving ;  even  when  the  condi 
tions  of  their  life  became  easier,  it  was  some  time 
before  the  influence  of  their  old  existence  ceased  to 
make  itself  felt  in  their  way  of  looking  at  things. 
The  first  pioneers  were,  it  is  true,  soon  followed 
by  great  slave  owners ;  and  by  degrees  there  grew 


The  Young  West  17 

up  a  clan  of  large  landed  proprietors  and  stock- 
raisers,  akin  to  the  planter  caste  which  was  so  all- 
powerful  along  the  coast;  but  it  was  never  rela 
tively  either  so  large  or  so  influential  as  the  latter, 
and  was  not  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  white 
population  by  anything  like  so  wide  a  gap  as  that 
which,  in  the  southern  Atlantic  and  Gulf  States, 
marked  the  difference  between  the  rich  growers 
of  cotton,  rice,  and  sugar,  and  the  squalid  "poor 
whites  "  or  "  crackers. " 

The  people  of  the  Border  States  were  thus 
mainly  composed  of  small  landowners,  scattered 
throughout  the  country;  they  tilled  their  small 
farms  for  themselves,  were  hewers  of  their  own 
wood  and  drawers  of  their  own  water,  and  for 
generations  remained  accustomed  to  and  skilful 
in  the  use  of  the  rifle.  The  pioneers  of  the  Middle 
West  were  not  dwellers  in  towns ;  they  kept  to  the 
open  country,  where  each  man  could  shift  for  him 
self  without  help  or  hindrance  from  his  neighbors, 
scorning  the  irksome  restraints  and  the  lack  of 
individual  freedom  of  city  life.  They  built  but 
few  cities  of  any  size ;  the  only  two  really  impor 
tant  ones  of  whose  inhabitants  they  formed  any 
considerable  part,  St.  Louis  and  New  Orleans, 
were  both  founded  by  the  French  long  before  our 
people  came  across  the  mountains  into  the  Missis 
sippi  valley.  Their  life  was  essentially  a  country 
life,  alike  for  the  rich  and  for  the  bulk  of  the 


is  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

population.  The  few  raw  frontier  towns  and 
squalid,  straggling  villages  were  neither  seats  of 
superior  culture  nor  yet  centers  for  the  distribu 
tion  of  educated  thought,  as  in  the  North.  Large 
tracts  of  land  remained  always  populated  by  a 
class  of  backwoodsmen  differing  but  little  from 
the  first  comers.  Such  was  the  district  from 
which  grand,  simple  old  Davy  Crockett  went  to 
Washington  as  a  Whig  Congressman ;  and  perhaps 
there  was  never  a  quainter  figure  in  our  national 
legislature  than  that  of  the  grim  old  rifleman, 
who  shares  with  Daniel  Boon  the  honor  of  stand 
ing  foremost  in  the  list  of  our  mighty  hunters. 
Crockett  and  his  kind  had  little  in  common  with 
the  men  who  ruled  supreme  in  the  politics  of  most 
of  the  Southern  States;  and  even  at  this  day 
many  of  their  descendants  in  the  wooded  moun 
tain  lands  are  Republicans ;  for  when  the  Middle 
States  had  lost  the  control  of  the  West,  and  when 
those  who  had  hitherto  followed  such  leaders  as 
Jackson,  Clay,  and  Benton  drifted  with  the  tide 
that  set  so  strongly  to  the  South,  it  was  only  the 
men  of  the  type  of  dogged,  stubborn  old  Crockett 
who  dared  to  make  head  against  it.  But,  indeed, 
one  of  the  characteristics  of  the  people  with  whom 
we  are  dealing  was  the  slowness  and  suspicion 
with  which  they  received  a  new  idea,  and  the 
tenacity  with  which  they  clung  to  one  that  they 
had  at  last  adopted. 


The  Young  West  19 

They  were  above  all  a  people  of  strong,  virile 
character,  certain  to  make  their  weight  felt  either 
for  good  or  for  evil.  They  had  many  virtues 
which  can  fairly  be  called  great,  and  their  faults 
were  equally  strongly  marked.  They  were  not  a 
thrifty  people,  nor  one  given  to  long-sustained 
drudging  work ;  there  were  not  then,  nor  are  there 
now,  to  be  found  in  this  land  such  comfortable, 
prosperous  homes  and  farms  as  those  which  dot  all 
the  country  where  dwell  the  men  of  Northeastern 
stock.  They  were  not,  as  a  rule,  even  ordinarily 
well  educated;  the  public  school  formed  no  such 
important  feature  in  their  life  as  it  did  in  the  life 
of  their  fellow-citizens  farther  north.  They  had 
narrow,  bitter  prejudices  and  dislikes;  the  hard 
and  dangerous  lives  they  had  led  had  run  their 
character  into  a  stern  and  almost  forbidding 
mold.  They  valued  personal  prowess  very 
highly,  and  respected  no  man  who  did  not  pos 
sess  the  strongest  capacity  for  self-help,  and 
who  could  not  shift  for  himself  in  any  danger. 
They  felt  an  intense,  although  perhaps  ignorant, 
pride  in  and  love  for  their  country,  and  looked 
upon  all  the  lands  hemming  in  the  United  States 
as  territory  which  they  or  their  children  should 
some  day  inherit;  for  they  were  a  race  of  mas 
terful  spirit,  and  accustomed  to  regard  with  easy 
tolerance  any  but  the  most  flagrant  violations  of 
law.  They  prized  highly  such  qualities  as  cour- 


20  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

age,  loyalty,  truth,  and  patriotism;  but  they 
were,  as  a  whole,  poor,  and  not  overscrupulous 
of  the  rights  of  others,  nor  yet  with  the  nicest 
sense  of  money  obligations ;  so  that  the  history  of 
their  state  legislation  affecting  the  rights  of  debtor 
and  creditor,  whether  public  or  private,  in  hard 
times,  is  not  pleasant  reading  for  an  American  who 
is  proud  of  his  country.  Their  passions,  once  roused, 
were  intense,  and  if  they  really  wished  anything 
they  worked  for  it  with  indomitable  persistency. 
There  was  little  that  was  soft  or  outwardly 
attractive  in  their  character:  it  was  stern,  rude, 
and  hard,  like  the  lives  they  led ;  but  it  was  the 
character  of  those  who  were  every  inch  men,  and 
who  were  Americans  through  to  the  very  heart's 
core.  In  their  private  lives  their  lawless  and  arro 
gant  freedom  and  lack  of  self-restraint  produced 
much  gross  licentiousness  and  barbarous  cruelty ; 
and  every  little  frontier  community  could  tell  its 
story  of  animal  savagery  as  regards  the  home  rela 
tions  of  certain  of  its  members.  Yet  in  spite  of  this 
they,  as  a  whole,  felt  the  family  ties  strongly,  and 
in  the  main  had  quite  a  high  standard  of  private 
morality.  Many  of  them,  at  any  rate,  were, 
according  to  their  lights,  deeply  and  sincerely 
religious ;  though  even  their  religion  showed  their 
strong,  coarse-fibred,  narrow  natures.  Episco- 
palianism  was  the  creed  of  the  rich  slave  owner, 
who  dwelt  along  the  seaboard;  but  the  Western 


The  Young  West  21 

settlers  belonged  to  some  one  or  other  of  the  divis 
ions  of  the  great  Methodist  and  Baptist  churches. 
They  were  as  savagely  in  earnest  about  this  as 
about  everything  else ;  meekness,  mildness,  broad 
liberality,  and  gentle  tolerance  of  difference  in 
religious  views  were  not  virtues  they  appreciated. 
They  were  always  ready  to  do  battle  for  their 
faith,  and,  indeed,  had  to  do  it,  as  it  was  quite  a 
common  amusement  for  the  wilder  and  more 
lawless  members  of  the  community  to  try  to 
break  up  by  force  the  great  camp-meetings  which 
formed  so  conspicuous  a  feature  in  the  social  and 
religious  life  of  the  country.  For  even  irreligion 
took  the  form  of  active  rebellion  against  God, 
rather  than  disbelief  in  His  existence. 

Physically  they  were  and  are,  especially  in  Ken 
tucky,  the  finest  members  of  our  race ;  an  exami 
nation  of  the  statistics  relating  to  the  volunteers 
in  the  Civil  War  shows  that  the  natives  of  no  other 
State,  and  the  men  from  no  foreign  country  what 
soever,  came  up  to  them  in  bodily  development. 

Such  a  people,  in  choosing  men  to  represent 
them  in  the  national  councils,  would  naturally 
pay  small  heed  to  refined,  graceful,  and  cultivated 
statesmanship;  their  allegiance  would  be  given 
to  men  of  abounding  vitality,  of  rugged  intellect, 
and  of  indomitable  will.  No  better  or  more  char 
acteristic  possessor  of  these  attributes  could  be 
imagined  than  Thomas  Benton. 


CHAPTER  II. 
BENTON'S  EARLY  LIFE  AND  ENTRY  INTO  THE 

SENATE. 

THOMAS  HART  BENTON  was  born  on 
March  14,  1782,  near  Hillsborough,  in 
Orange  County,  N.  C.,  the  same  State  that 
fifteen  years  before,  almost  to  a  day,  had  seen  the 
birth  of  the  great  political  chief  whose  most  promi 
nent  supporter  he  in  after  life  became.  Benton, 
however,  came  of  good  colonial  stock;  and  his 
early  surroundings  were  not  characterized  by  the 
squalid  poverty  that  marked  Jackson's,  though 
the  difference  in  the  social  condition  of  the  two 
families  was  of  small  consequence  on  the  frontier, 
where  caste  was,  and  is,  almost  unknown,  and 
social  equality  is  not  a  mere  figure  of  speech, — 
particularly  it  was  not  so  at  that  time  in  the 
Southwest,  where  there  were  no  servants  except 
black  slaves,  and  where  even  what  in  the  North 
would  be  called  "hired  help"  was  almost  an  un 
known  quantity. 

Benton's  father,  who  was  a  lawyer  in  good  stand 
ing  at  the  North  Carolina  bar,  died  when  the  boy 
was  very  young,  leaving  him  to  be  brought  up  by 
his  Virginia  mother.  She  was  a  woman  of  force, 
and,  for  her  time,  of  much  education.  She  herself 

22 


Early  Life  23 

began  the  training  of  her  son's  mind,  studying 
with  him  history  and  biography,  while  he  also,  of 
course,  had  access  to  his  father's  law  library.  The 
home  in  which  he  was  brought  up  was,  for  that 
time  and  for  that  part  of  the  country,  straitlaced ; 
his  mother,  though  a  Virginian,  had  many  traits 
which  belonged  rather  to  the  descendants  of  the 
Puritans,  and  possessed  both  their  strength  of 
character  and  their  austerely  religious  spirit.  Al 
though  living  in  a  roistering  age,  among  a  class 
peculiarly  given  to  all  the  coarser  kinds  of  plea 
sure,  and  especially  to  drink  and  every  form  of 
gambling,  she  nevertheless  preserved  the  most 
rigid  decorum  and  morality  in  her  own  household, 
frowning  especially  upon  all  intemperance,  and 
never  permitting  a  pack  of  cards  to  be  found 
within  her  doors.  She  was  greatly  beloved  and 
respected  by  the  son  whose  mind  she  did  so  much 
to  mould,  and  she  lived  to  see  him  become  one  of 
the  foremost  statesmen  of  the  country. 

Young  Benton  was  always  fond  of  reading.  He 
began  his  studies  at  home,  and  continued  them  at 
a  grammar  school  taught  by  a  young  New  Eng- 
lander  of  good  ability,  a  very  large  proportion  of 
the  school-teachers  of  the  country  then  coming 
from  New  England;  indeed,  school-teachers  and 
pedlers  were,  on  the  whole,  the  chief  contribu 
tions  made  by  the  Northeast  to  the  personnel  of 
the  new  Southwest.  Benton  then  began  a  course 


24  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

at  Chapel  Hill,  the  University  of  North  Carolina, 
but  broke  off  before  completing  it,  as  his  mother 
decided  to  move  her  family  westward  to  the  almost 
unbroken  wilderness  near  Nashville,  Term.,  where 
his  father  had  left  them  a  large  tract  of  land.  But 
he  was  such  an  insatiable  student  and  reader  that 
he  rapidly  acquired  a  very  extensive  knowledge, 
not  only  of  law,  but  of  history  and  even  of  Latin 
and  English  literature,  and  thus  became  a  well- 
read  and  cultivated,  indeed  a  learned  man ;  though 
his  frequent  displays  of  learning  and  knowledge 
were  sometimes  marked  by  a  trace  of  that  self- 
complacent,  amusing  pedantry  so  apt  to  charac 
terize  a  really  well-educated  man  who  lives  in  a 
community  in  which  he  believes,  and  with  which 
he  has  thoroughly  identified  himself,  but  whose 
members  are  for  the  most  part  below  the  average 
in  mental  cultivation. 

The  Bentons  founded  a  little  town,  named  after 
them,  and  in  which,  of  course,  they  took  their 
position  as  leaders  and  rich  landed  proprietors.  It 
lay  on  the  very  outskirts  of  the  Indian  country; 
indeed,  the  great  war  trail  of  the  southern  Indians 
led  right  through  the  settlement,  and  they  at  all 
times  swarmed  around  it.  The  change  from  the 
still  somewhat  rude  civilization  of  North  Carolina 
to  the  wilderness  on  the  border  was  far  less  abrupt 
and  startling  then  than  would  be  the  case  under 
similar  circumstances  now,  and  the  Bentons  soon 


Early  Life  25 

identified  themselves  completely  with  the  life  and 
interests  of  the  people  around  them.  They  even 
abandoned  the  Episcopalianism  of  their  old  home, 
and  became  Methodists,  like  their  neighbors. 
Young  Benton  himself  had  his  hands  full,  at 
first,  in  attending  to  his  great  backwoods  farm, 
tilled  by  slaves,  and  in  pushing  the  growth  of  the 
settlement  by  building  first  a  rude  log  school- 
house  (he  himself  taught  school  at  one  time,  while 
studying  law),  and  a  meeting-house  of  the  same 
primitive  construction,  then  mills,  roads,  bridges, 
and  so  forth.  The  work  hardened  and  developed 
him,  and  he  readily  enough  turned  into  a  regular 
frontiersman  of  the  better  and  richer  sort.  The 
neighboring  town  of  Nashville  was  a  raw,  preten 
tious  place,  where  horse-racing,  cock-fighting, 
gambling,  whisky  -  drinking,  and  the  various 
coarse  vices  which  masquerade  as  pleasures  in 
frontier  towns,  all  throve  in  rank  luxuriance.  It 
was  somewhat  of  a  change  from  Benton's  early 
training,  but  he  took  to  it  kindly,  and  though 
never  a  vicious  or  debauched  man,  he  bore  his  full 
share  in  the  savage  brawls,  the  shooting  and  stab 
bing  affrays,  which  went  to  make  up  one  of  the 
leading  features  in  the  excessively  unattractive 
social  life  of  the  place  and  epoch. 

At  that  time  dueling  prevailed  more  or  less 
throughout  the  United  States,  and  in  the  South 
and  West  to  an  extent  never  before  or  since 


26  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

attained.  On  the  frontier,  not  only  did  every  man 
of  spirit  expect  now  and  then  to  be  called  on  to 
engage  in  a  duel,  but  he  also  had  to  make  up  his 
mind  to  take  occasional  part  in  bloody  street- 
fights.  Tennessee,  the  State  where  Benton  then 
had  his  home,  was  famous  for  the  affrays  that 
took  place  within  its  borders ;  and  that  they  were 
common  enough  among  the  people  at  large  may 
be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  they  were  of  con 
tinual  occurrence  among  judges,  high  state 
officials,  and  in  the  very  legislature  itself,  where 
senators  and  assemblymen  were  always  becoming 
involved  in  undignified  rows  and  foolish  squabbles, 
apparently  without  fear  of  exciting  any  unfavor 
able  comment,  as  witness  Davy  Crockett's  naive 
account  of  his  early  experiences  as  a  backwoods 
member  of  the  Tennessee  Assembly.  Like  Jack 
son,  Benton  killed  his  man  in  a  duel.  This  was 
much  later,  in  1817,  when  he  was  a  citizen  of  Mis 
souri.  His  opponent  was  a  lawyer  named  Lucas. 
They  fought  twice,  on  Bloody  Island,  near  St. 
Louis.  On  the  first  occasion  both  were  wounded ; 
on  the  second  Lucas  was  killed.  The  latter  came 
of  a  truculent  family.  A  recent  biographer  of  his 
father,  Judge  John  R.  Lucas,  remarks,  with  re 
freshing  unconsciousness  of  the  grotesque  humor 
of  the  chronicle :  "  This  gentleman  was  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  men  who  ever  settled  west  of 
the  Mississippi  River.  .  .  ,  Towards  the  close 


Early  Life  27 

of  his  life  Judge  Lucas  became  melancholy  and 
dejected — the  result  of  domestic  affliction,  for  six 
of  his  sons  met  death  by  violence."  One  feels 
curious  to  know  how  the  other  sons  died. 

But  the  most  famous  of  Benton's  affrays  was 
that  with  Jackson  himself,  in  1813.  This  rose  out 
of  a  duel  of  laughable  rather  than  serious  char 
acter,  in  which  Benton's  brother  was  worsted  by 
General  Carroll,  afterward  one  of  Jackson's  lieu 
tenants  at  New  Orleans.  The  encounter  itself 
took  place  between  the  Benton  brothers  on  one 
side,  and  on  the  other,  Jackson,  General  Coffee, 
also  of  New  Orleans  fame,  and  another  friend. 
The  place  was  a  great  rambling  Nashville  inn,  and 
the  details  were  so  intricate  that  probably  not 
even  the  participants  themselves  knew  exactly 
what  had  taken  place,  while  all  the  witnesses  im 
partially  contradicted  each  other  and  themselves. 
At  any  rate,  Jackson  was  shot  and  Benton  was 
pitched  headlong  downstairs,  and  all  the  other 
combatants  were  more  or  less  damaged;  but  it 
ended  in  Jackson  being  carried  off  by  his  friends, 
leaving  the  Bentons  masters  of  the  field,  where 
they  strutted  up  and  down  and  indulged  in  a  good 
deal  of  loud  bravado.  Previous  to  this  Benton 
and  Jackson  had  been  on  the  best  of  terms,  and 
although  there  was  naturally  a  temporary  break 
in  their  friendship,  yet  it  proved  strong  enough 
in  the  end  to  stand  even  such  a  violent  wrench  as 


28  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

that  given  by  this  preposterously  senseless  and 
almost  fatal  brawl.  They  not  only  became  com 
pletely  reconciled,  but  eventually  even  the  closest 
and  warmest  of  personal  and  political  friends ;  for 
Benton  was  as  generous  and  forgiving  as  he  was 
hot-tempered,  and  Jackson's  ruder  nature  was  at 
any  rate  free  from  any  small  meanness  or  malice. 

In  spite  of  occasional  interludes  of  this  kind, 
which  must  have  given  a  rather  ferocious  fillip  to 
his  otherwise  monotonous  life,  Benton  completed 
his  legal  studies,  was  admitted  to  the  bar,  and 
began  to  practise  as  a  frontier  lawyer -at  Franklin. 
Very  soon,  however,  he  for  the  first  time  entered 
the  more  congenial  field  of  politics,  and  in  1811 
served  a  single  term  in  the  lower  house  of  the  Ten 
nessee  Legislature.  Even  thus  early  he  made  his 
mark.  He  had  a  bill  passed  introducing  the  cir 
cuit  system  into  the  state  judiciary,  a  reform  of 
much  importance,  especially  to  the  poorer  class  of 
litigants ;  and  he  also  introduced,  and  had  enacted 
into  a  law,  a  bill  providing  that  a  slave  should 
have  the  same  right  to  the  full  benefit  of  a  jury 
trial  as  would  a  white  man  suffering  under  the 
same  accusation.  This  last  measure  is  note 
worthy  as  foreshadowing  the  position  which 
Benton  afterward  took  in  national  politics,  where 
he  appeared  as  a  slaveholder,  it  is  true,  but  as  one 
of  the  most  enlightened  and  least  radical  of  his 
class.  Its  passage  also  showed  the  tendency  of 


Early  Life  29 

Southern  opinion  at  the  time,  which  was  un 
doubtedly  in  the  direction  of  bettering  the  con 
dition  of  the  blacks,  though  the  events  of  the 
next  few  years  produced  such  a  violent  revulsion 
of  feeling  concerning  the  negro  race  that  this  cur 
rent  of  public  opinion  was  completely  reversed. 
Benton,  however,  was  made  of  sturdy  stuff,  and 
as  he  grew  older  his  views  on  the  question  did  not 
alter  as  did  those  of  most  of  his  colleagues. 

Shortly  after  he  left  the  legislature  the  War  of 
1812  broke  out,  and  its  events  impressed  on  Ben- 
ton  another  of  what  soon  became  his  cardinal 
principles.  The  war  was  brought  on  by  the 
South  and  West,  the  Democrats  all  favoring  it, 
while  the  Federalists,  forming  the  then  anti- 
Democratic  party,  especially  in  the  Northeast, 
opposed  it ;  and  finally  their  more  extreme  mem 
bers,  at  the  famous  Hartford  Convention,  passed 
resolutions  supposed  to  tend  toward  the  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Union,  and  which  brought  upon  the 
party  the  bitter  condemnation  of  their  antag 
onists.  Says  Benton  himself:  "At  the  time  of 
its  first  appearance  the  right  of  Recession  was 
repulsed  and  repudiated  by  the  Democracy  gen 
erally.  .  .  .  The  leading  language  [in  respect  to 
it  south  of  the  Potomac  was  that  no  State  had  a 
right  to  withdraw  from  the  Union,  .  .  .  and  that 
any  attempt  to  dissolve  it,  or  to  obstruct  the 
action  of  constitutional  laws,  was  treason.  If 


30  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

since  that  time  political  parties  and  sectional 
localities  have  exchanged  attitudes  on  this  ques 
tion,  it  cannot  alter  the  question  of  right."  For, 
having  once  grasped  an  idea  and  made  it  his  own, 
Benton  clung  to  it  with  unyielding  tenacity,  no 
matter  whether  it  was  or  was  not  abandoned  by 
the  majority  of  those  with  whom  he  had  been 
in  the  habit  of  acting. 

Thus  early  Benton's  political  character  became 
molded  into  the  shape  which  it  ever  afterward 
retained.  He  was  a  slaveholder,  but  as  advanced 
as  a  slaveholder  could  be ;  he  remained  to  a  cer 
tain  extent  a  Southerner,  but  his  Southernism  was 
of  the  type  prevalent  immediately  after  the  Revo 
lution,  and  not  of  the  kind  that  came  to  the  fore 
prior  to  the  Rebellion.  He  was  much  more  a 
Westerner  in  his  feelings,  and  more  than  all  else 
he  was  emphatically  a  Union  man. 

Like  every  other  hot  spirit  of  the  West — and 
the  West  was  full  of  little  but  hot  spirits — 
Benton  heartily  favored  the  War  of  1812.  He 
served  as  a  colonel  of  volunteers  under  Jackson, 
but  never  saw  actual  fighting,  and  his  short  term 
of  soldiership  was  of  no  further  account  than  to 
furnish  an  excuse  to  Polk,  thirty-five  years  later, 
for  nominating  him  commanding  general  in  the 
time  of  the  Mexican  war, — an  incident  which,  as 
the  nomination  was  rejected,  may  be  regarded 
as  merely  ludicrous,  the  gross  impropriety  of  the 


Early  Life  31 

act  safely  defying  criticism.  He  was  of  genuine 
use,  however,  in  calling  on  and  exciting  the  vol 
unteers  to  come  forward;  for  he  was  a  fluent 
speaker,  of  fine  presence,  and  his  pompous  self- 
sufficiency  was  rather  admired  than  otherwise  by 
the  frontiersmen,  while  his  force,  energy,  and 
earnestness  commanded  their  respect.  He  also, 
when  Jackson's  reckless  impetuosity  got  him  into 
a  snarl  with  the  feeble  national  administration, 
whose  imbecile  incapacity  to  carry  on  the  war 
became  day  by  day  more  painfully  evident,  went 
to  Washington,  and  there  finally  extricated  his 
chief  by  dint  of  threatening  that,  if  "  justice"  was 
not  done  him,  Tennessee  would,  in  future  political 
contests,  be  found  ranged  with  the  administra 
tion's  foes.  For  Benton  already  possessed  politi 
cal  influence,  and  being,  like  most  of  his  class, 
anti-Federalist,  or  Democratic,  in  sentiment,  was 
therefore  of  the  same  party  as  the  people  at  Wash 
ington,  and  was  a  man  whose  representations 
would  have  some  weight  with  them. 

During  his  stay  in  Tennessee  Benton's  char 
acter  was  greatly  influenced  by  his  being  thrown 
into  close  contact  with  many  of  the  extraordinary 
men  who  then  or  afterward  made  their  mark  in 
the  strange  and  picturesque  annals  of  the  South 
west.  Jackson  even  thus  early  loomed  up  as  the 
greatest  and  arch-typical  representative  of  his 
people  and  his  section.  The  religious  bent  of  the 


32  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

time  was  shown  in  the  life  of  the  grand,  rugged  old 
Methodist,  Peter  Cartwright,  who,  in  the  far-off 
backwoods,  was  a  preacher  and  practical  exponent 
of  "muscular  Christianity"  half  a  century  before 
the  day  when,  under  Bishop  Selwyn  and  Charles 
Kingsley,  it  became  a  cult  among  the  most  highly 
civilized  classes  of  England.  There  was  David 
Crockett,  rifleman  and  congressman,  doomed  to  a 
tragic  and  heroic  death  in  that  remarkable  conflict 
of  which  it  was  said  at  the  time,  that " Thermopylae 
had  its  messengers  of  death,  but  the  Alamo  had 
none;"  and  there  was  Houston,  who,  after  a  sin 
gular  and  romantic  career,  became  the  greatest  of 
the  statesmen  and  soldiers  of  Texas.  It  was  these 
men,  and  their  like,  who,  under  the  shadow  of 
world-old  forests  and  in  the  sunlight  of  the  great, 
lonely  plains,  wrought  out  the  destinies  of  a  nation 
and  a  continent,  and  who,  with  their  rude  war- 
craft  and  state-craft,  solved  problems  that,  in  the 
importance  of  their  results,  dwarf  the  issues  of  all 
European  struggles  since  the  day  of  Waterloo  as 
completely  as  the  Punic  wars  in  their  outcome 
threw  into  the  shade  the  consequences  of  the  wars 
waged  at  the  same  time  between  the  different 
Greek  monarchies. 

Benton,  in  his  mental  training,  came  much 
nearer  to  the  statesmen  of  the  seaboard,  and  was 
far  better  bred  and  better  educated,  than  the  rest 
of  the  men  around  him.  But  he  was,  and  was  felt 


Early  Life  33 

by  them  to  be,  thoroughly  one  of  their  number, 
and  the  most  able  expounder  of  their  views ;  and 
it  is  just  because  he  is  so  completely  the  type  of  a 
great  and  important  class,  rather  than  because 
even  of  his  undoubted  and  commanding  ability  as 
a  statesman,  that  his  life  and  public  services  will 
always  repay  study.  His  vanity  and  boastfulness 
were  faults  which  he  shared  with  almost  all  his 
people ;  and,  after  all,  if  they  overrated  the  conse 
quence  of  their  own  deeds,  the  deeds,  nevertheless, 
did  possess  great  importance,  and  their  fault  was 
slight  compared  to  that  committed  by  some  of  us 
at  the  present  day,  who  have  gone  to  the  opposite 
extreme  and  try  to  belittle  the  actions  of  our 
fathers.  Benton  was  deeply  imbued  with  the 
masterful,  overbearing  spirit  of  the  West, — a 
spirit  whose  manifestations  are  not  always  agree 
able,  but  the  possession  of  which  is  certainly  a 
most  healthy  sign  of  the  virile  strength  of  a  young 
community.  He  thoroughly  appreciated  that  he 
was  helping  to  shape  the  future  of  a  country, 
whose  wonderful  development  is  the  most  im 
portant  feature  in  the  history  of  the  nineteenth 
century ;  the  non-appreciation  of  which  fact  is  in 
itself  sufficient  utterly  to  disqualify  any  American 
statesman  from  rising  to  the  first  rank. 

It  was  not  in  Tennessee,  however,  that  Benton 
rose  to  political  prominence,  for  shortly  after  the 
close  of  the  war   he  crossed  the  Mississippi  and 
3 


34  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

made  his  permanent  home  in  the  territory  of  Mis 
souri.  Missouri  was  then  our  extreme  western 
outpost,  and  its  citizens  possessed  the  characteris 
tic  Western  traits  to  an  even  exaggerated  extent. 
The  people  were  pushing,  restless,  and  hardy ;  they 
were  lawless  and  violent  to  a  degree.  In  spite  of 
the  culture  and  education  of  some  families,  society, 
as  a  whole,  was  marked  by  florid  unconvention- 
ality  and  rawness.  The  general  and  widespread 
intemperance  of  the  judges  and  high  officials  of 
state  was  even  more  marked  than  their  proclivities 
for  brawling.  The  lawyers,  as  usual,  furnished 
the  bulk  of  the  politicians;  success  at  the  bar 
depended  less  upon  learning  than  upon  "push" 
and  audacity.  The  fatal  feuds  between  individ 
uals  and  families  were  as  frequent  and  as  bloody 
as  among  Highland  clans  a  century  before.  The 
following  quotations  are  taken  at  random  from  a 
work  on  the  Bench  and  Bar  of  Missouri,  by  an 
ex-judge  of  its  supreme  court:  "A  man  by  the 
name  of  Hiram  K.  Turk,  and  four  sons,  settled  in 
1839  near  Warsaw,  and  a  personal  difficulty  oc 
curred  between  them  and  a  family  of  the  name  of 
Jones,  resulting  in  the  death  of  one  or  two.  The 
people  began  to  take  sides  with  one  or  the  other, 
and  finally  a  general  outbreak  took  place,  in 
which  many  were  killed,  resulting  in  a  general 
reign  of  terror  and  of  violence  beyond  the  power 
of  the  law  to  subdue. "  The  social  annals  of  this 


Early  Life  35 

pleasant  town  of  Warsaw  could  not  normally  have 
been  dull;  in  1844,  for  instance,  they  were  en 
livened  by  Judge  Cherry  and  Senator  Major  fight 
ing  to  the  death  on  one  of  its  principal  streets,  the 
latter  being  slain.  The  judges  themselves  were  by 
no  means  bigoted  in  their  support  of  law  and  order. 
"  In  those  days  it  was  common  for  people  to  settle 
their  quarrels  during  court  week.  .  .  .  Judge 
Allen  took  great  delight  in  these  exhibitions,  and 
would  at  any  time  adjourn  his  court  to  witness 
one.  ...  He  (Allen)  always  traveled  with  a 
holster  of  large  pistols  in  front  of  his  saddle,  and 
a  knife  with  a  blade  at  least  a  foot  long."  Han 
nibal  Chollop  was  no  mere  creature  of  fancy ;  on 
the  contrary,  his  name  was  legion,  and  he  flour 
ished  rankly  in  every  town  throughout  the  Missis 
sippi  valley.  But,  after  all,  this  ruffianism  was 
really  not  a  whit  worse  in  its  effects  on  the  national 
character  than  was  the  case  with  certain  of  the 
"universal  peace"  and  "non-resistance"  develop 
ments  in  the  Northeastern  States;  in  fact,  it  was 
more  healthy.  A  class  of  professional  non-com 
batants  is  as  hurtful  to  the  real,  healthy  growth 
of  a  nation  as  is  a  class  of  fire-eaters ;  for  a  weak 
ness  or  folly  is  nationally  as  bad  as  a  vice,  or  worse ; 
and,  in  the  long  run,  a  Quaker  may  be  quite  as 
undesirable  a  citizen  as  is  a  duelist.  No  man  who 
is  not  willing  to  bear  arms  and  fight  for  his  rights 
can  give  a  good  reason  why  he  should  be  entitled 


36  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

to  the  privilege  of  living  in  a  free  community.  The 
decline  of  the  militant  spirit  in  the  Northeast  dur 
ing  the  first  half  of  this  century  was  much  to  be 
regretted.  To  it  is  due,  more  than  to  any  other 
cause,  the  undoubted  average  individual  inferior 
ity  of  the  Northern  compared  to  the  Southern 
troops ;  at  any  rate,  at  the  beginning  of  the  great 
war  of  the  Rebellion.  The  Southerners,  by  their 
whole  mode  of  living,  their  habits,  and  their  love 
of  outdoor  sports,  kept  up  their  warlike  spirit; 
while  in  the  North  the  so-called  upper  classes 
developed  along  the  lines  of  a  wealthy  and  timid 
bourgeoisie  type,  measuring  everything  by  a  mer 
cantile  standard  (a  peculiarly  debasing  one  if 
taken  purely  by  itself),  and  submitting  to  be  ruled 
in  local  affairs  by  low  foreign  mobs,  and  in  national 
matters  by  their  arrogant  Southern  kinsmen.  The 
militant  spirit  of  these  last  certainly  stood  them 
in  good  stead  in  the  Civil  War.  The  world  has 
never  seen  better  soldiers  than  those  who  followed 
Lee;  and  their  leader  will  undoubtedly  rank  as 
without  any  exception  the  very  greatest  of  all  the 
great  captains  that  the  English-speaking  peoples 
have  brought  forth — and  this,  although  the  last 
and  chief  of  his  antagonists  may  himself  claim  to 
stand  as  the  full  equal  of  Marlborough  and  Wel 
lington. 

The  other  Western  States  still  kept  touch  on  the 
old  colonial  communities  of  the  seacoast,  having  a 


Early  Life  37 

second  or  alternative  outlet  through  Louisiana, 
newly  acquired  by  the  United  States,  it  is  true, 
but  which  was  nevertheless  an  old  settled  land. 
Missouri,  however,  had  lost  all  connection  with 
the  seacoast,  and  though,  through  her  great  river 
towns,  swarming  with  raftsmen  and  flat-boatmen, 
she  drove  her  main  and  most  thriving  trade  with 
the  other  Mississippi  cities,  yet  her  restless  and 
adventure-loving  citizens  were  already  seeking 
other  outlets  for  their  activity,  and  were  estab 
lishing  trade  relations  with  the  Mexicans;  being 
thus  the  earliest  among  our  people  to  come  into 
active  contact  with  the  Hispano-Indian  race  from 
whom  we  afterward  wrested  so  large  a  part  of 
their  inheritance.  Missouri  was  thrust  out  beyond 
the  Mississippi  into  the  vast  plains-country  of  the 
Far  West,  and,  except  on  the  river-front,  was  com 
pletely  isolated,  being  flanked  on  every  side  by 
great  stretches  of  level  wilderness,  inhabited  by 
roaming  tribes  of  warlike  Indians.  Thus  for  the 
first  time  the  borderers  began  to  number  in  their 
ranks  plainsmen  as  well  as  backwoodsmen.  In 
such  a  community  there  were  sure  to  be  numbers 
of  men  anxious  to  take  part  in  any  enterprise  that 
united  the  chance  of  great  pecuniary  gain  with  the 
certainty  of  even  greater  personal  risk,  and  both 
these  conditions  were  fulfilled  in  the  trading  ex 
peditions  pushed  out  from  Missouri  across  the 
trackless  wastes  lying  between  it  and  the  fringe 


38  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

of  Mexican  settlements  on  the  Rio  del  Norte. 
The  route  followed  by  these  caravans,  which 
brought  back  furs  and  precious  metals,  soon 
became  famous  tinder  the  name  of  the  Santa  F6 
trail;  and  the  story  of  the  perils,  hardships,  and 
gains  of  the  adventurous  traders  who  followed  it 
would  make  one  of  the  most  striking  chapters  of 
American  history. 

Among  such  people  Benton' s  views  and  habits 
of  thought  became  more  markedly  Western  and 
ultra-American  than  ever,  especially  in  regard  to 
our  encroachments  upon  the  territory  of  neighbor 
ing  powers.  The  general  feeling  in  the  West 
upon  this  last  subject  afterward  crystallized  into 
what  became  known  as  the  "Manifest  Destiny" 
idea,  which,  reduced  to  its  simplest  terms,  was: 
that  it  was  our  manifest  destiny  to  swallow  up  the 
land  of  all  adjoining  nations  who  were  too  weak  to 
withstand  us;  a  theory  that  forthwith  obtained 
immense  popularity  among  all  statesmen  of  easy 
international  morality.  It  cannot  be  too  often 
repeated  that  no  one  can  understand  even  the 
domestic,  and  more  especially  the  foreign,  policy 
of  Benton  and  his  school  without  first  understand 
ing  the  surroundings  amidst  which  they  had  been 
brought  up  and  the  people  whose  chosen  repre 
sentatives  they  were.  Recent  historians,  for 
instance,  always  speak  as  if  our  grasping  after 
territory  in  the  Southwest  was  due  solely  to  the 


Early  Life  39 

desire  of  the  Southerners  to  acquire  lands  out  of 
which  to  carve  new  slaveholding  States,  and  as  if 
it  was  merely  a  move  in  the  interests  of  the  slave 
power.  This  is  true  enough  so  far  as  the  motives 
of  Calhoun,  Tyler,  and  the  other  public  leaders  of 
the  Gulf  and  southern  seaboard  States  were  con 
cerned.  But  the  hearty  Western  support  given 
to  the  movement  was  due  to  entirely  different 
causes,  the  chief  among  them  being  the  fact  that 
the  Westerners  honestly  believed  themselves  to 
be  indeed  created  the  heirs  of  the  earth,  or  at  least 
of  so  much  of  it  as  was  known  by  the  name  of 
North  America,  and  were  prepared  to  struggle 
stoutly  for  the  immediate  possession  of  their 
heritage. 

One  of  Benton's  earliest  public  utterances  was 
in  regard  to  a  matter  which  precisely  illustrates 
this  feeling.  It  was  while  Missouri  was  still  a 
territory,  and  when  Benton,  then  a  prominent 
member  of  the  St.  Louis  bar,  had  by  his  force, 
capacity,  and  power  as  a  public  speaker  already 
become  well  known  among  his  future  constituents. 
The  treaty  with  Spain,  by  which  we  secured  Flor 
ida,  was  then  before  the  Senate,  which  body  had  to 
consider  it  several  times,  owing  to  the  dull  irreso 
lution  and  sloth  of  the  Spanish  government  in 
ratifying  it.  The  bounds  it  gave  us  were  far  too 
narrow  to  suit  the  more  fiery  Western  spirits,  and 
these  cheered  Benton  to  the  echo  when  he  attacked 


40  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

it  in  public  with  fierce  vehemence.  "The  magnifi 
cent  valley  of  the  Mississippi  is  ours,  with  all  its 
fountains,  springs,  and  floods;  and  woe  to  the 
statesman  who  shall  undertake  to  surrender  one 
drop  of  its  water,  one  inch  of  its  soil  to  any  foreign 
power."  So  he  said,  his  words  ringing  with  the 
boastful  confidence  so  well  liked  by  the  masterful 
men  of  the  West,  strong  in  their  youth,  and 
proudly  conscious  of  their  strength.  The  treaty 
was  ratified  in  the  Senate,  nevertheless,  all  the  old 
Southern  States  favoring  it,  and  the  only  votes  at 
any  stage  recorded  against  it  being  of  four  Western 
Senators,  coming  respectively  from  Ohio,  Ken 
tucky,  Tennessee,  and  Louisiana.  So  that  in 
1818,  at  any  rate,  the  desire  for  territorial  aggran 
dizement,  at  the  expense  of  Spain  or  Mexico,  was 
common  to  the  West  as  a  whole,  both  to  the  free 
and  the  slave  States,  and  was  not  exclusively 
favored  by  the  Southerners.  The  only  effect  of 
Benton' s  speech  was  to  give  rise  to  the  idea  that 
he  was  hostile  to  the  Southern  and  Democratic 
administration  at  Washington,  and  against  this 
feeling  he  had  to  contend  in  the  course  of  his  suc 
cessful  candidacy  for  the  United  States  Senator- 
ship  the  following  year,  when  Missouri  was  claim 
ing  admittance  to  the  Union. 

It  was  in  reference  to  this  matter  of  admitting 
Missouri  that  the  slavery  question  for  the  first 
time  made  its  appearance  in  national  politics, 


Early  Life  41 

where  it  threw  everything  into  confusion  and  for 
the  moment  overshadowed  all  else ;  though  it  van 
ished  almost  as  quickly  as  it  had  appeared,  and 
did  not  again  come  to  the  front  for  several  years. 
The  Northerners,  as  a  whole,  desiring  to  "  restrict" 
the  growth  of  slavery  and  the  slave  power,  de 
manded  that  Missouri,  before  being  admitted  as  a 
State,  should  abolish  slavery  within  her  bounda 
ries.  The  South  was  equally  determined  that  she 
should  be  admitted  as  a  slave  State ;  and  for  the 
first  time  the  politicians  of  the  country  divided  on 
geographical  rather  than  on  party  lines,  though 
the  division  proved  but  temporary,  and  was  of  but 
little  interest  except  as  foreshadowing  what  was  to 
come  a  score  of  years  later.  Even  within  the  ter 
ritory  itself  the  same  contest  was  carried  on  with 
the  violence  bred  by  political  conflicts  in  frontier 
States,  there  being  a  very  respectable  "restriction" 
party,  which  favored  abolition.  Benton  was  him 
self  a  slaveholder,  and  as  the  question  was  in  no 
way  one  between  the  East  and  the  West,  or  be 
tween  the  Union  as  a  whole  and  any  part  of  it,  he 
naturally  gave  full  swing  to  his  Southern  feelings, 
and  entered  with  tremendous  vigor  into  the  con 
test  on  the  anti-restriction  side.  So  successful 
were  his  efforts,  and  so  great  was  the  majority  of 
the  Missourians  who  sympathized  with  him,  that 
the  restrictionists  were  completely  routed,  and 
succeeded  in  electing  but  one  delegate  to  the 


42  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

constitutional  convention.  In  Congress  the  matter 
was  finally  settled  by  the  passage  of  the  famous 
Missouri  Compromise  bill,  a  measure  Southern  in 
its  origin,  but  approved  at  the  time  by  many  if 
not  most  Northerners,  and  disapproved  by  not  a 
few  Southerners.  Benton  heartily  believed  in  it, 
announcing  somewhat  vaguely  that  he  was 
"equally  opposed  to  slavery  agitation  and  to 
slavery  extension."  By  its  terms  Missouri  was 
admitted  as  a  slave  State,  while  slavery  was  abol 
ished  in  all  the  rest  of  the  old  province  of  Louisi 
ana  lying  north  and  west  of  it  and  north  of  the 
parallel  of  36°  30'.  Owing  to  an  objectionable 
clause  in  its  Constitution,  the  admission  was  not 
fully  completed  until  1821,  and  then  only  through 
the  instrumentality  of  Henry  Clay.  But  Benton 
took  his  seat  immediately,  and  entered  on  his 
thirty  years  of  service  in  the  United  States  Senate. 
His  appearance  in  national  politics  was  thus  co 
incident  with  the  appearance  of  the  question 
which,  it  is  true,  almost  immediately  sank  out  of 
sight  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years,  but  which  then 
reappeared  to  stay  for  good  and  to  become  of  pro 
gressively  absorbing  importance,  until,  combining 
itself  with  the  still  greater  question  of  national 
unity,  it  dwarfed  all  other  issues,  cleft  the  West  as 
well  as  the  East  asunder,  and,  as  one  of  its  minor 
results,  brought  about  the  political  downfall  of 
Benton  himself  and  of  his  whole  school  in  what 


Early  Life  43 

were  called  the  Border  States.  Before  entering 
the  Senate,  Benton  did  something  which  well 
illustrates  his  peculiar  uprightness,  and  the 
care  which  he  took  to  keep  his  public  acts  free 
from  the  least  suspicion  of  improper  influence. 
When  he  was  at  the  bar  in  St.  Louis,  real 
estate  litigation  was  much  the  most  important 
branch  of  legal  business.  The  condition  of  Mis 
souri  land-titles  was  very  mixed,  since  many  of 
them  were  based  upon  the  thousands  of  "con 
cessions"  of  land  made  by  the  old  French  and 
Spanish  governments,  which  had  been  ratified  by 
Congress,  but  subject  to  certain  conditions  which 
the  Creole  inhabitants,  being  ignorant  and  law 
less,  had  generally  failed  to  fulfil.  By  an  act  of 
Congress  these  inchoate  claims  were  to  be  brought 
before  the  United  States  recorder  of  land  titles; 
and  the  Missouri  bar  were  divided  as  to  what 
action  should  be  taken  on  them,  the  majority 
insisting  that  they  should  be  held  void,  while 
Benton  headed  the  opposite  party,  which  was 
averse  to  forfeiting  property  on  technical  grounds, 
and  advocated  the  confirmation  of  every  honest 
claim.  Further  and  important  legislation  was 
needed  to  provide  for  these  claims.  Benton, 
being  much  the  most  influential  member  of  the 
bar  who  had  advocated  the  confirmation  of  the 
claims,  and  being  so  able,  honest,  and  energetic, 
was  the  favorite  counsel  of  the  claimants,  and  had 


44  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

hundreds  of  their  titles  under  his  professional 
charge.  Of  course  in  such  cases  the  compensation 
of  the  lawyer  depended  solely  upon  his  success; 
and  success  to  Benton  would  have  meant  wealth. 
Nevertheless,  and  though  his  action  was  greatly 
to  his  own  pecuniary  hurt,  the  first  thing  he  did 
when  elected  Senator  was  to  convene  his  clients, 
and  tell  them  that  henceforth  he  could  have 
nothing  more  to  do,  as  their  attorney,  with  the 
prosecution  of  their  claims,  giving  as  his  reason 
that  their  success  largely  depended  upon  the 
action  of  Congress,  of  which  he  was  now  himself 
a  member,  so  that  he  was  bound  to  consult,  not 
any  private  interest,  but  the  good  of  the  com 
munity  as  a  whole.  He  even  refused  to  designate 
his  successor  in  the  causes,  saying  that  he  was 
determined  not  only  to  be  quite  unbiased  in  act 
ing  upon  the  subject  of  these  claims  as  Senator, 
but  not  to  have,  nor  to  be  suspected  of  having, 
any  personal  interest  in  the  fate  of  any  of  them. 
Many  a  modern  statesman  might  most  profitably 
copy  his  sensitiveness. 


CHAPTER  III. 

EARLY  YEARS  IN  THE  SENATE. 

WHEN  Benton  took  his  seat  in  the  United 
States  Senate,  Monroe,  the  last  president 
of  the  great  house  of  Virginia,  was  about 
beginning  his  second  term.  He  was  a  courteous, 
high-bred  gentleman,  of  no  especial  ability,  but 
well  fitted  to  act  as  presidential  figurehead  during 
the  politically  quiet  years  of  that  era  of  good  feel 
ing  which  lasted  from  1816  till  1824.  The  Fed 
eralist  party,  after  its  conduct  during  the  war, 
had  vanished  into  well-deserved  obscurity,  and 
though  influences  of  various  sorts  were  working 
most  powerfully  to  split  the  dominant  and  all- 
embracing  Democracy  into  factional  fragments, 
these  movements  had  not  yet  come  to  a  head. 

The  slavery  question,  it  cannot  be  too  often  said, 
was  as  yet  of  little  or  no  political  consequence. 
The  violent  excitement  over  the  admission  of  Mis 
souri  had  subsided  as  quickly  as  it  had  arisen; 
and  though  the  Compromise  bill  was  of  immense 
importance  in  itself,  and  still  more  as  giving  a  hint 
of  what  was  to  come,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
its  effect  upon  general  politics,  during  the  years 
immediately  succeeding  its  passage,  was  slight. 
Later  on,  the  slavery  question  became  of  such 

45 


46  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

paramount  consequence,  and  so  completely  identi 
fied  with  the  movement  for  the  dissolution  of  the 
Union,  that  it  seems  impossible  for  even  the  best 
of  recent  historians  of  American  politics  to  under 
stand  that  such  was  not  the  case  at  this  time.  One 
writer  of  note  even  goes  so  far  as  to  state  that 
"From  the  night  of  March  2,  1820,  party  history 
is  made  up  without  interruption  or  break  of  the 
development  of  geographical  [the  context  shows 
this  to  mean  Northern  and  Southern]  parties." 
There  is  very  little  ground  for  such  a  sweeping 
assertion  until  a  considerable  time  after  the  date 
indicated ;  indeed,  it  was  more  than  ten  years  later 
before  any  symptom  of  the  development  spoken  of 
became  at  all  marked.  Until  then,  parties  divided 
even  less  on  geographical  lines  than  had  been  the 
case  earlier,  during  the  last  years  of  the  existence 
of  the  Federalists ;  and  what  little  division  there 
was  had  no  reference  to  slavery.  Nor  was  it  till 
nearly  a  score  of  years  after  the  passage  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  bill  that  the  separatist  spirit 
began  to  identify  itself  for  good  with  the  idea  of 
the  maintenance  of  slavery.  Previously  to  that 
there  had  been  outbursts  of  separatist  feeling  in 
different  States,  but  always  due  to  entirely  differ 
ent  causes.  Georgia  flared  up  in  hot  defiance  of 
the  federal  government,  when  the  latter  rubbed 
against  her  on  the  question  of  removing  the  Cher- 
okees  from  within  her  borders.  But  her  having 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate          47 

negro  slaves  did  not  affect  her  feelings  in  the  least, 
and  her  attitude  was  just  such  as  any  Western 
State  with  Indians  on  its  frontier  is  now  apt  to 
assume  so  far  as  it  dares, — such  an  attitude  as 
Arizona,  for  example,  would  at  this  moment  take 
in  reference  to  the  Apaches,  if  she  were  able. 
Slavery  was  doubtless  remotely  one  of  the  irritat 
ing  causes  that  combined  to  work  South  Carolina 
up  to  a  fever  heat  of  insanity  over  the  nullification 
excitement.  But  in  its  immediate  origin  nullifica 
tion  arose  from  the  outcry  against  the  protective 
tariff,  and  it  is  almost  as  unfair  to  ascribe  it  in 
any  way  to  the  influence  of  slavery  as  it  would 
be  to  assign  a  similar  cause  for  the  Virginia  and 
Kentucky  resolutions  of  1798,  or  to  say  that  the 
absence  of  slavery  was  the  reason  for  the  abor 
tively  disloyal  agitation  in  New  England,  which 
culminated  in  the  Hartford  Convention.  The 
separatist  feeling  is  ingrained  in  the  fiber  of  our 
race,  and  though  in  itself  a  most  dangerous  fail 
ing  and  weakness,  is  yet  merely  a  perversion  and 
distortion  of  the  defiant  and  self-reliant  inde 
pendence  of  spirit  which  is  one  of  the  chief  of 
the  race  virtues ;  and  slavery  was  partly  the  cause 
and  partly  merely  the  occasion  of  the  abnormal 
growth  of  the  separatist  movement  in  the  South. 
Nor  was  the  tariff  question  so  intimately  associ 
ated  with  that  of  slavery  as  has  been  commonly 
asserted.  This  might  be  easily  guessed  from  the 


48  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

fact  that  the  originator  and  chief  advocate  of  a 
high  tariff  himself  came  from  a  slave  State,  and 
drew  many  of  his  warmest  supporters  from  among 
the  slaveholding  sugar-planters.  Except  in  the 
futile  discussion  over  the  proposed  Panama  Con 
gress  it  was  not  till  Benton 's  third  senatorial  term 
that  slavery  became  of  really  great  weight  in 
politics. 

One  of  the  first  subjects  that  attracted  Benton's 
attention  in  the  Senate  was  the  Oregon  question, 
and  on  this  he  showed  himself  at  once  in  his  true 
character  as  a  Western  man,  proud  alike  of  every 
part  of  his  country,  and  as  desirous  of  seeing  the 
West  extended  in  a  northerly  as  in  a  southerly 
direction.  Himself  a  slaveholder,  from  a  slave 
State,  he  was  one  of  the  earliest  and  most  vehe 
ment  advocates  of  the  extension  of  our  free  terri 
tory  northward  along  the  Pacific  coast.  All  the 
country  stretching  north  and  south  of  the  Oregon 
River  was  then  held  by  the  United  States  in  joint 
possession  with  Great  Britain.  But  the  whole 
region  was  still  entirely  unsettled,  and  as  a  matter 
of  fact  our  British  rivals  were  the  only  parties  in 
actual  occupation.  The  title  to  the  territory  was 
doubtful,  as  must  always  be  the  case  when  it  rests 
upon  the  inaccurate  maps  of  forgotten  explorers, 
or  upon  the  chance  landings  of  stray  sailors  and 
traders,  especially  if  the  land  in  dispute  is  unoc 
cupied  and  of  vast  but  uncertain  extent,  of  little 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate  49 

present  value,  and  far  distant  from  the  powers 
claiming  it.  The  real  truth  is  that  such  titles  are 
of  very  little  practical  value,  and  are  rightly 
enough  disregarded  by  any  nations  strong  enough 
to  do  so.  Ben  ton's  intense  Americanism,  and  his 
pride  and  confidence  in  his  country  and  in  her 
unlimited  capacity  for  growth  of  every  sort,  gifted 
him  with  the  power  to  look  much  farther  into  the 
future,  as  regarded  the  expansion  of  the  United 
States,  than  did  his  colleagues;  and  moreover 
caused  him  to  consider  the  question  from  a  much 
more  far-seeing  and  statesmanlike  standpoint. 
The  land  belonged  to  no  man,  and  yet  was  sure 
to  become  very  valuable ;  our  title  to  it  was  not 
very  good,  but  was  probably  better  than  that  of 
any  one  else.  Sooner  or  later  it  would  be  filled 
with  the  overflow  of  our  population,  and  would 
border  on  our  dominion,  and  on  our  dominion 
alone.  It  was  therefore  just,  and  moreover  in 
the  highest  degree  desirable,  that  it  should  be 
made  a  part  of  that  dominion  at  the  earliest  pos 
sible  moment.  Benton  introduced  a  bill  to  enable 
the  President  to  terminate  the  arrangement  with 
Great  Britain  and  make  a  definite  settlement  in 
our  favor ;  and  though  the  Senate  refused  to  pass 
it,  yet  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  bringing  the  sub 
ject  prominently  before  the  people,  and,  moreover, 
of  outlining  the  way  in  which  it  would  have  to  be 
and  was  finally  settled.  In  one  of  his  speeches  on 
4 


50  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

the  matter  he  said,  using  rather  highflown  lan 
guage  (for  he  was  unfortunately  deficient  in  sense 
of  humor) : '  *  Upon  the  people  of  Eastern  Asia  the 
establishment  of  a  civilized  power  on  the  opposite 
coast  of  America  could  not  fail  to  produce  great 
and  wonderful  benefits.  Science,  liberal  principles 
in  government,  and  the  true  religion  might  cast 
their  lights  across  the  intervening  sea.  The  valley 
of  the  Columbia  might  become  the  granary  of 
China  and  Japan,  and  an  outlet  to  their  impris 
oned  and  exuberant  population."  Could  he  have 
foreseen  how,  in  the  future,  the  Americans  of  the 
valley  of  the  Columbia  would  greet  the  "  impris 
oned  and  exuberant  population"  of  China,  he 
would  probably  have  been  more  doubtful  as  to 
the  willingness  of  the  latter  empire  to  accept  our 
standard  of  the  true  religion  and  liberal  principles 
of  government.  In  the  course  of  the  same  speech 
he  for  the  first  time,  and  by  what  was  then  con 
sidered  a  bold  flight  of  imagination,  suggested  the 
possibility  of  sending  foreign  ministers  to  the 
Oriental  nations,  to  China,  Japan,  and  Persia, 
"  and  even  to  the  Grand  Turk." 

Better  success  attended  a  bill  he  introduced  to 
establish  a  trading-road  from  Missouri  through  the 
Indian  country  to  New  Mexico,  which,  after  much 
debate,  passed  both  houses  and  was  signed  by 
President  Monroe.  The  road  thus  marked  out  and 
established  became,  and  remained  for  many  years, 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate          51 

a  great  thoroughfare,  and  among  the  chief  of  the 
channels  through  which  our  foreign  commerce 
flowed.  Until  Benton  secured  the  enactment  of 
this  law,  so  important  to  the  interests  and  develop 
ment  of  the  West,  the  overland  trade  with  Mexico 
had  been  carried  on  by  individual  effort,  and  at  the 
cost  of  incalculable  hazard,  hardship,  and  risk  of 
life.  Mexico,  with  its  gold  and  silver  mines,  its 
strange  physical  features,  its  population  utterly 
foreign  to  us  in  race,  religion,  speech,  and  ways  of 
life,  and  especially  because  of  the  glamour  of  mys 
tery  which  surrounded  it  and  partly  shrouded  it 
from  sight,  always  dazzled  and  strongly  attracted 
the  minds  of  the  Southwesterners,  occupying  much 
the  same  place  in  their  thoughts  that  the  Spanish 
Main  did  in  the  imagination  of  England  during 
the  reign  of  Elizabeth.  The  young  men  of  the 
Mississippi  valley  looked  upon  an  expedition  with 
one  of  the  bands  of  armed  traders,  who  wound 
their  way  across  Indian-haunted  wastes,  through 
deep  canyons,  and  over  lofty  mountain  passes,  to 
Santa  Fe,  Chihuahua,  and  Sonora,  with  the  same 
feelings  of  eager  excitement  and  longing  that  were 
doubtless  felt  by  some  of  their  forefathers  more 
than  two  centuries  previously  in  regard  to  the 
cruises  of  Drake  and  Hawkins.  The  long  wagon 
trains  or  pack  trains  of  the  traders  carried  with 
them  all  kinds  of  goods,  but  especially  cotton,  and 
brought  back  gold  and  silver  bullion,  bales  of  furs 


52  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

and  droves  of  mules ;  and,  moreover,  they  brought 
back  tales  of  lawless  adventure,  of  great  gains  and 
losses,  of  fights  against  Indians  and  Mexicans, 
and  of  triumphs  and  privations,  which  still  further 
inflamed  the  minds  of  the  Western  men.  Where 
they  had  already  gone  as  traders,  who  could  on 
occasion  fight,  they  all  hoped  on  some  future  day 
to  go  as  warriors,  who  would  acquire  gain  by  their 
conquests.  These  hopes  were  openly  expressed, 
and  with  very  little  more  idea  of  their  being  any 
right  or  wrong  in  the  matter  than  so  many  Norse 
Vikings  might  have  felt.  The  South  westerners 
are  credited  with  altogether  too  complex  motives 
when  it  is  supposed  that  they  were  actuated  in 
regard  to  the  conquest  of  northern  Mexico  by  a 
desire  to  provide  for  additional  slave  States  to 
offset  the  growth  of  the  North ;  their  emotions  in 
regard  to  their  neighbors'  land  were  in  the  main 
perfectly  simple  and  purely  piratical.  That  the 
Northeast  did  not  share  in  the  greed  for  new  terri 
tory  felt  by  the  other  sections  of  the  country  was 
due  partly  to  the  decline  in  its  militant  spirit  (a 
decline  on  many  accounts  sincerely  to  be  re 
gretted),  and  partly  to  its  geographical  situation, 
since  it  adjoined  Canada,  an  unattractive  and 
already  well-settled  country,  jealously  guarded 
by  the  might  of  Great  Britain. 

Another  question,  on  which  Benton  showed  him 
self  to  be  thoroughly  a  representative  of  Western 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate          53 

sentiment,  was  the  removal  of  the  Indian  tribes. 
Here  he  took  a  most  active  and  prominent  part  in 
reporting  and  favoring  the  bills,  and  in  advocating 
the  treaties  by  which  the  Indian  tribes  of  the 
South  and  West  were  forced  or  induced  (for  the 
latter  word  was  very  frequently  used  as  a  euphe 
mistic  synonym  of  the  former),  to  abandon  great 
tracts  of  territory  to  the  whites  and  to  move 
farther  away  from  the  boundaries  of  their  ever- 
encroaching  civilization.  Nor  was  his  action 
wholly  limited  to  the  Senate,  for  it  was  at  his 
instance  that  General  Clark,  at  St.  Louis,  con 
cluded  the  treaties  with  the  Kansas  and  Osage 
tribes,  by  which  the  latter  surrendered  to  the 
United  States  all  the  vast  territory  which  they 
nominally  owned  west  of  Missouri  and  Arkansas, 
except  small  reserves  for  themselves.  Benton, 
as  was  to  be  expected,  took  the  frontier  view  of 
the  Indian  question,  which,  by  the  way,  though 
often  wrong,  is  much  more  apt  to  be  right  than  is 
the  so-called  humanitarian  or  Eastern  view.  But, 
so  far  as  was  compatible  with  having  the  Indians 
removed,  he  always  endeavored  to  have  them 
kindly  and  humanely  treated.  There  was,  of 
course,  much  injustice  and  wrong  inevitably  at 
tendant  upon  the  Indian  policy  advocated  by  him, 
and  by  the  rest  of  the  Southern  and  Western 
statesmen;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  other 
course  could  have  been  pursued  with  most  of  the 


54  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

tribes.  In  the  Western  States  there  were  then 
sixty  millions  of  acres  of  the  best  land,  owned  in 
great  tracts  by  barbarous  or  half -barbarous  In 
dians,  who  were  always  troublesome  and  often 
dangerous  neighbors,  and  who  did  not  come  in 
any  way  under  the  laws  of  the  States  in  which 
they  lived.  The  States  thus  encumbered  would 
evidently  never  have  been  satisfied  until  all  their 
soil  was  under  their  own  jurisdiction  and  open  to 
settlement.  The  Cherokees  had  advanced  far  on 
the  road  toward  civilization,  and  it  was  undoubt 
edly  a  cruel  grief  and  wrong  to  take  them  away 
from  their  homes ;  but  the  only  alternative  would 
have  been  to  deprive  them  of  much  of  their  land, 
and  to  provide  for  their  gradually  becoming  citi 
zens  of  the  States  in  which  they  were.  For  a 
movement  of  this  sort  the  times  were  not  then, 
and,  unfortunately,  are  not  yet  ripe. 

Much  maudlin  nonsense  has  been  written  about 
the  governmental  treatment  of  the  Indians,  espe 
cially  as  regards  taking  their  land.  For  the  sim 
ple  truth  is  that  they  had  no  possible  title  to  most 
of  the  lands  we  took,  not  even  that  of  occupancy, 
and  at  the  most  were  in  possession  merely  by 
virtue  of  having  butchered  the  previous  inhabit 
ants.  For  many  of  its  actions  toward  them  the 
government  does  indeed  deserve  the  severest  criti 
cism;  but  it  has  erred  quite  as  often  on  the  side 
of  too  much  leniency  as  on  the  side  of  too  much 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate          55 

severity.  From  the  very  nature  of  things,  it  was 
wholly  impossible  that  there  should  not  be  much 
mutual  wrong-doing  and  injury  in  the  intercourse 
between  the  Indians  and  ourselves.  It  was 
equally  out  of  the  question  to  let  them  remain  as 
they  were,  and  to  bring  the  bulk  of  their  number 
up  to  our  standard  of  civilization  with  sufficient 
speed  to  enable  them  to  accommodate  themselves 
to  the  changed  condition  of  their  surroundings. 
The  policy  toward  them  advocated  by  Benton, 
which  was  much  the  same  as,  although  more 
humane  than,  that  followed  by  most  other  West 
ern  men  who  have  had  practically  to  face  the 
problem,  worked  harshly  in  many  instances  and 
was  the  cause  of  a  certain  amount  of  temporary 
suffering.  But  it  was  infinitely  better  for  the 
nation,  as  a  whole,  and,  in  the  end,  was  really 
more  just  and  merciful,  than  it  would  have  been 
to  attempt  following  out  any  of  the  visionary 
schemes  which  the  more  impracticable  Indian 
enthusiasts  are  fond  of  recommending. 

It  was  during  Monroe's  last  term  that  Henry 
Clay  brought  in  the  first  protective  tariff  bill,  as 
distinguished  from  tariff  bills  to  raise  revenue  with 
protection  as  an  incident  only.  It  was  passed  by 
a  curiously  mixed  vote,  which  hardly  indicated 
any  one's  future  position  on  the  tariff  excepting 
that  of  Clay  himself;  Massachusetts,  under  the 
lead  of  Webster,  joining  hands  with  the  Southern 


56  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

seacoast  States  to  oppose  it,  while  Tennessee  and 
New  York  split,  and  Missouri  and  Kentucky,  to 
gether  with  most  of  the  North,  favored  it.  Benton 
voted  for  it,  but  on  the  great  question  of  internal 
improvements  he  stood  out  clearly  for  the  views 
that  he  ever  afterward  held.  This  was  first 
brought  up  by  the  veto,  on  constitutional  grottnds, 
of  the  Cumberland  Road  bill,  which  had  previ 
ously  passed  both  houses  with  singular  unanimity, 
Benton 's  vote  being  one  of  the  very  few  recorded 
against  it.  In  regard  to  all  such  matters  Benton 
was  strongly  in  favor  of  a  strict  construction  of 
the  Constitution  and  of  guarding  the  rights  of  the 
States,  in  spite  of  his  devoted  attachment  to  the 
Union.  While  voting  against  this  bill,  and  deny 
ing  the  power  or  the  right  of  the  federal  govern 
ment  to  take  charge  of  improvements  which  would 
benefit  one  State  only,  Benton  was  nevertheless 
careful  to  reserve  to  himself  the  right  to  support 
measures  for  improving  national  rivers  or  harbors 
yielding  revenues.  The  trouble  is,  that  however 
much  the  two  classes  of  cases  may  differ  in  point 
of  expediency,  they  overlap  so  completely  that  it 
is  wholly  impossible  to  draw  a  hard  and  fast  line 
between  them,  and  the  question  of  constitution 
ality,  if  waived  in  the  one  instance,  can  scarcely 
with  propriety  be  raised  in  the  other. 

With  the  close  of  Monroe's  second  term  the 
"era  of  good  feeling"  came  to  an  end,  and  the 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate          57 

great  Democratic-Republican  party  split  up  into 
several  fragments,   which  gradually  crystallized 
round  two  centers.     But  in  1824  this  process  was 
still  incomplete,  and  the  presidential  election  of 
that  year  was  a  simple  scramble  between  four 
different  candidates, — Jackson,  Adams,  Clay,  and 
Crawford.     Jackson  had  the  greatest  number  of 
votes,  but  as  no  one  had  a  majority,  the  election 
was  thrown  into  the  House  of  Representatives, 
where  the  Clay  men,  inasmuch  as  their  candidate 
was  out  of  the  race,  went  over  to  Adams  and 
elected  him.     Benton  at  the  time,  and  afterward 
in  his  "Thirty  Years'  View,"  inveighed  against 
this  choice  as  being  a  violation  of  what  he  called 
the  "  principle  demos  krateo  " — a  barbarous  phrase 
for  which  he  had  a  great  fondness,  and  which  he 
used  and  misused  on  every  possible   occasion, 
whether  in  speaking  or  writing.     He  insisted  that, 
as  Jackson  had  secured  the  majority  of  the  elec 
toral  vote,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  to  ratify  promptly  this  "  choice  of  the 
people."     The    Constitution   expressly   provided 
that  this  need  not  be  done.     So  Benton,  who  on 
questions  of  state  rights  and  internal  improve 
ments  was  so  pronounced  a  stickler  for  a  strict 
construction    of    the    Constitution,    here    coolly 
assumed  the  absurd  position  that  the  Constitu 
tion   was   wrong  on   this   particular  point,    and 
should  be  disregarded,  on  the  ground  that  there 


58  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

was  a  struggle  "between  the  theory  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  the  democratic  principle."  His 
proposition  was  ridiculous.  The  "democratic 
principle"  had  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  mat 
ter  than  had  the  law  of  gravitation.  Either  the 
Constitution  was  or  it  was  not  to  be  accepted  as  a 
serious  document,  that  meant  something;  in  the 
former  case  the  election  of  Adams  was  proper  in 
every  respect,  in  the  latter  it  was  unnecessary  to 
have  held  any  election  at  all. 

At  this  period  every  one  was  floundering  about 
in  efforts  to  establish  political  relations,  Benton 
not  less  than  others ;  for  he  had  begun  the  canvass 
as  a  supporter  of  Clay,  and  had  then  gone  over  to 
Crawford.  But  at  the  end  he  had  become  a 
Jacksonian  Democrat,  and  during  the  rest  of  his 
political  career  he  figured  as  the  most  prominent 
representative  of  the  Jacksonian  Democracy  in 
the  Senate.  Van  Buren  himself,  afterward  Jack 
son's  prime  favorite  and  political  heir,  was  a  Craw 
ford  man  during  this  campaign. 

Adams,  after  his  election,  which  was  owing  to 
Clay's  support,  gave  Clay  the  position  of  secretary 
of  state  in  his  cabinet.  The  affair  unquestionably 
had  an  unfortunate  look,  and  the  Jacksonians, 
especially  Jackson,  at  once  raised  a  great  hue  and 
cry  that  there  had  been  a  corrupt  bargain.  Ben- 
ton,  much  to  his  credit,  refused  to  join  in  the 
outcry,  stating  that  he  had  good  and  sufficient 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate         59 

reasons — which  he  gave — to  be  sure  of  its  falsity ; 
a  position  which  brought  him  into  temporary  dis 
favor  with  many  of  his  party  associates,  and 
which  a  man  who  had  Benton's  ambition  and 
bitter  partisanship,  without  having  his  sturdy 
pluck,  would  have  hesitated  to  take.  The  assault 
was  directed  with  especial  bitterness  against  Clay, 
whom  Jackson  ever  afterward  included  in  the 
very  large  list  of  individuals  whom  he  hated  with 
the  most  rancorous  and  unreasoning  virulence. 
Randolph  of  Roanoke,  the  privileged  eccentric  of 
the  Senate,  in  one  of  those  long  harangues  in 
which  he  touched  upon  everybody  and  every 
thing,  except  possibly  the  point  at  issue,  made  a 
rabid  onslaught  upon  the  Clay-Adams  coalition 
as  an  alliance  of  "the  blackleg  and  the  Puritan." 
Clay,  who  was  susceptible  enough  to  the  charge 
of  loose  living,  but  who  was  a  man  of  rigid  honor 
and  rather  fond  than  otherwise  of  fighting, 
promptly  challenged  him,  and  a  harmless  inter 
change  of  shot  took  place.  Benton  was  on  the 
field  as  a  friend  of  both  parties,  and  his  account 
of  the  affair  is  very  amusing  in  its  description  of 
the  solemn,  hair-splitting  punctilio  with  which 
it  is  evident  that  both  Randolph  and  many  of 
his  contemporaries  regarded  points  of  dueling 
honor,  which  to  us  seem  either  absurd,  trivial,  or 
wholly  incomprehensible. 

Two  tolerably  well-defined  parties  now  emerged 


60  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

from  the  chaos  of  contending  politicians :  one  was 
the  party  of  the  administration,  whose  members 
called  themselves  National  Republicans,  and  later 
on  Whigs ;  the  other  was  the  Jacksonian  Democ 
racy.  Adams's  inaugural  address  and  first  mes 
sage  outlined  the  Whig  policy  as  favoring  a 
protective  tariff,  internal  improvements,  and  a 
free  construction  of  the  Constitution  generally. 
The  Jacksonians  accordingly  took  the  opposite 
side  on  all  these  points,  partly  from  principle  and 
partly  from  perversity.  In  the  Senate  they 
assailed  with  turgid  eloquence  every  administra 
tion  measure,  whether  it  was  good  or  bad,  very 
much  of  their  opposition  being  purely  factious 
in  character.  There  has  never  been  a  time  when 
there  was  more  rabid,  objectless,  and  unscrupu 
lous  display  of  partisanship.  Benton,  little  to 
his  credit,  was  a  leader  in  these  purposeless  con 
flicts.  The  most  furious  of  them  took  place  over 
the  proposed  Panama  mission.  This  was  a  scheme 
that  originated  in  the  fertile  brain  of  Henry  Clay, 
whose  Americanism  was  of  a  type  quite  as  pro 
nounced  as  Benton' s,  and  who  was  always  inclined 
to  drag  us  into  a  position  of  hostility  to  European 
powers.  The  Spanish-American  states,  having 
succeeded  in  winning  their  independence  from 
Spain,  were  desirous  of  establishing  some  principle 
of  concert  in  action  among  the  American  republics 
as  a  whole,  and  for  this  purpose  proposed  to  hold 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate          61 

an  international  congress  at  Panama.  Clay's 
fondness  for  a  spirited  and  spectacular  foreign 
policy  made  him  grasp  eagerly  at  trie  chance  of 
transforming  the  United  States  into  the  head  of 
an  American  league  of  free  republics,  which  would 
be  a  kind  of  cis-Atlantic  offset  to  the  Holy  Alli 
ance  of  European  despotisms.  Adams  took  up 
the  idea,  nominated  ministers  to  the  Panama  Con 
gress,  and  gave  his  reasons  for  his  course  in  a 
special  message  to  the  Senate.  The  administra 
tion  men  drew  the  most  rosy  and  impossible  pic 
tures  of  the  incalculable  benefits  which  would  be 
derived  from  the  proposed  congress;  and  the 
Jacksonians  attacked  it  with  an  exaggerated 
denunciation  that  was  even  less  justified  by  the 
facts. 

Adams's  message  was  properly  open  to  attack 
on  one  or  two  points;  notably  in  reference  to  its 
proposals  that  we  should  endeavor  to  get  the 
Spanish- American  states  to  introduce  religious 
tolerance  within  their  borders.  It  was  certainly 
an  unhappy  suggestion  that  we  should  endeavor 
to  remove  the  mote  of  religious  intolerance  from 
our  brother's  eye  while  indignantly  resenting  the 
least  allusion  to  the  beam  of  slavery  in  our  own. 
It  was  on  this  very  point  of  slavery  that  the  real 
opposition  hinged.  The  Spanish  states  had  eman 
cipated  their  comparatively  small  negro  popula 
tions,  and,  as  is  usually  the  case  with  Latin 


62  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

nations,  did  not  have  a  very  strong  caste  feeling 
against  the  blacks,  some  of  whom  accordingly  had 
risen  to  high  civic  and  military  rank;  and  they 
also  proposed  to  admit  to  their  congress  the  negro 
republic  of  Hayti.  Certain  of  the  slaveholders 
of  the  South  fiercely  objected  to  any  such  associa 
tion  ;  and  on  this  occasion  Benton  for  once  led  and 
voiced  the  ultra-Southern  feeling  on  the  subject, 
announcing  in  his  speech  that  diplomatic  inter 
course  with  Hayti  should  not  even  be  discussed  in 
the  Senate  chamber,  and  that  we  could  have  no 
association  with  republics  who  had  "black  gen 
erals  in  their  armies  and  mulatto  senators  in  their 
congresses."  But  this  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 
slaveholders  against  the  measure  was  largely, 
although  not  wholly,  spurious ;  and  really  had  less 
to  do  with  the  attitude  of  the  Jacksonian  Demo 
crats  than  had  a  mere  factious  opposition  to 
Adams  and  Clay.  This  was  shown  by  the  vote 
on  the  confirmation  of  the  ministers,  when  the 
Senators  divided  on  party  and  not  on  sectional 
lines.  The  nominations  were  confirmed,  but  not 
till  after  such  a  length  of  time  that  the  ministers 
were  unable  to  reach  Panama  until  after  the  con 
gress  had  adjourned. 

The  Oregon  question  again  came  up  during 
Adams's  term,  the  administration  favoring  the 
renewal  of  the  joint  occupation  convention,  by 
which  we  held  the  country  in  common  with  Great 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate          63 

Britain.  There  was  not  much  public  feeling  in 
the  matter ;  in  the  East  there  was  none  whatever. 
But  Benton,  when  he  opposed  the  renewal,  and 
claimed  the  whole  territory  as  ours,  gave  expres 
sion  to  the  desires  of  all  the  Westerners  who 
thought  over  the  subject  at  all.  He  was  followed 
by  only  half  a  dozen  Senators,  all  but  one  from 
the  West,  and  from  both  sides  of  the  Ohio — Illi 
nois,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Mississippi;  the  North 
west  and  Southwest  as  usual  acting  together. 

The  vote  on  the  protective  tariff  law  of  1828 
furnished  another  illustration  of  the  solidarity  of 
the  West.  New  England  had  abandoned  her  free 
trade  position  since  1824,  and  the  North  went 
strongly  for  the  new  tariff ;  the  southern  seacoast 
States,  except  Louisiana,  opposed  it  bitterly ;  and 
the  bill  was  carried  by  the  support  of  the  Western 
States,  both  the  free  and  the  slave.  This  tariff 
bill  was  the  first  of  the  immediate  irritating  causes 
which  induced  South  Carolina  to  go  into  the  nulli 
fication  movement.  Benton's  attitude  on  the 
measure  was  that  of  a  good  many  other  men  who, 
in  their  public  capacities,  are  obliged  to  appear  as 
protectionists,  but  who  lack  his  frankness  in  stat 
ing  their  reasons.  He  utterly  disbelieved  in  and 
was  opposed  to  the  principle  of  the  bill,  but  as  it 
had  bid  for  and  secured  the  interest  of  Missouri 
by  a  heavy  duty  on  lead,  he  felt  himself  forced  to 
support  it ;  and  so  he  announced  his  position.  He 


64  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

simply  went  with  his  State,  precisely  as  did  Web 
ster,  the  latter,  in  following  Massachusetts'  change 
of  front  and  supporting  the  tariff  of  1828,  turning 
a  full  and  complete  somersault.  Neither  the  one 
nor  the  other  was  to  blame.  Free  traders  are  apt 
to  look  at  the  tariff  from  a  sentimental  standpoint ; 
but  it  is  in  reality  purely  a  business  matter,  and 
should  be  decided  solely  on  grounds  of  expediency. 
Political  economists  have  pretty  generally  agreed 
that  protection  is  vicious  in  theory  and  harmful  in 
practice ;  but  if  the  majority  of  the  people  in  in 
terest  wish  it,  and  it  affects  only  themselves,  there 
is  no  earthly  reason  why  they  should  not  be 
allowed  to  try  the  experiment  to  their  hearts' 
content.  The  trouble  is  that  it  rarely  does  affect 
only  themselves;  and  in  1828  the  evil  was  pecu 
liarly  aggravated  on  account  of  the  unequal  way 
in  which  the  proposed  law  would  affect  different 
sections.  It  purported  to  benefit  the  rest  of  the 
country,  but  it  undoubtedly  worked  real  injury  to 
the  planter  States,  and  there  is  small  ground  for 
wonder  that  the  irritation  over  it  in  the  region  so 
affected  should  have  been  intense. 

During  Adams's  term  Benton  began  his  fight  for 
disposing  of  the  public  lands  to  actual  settlers  at  a 
small  cost.  It  was  a  move  of  enormous  importance 
to  the  whole  West ;  and  Benton's  long  and  sturdy 
contest  for  it,  and  for  the  right  of  preemption,  en 
title  him  to  the  greatest  credit.  He  never  gave  up 


Early  Years  in  the  Senate         65 

the  struggle,  although  repulsed  again  and  again, 
and  at  the  best  only  partially  successful;  for  he 
had  to  encounter  much  opposition,  especially  from 
the  short-sighted  selfishness  of  many  of  the  North- 
easterners,  who  wished  to  consider  the  public  lands 
purely  as  sources  of  revenue.  He  utterly  opposed 
the  then  existing  system  of  selling  land  to  the 
highest  bidder — a  most  hurtful  practice;  and 
objected  to  the  establishment  of  an  arbitrary 
minimum  price,  which  practically  kept  all  land 
below  a  certain  value  out  of  the  market  altogether. 
He  succeeded  in  establishing  the  preemption  sys 
tem,  and  had  the  system  of  renting  public  mines, 
etc.,  abolished;  and  he  struggled  for  the  principle 
of  giving  land  outright  to  settlers  in  certain  cases. 
As  a  whole,  his  theory  of  a  liberal  system  of  land 
distribution  was  undoubtedly  the  correct  one,  and 
he  deserves  the  greatest  credit  for  having  pushed 
it  as  he  did. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   ELECTION   OF  JACKSON,    AND  THE   SPOILS 
SYSTEM. 

IN  the  presidential  election  of  1828  Jackson  and 
Adams  were  pitted  against  each  other  as  the 
only  candidates  before  the  people,  and  Jack 
son  won  an  overwhelming  victory.  The  followers 
of  the  two  were  fast  developing  respectively  into 
Democrats  and  Whigs,  and  the  parties  were  hard 
ening  and  taking  shape,  while  the  dividing  lines 
were  being  drawn  more  clearly  and  distinctly. 
But  the  contest  was  largely  a  personal  one,  and 
Jackson's  success  was  due  to  his  own  immense 
popularity  more  than  to  any  party  principles 
which  he  was  supposed  to  represent.  Almost  the 
entire  strength  of  Adams  was  in  the  Northeast; 
but  it  is  absolutely  wrong  to  assume,  because  of 
this  fact,  that  the  election  even  remotely  fore 
shadowed  the  way  in  which  party  lines  would  be 
drawn  in  the  coming  sectional  antagonism  over 
slavery.  Adams  led  Jackson  in  the  two  slave 
States  of  Maryland  and  Delaware;  and  in  the 
free  States  outside  of  New  England  Jackson  had 
an  even  greater  lead  over  Adams.  East  of  the 
Alleghanies  it  may  here  and  there  have  been  taken 
as  in  some  sort  a  triumph  of  the  South  over  the 

66 


The  Election  of  Jackson  67 

North;  but  its  sectional  significance,  as  far  as  it 
had  any,  really  came  from  its  being  a  victory  of 
the  West  over  the  East.  Infinitely  more  impor 
tant  than  this  was  the  fact  that  it  represented  the 
overwhelmingly  successful  upheaval  of  the  most 
extreme  Democratic  elements  in  the  community. 

Until  1828  all  the  presidents,  and  indeed  almost 
all  the  men  who  took  the  lead  in  public  life,  alike 
in  national  and  in  state  affairs,  had  been  drawn 
from  what  in  Europe  would  have  been  called  the 
"upper  classes."  They  were  mainly  college-bred 
men  of  high  social  standing,  as  well  educated  as 
any  in  the  community,  usually  rich  or  at  least 
well-to-do.  Their  subordinates  in  office  were  of 
much  the  same  material.  It  was  believed,  and 
the  belief  was  acted  upon,  that  public  life  needed 
an  apprenticeship  of  training  and  experience. 
Many  of  our  public  men  had  been  able ;  almost  all 
had  been  honorable  and  upright.  The  change  of 
parties  in  1800,  when  the  Jeffersonian  Democracy 
came  in,  altered  the  policy  of  the  government,  but 
not  the  character  of  the  officials.  In  that  move 
ment,  though  Jefferson  had  behind  him  the  mass 
of  the  people  as  the  rank  and  file  of  his  party,  yet 
all  his  captains  were  still  drawn  from  among  the 
men  in  the  same  social  position  as  himself.  The 
Revolutionary  war  had  been  fought  under  the 
leadership  of  the  colonial  gentry;  and  for  years 
after  it  was  over  the  people,  as  a  whole,  felt  that 


68  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

their  interests  could  be  safely  entrusted  to  and 
were  identical  with  those  of  the  descendants  of 
their  revolutionary  leaders.  The  classes  in  which 
were  to  be  found  almost  all  the  learning,  the  talent, 
the  business  activity,  and  the  inherited  wealth  and 
refinement  of  the  country,  had  also  hitherto  con 
tributed  much  to  the  body  of  its  rulers. > 

The  Jacksonian  Democracy  stood  for  the  revolt 
against  these  rulers;  its  leaders,  as  well  as  their 
followers,  all  came  from  the  mass  of  the  people. 
The  majority  of  the  voters  supported  Jackson 
because  they  felt  he  was  one  of  themselves, 
and  because  they  understood  that  his  election 
would  mean  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  classes 
in  power  and  their  retirement  from  the  control 
of  the  government.  There  was  nothing  to  be  said 
against  the  rulers  of  the  day ;  they  had  served  the 
country  and  all  its  citizens  well,  and  they  were 
dismissed,  not  because  the  voters  could  truthfully 
allege  any  wrong-doing  whatsoever  against  them, 
but  solely  because,  in  their  purely  private  and 
personal  feelings  and  habits  of  life,  they  were 
supposed  to  differ  from  the  mass  of  the  people. 
This  was  such  an  outrageously  absurd  feeling  that 
the  very  men  who  were  actuated  by  it,  or  who, 
like  Benton,  shaped  and  guided  it,  were  ashamed 
to  confess  the  true  reason  of  their  actions,  and  tried 
to  cloak  it  behind  an  outcry,  as  vague  and  sense 
less  as  it  was  clamorous,  against  "aristocratic 


The  Election  of  Jackson  69 

corruption"  and  other  shadowy  and  spectral 
evils.  Benton  even  talked  loosely  of  "  retriev 
ing  the  country  from  the  deplorable  condition 
in  which  the  enlightened  classes  had  sunk  it,'* 
although  the  country  was  perfectly  prosperous 
and  in  its  usual  state  of  quiet,  healthy  growth. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  opponents  of  Jackson 
indulged  in  talk  almost  as  wild,  and  fears  even 
more  extravagant  than  his  supporters'  hopes; 
and  the  root  of  much  of  their  opposition  lay  in  a 
concealed  but  still  existent  caste  antagonism  to 
a  man  of  Jackson's  birth  and  bringing  up.  In 
fact,  neither  side,  in  spite  of  all  their  loud  talk  of 
American  republicanism,  had  yet  mastered  enough 
of  its  true  spirit  to  be  able  to  see  that  so  long  as 
public  officers  did  their  whole  duty  to  all  classes 
alike,  it  was  not  in  the  least  the  affair  of  their  con 
stituents  whether  they  chose  to  spend  their  hours 
of  social  relaxation  in  their  shirt-sleeves  or  in 
dress  coats. 

The  change  was  a  great  one ;  it  was  not  a  change 
of  the  policy  under  which  the  government  was 
managed,  as  in  Jefferson's  triumph,  but  of  the 
men  who  controlled  it.  The  two  great  Democratic 
victories  had  little  in  common ;  almost  as  little  as 
had  the  two  great  leaders  under  whose  auspices 
they  were  respectively  won, — and  few  men  were 
ever  more  unlike  than  the  scholarly,  timid,  and 
shifty  doctrinaire,  who  supplanted  the  elder 


yo  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Adams, and  the  ignorant,  headstrong, and  straight 
forward  soldier,  who  was  victor  over  the  younger. 
That  the  change  was  the  deliberate  choice  of  the 
great  mass  of  the  people,  and  that  it  was  one  for 
the  worse,  was  then,  and  has  been  ever  since,  the 
opinion  of  most  thinking  men ;  certainly  the  pub 
lic  service  then  took  its  first  and  greatest  step  in 
that  downward  career  of  progressive  debasement 
and  deterioration  which  has  only  been  checked  in 
our  own  days.  But  those  who  would,  offhand, 
decry  the  Democratic  principle  on  this  account 
would  do  well  to  look  at  the  nearly  contempo 
raneous  career  of  the  pet  heroes  of  a  trans-Atlan 
tic  aristocracy  before  passing  judgment.  A  very 
charming  English  historian  of  our  day1  has  com 
pared  Wellington  with  Washington ;  it  would  have 
been  far  juster  to  have  compared  him  with  Andrew 
Jackson.  Both  were  men  of  strong,  narrow  minds 
and  bitter  prejudices,  with  few  statesmanlike 
qualities,  who,  for  brilliant  military  services,  were 
raised  to  the  highest  civil  positions  in  the  gift  of 
the  State.  The  feeling  among  the  aristocratic 
classes  of  Great  Britain  in  favor  of  the  Iron  Duke 
was  nearly  as  strong  and  quite  as  unreasonable  as 
was  the  homage  paid  by  their  homelier  kinsfolk 
across  the  Atlantic  to  Old  Hickory.  Wellington's 
military  successes  were  far  greater,  for  he  had 
more  chances ;  but  no  single  feat  of  his  surpassed 
Austin  McCarthy. 


The  Election  of  Jackson  71 

the  remarkable  victory  won  against  his  ablest 
lieutenant  and  choicest  troops  by  a  much  smaller 
number  of  backwoods  riflemen  under  Andrew 
Jackson.  As  a  statesman  Wellington  may  have 
done  less  harm  than  Jackson,  for  he  had  less  in 
fluence;  but  he  has  no  such  great  mark  to  his 
credit  as  the  old  Tennessean's  attitude  toward  the 
Nullifiers.  If  Jackson's  election  is  a  proof  that 
the  majority  is  not  always  right,  Wellington's 
elevation  may  be  taken  as  showing  that  the 
minority,  or  a  fraction  thereof,  is  in  its  turn  quite 
as  likely  to  be  wrong. 

This  caste  antagonism  was  the  distinguishing 
feature  in  the  election  of  1828,  and  the  partially 
sectional  character  of  the  contest  was  due  to  the 
different  degree  of  development  the  caste  spirit 
had  reached  in  different  portions  of  the  Union.  In 
New  England  wealth  was  quite  evenly  distributed, 
and  education  and  intelligence  were  nearly  univer 
sal  ;  so  there  the  antagonism  was  slight,  the  bulk 
of  the  New  England  vote  being  given,  as  usually 
before  and  since,  in  favor  of  the  right  candidate. 
In  the  Middle  States,  on  the  contrary,  the  antago 
nism  was  very  strong.  In  the  South  it  was  of  but 
little  political  account  as  between  the  whites  them 
selves,  they  all  being  knit  together  by  the  barba 
rous  bond  of  a  common  lordship  of  race ;  and  here 
the  feeling  for  Jackson  was  largely  derived  from 
the  close  kinship  still  felt  for  the  West,  In  the 


72  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

West  itself,  where  Jackson's  great  strength  lay, 
the  people  were  still  too  much  on  the  same  plane 
of  thought  as  well  as  of  material  prosperity,  and 
the  wealthy  and  cultivated  classes  were  of  too  lim 
ited  extent  to  admit  of  much  caste  feeling  against 
the  latter ;  and,  accordingly,  instead  of  hostility  to 
them,  the  Western  caste  spirit  took  the  form  of 
hostility  to  their  far  more  numerous  representa 
tives  who  had  hitherto  formed  the  bulk  of  the 
political  rulers  of  the  East. 

New  England  was  not  only  the  most  advanced 
portion  of  the  Union,  as  regards  intelligence,  cul 
ture,  and  general  prosperity,  but  was  also  most 
disagreeably  aware  of  the  fact,  and  was  possessed 
with  a  self-conscious  virtue  that  was  peculiarly 
irritating  to  the  Westerners,  who  knew  that  they 
were  looked  down  upon,  and  savagely  resented  it 
on  every  occasion ;  and,  besides,  New  England  was 
apt  to  meddle  in  affairs  that  more  nearly  con 
cerned  other  localities.  Several  of  Benton's 
speeches  at  this  time  show  this  irritation  against 
the  Northeast,  and  also  incidentally  bring  out  the 
solidarity  of  interest  felt  throughout  the  West. 
In  a  long  and  able  speech,  favoring  the  repeal  of 
the  iniquitous  ''salt  tax,"  or  high  duty  on  im 
ported  salt  (a  great  hobby  of  his,  in  which,  after 
many  efforts,  he  was  finally  successful),  he  brought 
out  the  latter  point  very  strongly,  besides  com 
plaining  of  the  disproportionate  lightness  of  the 


The  Election  of  Jackson  73 

burden  imposed  upon  the  Northeast  by  the  high 
tariff,  of  which  he  announced  himself  to  be  but  a 
moderate  adherent.  In  common  with  all  other 
Western  statesmen  he  resented  keenly  the  sus 
picion  with  which  the  Northeast  was  then  only 
too  apt  to  regard  the  West,  quoting  in  one  of  his 
speeches  with  angry  resentment  a  prevalent  New 
England  sneer  at  "the  savages  beyond  the  Alle- 
ghanies."  At  the  time  we  are  speaking  of  it  must 
be  remembered  that  many  even  of  the  most  ad 
vanced  Easterners  were  utterly  incapable  of 
appreciating  the  almost  limitless  capacity  of  their 
country  for  growth  and  expansion,  being  in  this 
respect  far  behind  their  Western  brethren;  in 
deed,  many  regarded  the  acquisition  of  any  new 
territory  in  the  West  with  alarm  and  regret,  as 
tending  to  make  the  Union  of  such  unwieldy  size 
that  it  would  break  of  its  own  weight. 

Benton  was  the  leading  opponent  of  a  proposal, 
introduced  by  Senator  Foote  of  Connecticut,  to  in 
quire  into  the  expediency  of  limiting  the  sales  of 
public  lands  to  such  lands  as  were  then  in  the 
market.  The  limitation  would  have  been  most 
injurious  to  the  entire  West,  which  was  thus  men 
aced  by  the  action  of  a  New  Englander,  while 
Benton  appeared  as  the  champion  of  the  whole 
section,  North  and  South  alike,  in  the  speech 
wherein  he  strenuously  and  successfully  opposed 
the  adoption  of  the  resolution,  and  at  the  same 


74  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

time  bitterly  attacked  the  quarter  of  the  country 
from  which  it  came,  as  having  from  the  earliest 
years  opposed  everything  that  might  advance  the 
interests  of  the  people  beyond  the  Alleghanies. 
Webster  came  to  the  assistance  of  the  mover  of 
the  measure  in  a  speech  wherein,  among  other 
things,  he  claimed  for  the  North  the  merit  of  the 
passage  of  the  Ordinance  of  1787,  in  relation  to 
the  Northwest  Territory,  and  especially  of  the 
anti-slavery  clause  therein  contained.  But  Ben- 
ton  here  caught  him  tripping,  and  in  a  very  good 
speech  showed  that  he  was  completely  mistaken 
in  his  facts.  The  debate  now,  however,  com 
pletely  left  the  point  at  issue,  taking  a  bitterly 
sectional  turn,  and  giving  rise  to  the  famous  con 
troversy  between  Hayne  of  South  Carolina,  who 
for  the  first  time  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  an 
nounced  the  doctrine  of  nullification,  and  Web 
ster,  who,  in  response  to  his  antagonist,  voiced 
the  feeling  of  the  Union  men  of  the  North  in  that 
wonderful  and  magnificent  speech  known  ever 
since  under  the  name  of  the  "Reply  to  Hayne," 
and  the  calling  forth  of  which  will  henceforward 
be  Hayne 's  sole  title  to  fame.  Benton,  though 
himself  a  strong  Union  and  anti-nullification  man, 
was  still  too  excited  over  the  subject-matter  of  the 
bill  and  the  original  discussion  over  it  to  under 
stand  that  the  debate  had  ranged  off  upon  matters 
of  infinitely  greater  importance,  and  entirely  failed 


The  Election  of  Jackson  75 

to  realize  that  he  had  listened  to  the  greatest  piece 
of  oratory  of  the  century.  On  the  contrary,  en 
couraged  by  his  success  earlier  in  the  debate,  he 
actually  attempted  a  kind  of  reply  to  Webster, 
attacking  him  with  invective  and  sarcasm  as  an 
alarmist,  and  taunting  him  with  the  memory  of 
the  Hartford  Convention,  which  had  been  held 
by  members  of  the  Federalist  party,  to  which 
Webster  himself  had  once  belonged.  Benton 
afterward  became  convinced  that  Webster's 
views  were  by  no  means  those  of  a  mere  alarmist, 
and  frankly  stated  that  he  had  been  wrong  in  his 
position ;  but  at  the  time,  heated  by  his  original 
grievance,  as  a  Western  man  against  New  Eng 
land,  he  failed  entirely  to  understand  the  true 
drift  of  Hayne's  speech.  Much  of  New  England's 
policy  to  the  West  was  certainly  excessively  nar 
row-minded. 

Jackson's  administration  derives  a  most  unen 
viable  notoriety  as  being  the  one  under  which  the 
"  spoils  system  "  became,  for  the  first  time,  grafted 
on  the  civil  service  of  the  nation;  appointments 
and  removals  in  the  public  service  being  made  de 
pendent  upon  political  qualifications,  and  not,  as 
hitherto,  upon  merit  or  capacity.  Benton,  to  his 
honor,  always  stoutly  opposed  this  system.  It  is 
unfair  to  assert  that  Jackson  was  the  originator  of 
this  method  of  appointment ;  but  he  was  certainly 
its  foster-father,  and  more  than  any  one  else  is 


76  Thomas   Hart  Benton 

responsible  for  its  introduction  into  the  affairs  of 
the  national  government.  Despite  all  the  Eastern 
sneers  at  the  "savages"  of  the  West,  it  was  from 
Eastern  men  that  this  most  effective  method  of 
debauching  political  life  came.  The  Jacksonian 
Democrats  of  the  West,  when  they  introduced  it 
into  the  working  of  the  federal  government,  sim 
ply  copied  the  system  which  they  found  already 
firmly  established  by  their  Eastern  allies  in  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania.  For  many  years  the 
course  of  politics  throughout  the  country  had  been 
preparing  and  foreshadowing  the  advent  of  the 
"spoils  system."  The  greatest  single  stroke  in  its 
favor  had  been  done  at  the  instigation  of  Craw 
ford,  when  that  scheming  politician  was  seeking 
the  presidency,  and,  to  further  his  ends,  he  pro 
cured  the  passage  by  Congress  of  a  law  limiting 
the  term  of  service  of  all  public  officials  to  four 
years,  thus  turning  out  of  office  all  the  fifty  thou 
sand  public  servants  during  each  presidential 
term.  This  law  has  never  been  repealed,  every 
low  politician  being  vitally  interested  in  keeping 
it  as  it  is,  and  accordingly  it  is  to  be  found  on  the 
statute-books  at  the  present  day;  and  though  it 
has  the  company  of  some  other  very  bad  measures, 
it  still  remains  very  much  the  worst  of  all,  as 
regards  both  the  evil  it  has  done  and  that  which 
it  is  still  doing.  This  four  years'  limitation  law 
was  passed  without  comment  or  protest,  every 


The  Spoils  System  77 

one  voting  in  its  favor,  its  probable  working  not 
being  comprehended  in  the  least.  Says  Benton, 
who,  with  all  his  colleagues,  voted  for  it:  "The 
object  of  the  law  was  to  pass  the  disbursing  officers 
every  four  years  under  the  supervision  of  the 
appointing  power,  for  the  inspection  of  their 
accounts,  in  order  that  defaulters  might  be  de 
tected  and  dropped,  while  the  faithful  should  be 
ascertained  and  continued.  ...  It  was  found  to 
operate  contrary  to  its  intent,  and  to  have  become 
the  facile  means  of  getting  rid  of  faithful  disburs 
ing  officers,  instead  of  retaining  them."  New 
York  has  always  had  a  low  political  standard,  one 
or  the  other  of  its  great  party  and  factional  organ 
izations,  and  often  both  or  all  of  them,  being  at  all 
times  most  unlovely  bodies  of  excessively  un 
wholesome  moral  tone.  Aaron  Burr  introduced 
the  "spoils  system"  into  her  state  affairs,  and  his 
methods  were  followed  and  improved  upon  by 
Marcy,  Wright,  Van  Buren,  and  all  the  "Albany 
Regency."  In  1829  these  men  found  themselves 
an  important  constituent  portion  of  the  winning 
party,  and  immediately,  by  the  help  of  the  only 
too  willing  Jackson,  proceeded  to  apply  their  sys 
tem  to  affairs  at  Washington.  It  was  about  this 
time  that,  in  the  course  of  a  debate  in  the  Senate, 
Marcy  gave  utterance  to  the  now  notorious  maxim, 
"  To  the  victors  belong  the  spoils." 

Under  Adams  the  non-partisan  character  of  the 


78  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

public  service  had  been  guarded  with  a  scrupulous 
care  that  could  almost  be  called  exaggerated.  In 
deed,  Adams  certainly  went  altogether  too  far  in 
his  non-partisanship  when  it  came  to  appointing 
cabinet  and  other  high  officers,  his  views  on  such 
points  being  not  only  fantastic,  but  absolutely 
wrong.  The  colorless  character  of  his  administra 
tion  was  largely  due  to  his  having,  in  his  anxiety  to 
avoid  blind  and  unreasoning  adherence  to  party, 
committed  the  only  less  serious  fault  of  paying  too 
little  heed  to  party;  for  a  healthy  party  spirit  is 
prerequisite  to  the  performance  of  effective  work 
in  American  political  life.  Adams  was  not  elected 
purely  for  himself,  but  also  on  account  of  the  men 
and  the  principles  that  he  was  supposed  to  repre 
sent  ;  and  when  he  partly  surrounded  himself  with 
men  of  opposite  principles,  he  just  so  far,  though 
from  the  best  of  motives,  betrayed  his  supporters, 
and  rightly  forfeited  much  of  their  confidence. 
But,  under  him,  every  public  servant  felt  that,  so 
long  as  he  faithfully  served  the  State,  his  position 
was  secure,  no  matter  what  his  political  opinions 
might  be. 

With  the  incoming  of  the  Jacksonians  all  this 
changed,  and  terribly  for  the  worse.  A  perfect 
reign  of  terror  ensued  among  the  office-holders. 
In  the  first  month  of  the  new  administration  more 
removals  took  place  than  during  all  the  previous 
administrations  put  together.  Appointments  were 


The    Spoils  System  79 

made  with  little  or  no  attention  to  fitness,  or  even 
honesty,  but  solely  because  of  personal  or  political 
services.  Removals  were  not  made  in  accordance 
with  any  known  rule  at  all;  the  most  frivolous 
pretexts  were  sufficient,  if  advanced  by  useful  poli 
ticians  who  needed  places  already  held  by  capable 
incumbents.  Spying  and  tale -bearing  became 
prominent  features  of  official  life,  the  meaner 
office-holders  trying  to  save  their  own  heads  by 
denouncing  others.  The  very  best  men  were  un 
ceremoniously  and  causelessly  dismissed;  gray- 
headed  clerks,  who  had  been  appointed  by  the 
earlier  presidents, — by  Washington,  the  elder 
Adams,  and  Jefferson, — being  turned  off  at  an 
hour's  notice,  although  a  quarter  of  a  century 's 
faithful  work  in  the  public  service  had  unfitted 
them  to  earn  their  living  elsewhere.  Indeed,  it 
was  upon  the  best  and  most  efficient  men  that  the 
blow  fell  heaviest;  the  spies,  tale-bearers,  and 
tricksters  often  retained  their  positions.  In  1829 
the  public  service  was,  as  it  always  had  been,  ad 
ministered  purely  in  the  interest  of  the  people; 
and  the  man  who  was  styled  the  especial  cham 
pion  of  the  people  dealt  that  service  the  heaviest 
blow  it  has  ever  received. 

Benton  himself  always  took  a  sound  stand  on 
the  civil  service  question,  although  his  partisan 
ship  led  him  at  times  to  defend  Jackson's  course 
when  he  must  have  known  well  that  it  was 


8o  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

indefensible.  He  viewed  with  the  greatest  alarm 
and  hostility  the  growth  of  the' '  spoils  system, '  'and 
early  introduced,  as  chairman  of  a  special  commit 
tee,  a  bill  to  repeal  the  harmful  four  years'  limita 
tion  act.  In  discussing  this  proposed  bill  after 
ward,  he  wrote,  in  words  that  apply  as  much  at 
this  time  as  they  did  then :  "  The  expiration  of  the 
four  years'  term  came  to  be  considered  as  the  ter 
mination  and  vacation  of  all  the  offices  on  which  it 
fell,  and  the  creation  of  vacancies  to  be  filled  at 
the  option  of  the  President.  The  bill  to  remedy 
this  defect  gave  legal  effect  to  the  original  inten 
tion  of  the  law  by  confining  the  vacation  of  office 
to  actual  defaulters.  The  power  of  the  President 
to  dismiss  civil  officers  was  not  attempted  to  be 
curtailed,  but  the  restraints  of  responsibility  were 
placed  upon  its  exercise  by  requiring  the  cause  of 
dismission  to  be  communicated  to  Congress  in  each 
case.  The  section  of  the  bill  to  that  effect  was  in 
these  words :  That  in  all  nominations  made  by  the 
President  to  the  Senate,  to  fill  vacancies  occasioned 
by  an  exercise  of  the  President's  power  to  remove 
from  office,  the  fact  of  the  removal  shall  be  stated  to 
the  Senate  at  the  same  time  that  the  nomination  is 
made,  with  a  statement  of  the  reasons  for  which  such 
officer  may  have  been  removed.  This  was  intended 
to  operate  as  a  restraint  upon  removals  without 
cause." 

In  the  "Thirty  Years'  View"  he  again  writes, 


The  Spoils  System  8r 

in  language  which  would  be  appropriate  from 
every  advanced  civil  service  reformer  of  the  pres 
ent  day,  that  is,  from  every  disinterested  man  who 
has  studied  the  workings  of  the  "spoils  system" 
with  any  intelligence : 

I  consider  "sweeping"  removals,  as  now  practised 
by  both  parties,  a  great  political  evil  in  our  country, 
injurious  to  individuals,  to  the  public  service,  to  the 
purity  of  elections,  and  to  the  harmony  and  union  of 
the  people.  Certainly  no  individual  has  a  right  to  an 
office;  no  one  has  an  estate  or  property  in  a  public 
employment;  but  when  a  mere  ministerial  worker 
in  a  subordinate  station  has  learned  its  duties  by 
experience  and  approved  his  fidelity  by  his  conduct, 
it  is  an  injury  to  the  public  service  to  exchange  him 
for  a  novice  whose  only  title  to  the  place  may  be  a 
political  badge  or  partisan  service.  It  is  exchanging 
experience  for  inexperience,  tried  ability  for  untried, 
and  destroying  the  incentive  to  good  conduct  by  de 
stroying  its  reward.  To  the  party  displaced  it  is  an 
injury,  he  having  become  a  proficient  in  that  business, 
expecting  to  remain  in  it  during  good  behavior,  and 
finding  it  difficult,  at  an  advanced  age,  and  with 
fixed  habits,  to  begin  a  new  career  in  some  new  walk 
of  life.  It  converts  elections  into  scrambles  for  office, 
and  degrades  the  government  into  an  office  for  re 
wards  and  punishments ;  and  divides  the  people  of  the 
Union  into  adverse  parties,  each  in  its  turn,  and  as  it 
becomes  dominant,  to  strip  and  proscribe  the  other. 

Benton  had  now  taken  the  position  which  he 
was  for  many  years  to  hold,  as  the  recognized  sen 
atorial  leader  of  a  great  and  well-defined  party. 
6 


82  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Until  1828  the  prominent  political  chiefs  of  the 
nation  had  either  been  its  presidents,  or  had  been 
in  the  cabinets  of  these  presidents.  But  after 
Jackson's  time  they  were  in  the  Senate,  and  it  was 
on  this  body  that  public  attention  was  concen 
trated.  Jackson's  cabinet  itself  showed  such  a 
falling  off,  when  compared  with  the  cabinets  of 
any  of  his  predecessors,  as  to  justify  the  caustic 
criticism  that,  when  he  took  office,  there  came  in 
' '  the  millennium  of  the  minnows. ' '  In  the  Senate, 
on  the  contrary,  there  were  never  before  or  since  so 
many  men  of  commanding  intellect  and  powers. 
Calhoun  had  been  elected  as  vice-president  on  the 
Jacksonian  ticket,  and  was  thus,  in  1829,  presid 
ing  over  the  body  of  which  he  soon  became  an 
active  member;  Webster  and  Clay  were  already 
taking  their  positions  as  the  leaders  of  the  great 
National  Republican,  or,  as  it  was  afterward 
called,  Whig  party. 

When  the  rupture  between  Calhoun  and  the 
Jacksonian  Democrats,  and  the  resignation  of  the 
former  from  the  vice-presidency  took  place,  three 
parties  developed  in  the  United  States  Senate. 
One  was  composed  of  the  Jacksonian  Democrats, 
with  Benton  at  their  head;  one  was  made  up  of 
the  little  band  of  Nullifiers,  led  by  Calhoun ;  and 
the  third  included  the  rather  loose  array  of  the 
Whigs,  tinder  Clay  and  Webster.  The  feeling 
of  the  Jacksonians  toward  Calhoun  and  the 


The  Spoils  System  83 

Nullifiers  and  toward  Clay  and  the  Clay  Whigs 
were  largely  those  of  personal  animosity ;  but  they 
had  very  little  of  this  sentiment  toward  Webster 
and  his  associates,  their  differences  with  them 
being  on  questions  of  party  principle,  or  else 
proceeding  from  merely  sectional  causes. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE     STRUGGLE     WITH    THE     NULLIFIERS. 

DURING  both  Jackson's  presidential  terms 
he  and  his  adherents  were  engaged  in  two 
great  struggles :  that  with  the  Nullifiers, 
and  that  with  the  Bank.  Although  these  strug 
gles  were  in  part  synchronous,  it  will  be  easier  to 
discuss  each  by  itself. 

The  nullification  movement  in  South  Carolina, 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  third  and  early  part 
of  the  fourth  decades  in  the  present  century,  had 
nothing  to  do,  except  in  the  most  distant  way, 
with  slavery.  Its  immediate  cause  was  the  high 
tariff;  remotely  it  sprang  from  the  same  feelings 
which  produced  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  reso 
lutions  of  1798. 

Certain  of  the  slave  States,  including  those 
which  raised  hemp,  indigo,  and  sugar,  were  high- 
tariff  States;  indeed,  it  was  not  till  toward  the 
close  of  the  presidency  of  Monroe  that  there  had 
been  much  sectional  feeling  over  the  policy  of  pro 
tection.  Originally,  while  we  were  a  purely  agri 
cultural  and  mercantile  people,  free  trade  was  the 
only  economic  policy  which  occurred  to  us  as  possi 
ble  to  be  followed,  the  first  tariff  bill  being  passed 
in  1816.  South  Carolina  then  was  inclined  to 

84 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers      85 

favor  the  system,  Calhoun  himself  supporting  the 
bill,  and,  his  subsequent  denials  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding,  distinctly  advocating  the  policy 
of  protection  to  native  industries;  while  Massa 
chusetts  then  and  afterward  stoutly  opposed  its 
introduction,  as  hostile  to  her  interests.  However, 
the  bill  was  passed,  and  Massachusetts  had  to  sub 
mit  to  its  operation.  After  1816,  new  tariff  laws 
were  enacted  about  every  four  years,  and  soon  the 
coast  slave  States,  except  Louisiana,  realized  that 
their  working  was  hurtful  to  the  interests  of  the 
planters.  New  England  also  changed  her  attitude ; 
and  when  the  protective  tariff  bill  of  1828  came 
up,  its  opponents  and  supporters  were  sharply 
divided  by  sectional  lines.  But  these  lines  were 
not  such  as  would  have  divided  the  States  on  the 
question  of  slavery.  The  Northeast  and  North 
west  alike  favored  the  measure,  as  also  did  all  the 
Southern  States  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  and  Lou 
isiana.  It  was  therefore  passed  by  an  overwhelm 
ing  vote,  against  the  solid  opposition  of  the  belt  of 
Southern  coast  States  stretching  from  Virginia  to 
Mississippi,  and  including  these  two. 

The  States  that  felt  themselves  harmed  by  the 
tariff  did  something  more  than  record  their  disap 
proval  by  the  votes  of  their  representatives  in  Con 
gress.  They  nearly  all,  through  their  legislatures, 
entered  emphatic  protests  against  its  adoption,  as 
being  most  harmful  to  them  and  dangerous  to  the 


86  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Union ;  and  some  accompanied  their  protests  with 
threats  as  to  what  would  be  done  if  the  obnox 
ious  laws  should  be  enforced.  They  certainly 
had  grounds  for  discontent.  In  1828  the  tariff, 
whether  it  benefited  the  country  as  a  whole  or  not, 
unquestionably  harmed  the  South ;  and  in  a  fed 
eral  Union  it  is  most  unwise  to  pass  laws  which 
shall  benefit  one  part  of  the  community  to  the 
hurt  of  another  part,  when  the  latter  receives  no 
compensation.  The  truculent  and  unyielding  atti 
tude  of  the  extreme  protectionists  was  irritating  in 
the  extreme ;  for  cooler  men  than  the  South  Caro 
linians  might  well  have  been  exasperated  at  such 
an  utterance  as  that  of  Henry  Clay,  when  he  stated 
that  for  the  sake  of  the  "American  system"-— by 
which  title  he  was  fond  of  styling  a  doctrine 
already  ancient  in  medieval  times — he  would 
"defy  the  South,  the  President,  and  the  devil." 

On  the  other  hand,  both  the  good  and  the 
evil  effects  of  the  tariff  were  greatly  exaggerated. 
Some  harm  to  the  planter  States  was  doubtless 
caused  by  it ;  but  their  falling  back,  as  compared 
with  the  North,  in  the  race  for  prosperity,  was 
doubtless  caused  much  more  by  the  presence  of 
slavery,  as  Dallas  of  Pennsylvania  pointed  out  in 
the  course  of  some  very  temperate  and  moderate 
remarks  in  the  Senate.  Clay's  assertions  as  to 
what  the  tariff  had  done  for  the  West  were  equally 
ill-founded,  as  Benton  showed  in  a  good  speech, 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     87 

wherein  he  described  picturesquely  enough  the  in 
dustries  and  general  condition  of  his  portion  of  the 
country,  and  asserted  with  truth  that  its  revived 
prosperity  was  due  to  its  own  resources,  entirely 
independent  of  federal  aid  or  legislation.  He 
said :  ' '  I  do  not  think  we  are  indebted  to  the  high 
tariff  for  our  fertile  lands  and  our  navigable  rivers ; 
and  I  am  certain  we  are  indebted  to  these  blessings 
for  the  prosperity  we  enjoy."  "  In  all  that  comes 
from  the  soil  the  people  of  the  West  are  rich. 
They  have  an  abundant  supply  of  food  for  man 
and  beast,  and  a  large  surplus  to  send  abroad. 
They  have  the  comfortable  living  which  industry 
creates  for  itself  in  a  rich  soil,  but  beyond  this 
they  are  poor.  .  .  .  They  have  no  roads  paved  or 
macadamized ;  no  canals  or  aqueducts ;  no  bridges 
of  stone  to  cross  the  innumerable  streams ;  no  edi 
fices  dedicated  to  eternity ;  no  schools  for  the  fine 
arts;  not  a  public  library  for  which  an  ordinary 
scholar  would  not  apologize."  Then  he  went  on 
to  speak  of  the  commerce  of  the  West  and  its 
exports,  "the  marching  myriads  of  living  animals 
annually  taking  their  departure  from  the  heart  of 
the  West,  defiling  through  the  gorges  of  the  Cum 
berland,  the  Alleghany,  and  the  Appalachian 
Mountains,  or  traversing  the  plains  of  the  South, 
diverging  as  they  march,  .  .  .  and  the  flying 
steamboats  and  the  fleets  of  floating  arks,  loaded 
with  the  products  of  the  forest,  the  farm,  and  the 


88  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

pasture,  following  the  courses  of  our  noble  rivers, 
and  bearing  their  freights  to  the  great  city"  of 
New  Orleans. 

Unfortunately  Benton  would  interlard  even  his 
best  speeches  with  theories  of  economics  often 
more  or  less  crude,  and,  still  worse,  with  a  series 
of  classic  quotations  and  allusions;  for  he  was 
grievously  afflicted  with  the  rage  for  cheap  pseudo- 
classicism  that  Jefferson  and  his  school  had  bor 
rowed  from  the  French  revolutionists.  Nor  could 
he  resist  the  temptation  to  drag  in  allusions  to 
some  favorite  hobby.  The  repeal  of  the  salt  tax 
was  an  especial  favorite  of  his.  He  was  perfectly 
right  in  attacking  the  tax,  and  deserves  the  great 
est  credit  for  the  persistency  which  finally  won 
him  the  victory.  But  his  associates,  unless  of  a 
humorous  turn  of  mind,  must  have  found  his  allu 
sions  to  it  rather  tiresome,  as  when,  apropos  of 
the  commerce  of  the  Mississippi,  and  without  any 
possible  excuse  for  speaking  of  the  iniquity  of 
taxing  salt,  he  suddenly  alluded  to  New  Orleans 
as  "  that  great  city  which  revives  upon  the  banks 
of  the  Mississippi  the  name  of  the  greatest  of  the 
emperors1  that  ever  reigned  upon  the  banks  of 
the  Tiber,  and  who  eclipsed  the  glory  of  his  own 
heroic  exploits  by  giving  an  order  to  his  legions 
never  to  levy  a  contribution  of  salt  upon  a  Roman 
citizen  f" 

1  Aurelian. 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     89 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  tariff  did  some 
harm  to  the  South,  and  that  it  was  natural  for  the 
latter  to  feel  resentment  at  the  way  in  which  it 
worked.  But  it  must  also  be  remembered  that  no 
law  can  be  passed  which  does  not  distribute  its 
benefits  more  or  less  unequally,  and  which  does 
not,  in  all  probability,  work  harm  in  some  cases. 
Moreover,  the  South  was  estopped  from  complain 
ing  of  one  section  being  harmed  by  a  law  that 
benefited,  or  was  supposed  to  benefit,  the  country 
at  large,  by  her  position  in  regard  to  the  famous 
embargo  and  non-importation  acts.  These  in 
flicted  infinitely  more  damage  and  loss  in  New 
England  than  any  tariff  law  could  inflict  on  South 
Carolina,  and,  moreover,  were  put  into  execution 
on  account  of  a  quarrel  with  England  forced  on  by 
the  West  and  South  contrary  to  the  desire  of  the 
East.  Yet  the  Southerners  were  fierce  in  their 
denunciations  of  such  of  the  Federalists  as  went  to 
the  extreme  in  opposition  to  them.  Even  in  1816 
Massachusetts  had  been  obliged  to  submit  with 
good  grace  to  the  workings  of  a  tariff  which  she 
deemed  hostile  to  her  interests,  and  which  many 
Southerners  then  advocated.  Certainly,  even  if 
the  new  tariff  laws  were  ill-advised,  unjust,  and 
unequal  in  their  working,  yet  they  did  not,  in  the 
most  remote  degree,  justify  any  effort  to  break  up 
the  Union ;  especially  the  South  had  no  business 
to  complain  when  she  herself  had  joined  in  laying 


90  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

heavier  burdens  on  the  shoulders  of  New  England. 
Complain  she  did,  however;  and  soon  added 
threats  to  complaints,  and  was  evidently  ready  to 
add  acts  to  threats.  Georgia,  at  first,  took  the 
lead  in  denunciation;  but  South  Carolina  soon 
surpassed  her,  and  finally  went  to  the  length  of 
advocating  and  preparing  for  separation  from  the 
Union ;  a  step  that  produced  a  revulsion  of  feeling 
even  among  her  fellow  anti-tariff  States.  The 
South  Carolinian  statesmen  now  proclaimed  the 
doctrine  of  nullification, — that  is,  proclaimed  that 
if  any  State  deemed  a  federal  law  improper,  it 
could  proceed  to  declare  that  law  null  and  void  so 
far  as  its  own  territory  was  concerned, — and,  as  a 
corollary,  that  it  had  the  right  forcibly  to  prevent 
execution  of  this  void  law  within  its  borders.  This 
was  proclaimed,  not  as  an  exercise  of  the  right  of 
revolution,  which,  in  the  last  resort,  belongs,  of 
course,  to  every  community  and  class,  but  as  a 
constitutional  privilege.  Jefferson  was  quoted  as 
the  father  of  the  idea,  and  the  Kentucky  resolu 
tions  of  1798-99,  which  he  drew,  were  cited  as  the 
precedent  for  the  South  Carolinian  action.  In 
both  these  last  assertions  the  Nullifiers  were  cor 
rect.  Jefferson  was  the  father  of  nullification, 
and  therefore  of  secession.  He  used  the  word 
*' nullify"  in  the  original  draft  which  he  supplied 
to  the  Kentucky  Legislature,  and  though  that 
body  struck  it  out  of  the  resolutions  which  they 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     91 

passed  in  1798,  they  inserted  it  in  those  of  the 
following  year.  This  was  done  mainly  as  an  un 
scrupulous  party  move  on  Jefferson* s  part,  and 
when  his  side  came  into  power  he  became  a  firm 
upholder  of  the  Union;  and,  being  constitution 
ally  unable  to  put  a  proper  value  on  truthfulness, 
he  even  denied  that  his  resolutions  could  be  con 
strued  to  favor  nullification — though  they  could 
by  no  possibility  be  construed  to  mean  anything 
else. 

At  this  time  it  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  nullifi 
cation  as  a  constitutional  dogma ;  it  is  an  absurd 
ity  too  great  to  demand  serious  refutation.  The 
United  States  has  the  same  right  to  protect  itself 
from  death  by  nullification,  secession,  or  rebellion, 
that  a  man  has  to  protect  himself  from  death  by 
assassination.  Calhoun's  hair-splitting  and  meta 
physical  disquisitions  on  the  constitutionality  of 
nullification  have  now  little  more  practical  interest 
than  have  the  extraordinary  arguments  and  dis 
cussions  of  the  school-men  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

But  at  the  time  they  were  of  vital  interest,  for 
they  were  words  which  it  was  known  South  Caro 
lina  was  prepared  to  back  up  by  deeds.  Calhoun 
was  vice-president,  the  second  officer  in  the  federal 
government,  and  yet  also  the  avowed  leader  of  the 
most  bitter  disunionists.  His  State  supported  him 
by  an  overwhelming  majority,  although  even  with 
in  its  own  borders  there  was  an  able  opposition, 


92  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

headed  by  the  gallant  and  loyal  family  of  the 
Dray  tons, — the  same  family  that  afterward  fur 
nished  the  captain  of  Farragut's  flagship,  the 
glorious  old  Hartford.  There  was  a  strong  senti 
ment  in  the  other  Southern  States  in  his  favor; 
the  public  men  of  South  Carolina  made  speech 
after  speech  goading  him  on  to  take  even  more 
advanced  ground. 

In  Washington  the  current  at  first  seemed  to  be 
all  setting  in  favor  of  the  Nullifiers;  they  even 
counted  on  Jackson's  support,  as  he  was  a  South 
erner  and  a  states' -rights  man.  But  he  was  also  a 
strong  Unionist,  and,  moreover,  at  this  time,  felt 
very  bitterly  toward  Calhoun,  with  whom  he  had 
just  had  a  split,  and  had  in  consequence  remodeled 
his  cabinet,  thrusting  out  all  Calhoun 's  supporters, 
and  adopting  Van  Buren  as  his  political  heir, — the 
position  which  it  was  hitherto  supposed  the  great 
Carolina  separatist  occupied. 

The  first  man  to  take  up  the  gauntlet  the  Nulli 
fiers  had  thrown  down  was  Webster,  in  his  famous 
reply  to  Hayne.  He,  of  course,  voiced  the  senti 
ment  of  the  Whigs,  and  especially  of  the  North 
east,  where  the  high  tariff  was  regarded  with 
peculiar  favor,  where  the  Union  feeling  was 
strong,  and  where  there  was  a  certain  antagonism 
felt  toward  the  South.  The  Jacksonian  Demo 
crats,  whose  strength  lay  in  the  West,  had  not  yet 
spoken.  They  were,  for  the  most  part,  neither 


The  Struggles  with  the  Nullifiers     93 

ultra-protectionists  nor  absolute  free-traders; 
Jackson's  early  presidential  utterances  had  given 
offense  to  the  South  by  not  condemning  all  high- 
tariff  legislation,  but  at  the  same  time  had  de 
clared  in  favor  of  a  much  more  moderate  degree 
of  protection  than  suited  the  Whigs.  Only  a  few 
weeks  after  Webster's  speech  Jackson's  chance 
came,  and  he  declared  himself  in  unmistakable 
terms.  It  was  on  the  occasion  of  the  Jefferson 
birthday  banquet,  April  13,  1830.  An  effort  was 
then  being  made  to  have  Jefferson's  birthday  cele 
brated  annually ;  and  the  Nullifiers,  rightly  claim 
ing  him  as  their  first  and  chief  apostle,  attempted 
to  turn  this  particular  feast  into  a  demonstration 
in  favor  of  nullification.  Most  of  the  speakers 
present  were  actively  or  passively  in  favor  of  the 
movement,  and  the  toasts  proposed  strongly 
savored  of  the  new  doctrine.  But  Jackson,  Ben- 
ton,  and  a  number  of  other  Union  men  were  in 
attendance  also,  and  when  it  came  to  Jackson's 
turn  he  electrified  the  audience  by  proposing: 
"Our  federal  Union;  it  must  be  preserved." 
Calhoun  at  once  answered  with:  "The  Union; 
next  to  our  liberty  the  most  dear;  may  we  all 
remember  that  it  can  only  be  preserved  by  re 
specting  the  rights  of  the  States  and  distributing 
equally  the  benefit  and  burden  of  the  Union." 
The  issue  between  the  President  and  the  Vice- 
President  was  now  complete,  and  the  Jacksonian 


94  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Democracy  was  squarely  committed  against  nulli 
fication.  Jackson  had  risen  to  the  occasion  as 
only  a  strong  and  a  great  man  could  rise,  and  his 
few,  telling  words,  finely  contrasting  at  every 
point  with  Calhoun's  utterances,  rang  throughout 
the  whole  country,  and  will  last  as  long  as  our 
government.  One  result,  at  least,  the  Nullifiers 
accomplished, — they  completely  put  an  end  to  the 
Jefferson  birthday  celebrations. 

The  South  Carolinians  had  no  intention  of 
flinching  from  the  contest  which  they  had  pro 
voked,  even  when  they  saw  that  the  North  and 
West  were  united  against  them,  and  though  the 
tide  began  to  set  the  same  way  in  their  sister 
States  of  the  South;  North  Carolina,  among  the 
latter,  being  the  first  and  most  pronounced  in  her 
support  of  the  President  and  denunciation  of  the 
Nullifiers.  The  men  of  the  Palmetto  State  have 
always  ranked  high  for  hot-headed  courage,  and 
they  soon  showed  that  they  had  wills  as  fiery  as 
that  of  Jackson  himself.  Yet  in  the  latter  they 
had  met  an  antagonist  well  worthy  of  any  foeman's 
steel.  In  declining  an  invitation  to  be  present  at 
Charleston,  on  July  4,  1831,  the  President  again 
defined  most  clearly  his  position  in  favor  of  the 
Union,  and  his  words  had  an  especial  significance 
because  he  let  it  be  seen  that  he  was  fully  deter 
mined  to  back  them  up  by  force  if  necessary.  But 
his  letter  only  had  the  effect  of  inflaming  still 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     95 

more  the  minds  of  the  South  Carolinians.  The 
prime  cause  of  irritation,  the  tariff,  still  remained ; 
and  in  1832,  Clay,  having  entered  the  Senate  after 
a  long  retirement  from  politics,  put  the  finishing 
stroke  to  their  anger  by  procuring  the  passage  of 
a  new  tariff  bill,  which  left  the  planter  States 
almost  as  badly  off  as  did  the  law  of  1828.  Jack 
son  signed  this,  although  not  believing  that  it  went 
far  enough  in  the  reduction  of  duties. 

In  the  presidential  election  of  1832,  Jackson 
defeated  Clay  by  an  enormous  majority;  Van 
Buren  was  elected  vice-president,  there  being  thus 
a  Northern  man  on  the  ticket.  South  Carolina 
declined  to  take  part  in  the  election,  throwing 
away  her  vote.  Again,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind 
that  the  slave  question  did  not  shape,  or,  indeed, 
enter  into  this  contest  at  all,  directly,  although 
beginning  to  be  present  in  the  background  as  a 
source  of  irritation.  In  1832  there  was  tenfold 
more  feeling  in  the  North  against  masonry  and 
secret  societies  generally,  than  there  was  against 
slavery. 

Benton  threw  himself  in,  heart  and  soul,  with 
the  Union  party,  acting  as  Jackson's  right-hand 
man  throughout  the  contest  with  South  Carolina, 
and  showing  an  even  more  resolute  and  unflinch 
ing  front  than  Old  Hickory  himself.  No  better  or 
trustier  ally  than  the  Missouri  statesman,  in  a  hard 
fight  for  a  principle,  could  be  desired.  He  was 


96  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

intensely  national  in  all  his  habits  of  thought ;  he 
took  a  deep,  personal  pride  in  all  his  country,— 
North,  South,  East,  and  West.  He  had  been  very 
loath  to  believe  that  any  movement  hostile  to  the 
Union  was  really  on  foot;  but  once  thoroughly 
convinced  of  it  he  chose  his  own  line  of  action 
without  an  instant's  hesitation. 

A  fortnight  after  the  presidential  election  South 
Carolina  passed  her  ordinance  of  nullification,  di 
rected  against  the  tariff  laws  generally,  and  against 
those  of  1828  and  1832  in  particular.  The  ordi 
nance  was  to  take  effect  on  February  i ;  and  if, 
meantime,  the  federal  government  should  make 
any  attempt  to  enforce  the  laws,  the  fact  of  such 
attempt  was  to  end  the  continuance  of  South  Caro 
lina  in  the  Union. 

Jackson  promptly  issued  a  proclamation  against 
nullification,  composed  jointly  by  himself  and  the 
great  Louisiana  jurist  and  statesman,  Livingston. 
It  is  one  of  the  ablest,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most 
important,  of  all  American  state  papers.  It  is 
hard  to  see  how  any  American  can  read  it  now 
without  feeling  his  veins  thrill.  Some  claim  it  as 
being  mainly  the  work  of  Jackson,  others  as  that 
of  Livingston ;  it  is  great  honor  for  either  to  have 
had  a  hand  in  its  production. 

In  his  annual  message  the  President  merely  re 
ferred,  in  passing,  to  the  Nullifiers,  expressing  his 
opinion  that  the  action  in  reducing  the  duties, 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     97 

which  the  extinction  of  the  public  debt  would  per 
mit  and  require,  would  put  an  end  to  the  proceed 
ings.  As  matters  grew  more  threatening,  how 
ever,  South  Carolina  making  every  preparation 
for  war,  and  apparently  not  being  conciliated  in 
the  least  by  the  evident  desire  in  Congress  to  meet 
her  more  than  half  way  on  the  tariff  question, 
Jackson  sent  a  special  message  to  both  houses. 
He  had  already  sent  General  Scott  to  Charleston, 
and  had  begun  the  concentration  of  certain  mili 
tary  and  naval  forces  in  or  near  the  state  bounda 
ries.  He  now  asked  Congress  to  pass  a  measure 
to  enable  him  to  deal  better  with  possible  resist 
ance  to  the  laws.  South  Carolina  having  com 
plained  of  the  oppressed  condition  in  which  she 
found  herself,  owing  to  the  working  of  the  tariff, 
Jackson,  in  his  message,  with  some  humor,  quoted 
in  reply  the  last  Thanksgiving  proclamation  of 
her  governor,  wherein  he  dilated  upon  the  State's 
unexampled  prosperity  and  happiness. 

It  must  always  be  kept  in  mind  in  describing 
the  attitude  of  the  Jacksonian  Democrats  toward 
the  Nullifiers,  that  they  were  all  along,  especially 
in  the  West,  hostile  to  a  very  high  tariff.  Jackson 
and  Benton  had  always  favored  a  much  lower 
tariff  than  that  established  in  1828  and  hardly 
changed  in  1832.  It  was  no  change  of  front  on 
their  part  now  to  advocate  a  reduction  of  duties. 
Jackson  and  Benton  both  felt  that  there  was  much 
7 


98  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

ground  for  South  Carolina's  original  complaint, 
although  as  strongly  opposed  to  her  nullification 
attitude  as  any  Northerner.  Most  of  the  Southern 
senators  and  representatives,  though  opposed  to 
nullification,  were  almost  equally  hostile  to  the 
high  tariff ;  and  very  many  others  were  at  heart  in 
sympathy  with  nullification  itself.  The  intensely 
national  and  anti-separatist  tone  of  Jackson's  dec 
laration, — a  document  that  might  well  have  come 
from  Washington  or  Lincoln,  and  that  would  have 
reflected  high  honor  on  either, — though  warmly 
approved  by  Benton,  was  very  repugnant  to  many 
of  the  Southern  Democrats,  and  was  too  much  even 
for  certain  of  the  Whigs.  In  fact,  it  reads  like 
the  utterance  of  some  great  Federalist  or  Repub 
lican  leader.  The  feeling  in  Congress  as  a  whole 
was  as  strong  against  the  tariff  as  it  was  against 
nullification;  and  Jackson  had  to  take  this  into 
account,  all  the  more  because  not  only  was  he  in 
some  degree  of  the  same  way  of  thinking,  but  also 
many  of  his  followers  entertained  the  sentiment 
even  more  earnestly. 

Calhoun  introduced  a  series  of  nullification 
resolutions  into  the  Senate,  and  defended  them 
strongly  in  the  prolonged  constitutional  debate 
that  followed.  South  Carolina  meanwhile  put  off 
the  date  at  which  her  decrees  were  to  take  effect, 
so  that  she  might  see  what  Congress  would  do. 
Beyond  question,  Jackson's  firmness,  and  the  way 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers      99 

in  which  he  was  backed  up  by  Benton,  Webster, 
and  their  followers,  was  having  some  effect.  He 
had  openly  avowed  his  intention,  if  matters  went 
too  far,  of  hanging  Calhoun  "  higher  than  Raman." 
He  unquestionably  meant  to  imprison  him,  as  well 
as  the  other  South  Carolina  leaders,  the  instant 
that  State  came  into  actual  collision  with  the 
Union;  and  to  the  end  of  his  life  regretted,  and 
with  reason,  that  he  had  not  done  so  without  wait 
ing  for  an  overt  act  of  resistance.  Some  his 
torians  have  treated  this  as  if  it  were  an  idle  threat ; 
but  such  it  certainly  was  not.  Jackson  undoubt 
edly  fully  meant  what  he  said,  and  would  have 
acted  promptly  had  the  provocation  occurred, 
and,  moreover,  he  would  have  been  sustained  by 
the  country.  He  was  not  the  man  to  weigh 
minutely  what  would  and  what  would  not  fall 
just  on  one  side  or  the  other  of  the  line  defining 
treason;  nor  was  it  the  time  for  too  scrupulous 
adherence  to  precise  wording.  Had  a  collision 
occurred,  neither  Calhoun  nor  his  colleague  would 
ever  have  been  permitted  to  leave  Washington; 
and  brave  though  they  were,  the  fact  -unquestion 
ably  had  much  influence  with  them. 

Webster  was  now  acting  heartily  with  Benton. 
He  introduced  a  set  of  resolutions  which  showed 
that  in  the  matters  both  of  the  tariff  and  of  nullifi 
cation  his  position  was  much  the  same  as  was  that 
of  the  Missourian.  Unfortunately  Congress  as  a 


ioo  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

whole  was  by  no  means  so  stiff -kneed.  A  certain 
number  of  Whigs  followed  Webster,  and  a  certain 
number  of  Democrats  clung  to  Benton ;  but  most 
Southerners  were  very  reluctant  to  allow  pressure 
to  be  brought  to  bear  on  South  Carolina,  and  many 
Northerners  were  as  willing  to  compromise  as 
Henry  Clay  himself.  In  accordance  with  Jack 
son's  recommendations  two  bills  were  introduced: 
one  the  so-called  "  Force  Bill,"  to  allow  the  Presi 
dent  to  take  steps  to  defend  the  federal  authority 
in  the  event  of  actual  collision ;  and  the  other  a 
moderate,  and,  on  the  whole,  proper  tariff  bill,  to 
reduce  protective  duties.  Both  were  introduced 
by  administration  supporters.  Benton  and  Web 
ster  warmly  sustained  the  "Force  Bill,"  which 
was  bitterly  attacked  by  the  Nullifiers  and  by 
most  of  the  Southerners,  who  really  hardly  knew 
what  stand  to  take,  the  leading  opponent  being 
Tyler  of  Virginia,  whose  disunion  attitude  was 
almost  as  clearly  marked  as  that  of  Calhoun  him 
self.  The  measure  was  eminently  just,  and  was 
precisely  what  the  crisis  demanded ;  and  the  Sen 
ate  finally  passed  it  and  sent  it  to  the  House. 

All  this  time  an  obstinate  struggle  was  going  on 
over  the  tariff  bill.  Calhoun  and  his  sympathizers 
were  beginning  to  see  that  there  was  real  danger 
ahead,  alike  to  themselves,  their  constituents,  and 
their  principles,  if  they  followed  unswervingly  the 
course  they  had  laid  down;  and  the  weak-kneed 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     101 

brethren  on  the  other  side,  headed  by  Clay,  were 
becoming  even  more  uneasy.  Calhoun  wished  to 
avert  collision  with  the  federal  government ;  day 
was  quite  as  anxious  to  avoid  an  outbreak  in  the 
South  and  to  save  what  he  could  of  the  protective 
system,  which  was  evidently  doomed.  Calhoun 
was  willing  to  sacrifice  some  of  his  constitutional 
theories  in  regard  to  protection ;  Clay  was  ready 
greatly  to  reduce  protection  itself.  Each  of  them, 
but  especially  Clay,  was  prepared  to  shift  his  stand 
somewhat  from  that  of  abstract  moral  right  to 
that  of  expediency.  Benton  and  Webster  were 
too  resolute  and  determined  in  their  hostility  to 
any  form  of  yielding  to  South  Carolina's  insolent 
defiance  to  admit  any  hope  of  getting  them  to 
accept  a  compromise ;  but  the  majority  of  the 
members  were  known  to  be  only  too  ready  to  jump 
at  any  half-way  measure  which  would  patch  up  the 
affair  for  the  present,  no  matter  what  the  sacrifice 
of  principle  or  how  great  the  risk  incurred  for  the 
future.  Accordingly,  Clay  and  Calhoun  met  and 
agreed  on  a  curious  bill,  in  reality  recognizing  the 
protective  system,  but  making  a  great  although 
gradual  reduction  of  duties ;  and  Clay  introduced 
this  as  a  "compromise  measure."  It  was  substi 
tuted  in  the  House  for  the  administration  tariff  bill, 
was  passed  and  sent  to  the  Senate.  It  gave  South 
Carolina  much,  but  not  all,  that  she  demanded. 
Her  representatives  announced  themselves 


102  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

satisfied,  and  supported  it,  together  with  all 
their  Southern  sympathizers;  Webster  and  Ben- 
ton  fought  it  stoutly  to  the  last,  but  it  was  passed 
by  a  great  majority ;  a  few  Northerners  followed 
Webster,  and  Benton  received  fair  support  from 
his  Missouri  colleagues  and  the  Maryland  senators ; 
the  other  senators,  Whigs  and  Democrats  alike, 
voted  for  the  measure.  Many  of  the  Southerners 
were  imbued  with  separatist  principles,  although 
not  yet  to  the  extent  that  Calhoun  was;  others, 
though  Union  men,  did  not  possess  the  unflinch 
ing  will  and  stern  strength  of  character  that  en 
abled  Benton  to  stand  out  against  any  section  of 
the  country,  even  his  own,  if  it  was  wrong.  Silas 
Wright  of  New  York,  a  typical  Northern  "  dough 
face"  politician,  gave  exact  expression  to  the 
"dough-face"  sentiment,  which  induced  Northern 
members  to  vote  for  the  compromise,  when  he 
stated  that  he  was  unalterably  opposed  to  the 
principle  of  the  bill,  but  that  on  account  of  the 
attitude  of  South  Carolina,  and  of  the  extreme 
desire  which  he  had  to  remove  all  cause  of  dis 
content  in  that  State,  and  in  order  to  enable  her 
again  to  become  an  affectionate  member  of  the 
Union,  he  would  vote  for  what  was  satisfactory 
to  her,  although  repugnant  to  himself.  Wright, 
Marcy,  and  their  successors  in  New  York  politics, 
almost  up  to  the  present  day,  certainly  carried 
cringing  subserviency  to  the  South  to  a  pitch  that 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     103 

was  fairly  sublime.  The  "Force  Bill"  and  the 
compromise  tariff  bill  passed  both  houses  nearly 
simultaneously,  and  were  sent  up  to  the  President, 
who  signed  both  on  the  same  day.  His  signing 
the  compromise  bill  was  a  piece  of  weakness  out 
of  keeping  with  his  whole  character,  and  especially 
out  of  keeping  with  his  previous  course  toward 
the  Nullifiers.  The  position  assumed  by  Ben- 
ton  and  Webster  that  South  Carolina  should  be 
made  to  submit  first  and  should  have  the  justice 
of  her  claims  examined  into  afterward,  was 
unquestionably  the  only  proper  attitude. 

My  objections  to  this  bill,  and  to  its  mode  of  being 
passed,  were  deep  and  abiding,  and  went  far  beyond 
its  own  obnoxious  provisions,  and  all  the  transient  and 
temporary  considerations  connected  with  it.  .  .  .  A 
compromise  made  with  a  state  in  arms  is  a  capitula 
tion  to  that  state.  .  .  .  The  injury  was  great  then, 
and  a  permanent  evil  example.  It  remitted  the  gov 
ernment  to  the  condition  of  the  old  confederation, 
acting  upon  sovereignties  instead  of  individuals.  It 
violated  the  feature  of  our  Union  which  discriminated 
it  from  all  confederacies  that  ever  existed,  and  which 
was  wisely  and  patriotically  put  into  the  Constitution 
to  save  it  from  the  fate  which  had  attended  all  con 
federacies,  ancient  and  modern.  .  .  .  The  framers  of 
our  Constitution  established  a  Union  instead  of  a 
League — to  be  sovereign  and  independent  within  its 
sphere,  acting  upon  persons  through  its  own  laws  and 
courts,  instead  of  acting  on  communities  through 
persuasion  or  force.  The  effect  of  this  compromise 
legislation  was  to  destroy  this  great  feature  of  our 


104  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Union — to  bring  the  general  and  state  governments 
into  conflict — and  to  substitute  a  sovereign  state  for 
an  offending  individual  as  often  as  a  state  chose  to 
make  the  cause  of  that  individual  her  own. 

Not  only  was  Benton 's  interpretation  of  the 
Constitution  sound,  and  one  that  by  the  course  of 
events  has  now  come  to  be  universally  accepted, 
but  his  criticisms  on  the  wisdom  of  the  com 
promise  bill  were  perfectly  just.  Had  the  Anti- 
Nullifiers  stood  firm,  the  Nullifiers  would  probably 
have  given  way,  and  if  not,  would  certainly  have 
been  crushed.  Against  a  solid  North  and  West, 
with  a  divided  South,  even  her  own  people  not 
being  unanimous,  and  with  Jackson  as  chief  ex 
ecutive,  South  Carolina  could  not  have  made  even 
a  respectable  resistance.  A  salutary  lesson  then 
might  very  possibly  have  saved  infinite  trouble 
and  bloodshed  thereafter.  But  in  Jackson's  case 
it  must  be  remembered  that,  so  far  as  his  acts 
depended  purely  upon  his  own  will  and  judgment, 
no  fault  can  be  found  with  him ;  he  erred  only  in 
ratifying  a  compromise  agreed  to  by  the  vast 
majority  of  the  representatives  of  the  people  in 
both  houses  of  Congress. 

The  battle  did  not  result  in  a  decisive  victory 
for  either  side.  This  was  shown  by  the  very  fact 
that  each  party  insisted  that  it  had  won  a  signal 
triumph.  Calhoun  and  Clay  afterward  quarreled 
in  the  Senate  chamber  as  to  which  had  given  up 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     105 

the  more  in  the  compromise.  South  Carolina  had 
declared,  first,  that  the  tariff  was  unconstitutional, 
and  therefore  to  be  opposed  upon  principle; 
second,  that  it  worked  injustice  to  her  interests, 
and  must  be  abolished  forthwith;  thirdly,  that, 
if  it  were  not  so  abolished,  she  would  assert  her 
power  to  nullify  a  federal  law,  and,  if  necessary, 
would  secede  from  the  Union.  When  her  repre 
sentatives  agreed  to  the  compromise  bill,  they 
abandoned  the  first  point;  the  second  was  de 
cided  largely  in  her  favor,  though  protection  was 
not  by  any  means  entirely  given  up ;  the  third  she 
was  allowed  to  insist  upon  with  impunity,  although 
the  other  side,  by  passing  the  "  Force  Bill, "showed 
that  in  case  matters  did  proceed  to  extremities 
they  were  prepared  to  act  upon  the  opposite  con 
viction.  Still,  she  gained  most  of  that  for  which 
she  contended,  and  the  victory,  as  a  whole,  rested 
with  her.  Calhoun's  purposes  seem  to  have  been, 
in  the  main,  pure ;  but  few  criminals  have  worked 
as  much  harm  to  their  country  as  he  did.  The 
plea  of  good  intentions  is  not  one  that  can  be 
allowed  to  have  much  weight  in  passing  historical 
judgment  upon  a  man  whose  wrong-headedness 
and  distorted  way  of  looking  at  things  produced, 
or  helped  to  produce,  such  incalculable  evil ;  there 
is  a  wide  political  applicability  in  the  remark 
attributed  to  a  famous  Texan,  to  the  effect  that 
he  might,  in  the  end,  pardon  a  man  who  shot  him 


io6  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

on  purpose,  but  that  he  would  surely  never  forgive 
one  who  did  so  accidentally. 

Without  doubt,  the  honors  of  the  nullification 
dispute  were  borne  off  by  Benton  and  Webster. 
The  latter's  reply  to  Hayne  is,  perhaps,  the  great 
est  single  speech  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and 
he  deserves  the  highest  credit  for  the  stubborn 
ness  with  which  he  stood  by  his  colors  to  the  last. 
There  never  was  any  question  of  Webster's  cour 
age  ;  on  the  occasions  when  he  changed  front  he 
was  actuated  by  self-interest  and  ambition,  not  by 
timidity.  Usually  he  appears  as  an  advocate 
rather  than  an  earnest  believer  in  the  cause  he 
represents ;  but  when  it  came  to  be  a  question  of 
the  Union,  he  felt  what  he  said  with  the  whole 
strength  of  his  nature. 

An  even  greater  meed  of  praise  attaches  to  Ben- 
ton  for  the  unswerving  fidelity  which  he  showed 
to  the  Union  in  this  crisis.  Webster  was  a  high- 
tariff  man,  and  was  backed  up  by  all  the  sectional 
antipathies  of  the  Northeast  in  his  opposition  to 
the  Nullifiers;  Benton,  on  the  contrary,  was  a 
believer  in  a  low  tariff,  or  in  one  for  revenue 
merely,  and  his  sectional  antipathies  were  the 
other  way.  Yet,  even  when  deserted  by  his  chief, 
and  when  he  was  opposed  to  every  senator  from 
south  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Ohio,  he  did  not 
flinch  for  a  moment  from  his  attitude  of  aggressive 
loyalty  to  the  national  Union.  He  had  a  singularly 


The  Struggle  with  the  Nullifiers     107 

strong  and  upright  character;  this  country  has 
never  had  a  statesman  more  fearlessly  true 
to  his  convictions,  when  great  questions  were  at 
stake,  no  matter  what  might  be  the  cost  to  him 
self,  or  the  pressure  from  outside, — even  when,  as 
happened  later,  his  own  State  was  against  him. 
Intellectually  he  cannot  for  a  moment  be  com 
pared  to  the  great  Massachusetts  senator;  but 
morally  he  towers  much  higher. 

Yet,  while  praising  Jackson  and  Benton  for  their 
behavior  toward  South  Carolina,  we  cannot  forget 
that  but  a  couple  of  years  previously  they  had  not 
raised  their  voices  even  in  the  mildest  rebuke  of 
Georgia  for  conduct  which,  though  not  nearly 
so  bad  in  degree  as  that  of  South  Carolina,  was 
of  much  the  same  kind.  Toward  the  close  of 
Adams's  term,  Georgia  had  bid  defiance  to  the 
mandates  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  proceeded  to 
settle  the  Indian  question  within  her  borders  with 
out  regard  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
and  these  matters  were  still  unsettled  when  Jack 
son  became  president.  Unfortunately  he  let  his 
personal  feelings  bias  him;  and,  as  he  took  the 
Western  and  Georgian  view  of  the  Indian  ques 
tion,  and,  moreover,  hated  the  Supreme  Court 
because  it  was  largely  Federalist  in  its  composi 
tion,  he  declined  to  interfere.  David  Crockett, 
himself  a  Union  man  and  a  nationalist  to  the  back 
bone,  rated  Jackson  savagely,  and  with  justice, 


io8  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

for  the  inconsistency  of  his  conduct  in  the  two 
cases,  accusing  him  of  having,  by  his  harmful 
leniency  to  Georgia,  encouraged  South  Carolina 
to  act  as  she  did,  and  ridiculing  him  because, 
while  he  smiled  at  the  deeds  of  the  one  State, 
when  the  like  acts  were  done  by  the  other,  "he 
took  up  the  rod  of  correction  and  shook  it  over 
her." 


CHAPTER  VI. 

JACKSON  AND  BENTON  MAKE  WAR  ON  THE  BANK. 

IF  the  struggle  with  the  Nullifiers  showed  Ben- 
ton  at  his  best,  in  the  conflict  with  the  Bank 
he  exhibited  certain  qualities  which  hardly 
place  him  in  so  favorable  a  light.  Jackson's 
attack  upon  the  Bank  was  a  move  undertaken 
mainly  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  one  which, 
at  first,  most  of  his  prominent  friends  were 
alarmed  to  see  him  undertake.  Benton  alone 
supported  him  from  the  beginning.  Captain  and 
lieutenant  alike  intensely  appreciated  the  joy  of 
battle;  they  cared  for  a  fight  because  it  was  a 
fight,  and  the  certainty  of  a  struggle,  such  as 
would  have  daunted  weaker  or  more  timid  men, 
simply  offered  to  them  an  additional  inducement 
to  follow  out  the  course  they  had  planned.  Ben- 
ton's  thoroughgoing  support  was  invaluable  to 
Jackson.  The  President  sorely  needed  a  friend 
in  the  Senate  who  would  uphold  him  through  thick 
and  thin,  and  who  yet  commanded  the  respect 
of  all  his  opponents  by  his  strength,  ability,  and 
courage.  To  be  sure,  Benton's  knowledge  of 
financial  economics  was  not  always  profound ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand  a  thorough  mastery  of  the  laws 
of  finance  would  have  been,  in  this  fight,  a  very 

109 


no  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

serious  disadvantage  to  any  champion  of  Jackson. 
The  rights  and  wrongs  of  this  matter  have  been 
worn  threadbare  in  countless  discussions.  For 
much  of  the  hostility  of  Jackson  and  Benton 
toward  the  Bank  there  were  excellent  grounds; 
but  many  of  their  actions  were  wholly  indefensible 
and  very  harmful  in  their  results  to  the  country. 
An  assault  upon  what  Benton  called  "the  money 
power  "  is  apt  to  be  popular  in  a  democratic  repub 
lic,  partly  on  account  of  the  vague  fear  with  which 
the  poorer  and  more  ignorant  voters  regard  a 
powerful  institution,  whose  working  they  do  not 
understand,  and  partly  on  account  of  the  jealousy 
they  feel  toward  those  who  are  better  off  than 
themselves.  When  these  feelings  are  appealed  to 
by  men  who  are  intensely  in  earnest,  and  who  are 
themselves  convinced  of  the  justice  and  wisdom  of 
their  course,  they  become  very  formidable  factors 
in  any  political  contest. 

The  struggle  first  became  important  when  the 
question  of  the  recharter  of  the  Bank  was  raised, 
toward  the  end  of  Jackson's  first  term,  the  present 
charter  still  having  three  years  to  run.  This  char 
ter  had  in  it  many  grave  faults ;  and  there  might 
well  be  a  question  as  to  whether  it  should  be  re 
newed.  The  Bank  itself,  beyond  doubt,  possessed 
enormous  power;  too  much  power  for  its  own  or 
outsiders'  good.  Its  president,  Biddle,  was  a  man 
of  some  ability,  but  conceited  to  the  last  degree, 


War  on  the  Bank  m 

untruthful,  and  to  a  certain  extent  unscrupulous  in 
the  use  he  made  of  the  political  influence  of  the 
great  moneyed  institution  over  which  he  presided. 
Some  of  the  financial  theories  on  which  he  man 
aged  the  Bank  were  wrong ;  yet,  on  the  whole,  it 
was  well  conducted,  and  under  its  care  the  mone 
tary  condition  of  the  country  was  quiet  and  good, 
infinitely  better  than  it  had  been  before,  or  than, 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Jacksonian  Democracy, 
it  afterward  became. 

The  two  great  reasons  for  Jackson's  success 
throughout  his  political  career  were  to  be  found  in 
the  strength  of  the  feeling  in  his  favor  among  the 
poorer  and  least  educated  classes  of  voters,  and  in 
the  ardent  support  given  him  by  the  low  poli 
ticians,  who,  by  playing  on  his  prejudices  and 
passions,  molded  him  to  their  wishes,  and  who 
organized  and  perfected  in  their  own  and  his  in 
terests  a  great  political  machine,  founded  on  the 
"spoils  system;"  and  both  the  Jacksonian  rank 
and  file  and  the  Jacksonian  politicians  soon  agreed 
heartily  in  their  opposition  to  the  Bank.  Jackson 
and  Benton  opposed  it  for  the  same  reasons  that 
the  bulk  of  their  followers  did;  that  is  to  say, 
partly  from  honest  and  ignorant  prejudice  and 
partly  from  a  well-founded  feeling  of  distrust  as 
to  some  of  its  actions.  The  mass  of  their  fellow 
party  leaders  and  henchmen  assailed  it  with  the 
cry  that  it  was  exerting  its  influence  to  debauch 


n2  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

politics,  while  at  the  same  time  they  really  sought 
to  use  it  as  a  power  in  politics  on  their  own  side. 

Jackson,  in  his  first  annual  message  in  1829, 
had  hinted  that  he  was  opposed  to  the  recharter 
of  the  Bank,  then  a  question  of  the  future  and  not 
to  arise  for  four  or  five  years.  At  the  same  time 
he  had  called  in  question  the  constitutionality  and 
expediency  of  the  Bank's  existence,  and  had  criti 
cised  as  vicious  its  currency  system.  The  matter 
of  constitutionality  had  been  already  decided  by 
the  Supreme  Court,  the  proper  tribunal,  and  was, 
and  had  been  for  years,  an  accepted  fact ;  it  was 
an  absurdity  to  call  it  in  question.  As  regards 
the  matter  of  expediency,  certainly  the  Jackson- 
ians  failed  signally  to  put  anything  better  in  its 
place.  Yet  it  was  undeniable  that  there  were 
grave  defects  in  the  currency  system. 

The  President's  message  roused  but  little  in 
terest,  and  what  little  it  did  rouse  was  among  the 
Bank's  friends.  At  once  these  began  to  prepare 
the  way  for  the  recharter  by  an  active  and  exten 
sive  agitation  in  its  favor.  The  main  bank  was  at 
Philadelphia,  but  it  had  branches  everywhere,  and 
naturally  each  branch  bank  was  a  center  of  opposi 
tion  to  the  President's  proposed  policy.  As  the 
friends  of  the  Bank  were  greatly  interested,  and 
as  the  matter  did  not  immediately  concern  those 
who  afterward  became  its  foes,  the  former,  for 
the  time,  had  it  all  their  own  way,  and  the  drift  of 


War  on  the  Bank  113 

public  opinion  seemed  to  be  strongly  in  its  favor. 
Bentonwas  almost  the  only  public  man  of  prom 
inence  who  tried  to  stem  this  tide  from  the  be 
ginning.  Jackson's  own  party  associates  were 
originally  largely  against  him,  and  so  he  stood  all 
the  more  in  need  of  the  vigorous  support  which 
he  received  from  the  Missouri  senator.  Indeed,  it 
would  be  unfair  in  the  matter  of  the  attack  on  the 
Bank  to  call  Benton  Jackson's  follower ;  he  might 
with  more  propriety  be  called  the  leader  in  the 
assault,  although  of  course  he  could  accomplish 
little  compared  with  what  was  done  by  the  great 
popular  idol.  He  had  always  been  hostile  to  the 
Bank,  largely  as  a  matter  of  Jeff  ersonian  tradition, 
and  he  had  shown  his  hostility  by  resolutions  in 
troduced  in  the  Senate  before  Jackson  was  elected 
president. 

Early  in  1831  he  asked  leave  to  introduce  a 
resolution  against  the  recharter  of  the  Bank ;  his 
purpose  being  merely  to  give  formal  notice  of  war 
against  it,  and  to  attempt  to  stir  up  a  current  of 
feeling  counter  to  that  which  then  seemed  to  be 
generally  prevailing  in  its  favor.  In  his  speech 
he  carefully  avoided  laying  stress  upon  any  such 
abstract  point  as  that  of  constitutionality,  and 
dwelt  instead  upon  the  questions  that  would  affect 
the  popular  mind;  assailing  the  Bank  as  "having 
too  much  power  over  the  people  and  the  govern 
ment,  over  business  and  politics,  and  as  too  much 
8 


U4  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

disposed  to  exercise  that  power  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  freedom  and  equality  which  should  prevail  in 
a  republic,  to  be  allowed  to  exist  in  our  country." 
The  force  of  such  an  argument  in  a  popular  elec 
tion  will  be  acknowledged  by  all  practical  poli 
ticians.  But,  although  Benton  probably  believed 
what  he  said,  or  at  any  rate  most  of  it,  he  certainly 
ought  not  to  have  opened  the  discussion  of  a  great 
financial  measure  with  a  demagogic  appeal  to  caste 
prejudices.  He  wished  to  substitute  a  gold  cur 
rency  in  the  place  of  the  existing  bank-notes,  and 
was  not  disturbed  at  all  as  to  how  he  would  supply 
the  place  of  the  Bank,  saying :  '  *  I  am  willing  to  see 
the  charter  expire,  without  providing  any  substi 
tute  for  the  present  Bank.  I  am  willing  to  see  the 
currency  of  the  federal  government  left  to  the  hard 
money  mentioned  and  intended  in  the  Constitu 
tion  ;  .  .  .  every  species  of  paper  might  be  left  to 
the  state  authorities,  unrecognized  by  the  federal 
government!"  Of  the  beauties  of  such  a  system 
as  the  last  the  country  later  on  received  practical 
demonstration.  Some  of  his  utterances,  however, 
could  be  commended  to  the  friends  of  greenbacks 
and  of  dishonest  money  even  at  the  present  day,  as 
when  he  says:  "Gold  and  silver  are  the  best  cur 
rency  for  a  republic;  it  suits  the  men  of  middle 
property  and  the  working  people  best;  and  if  I 
was  going  to  establish  a  workingman's  party  it 
should  be  on  the  basis  of  hard  money — a  hard- 


War  on  the  Bank  115 

money  party  against  a  paper  party."  The  Bank 
was  in  Philadelphia ;  much  of  the  stock  was  held 
in  the  East,  and  a  good  deal  was  held  abroad, 
which  gave  Benton  a  chance  to  play  on  sectional 
feelings,  as  follows:  "To  whom  is  all  the  power 
granted?  To  a  company  of  private  individuals, 
many  of  them  foreigners,  and  the  mass  of  them 
residing  in  a  remote  and  narrow  corner  of  the 
Union,  unconnected  by  any  sympathy  with  the  fer 
tile  regions  of  the  Great  Valley,  in  which  the  natu 
ral  power  of  this  Union — the  power  of  numbers — 
will  be  found  to  reside  long  before  the  renewed 
term  of  a  second  charter  would  expire."  Among 
the  other  sentences  occurs  the  following  bit  of 
pure  demagogic  pyrotechnics:  "It  [the  Bank] 
tends  to  aggravate  the  inequality  of  fortunes ;  to 
make  the  rich  richer  and  the  poor  poorer ;  to  mul 
tiply  nabobs  and  paupers;  and  to  deepen  and 
widen  the  gulf  which  separates  Dives  from  Laza 
rus.  A  great  moneyed  power  is  favorable  to 
great  capitalists,  for  it  is  the  principle  of  money 
to  favor  money.  It  is  unfavorable  to  small  capi 
talists,  for  it  is  the  principle  of  money  to  eschew 
the  needy  and  unfortunate „  It  is  injurious  to 
the  laboring  classes."  Altogether  it  was  not  a 
speech  to  be  proud  of.  The  Senate  refused  per 
mission  to  introduce  the  resolution  by  the  close 
vote  of  twenty-three  to  twenty. 

Benton  lived  only  a  generation  after  that  one 


n6  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

which  had  itself  experienced  oppression  from  a 
king,  from  an  aristocratic  legislature,  and  from  a 
foreign  power;  and  so  his  rant  about  the  undue 
influence  of  foreigners  in  our  governmental  affairs, 
and  his  declamation  over  the  purely  supposititious 
powers  that  were  presumed  to  be  conspiring  against 
the  welfare  of  the  poorer  classes  probably  more 
nearly  expressed  his  real  feelings  than  would  be 
the  case  with  the  similar  utterances  of  any  leading 
statesman  nowadays.  He  was  an  enthusiastic 
believer  in  the  extreme  Jeffersonian  doctrinaire 
views  as  to  the  will  of  the  majority  being  always 
right,  and  as  to  the  moral  perfection  of  the  aver 
age  voter.  Like  his  fellow  statesmen  he  failed  to 
see  the  curious  absurdity  of  supporting  black 
slavery,  and  yet  claiming  universal  suffrage  for 
whites  as  a  divine  right,  not  as  a  mere  matter  of 
expediency  resulting  on  the  whole  better  than  any 
other  method.  He  had  not  learned  that  the 
majority  in  a  democracy  has  no  more  right  to 
tyrannize  over  a  minority  than,  under  a  different 
system,  the  latter  would  have  to  oppress  the 
former ;  and  that,  if  there  is  a  moral  principle  at 
stake,  the  saying  that  the  voice  of  the  people  is 
the  voice  of  God  may  be  quite  as  untrue,  and  do 
quite  as  much  mischief,  as  the  old  theory  of  the 
divine  right  of  kings.  The  distinguishing  feature 
of  our  American  governmental  system  is  the  free 
dom  of  the  individual ;  it  is  quite  as  important  to 


War  on  the  Bank  117 

prevent  his  being  oppressed  by  many  men  as  it  is 
to  save  him  from  the  tyranny  of  one. 

This  speech  on  the  recharter  showed  a  great 
deal  of  wide  reading  and  much  information ;  but 
a  good  part  of  it  was  sheer  declamation,  in  the 
turgid,  pompous  style  that  Benton,  as  well  as  a 
great  many  other  American  public  speakers,  was 
apt  to  mistake  for  genuine  oratory.  His  subse 
quent  speech  on  currency,  however,  was  much 
better.  This  was  likewise  delivered  on  the  occa 
sion  of  asking  leave  to  present  a  joint  resolution, 
which  leave  was  refused.  The  branch  draft  sys 
tem  was  the  object  of  the  assault.  These  branch 
drafts  were  for  even  sums  of  small  denomination, 
circulating  like  bank-notes;  they  were  drawn  on 
the  parent  bank  at  Philadelphia  to  the  order  of 
some  officer  of  the  branch  bank,  and  were  indorsed 
by  the  latter  to  bearer.  Thus  paper  was  issued  at 
one  place  which  was  payable  at  another  and  a  dis 
tant  place ;  and  among  other  results  there  ensued 
a  constant  inflation  of  credit.  They  were  very 
mischievous  in  their  workings ;  they  had  none  of 
the  marks  of  convertible  bank-notes  or  money, 
and  so  long  as  credit  was  active  there  could  be  no 
check  on  the  inflation  of  the  currency  by  them. 
Payment  could  be  voluntarily  made  at  the  branch 
banks  whence  issued,  but  if  it  was  refused  the 
owner  had  only  the  right  to  go  to  Philadelphia 
and  sue  the  directors  there.  Most  of  these  drafts 


us  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

were  issued  at  the  most  remote  and  inaccessible 
branches,  the  payment  of  them  being,  therefore, 
much  delayed  by  distance  and  difficulty;  nor 
were  the  directors  liable  for  excessive  issues. 
They  constituted  the  bulk  of  all  the  paper  seen  in 
circulation ;  they  were  supposed  to  be  equivalent 
to  money,  but  being  bills  of  exchange  they  were 
merely  negotiable  instruments ;  they  did  not  have 
the  properties  of  bank-notes,  which  are  constantly 
and  directly  interchangeable  with  money.  In 
their  issue  Biddle  had  laid  himself  open  to  attack ; 
and  in  defending  them  he  certainly  did  not  always 
speak  the  truth,  wilfully  concealing  or  coloring 
facts.  Moreover,  his  self-satisfaction  and  the 
foolish  pride  in  his  own  power,  which  he  could  not 
conceal,  led  him  into  making  imprudent  boasts  as 
to  the  great  power  the  Bank  could  exercise  over 
other  local  banks,  and  over  the  general  prosperity 
of  the  country,  while  dilating  upon  its  good  con 
duct  in  not  using  this  power  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  public.  All  this  was  playing  into  Benton 's 
hands.  He  showed  some  of  the  evils  of  the  branch 
draft  system,  although  apparently  not  seeing 
others  that  were  quite  as  important.  He  at 
tacked  the  Bank  for  some  real  and  many  imagi 
nary  wrong-doings ;  and  quoted  Biddle  himself  as 
an  authority  for  the  existence  of  powers  dangerous 
to  the  welfare  of  the  State. 

The  advocates  of  the  Bank  were  still  in  the 


War  on  the  Bank  119 

majority  in  both  houses  of  Congress,  and  soon 
began  preparations  for  pushing  through  a  bill  for 
the  recharter.  The  issue  began  to  become  politi 
cal.  Webster,  Clay,  and  most  of  the  other  anti- 
administration  men  were  for  the  Bank;  and  so 
when  the  convention  of  the  National  Republicans, 
who  soon  afterward  definitely  assumed  the  name 
of  Whigs,  took  place,  they  declared  heartily  in  its 
favor,  and  nominated  for  the  presidency  its  most 
enthusiastic  supporter,  Henry  Clay.  The  Bank 
itself  unquestionably  preferred  not  to  be  dragged 
into  politics ;  but  Clay,  thinking  he  saw  a  chance 
for  a  successful  stroke,  fastened  upon  it,  and  the 
convention  that  nominated  him  made  the  fight 
against  Jackson  on  the  ground  that  he  was  hostile 
to  the  Bank.  Even  had  this  not  already  been  the 
case,  no  more  certain  method  of  insuring  his  hos 
tility  could  have  been  adopted. 

Still,  however,  many  of  Jackson's  supporters  were 
also  advocates  of  recharter ;  and  the  bill  for  that 
purpose  commanded  the  majority  in  Congress. 
Benton  took  the  lead  in  organizing  the  opposition, 
not  with  the  hope  of  preventing  its  passage,  but 
"to  attack  incessantly,  assail  at  all  points,  display 
the  evil  of  the  institution,  rouse  the  people,  and 
prepare  them  to  sustain  the  veto."  In  other 
words,  he  was  preparing  for  an  appeal  to  the 
people,  and  working  to  secure  an  anti-Bank 
majority  in  the  next  Congress.  He  instigated 


120  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

and  prepared  the  investigation  into  the  affairs  of 
the  Bank,  which  was  made  in  the  House,  and  he 
led  the  harassing  parliamentary  warfare  carried 
on  against  the  rechartering  bill  in  the  Senate. 
He  himself  seems  to  have  superintended  the 
preparation  of  the  charges  which  were  investi 
gated  by  the  House.  A  great  flurry  was  made 
over  them,  Benton  and  all  his  friends  claiming 
that  they  were  fully  substantiated ;  but  the  only 
real  point  scored  was  that  against  the  branch 
drafts.  Benton,  with  the  majority  of  the  com 
mittee  of  investigation,  had  the  loosest  ideas  as 
to  what  a  bank  ought  to  do,  loud  though  they 
were  in  denunciation  of  what  this  particular  bank 
was  alleged  to  have  done. 

Webster  made  the  great  argument  in  favor  of 
the  recharter  bill.  Benton  took  the  lead  in  oppo 
sition,  stating,  what  was  probably  true,  that  the 
bill  was  brought  up  so  long  before  the  charter  ex 
pired  for  political  reasons,  and  criticizing  it  as 
premature;  a  criticism  unfortunately  applicable 
with  even  greater  force  to  Jackson's  message.  His 
speech  was  largely  mere  talking  against  time,  and 
he  wandered  widely  from  the  subject.  Among 
other  things  he  invoked  the  aid  of  the  principle  of 
states' -rights,  because  the  Bank  then  had  power  to 
establish  branches  in  any  State,  whether  the  latter 
liked  it  or  not,  and  free  from  state  taxation.  He 
also  appealed  to  tne  Western  members  as  such, 


War  on  the  Bank  121 

insisting  that  the  Bank  discriminated  against  their 
section  of  the  country  in  favor  of  the  East;  the 
facts  being  that  the  shrewdness  and  commercial 
morality  of  the  Northeast,  particularly  of  New 
England,  saved  them  from  the  evils  brought  on 
the  Westerners  by  the  foolishness  with  which  they 
abused  their  credit  and  the  laxness  with  which 
they  looked  on  monetary  obligations.  But  in  spite 
of  all  that  Benton  could  do,  the  bill  passed  both 
houses,  the  Senate  voting  in  its  favor  by  twenty- 
eight  ayes  against  twenty  nays. 

Jackson,  who  never  feared  anything,  and  was 
more  than  ready  to  accept  the  fight  which  was  in 
some  measure  forced  on  him,  yet  which  in  some 
degree  he  had  courted,  promptly  vetoed  the  bill  in 
a  message  which  stated  some  truths  forcibly  and 
fearlessly,  which  developed  some  very  queer  con 
stitutional  and  financial  theories,  and  which  con 
tained  a  number  of  absurdities,  evidently  put  in, 
not  for  the  benefit  of  the  Senate,  but  to  influence 
voters  at  the  coming  presidential  election.  The 
leaders  of  the  opposition  felt  obliged  to  make  a 
show  of  trying  to  pass  the  bill  over  the  veto  in 
order  to  get  a  chance  to  answer  Jackson.  Web 
ster  again  opened  the  argument.  Clay  made  the 
fiercest  onslaught,  assailing  the  President  person 
ally  besides  attacking  the  veto  power,  and  trying 
to  discredit  its  use.  But  the  presidential  power  of 
veto  is  among  the  best  features  of  our  government, 


122  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

and  Benton  had  no  difficulty  in  making  a  good 
defense  of  it;  although  many  of  the  arguments 
adduced  by  him  in  its  favor  were  entirely  unsound, 
being  based  on  the  wholly  groundless  assumption 
that  the  function  of  the  President  corresponded  to 
that  of  the  ancient  Roman  tribune  of  the  people, 
and  was  supposed  to  be  exercised  in  the  interests 
of  the  people  to  control  the  legislature — thus  wil 
fully  overlooking  the  fact  that  the  legislature  also 
was  elected  by  the  people.  When  on  his  ultra- 
democratic  hobby  Benton  always  rode  very  loose 
in  the  saddle,  and  with  little  knowledge  of  where 
he  was  going.  Clay  and  Benton  alike  drew  all 
sorts  of  analogies  between  the  state  of  affairs  in 
the  United  States  and  that  formerly  prevailing 
in  France,  England,  and  above  all  in  the  much 
suffering  republics  of  antiquity.  Benton  insisted 
that  the  Bank  had  wickedly  persuaded  the  West 
to  get  in  debt  to  it  so  as  to  have  that  section  in  its 
power,  and  that  the  Western  debt  had  been  cre 
ated  with  a  view  to  political  engineering ;  the  fact 
being  that  the  Westerners  had  run  into  debt  purely 
by  their  own  fault,  and  that  the  Bank  itself  was 
seriously  alarmed  at  the  condition  of  its  Western 
branches.  The  currency  being  in  much  worse 
shape  in  the  West  than  in  the  Northeast,  gold  and 
silver  naturally  moved  toward  the  latter  place; 
and  this  result  of  their  own  shortcomings  was 
again  held  up  as  a  grievance  of  the  Westerners 


War  on  the  Bank  123 

against  the  Bank.  He  also  read  a  severe  lecture 
on  the  interests  of  party  discipline  to  the  Demo 
crats  who  had  voted  for  the  recharter,  assuring 
them  that  they  could  not  continue  to  be  both  for 
the  Bank  and  for  Jackson.  The  Jacksonian 
Democracy,  nominally  the  party  of  the  multitude, 
was  in  reality  the  nearest  approach  the  United 
States  has  ever  seen  to  the  "  one  man  power ;"  and 
to  break  with  Jackson  was  to  break  with  the 
Democratic  party.  The  alternative  of  expulsion 
or  of  turning  a  somersault  being  thus  plainly  pre 
sented  to  the  recalcitrant  members,  they  for  the 
most  part  chose  the  latter,  and  performed  the  re 
quired  feat  of  legislative  acrobatics  with  the  most 
unobtrusive  and  submissive  meekness.  The  de 
bate  concluded  with  a  sharp  and  undignified  inter 
change  of  personalities  between  the  Missouri  and 
Kentucky  senators,  Clay  giving  Benton  the  lie 
direct,  and  the  latter  retorting  in  kind.  Each  side, 
of  course,  predicted  the  utter  ruin  of  the  country, 
if  the  other  prevailed.  Benton  said  that,  if  the 
Bank  conquered,  the  result  would  be  the  estab 
lishment  of  an  oligarchy,  and  then  of  a  monarchy, 
and  finally,  the  death  of  the  republic  by  corruption. 
Webster  stated  as  his  belief  that,  if  the  sentiments 
of  the  veto  message  received  general  approbation, 
the  Constitution  could  not  possibly  survive  its 
fiftieth  year.  Webster,  however,  in  that  debate, 
showed  to  good  advantage.  Benton  was  no  match 


124  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

for  him,  either  as  a  thinker  or  as  a  speaker;  but 
with  the  real  leader  of  the  Whig  party,  Henry 
Clay,  he  never  had  much  cause  to  fear  comparison. 

All  the  state  banks  were  of  course  rabidly  in 
favor  of  Jackson ;  and  the  presidential  election  of 
1832  was  largely  fought  on  the  bank  issue.  In 
Pennsylvania,  however,  the  feeling  for  the  Bank 
was  only  less  strong  than  that  for  Jackson;  and 
accordingly  that  Boeotian  community  sapiently 
cast  its  electoral  votes  for  the  latter,  while  instruct 
ing  its  senators  and  representatives  to  support  the 
former.  But  the  complete  and  hopeless  defeat  of 
Clay  by  Jackson  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Bank.  Jack 
son  was  not  even  content  to  let  it  die  naturally  by 
the  lapse  of  its  charter.  His  attitude  toward  it 
so  far  had  been  one  for  which  much  could  be  said ; 
indeed,  very  good  grounds  can  be  shown  for  think 
ing  his  veto  proper.  But  of  the  impropriety  of 
his  next  step  there  could  be  no  possible  ques 
tion.  Congress  had  passed  a  resolution  declaring 
its  belief  in  the  safety  of  the  United  States 
deposits  in  the  Bank;  but  the  President,  in  the 
summer  of  1833,  removed  these  deposits  and 
placed  them  in  certain  state  banks.  He  experi 
enced  some  difficulty  in  getting  a  secretary  of  the 
treasury  who  would  take  such  a  step;  finally  he 
found  one  in  Taney. 

The  Bank  memorialized  Congress  at  once ;  and 
the  anti-administration  majority  in  the  Senate 


o 


Ha 


him,  either  as  a  thinker  or  as  a  sp^-eer:  but 
with  the  real  leader  of  the  Whig  party  Henry 
Clay,  he  never  had  much  cause  to  fear  cotr;  pa  v^on; 
All  the  state  banks  were  of  course  rabidly  in 
favor  of  Jackson  ;  and  the  presidential  clarion  of 
1832  was  largely  fought  on  the  bank  issue.  In 
Pennsyh  icwever,  the  feeling  for  the  Bajik 

was  only  •<<*£  f.*iv.ng  than  that  for  Jackson;  and 
aca.^J  community  sapient  1y 

cs«*  i->  '  <tter,  while  instruct- 

*ttg  J-  -••  fcfcttaM  io  support  the 

*  fsewfcs&;  -   :*HI  &  ^rter  defeat  of 


iccked,  very  gcK^d  ground--  ».v.in  *>e  snown  for  tliink- 
ing  his  veto  proper.  But  of  the  impropriety  of 
his  next  step  there  could  he  no  possible  ques 
tion.  Congress  had  pissed  a  resolv.'. !  declaring 
its  belie*  in  the  ^3*ty  *_*f.  ^  i'^itcd  States 
deposits  ia  ih.  n&i  &^  President,  in  the 

summer  of    i"U  these   deposits  and 

placed  them  in  eft****  *?«ate  banks.  He  experi 
enced  some  dif^cul- ;  sn  getting  a  secretary  of  the 
treasur}^  who  would  take  such  a  step;  finally  he 
found  one  in  Taney. 

The  Bank  memorialized  Congress  at  once,  an-.J 
the.  anti-administration  majority  in  the  S- 


" 


Roger  B. 


Roger  B 


War  on  the  Bank  125 

forthwith  took  up  the  quarrel.  They  first  re 
jected  Jackson's  nominations  for  bank  directors, 
and  then  refused  to  confirm  Taney  himself.  Two 
years  later  Jackson  made  the  latter  chief  justice  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  in  which  position  he  lived  to 
do  even  more  mischief  than  he  had  time  or  oppor 
tunity  to  accomplish  as  secretary  of  the  treasury. 

Benton  was  the  administration  champion  in  the 
Senate.  Opposed  to  him  were  Webster  and  Clay, 
as  leaders  of  the  Whigs,  supported  for  the  time 
being  by  Calhoun.  The  feeling  of  Clay  and  Cal- 
houn  against  the  President  was  bitterly  personal, 
and  was  repaid  by  his  rancorous  hatred.  But 
Webster,  though  he  was  really  on  most  questions 
even  more  antagonistic  to  the  ideas  of  the  Jack- 
sonian  school,  always  remained  personally  on  good 
terms  with  its  leaders. 

Clay  introduced  a  resolution  directing  the  return 
of  the  deposits ;  Benton  opposed  it ;  it  passed  by 
a  vote  of  twenty-eight  to  eighteen,  but  was  lost  in 
the  House.  Clay  then  introduced  a  resolution  de 
manding  to  know  from  the  President  whether  the 
paper  alleged  to  have  been  published  by  his  au 
thority  as  having  been  read  to  the  cabinet,  in 
relation  to  the  removal  of  the  deposits,  was  genu 
ine  or  not ;  and,  if  it  was,  asking  for  a  copy.  Ben- 
ton  opposed  the  motion,  which  nevertheless  passed. 
But  the  President  refused  to  accede  to  the  de 
mand.  Meanwhile  the  new  departure  in  banking, 


i26  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

inaugurated  by  the  President,  was  working  badly. 
One  of  the  main  grounds  for  removing  the  deposits 
was  the  allegation  that  they  were  used  to  debauch 
politics.  This  was  never  proved  against  the  old 
United  States  Bank ;  but  under  Jackson's  admin 
istration,  which  corrupted  the  public  service  in 
every  way,  the  deposits  became  fruitful  sources  of 
political  reward  and  bribery. 

Clay  then  introduced  his  famous  resolution  cen 
suring  the  President  for  his  action,  and  supported 
it  in  a  long  and  fiery  speech ;  a  speech  which,  like 
most  of  Clay's,  was  received  by  his  followers  at  the 
time  with  rapture,  but  in  which  this  generation 
fails  to  find  the  sign  of  that  remarkable  ability 
with  which  his  own  contemporaries  credited  the 
great  Kentuckian.  He  attacked  Jackson  with 
fierce  invective,  painting  him  as  an  unscrupulous 
tyrant,  who  was  inaugurating  a  revolution  in  the 
government  of  the  Union.  But  he  was  outdone 
by  Calhoun,  who,  with  continual  interludes  of  com 
placent  references  to  the  good  already  done  by  the 
Nullifiers,  assailed  Jackson  as  one  of  a  band  of  art 
ful,  corrupt,  and  cunning  politicians,  and  drew  a 
picture  even  more  lurid  than  Clay's  of  the  future 
of  the  country,  and  the  danger  of  impending  revo 
lution.  Webster's  speeches  were  more  self-con 
tained  in  tone.  Benton  was  the  only  Jacksonian 
senator  who  could  contend  with  the  great  Nullifier 
and  the  two  great  Whigs ;  and  he  replied  at  length, 


War  on  the  Bank  127 

and  in  much  the  same  style  as  they  had  spoken. 
The  Senate  was  flooded  with  petitions  in  favor 
of  the  Bank,  which  were  presented  with  suitable 
speeches  by  the  leading  Whigs.  Benton  ridiculed 
the  exaggerated  tone  of  alarm  in  which  these  peti 
tions  were  drawn,  and  declared  that  the  panic,  ex 
citement,  and  suffering  existing  in  business  circles 
throughout  the  country  were  due  to  the  deliberate 
design  of  the  Bank,  and  afforded  a  fresh  proof  that 
the  latter  was  a  dangerous  power  to  the  State. 

The  resolution  of  censure  was  at  last  passed  by 
a  vote  of  twenty-six  to  twenty,  and  Jackson,  in  a 
fury,  sent  in  a  written  protest  against  it,  which  the 
Senate  refused  to  receive.  The  excitement  all 
over  the  country  was  intense  throughout  the  strug 
gle.  The  suffering,  which  was  really  caused  by 
the  President's  act,  but  which  was  attributed  by 
his  supporters  to  the  machinations  of  the  Bank, 
was  very  real ;  even  Benton  admitted  this,  although 
contending  that  it  was  not  a  natural  result  of  the 
policy  pursued,  but  had  been  artificially  excited— 
or,  as  he  very  clumsily  phrased  it,  "though  ficti 
tious  and  forged,  yet  the  distress  was  real,  and  did 
an  immensity  of  damage."  Neither  Jackson  nor 
Benton  yielded  an  inch  to  the  outside  pressure; 
the  latter  was  the  soul  of  the  fight  in  Congress, 
making  over  thirty  speeches  during  the  struggle. 

During  the  debate  on  receiving  the  President's 
protest,  Benton  gave  notice  of  his  intention  at  an 


128  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

early  day  to  move  to  expunge  from  the  journal  the 
resolution  of  censure.  This  idea  was  entirely  his 
own,  and  he  gave  the  notice  without  having  con 
sulted  anybody.  It  was,  however,  a  motion  after 
Jackson's  own  heart,  as  the  latter  now  began  to 
look  upon  the  affair  as  purely  personal  to  himself. 
His  party  accepted  this  view  of  the  matter  with  a 
servile  alacrity  only  surpassed  by  the  way  in  which 
its  leaders  themselves  bowed  down  before  the  mob ; 
and  for  the  next  two  years  the  state  elections  were 
concerned  purely  with  personal  politics,  the  main 
point  at  issue  in  the  choice  for  every  United  States 
senator  being,  whether  he  would  or  would  not  sup 
port  Benton 's  expunging  resolution.  The  whole 
affair  seems  to  us  so  puerile  that  we  can  hardly 
understand  the  importance  attached  to  it  by  the 
actors  themselves.  But  the  men  who  happened  at 
that  period  to  be  the  leaders  in  public  affairs  were 
peculiarly  and  frankly  incapable  of  separating  in 
their  minds  matters  merely  affecting  themselves 
from  matters  affecting  their  constituents.  Each 
firmly  believed  that  if  he  was  not  the  whole  State, 
he  was  at  least  a  most  important  fraction  of  it; 
and  this  was  as  plainly  seen  in  Webster's  colossal 
egoism  and  the  frank  vanity  of  Henry  Clay  as  in 
Benton 's  ponderous  self -consciousness  and  the  all- 
pervading  personality  of  Andrew  Jackson. 

Some  of  the  speeches  on  the  expunging  resolu 
tion  show  delicious,  although  entirely  unconscious, 


War  on  the  Bank  129 

humor.  If  there  ever  was  a  wholly  irrational  state 
of  mind  it  was  that  in  which  the  Jacksonians  per 
petually  kept  themselves.  Every  canvass  on  Jack 
son's  behalf  was  one  of  sound,  fury,  and  excite 
ment,  of  appeal  to  the  passions,  prejudices,  and 
feelings,  but  never  the  reason,  of  the  people.  A 
speech  for  him  was  generally  a  mere  frantic  denun 
ciation  of  whatever  and  whoever  was  opposed  to 
him,  coupled  with  fulsome  adulation  of  "the  old 
hero.'*  His  supporters  rarely  indeed  spoke  to  the 
cool  judgment  of  the  country,  for  the  very  excel 
lent  reason  that  the  cool  judgment  of  the  country 
was  apt  to  be  against  them.  Such  being  the  case, 
it  is  amusing  to  read  in  Benton's  speech  on  receiv 
ing  the  protest  the  following  sentences,  apparently 
uttered  in  solemn  good  faith,  and  with  sublime 
unconsciousness  of  irony: 

To  such  a  community  [the  American  body  politic] — 
in  an  appeal  on  a  great  question  of  constitutional  law 
to  the  understandings  of  such  a  people — declamation, 
passion,  epithets,  opprobrious  language,  will  stand  for 
nothing.  They  will  float  harmless  and  unheeded 
through  the  empty  air,  and  strike  in  vain  upon  the  ear 
of  a  sober  and  dispassionate  tribunal.  Indignation, 
real  or  affected;  wrath,  however  hot;  fury,  however 
enraged;  asseverations,  however  violent;  denuncia 
tion,  however  furious,  will  avail  nothing.  Facts, 
inexorable  facts,  are  all  that  will  be  attended  to; 
reason,  calm  and  self-possessed,  is  all  that  will  be 
listened  to. 

The  description  of  the  mass  of  Jacksonian  voters 
9 


130  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

as  forming  "a  sober  and  dispassionate  tribunal" 
is  an  artistic  touch  of  fancy  quite  unique,  but  ad 
mirably  characteristic  of  Benton,  whose  state 
ments  always  rose  vigorously  to  the  necessities  of 
the  occasion. 

Webster,  in  an  effort  to  make  the  best  of  un 
toward  circumstances,  brought  in  a  bill  to  rechar- 
ter  the  Bank  for  a  short  period,  at  the  same  time 
doing  away  with  some  of  the  features  that  were 
objectionable  in  the  old  charter.  This  bill  might 
have  passed,  had  it  not  been  opposed  by  the  ex 
treme  Bank  men,  including  Clay  and  Calhoun. 
In  the  course  of  the  debate  over  it  Benton  deliv 
ered  a  very  elaborate  and  carefully  studied  speech 
in  favor  of  hard  money  and  a  currency  of  the  pre 
cious  metals;  a  speech  which  is  to  this  day  well 
worth  careful  reading.  Some  of  his  financial 
theories  were  crude  and  confused;  but  on  the 
main  question  he  was  perfectly  sound.  Both  he 
and  Jackson  deserve  great  credit  for  having  done 
much  to  impress  the  popular  mind  with  the  benefit 
of  hard,  that  is  to  say  honest,  money.  Benton 
was  the  strongest  hard-money  man  then  in  public 
life,  being,  indeed,  popularly  nicknamed  "Old 
Bullion."  He  thoroughly  appreciated  that  a 
metallic  currency  was  of  more  vital  importance 
to  the  laboring  men  and  to  men  of  small  capital 
generally  than  to  any  of  the  richer  classes.  A 
metallic  currency  was  always  surer  and  safer  than 


War  on  the  Bank  131 

a  paper  currency ;  where  it  exists  a  laboring  man 
dependent  on  his  wages  need  fear  less  than 
any  other  member  of  the  community  the  evils  of 
bad  banking.  Benton's  idea  of  the  danger  to  the 
masses  from  "  the  money  power  "  was  exaggerated ; 
but  in  advocating  a  sound  gold  currency  he  took 
the  surest  way  to  overcome  any  possible  danger 
ous  tendency.  A  craze  for  "soft,"  or  dishonest, 
money — a  greenback  movement,  or  one  for  short- 
weight  silver  dollars — works  more  to  the  disad 
vantage  of  the  whole  mass  of  the  people  than  even 
to  that  of  the  capitalists ;  it  is  a  move  directly  in 
the  interests  of  "the  money  power,"  which  its 
loud-mouthed  advocates  are  ostensibly  opposing 
in  the  interests  of  democracy. 

Benton  continued  his  speeches.  The  panic  was 
now  subsiding ;  there  had  not  been  time  for  Jack 
son's  ruinous  policy  of  making  deposits  in  numer 
ous  state  banks,  and  thereby  encouraging  wild 
inflation  of  credit,  to  bear  fruit  and,  as  it  after 
ward  did,  involve  the  whole  country  in  financial 
disaster.  Therefore  Benton  was  able  to  exult 
greatly  over  the  favorable  showing  of  affairs  in 
the  report  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury.  He 
also  procured  the  passage  of  a  gold  currency  law, 
which,  however,  fixed  the  ratio  of  value  between 
gold  and  silver  at  sixteen  to  one;  an  improper 
proportion,  but  one  which  had  prevailed  for  three 
centuries  in  the  Spanish- American  countries,  from 


132  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

which  he  copied  it.  In  consequence  of  this  law 
gold,  long  banished,  became  once  more  a  circu 
lating  medium  of  exchange. 

The  Bank  of  the  United  States  afterward  was 
turned  into  the  State  Bank  of  Pennsylvania;  it 
was  badly  managed  and  finally  became  insolvent. 
The  Jacksonians  accepted  its  downfall  as  a  vindi 
cation  of  their  policy ;  but  in  reality  it  was  due  to 
causes  not  operative  at  the  time  of  the  great  strug 
gle  between  the  President  and  the  Senate  over 
its  continued  existence.  Certainly  by  no  possible 
financial  policy  could  it  have  produced  such  wide 
spread  ruin  and  distress  as  did  the  system  intro 
duced  by  Jackson. 

Long  after  the  Bank  controversy  had  lost  all 
practical  bearing  it  continued  to  be  agitated  by 
the  chief  parties  to  it,  who  still  felt  sore  from  the 
various  encounters.  Jackson  assailed  it  again  in 
his  message ;  a  friendly  committee  of  the  Senate 
investigated  it  and  reported  in  its  favor,  besides 
going  out  of  their  way  to  rake  up  charges  against 
Jackson  and  Benton.  The  latter  replied  in  a  long 
speech,  and  became  involved  in  personalities  with 
the  chairman,  Tyler  of  Virginia.  Neither  side 
paid  attention  to  any  but  the  partisan  aspect  of 
the  question,  and  the  discussions  were  absolutely 
profitless. 

The  whole  matter  was  threshed  over  again  and 
again,  long  after  nothing  but  chaff  was  left,  during 


War  on  the  Bank  133 

the  debates  on  Benton's  expunging  resolution. 
Few  now  would  defend  this  resolution.  The  origi 
nal  resolution  of  censure  may  have  been  of  doubt 
ful  propriety ;  but  it  was  passed,  was  entered  on 
the  record,  and  had  become  a  part  of  the  journal 
of  the  Senate.  It  would  have  been  perfectly 
proper  to  pass  another  resolution  condemning  or 
reversing  the  original  one,  and  approving  the 
course  of  the  President ;  but  it  was  in  the  highest 
degree  improper  to  set  about  what  was  in  form 
falsifying  the  record.  Still,  Benton  found  plenty 
of  precedents  in  the  annals  of  other  legislative 
bodies  for  what  he  proposed  to  do,  and  the  country 
as  a  whole,  backed  him  up  heartily.  He  was 
further  stimulated  by  the  knowledge  that  there 
was  probably  no  other  legislative  act  in  which 
Jackson  took  such  intense  interest,  or  which  could 
so  gratify  his  pride ;  the  mortification  to  Clay  and 
Calhoun  would  be  equally  great.  Benton's  motion 
failed  more  than  once,  but  the  complexion  of  the 
Senate  was  rapidly  changed  by  the  various  States 
substituting  Democratic  for  Whig  or  anti-Jackson 
senators.  Some  of  the  changes  were  made,  as  in 
Virginia,  by  senators  refusing  to  vote  for  the  ex 
punging  resolution,  as  required  by  the  state  legis 
latures,  and  then  resigning  their  seats,  pursuant  to 
a  ridiculous  theory  of  the  ultra-Democrats,  which, 
if  carried  out,  would  completely  nullify  the  provi 
sion  for  a  six  years'  senatorial  term.  Finally,  at 


i34  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

the  very  close  of  Jackson's  administration,  Benton 
found  himself  with  a  fair  majority  behind  him, 
and  made  the  final  move.  His  speech  was  of 
course  mainly  filled  with  a  highly  colored  account 
of  the  blessings  wrought  for  the  American  people 
by  Andrew  Jackson,  and  equally  of  course  the 
latter  was  compared  at  length  to  a  variety  of 
ancient  Roman  worthies.  The  final  scene  in  the 
Senate  had  an  element  of  the  comic  about  it. 
The  expungers  held  a  caucus  and  agreed  to  sit  the 
session  out  until  the  resolution  was  passed;  and 
with  prudent  forethought,  Benton,  well  aware  that 
when  hungry  and  tired  his  followers  might  show 
less  inflexibility  of  purpose,  provided  in  an  adjoin 
ing  committee-room  "an  ample  supply  of  cold 
hams,  turkeys,  rounds  of  beef,  pickles,  wines,  and 
cups  of  hot  coffee/'  wherewith  to  inspirit  the  faint 
hearted. 

Fortified  by  the  refreshments,  the  expungers 
won  a  complete  victory.  If  the  language  of  Jack 
son's  admirers  was  overdrawn  and  strained  to  the 
last  degree  in  lauding  him  for  every  virtue  that  he 
had  or  had  not,  it  must  be  remembered  that  his 
opponents  went  quite  as  far  wrong  on  the  other 
side  in  their  denunciations  and  extravagant  proph 
ecies  of  gloom.  Webster  made  a  very  dignified 
and  forcible  speech  in  closing  the  argument  against 
the  resolution,  but  Calhoun  and  Clay  were  much 
less  moderate, — the  latter  drawing  a  vivid  picture 


War  on  the  Bank  135 

of  a  rapidly  approaching  reign  of  lawless  military 
violence,  and  asserting  that  his  opponents  had 
"extinguished  one  of  the  brightest  and  purest 
lights  that  ever  burnt  at  the  altar  of  civil  liberty." 
As  a  proper  finale  Jackson,  to  show  his  apprecia 
tion,  gave  a  great  dinner  to  the  expungers  and 
their  wives,  Benton  sitting  at  the  head  of  the 
table.  Jackson  and  Benton  solemnly  thought 
that  they  were  taking  part  in  a  great  act  of  justice, 
and  were  amusingly  unable  to  see  the  comic  side 
of  their  acts.  They  probably  really  believed 
most  of  their  own  denunciations  of  the  Bank,  and 
very  possibly  thought  that  the  wickedness  of  its 
followers  might  tempt  them  to  do  any  desperate 
deed.  At  any  rate,  they  enjoyed  posing  alike  to 
themselves  and  to  the  public  as  persons  of  antique 
virtue,  who  had  risked  both  life  and  reputation  in 
a  hazardous  but  successful  attempt  to  save  the 
liberties  of  the  people  from  the  vast  and  hostile 
forces  of  the  aristocratic  "money  power." 

The  best  verdict  on  the  expunging  resolution 
was  given  by  Webster  when  he  characterized  the 
whole  affair  as  one  which,  if  it  were  not  regarded  as 
a  ruthless  violation  of  a  sacred  instrument,  would 
appear  to  be  little  elevated  above  the  character  of 
a  contemptible  farce. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   DISTRIBUTION    OF   THE   SURPLUS. 

BENTON  was  supremely  self-satisfied  with  the 
part  he  had  played  in  the  struggle  with  the 
Bank.  But  very  few  thinking  men  would 
now  admit  that  his  actions,  as  a  whole,  on  the  occa 
sion  in  question,  were  to  his  credit,  although  in  the 
matter  of  the  branch  drafts  he  was  perfectly  right, 
and  in  that  of  the  recharter  at  least  occupied  de 
fensible  ground.  His  general  views  on  monetary 
matters,  however,  were  sound,  and  on  some  of  the 
financial  questions  that  shortly  arose  he  occupied 
a  rather  lonely  preeminence  of  good  sense  among 
his  fellow  senators;  such  being  particularly  the 
case  as  regards  the  various  mischievous  schemes 
in  relation  to  disposing  of  tne  public  lands,  and  of 
the  money  drawn  from  their  sale.  The  revenue 
derived  from  all  sources,  including  these  sales  of 
public  lands,  had  for  some  years  been  much  in 
excess  of  the  governmental  expenses,  and  a  sur 
plus  had  accumulated  in  the  treasury.  This  sur 
plus  worked  more  damage  than  any  deficit  would 
have  done. 

There  were  gold  mines  in  the  Southern  States, 
which  had  been  growing  more  and  more  produc 
tive  ;  and,  as  the  cost  of  freighting  the  bullion  was 

136 


The  Distribution  of  the  Surplus     137 

excessive,  a  bill  was  introduced  to  establish  branch 
mints  at  New  Orleans  and  in  the  gold  regions  of 
Georgia  and  North  Carolina.  Benton  advocated 
this  strongly,  as  a  constitutional  right  of  the  South 
and  West,  and  as  greatly  in  the  interest  of  those 
two  sections ;  and  also  as  being  another  move  in 
favor  of  a  hard-money  currency  as  opposed  to  one 
of  paper.  There  was  strong  opposition  to  the  bill ; 
many  of  the  Whigs  having  been  carried  so  far  by 
their  heated  devotion  to  the  United  States  Bank 
in  its  quarrel  that  they  had  become  paper-money 
men.  But  the  vote  was  neither  sectional  nor  par 
tisan  in  its  character.  Clay  led  the  opposition, 
while  Webster  supported  Benton. 

Before  this  time  propositions  to  distribute  among 
the  States  the  revenue  from  the  public  lands  had 
become  common;  and  they  were  succeeded  by 
propositions  to  distribute  the  lands  themselves, 
and  then  by  others  to  distribute  all  the  surplus 
revenue.  Calhoun  finally  introduced  an  amend 
ment  to  the  Constitution  to  enable  the  surplus  in 
the  treasury  during  the  next  eight  years  to  be 
distributed  among  the  various  States;  the  esti 
mate  being  that  for  the  time  mentioned  there 
would  be  about  nine  millions  surplus  annually. 
Benton  attacked  the  proposal  very  ably,  showing 
the  viciousness  of  a  scheme  which  would  degrade 
every  state  government  into  the  position  of  a 
mendicant,  and  would  allow  money  to  be  collected 


138  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

from  the  citizens  with  one  hand  in  order  to  be 
given  back  to  them  with  the  other ;  and  also  deny 
ing  that  the  surplus  would  reach  anything  like  the 
dimensions  indicated.  He  ridiculed  the  idea  of 
making  a  constitutional  amendment  to  cover  so 
short  a  period  of  time ;  and  stated  that  he  would 
greatly  prefer  to  see  the  price  paid  for  public  lands 
by  incoming  settlers  reduced,  and  what  surplus 
there  was  expended  on  strengthening  the  defenses 
of  the  United  States  against  foreign  powers.  This 
last  proposition  was  eminently  proper.  We  were 
then,  as  always,  in  our  chronic  state  of  utter  de- 
fenselessness  against  any  hostile  attack,  and  yet 
were  in  imminent  danger  of  getting  embroiled  with 
at  least  one  great  power, — France.  Our  danger 
is  always  that  we  shall  spend  too  little,  and  not  too 
much,  in  keeping  ourselves  prepared  for  foreign 
war.  Calhoun's  resolution  was  a  total  failure,  and 
was  never  even  brought  to  a  vote. 

Benton's  proposed  method  of  using  the  surplus 
came  in  with  peculiar  propriety  on  account  of  the 
conduct  of  the  Whigs  and  Nullifiers  in  joining  to 
oppose  the  appropriation  of  three  millions  of  dol 
lars  for  purposes  of  defense,  which  was  provided 
for  in  the  general  fortification  bill.  The  House 
passed  this  bill  by  a  great  majority.  It  was  emi 
nently  proper  that  we  should  at  once  take  steps 
to  provide  for  the  very  possible  contingency  of  a 
war  with  France,  as  the  relations  with  that  power 


The  Distribution  of  the  Surplus     139 

were  growing  more  threatening  every  day ;  but  the 
opposition  of  the  anti- Jackson  men  to  the  admin 
istration  and  to  all  its  measures  had  become  so 
embittered  that  they  were  willing  to  run  the  risk 
of  seriously  damaging  the  national  credit  and 
honor,  if  they  could  thereby  score  a  point  against 
their  political  adversaries.  Accordingly,  under 
the  lead  of  Webster,  Clay,  and  Calhoun,  they 
defeated  the  bill  in  the  Senate,  in  spite  of  all  that 
could  be  done  to  save  it  by  Benton,  who,  what 
ever  his  faults,  was  always  patriotic.  The  appro 
priation  had  been  very  irregular  in  form,  and 
under  ordinary  circumstances  there  would  have 
been  good  justification  for  inquiring  into  it  before 
permitting  its  passage;  but  under  the  circum 
stances  its  defeat  at  the  moment  was  most  unfor 
tunate.  For  the  President  had  been  pressing 
France,  even  to  the  point  of  tolerably  plain 
threats,  in  order  to  induce  or  compel  her  to  fulfil 
the  conditions  of  the  recent  treaty  by  which  she 
had  bound  herself  to  pay  a  considerable  indem 
nity,  long  owing  by  her  to  the  United  States  for 
depredations  on  our  commerce.  Now  she  men 
aced  war,  avowedly  on  the  ground  that  we  were 
unprepared  to  resist  her;  and  this  vote  in  the 
Senate  naturally  led  the  French  government  to 
suppose  that  Jackson  was  not  sustained  by  the 
country  in  the  vigorous  position  which  he  had 
assumed.  In  speaking  on  the  message  of  the 


140  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

President  which  alluded  to  this  state  of  affairs, 
Benton  strongly  advocated  our  standing  firmly 
for  our  rights,  making  a  good  speech,  which 
showed  much  historical  learning.  He  severely 
reproached  the  anti-administration  senators  for 
their  previous  conduct  in  causing  the  loss  of  the 
defense  appropriation  bill,  and  for  preferring  to 
do  worse  than  waste  the  surplus  by  distributing  it 
among  the  different  States  instead  of  applying  it 
according  to  the  provisions  of  that  wise  measure. 
This  brought  on  a  bitter  wrangle,  in  which  Ben- 
ton  certainly  had  the  best  of  it.  Calhoun  was  in 
favor  of  humiliating  non-resistance ;  he  never  ad 
vocated  warlike  measures  when  the  dignity  of  the 
nation  was  at  stake,  fond  though  he  was  of  threat 
ening  violence  on  behalf  of  slavery  or  that  form  of 
secession  known  as  nullification.  Benton  quoted 
from  speeches  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies 
to  show  that  the  French  were  encouraged  to  take 
the  position  that  they  did  on  account  of  the  action 
of  the  Senate,  and  the  disposition  shown  by  a  ma 
jority  among  the  senators  rather  to  pull  down  the 
President  in  a  party  struggle  than  to  uphold  him 
in  his  efforts  to  save  the  national  honor  in  a  contest 
with  France.  A  curious  feature  of  his  speech  was 
that  in  which  he  warned  the  latter  power  that,  in 
the  event  of  a  conflict,  it  would  have  to  do  with  a 
branch  of  the  same  race  which,  "from  the  days  of 
Agincourt  and  Crecy,  of  Blenheim  and  Ramillies, 


The  Distribution  of  the  Surplus     141 

down  to  the  days  of  Salamanca  and  Waterloo,  has 
always  known  perfectly  well  how  to  deal  with  the 
impetuous  and  fiery  courage  of  the  French."  This 
sudden  outcropping  of  what,  in  Bentonian  Eng 
lish,  might  be  called  Pan -Anglo-Saxon  sentiment 
was  all  the  more  surprising  inasmuch  as  both  Ben- 
ton  himself  and  the  party  to  which  he  belonged 
were  strongly  anti-English  in  their  way  of  looking 
at  our  foreign  policy,  at  least  so  far  as  North 
America  was  concerned.  In  the  end  France 
yielded,  though  trying  to  maintain  her  dignity 
by  stating  that  she  had  not  done  so,  and  the 
United  States  received  what  was  due  them. 

Benton  strongly  opposed  the  payment  by  the 
United  States  of  the  private  claims  of  its  citizens 
for  damages  arising  from  the  French  spoliations 
at  the  end  of  the  last  century.  He  pointed  out 
that  the  effort  to  pay  such  claims,  scores  of  years 
after  the  time  of  their  accruing,  rarely  benefits 
any  of  the  parties  originally  in  interest,  and  can 
only  do  real  service  to  dishonest  speculators.  His 
speech  on  this  matter  would  not  be  bad  reading 
for  some  of  the  pension- jobbing  congressmen  of 
the  present  day,  and  their  supporters ;  but  as  con 
cerned  these  French  claims  he  could  have  been 
easily  answered. 

In  the  controversy  over  the  bill  introduced  by 
Clay,  to  distribute  the  revenue  derived  from  the 
public  lands  among  the  States  for  the  next  five 


142  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

years,  Benton  showed  to  great  advantage  com 
pared  both  to  the  introducer  of  the  bill  himself, 
and  to  Webster,  his  supporter.  He  had  all  along 
taken  the  view  of  the  land  question  that  would  be 
natural  to  a  far-seeing  Western  statesman  de 
sirous  of  encouraging  immigration.  He  wished 
the  public  lands  to  be  sold  in  small  parcels  to 
actual  settlers,  at  prices  that  would  allow  any 
poor  man  who  was  thrifty  to  take  up  a  claim.  He 
had  already  introduced  a  bill  to  sell  them  at  grad 
uated  prices,  the  minimum  being  established  at  a 
dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  an  acre ;  but  if  land 
remained  unsold  at  this  rate  for  three  years  it  was 
then  to  be  sold  for  what  it  would  bring  in  the 
market.  This  bill  passed  the  Senate,  but  failed 
in  the  House. 

In  opposing  Clay's  distribution  scheme  Benton 
again  brought  forward  his  plan  of  using  the  sur 
plus  to  provide  for  the  national  defenses ;  and  in 
his  speech  showed  the  strongly  national  turn  of  his 
mind,  saying: 

In  this  great  system  of  national  defense  the  whole 
Union  is  equally  interested ;  for  the  country,  in  all  that 
concerns  its  defenses,  is  but  a  unit,  and  every  section  is 
interested  in  the  defense  of  every  other  section,  and 
every  individual  citizen  is  interested  in  the  defense  of 
the  whole  population.  It  is  in  vain  to  say  that  the 
navy  is  on  the  sea,  and  the  fortifications  on  the  sea 
board,  and  that  the  citizens  in  the  interior  States,  or  in 
the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  have  no  interest  in  these 


The  Distribution  of  the  Surplus     143 

remote  defenses.  Such  an  idea  is  mistaken  and  delu 
sive;  the  inhabitant  of  Missouri  or  of  Indiana  has  a 
direct  interest  in  keeping  open  the  mouths  of  the 
rivers,  defending  the  seaport  towns,  and  preserving 
a  naval  force  that  will  protect  the  produce  of  his  labor 
in  crossing  the  ocean  and  arriving  safely  in  foreign 
markets. 

Benton's  patriotism  always  included  the  whole 
country  in  spite  of  the  strength  of  his  local  sympa 
thies.  The  bill  passed  the  Senate  by  a  rather  close 
vote,  and  went  to  the  House,  where  it  soon  became 
evident  that  it  was  doomed  to  failure.  There  was 
another  bill,  practically  of  much  the  same  import, 
before  the  Senate,  providing  for  the  distribution 
of  the  surplus  among  the  States  in  proportion  to 
their  electoral  votes,  but  omitting  the  excellent 
proviso  concerning  the  defenses.  To  suit  the 
views  of  Calhoun  and  the  sticklers  for  strict  con 
struction  generally,  the  form  of  this  rival  bill  was 
changed,  so  that  the  "distribution"  purported  to 
be  a  "deposit"  merely;  the  money  being  nomi 
nally  only  loaned  to  the  States,  who  pledged  their 
faith  to  return  it  when  Congress  should  call  for  it. 
As  it  was  of  course  evident  that  such  a  loan  would 
never  be  repaid,  the  substitution  of  "deposit"  for 
"distribution"  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  verbal 
change  to  give  the  doctrinaires  a  loophole  for 
escape  from  their  previous  position ;  they  all  took 
advantage  of  it,  and  the  bill  received  overwhelm 
ing  support,  and  was  passed  by  both  houses. 


144  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Benton,  however,  stood  out  against  it  to  the 
last,  and  in  a  very  powerful  speech  foretold  the 
evils  which  the  plan  would  surely  work.  He 
scornfully  exposed  the  way  in  which  some  of  the 
members  were  trying,  by  a  trick  of  wording,  to 
hide  the  nature  of  the  bill  they  were  enacting  into 
a  law,  and  thus  to  seem  to  justify  themselves  for 
the  support  they  were  giving  it.  "  It  is  in  name  a 
deposit;  in  form,  a  loan;  in  essence  and  design, 
a  distribution,"  said  Benton.  He  ridiculed  the 
attitude  of  the  hair-splitting  strict  construction- 
ists,  like  Calhoun,  who  had  always  pretended  most 
scrupulously  to  respect  the  exact  wording  of  the 
Constitution,  and  who  had  previously  refused  to 
vote  for  distribution  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
unconstitutional : 

At  the  commencement  of  the  present  session  a 
proposition  was  made  [by  Calhoun]  to  amend  the 
Constitution,  to  permit  this  identical  distribution  to 
be  made.  That  proposition  is  now  upon  our  calendar, 
for  the  action  of  Congress.  All  at  once  it  is  discov 
ered  that  a  change  of  name  will  do  as  well  as  a  change 
of  the  Constitution.  Strike  out  the  word  "dis 
tribute"  and  insert  the  word  "deposit,"  and  incon 
tinently  the  impediment  is  removed;  the  constitu 
tional  difficulty  is  surmounted,  and  the  distribution 
can  be  made. 

He  showed  that  to  the  States  themselves  the 
moneys  distributed  would  either  be  useless,  or 
else — and  much  more  probably — they  would  be 


The  Distribution  of  the  Surplus     145 

fruitful  sources  of  corruption  and  political  de 
bauchery.  He  was  quite  right.  It  would  have 
been  very  much  better  to  have  destroyed  the  sur 
plus  than  to  have  distributed  it  as  was  actually 
done.  None  of  the  States  gained  any  real  benefit 
by  the  transaction ;  most  were  seriously  harmed. 
At  the  best,  the  money  was  squandered  in  the  rage 
for  public  improvements  that  then  possessed  the 
whole  people;  often  it  was  stolen  outright,  or 
never  accounted  for.  In  the  one  case,  it  was  an 
incentive  to  extravagance ;  in  the  other,  it  was  a 
corruption  fund.  Yet  the  popular  feeling  was 
strongly  in  favor  of  the  measure  at  the  time,  and 
Benton  was  almost  the  only  public  man  of  note 
who  dared  to  resist  it.  On  this  occasion,  as  in  the 
closing  act  of  the  struggle  with  the  Nullifiers,  he 
showed  more  backbone  than  did  his  great  chief; 
for  Jackson  signed  the  bill,  although  criticizing  it 
most  forcibly  and  pungently. 

The  success  of  this  measure  naturally  encour 
aged  the  presentation  of  others.  Clay  attempted  to 
revive  his  land-money  distribution  bill,  btit  was 
defeated,  mainly  through  Benton's  efforts.  Three 
or  four  other  similar  schemes,  including  one  of 
Calhoun's,  also  failed.  Finally,  a  clause  providing 
for  a  further  "  deposit "  of  surplus  moneys  with  the 
States  was  tacked  to  a  bill  appropriating  money 
for  defenses,  thereby  loading  it  down  so  that  it 
was  eventually  lost.  In  the  Senate  the  "  deposit" 

10 


146  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

amendment  was  finally  struck  out,  in  spite  of 
the  opposition  of  Clay,  Calhoun,  and  Webster. 
Throughout  the  whole  discussion  of  the  distribu 
tion  of  the  surplus  Benton  certainly  shines  by  com 
parison  with  any  one  of  his  three  great  senatorial 
rivals. 

He  shows  to  equally  great  advantage  compared 
to  them  in  the  part  taken  by  him  in  reference  to 
Jackson's  so-called  specie  circulars.  The  craze  for 
speculation  had  affected  the  sales  of  public  lands, 
which  were  increasing  at  an  extraordinary  rate, 
nearly  twenty-five  million  dollars'  worth  being  sold 
in  1836.  As  a  rule,  the  payments  were  made  in 
the  notes  of  irresponsible  banks,  gotten  up  in  many 
cases  by  the  land  speculators  themselves.  The 
sales  were  running  up  to  five  millions  a  month, 
with  prospect  of  a  boundless  increase,  so  that  all 
the  public  land  bade  fair  to  be  converted  into  in 
convertible  paper.  Benton  had  foreseen  the  evil 
results  attending  such  a  change,  and,  though  well 
aware  that  he  was  opposing  powerful  interests  in 
his  own  section  of  the  country,  had  already  tried 
to  put  a  stop  to  it  by  law.  In  his  speech  he  had 
stated  that  the  unprecedented  increase  in  the  sale 
of  public  lands  was  due  to  the  accommodations  re 
ceived  by  speculators  from  worthless  banks,  whose 
notes  in  small  denominations  would  be  taken  to 
some  distant  part  of  the  country,  whence  it  would 
be  a  long  time  before  they  were  returned  and 


The  Distribution  of  the  Surplus     147 

presented  for  payment.  The  speculators,  with 
paper  of  which  the  real  value  was  much  below  par, 
could  outbid  settlers  and  cultivators  who  could  only 
offer  specie,  or  notes  that  were  its  equivalent.  He 
went  on  to  say  that* 'the  effect  was  equally  injurious 
to  every  interest  concerned — except  the  banks  and 
the  speculators :  it  was  injurious  to  the  treasury, 
which  was  filling  up  with  paper ;  to  the  new  States, 
which  were  flooded  with  paper ;  and  to  settlers  and 
cultivators,  who  were  outbid  by  speculators  loaded 
with  this  borrowed  paper.  A  return  to  specie 
payments  for  lands  was  the  remedy  for  all  these 
evils/' 

Benton's  reasoning  was  perfectly  sound.  The 
effects  on  settlers,  on  the  new  States,  and  on  the 
government  itself  were  precisely  such  as  he  de 
scribed,  and  the  proposed  remedy  was  the  right 
one.  But  his  bill  failed ;  for  the  Whigs,  including 
even  Webster,  had  by  this  time  worked  themselves 
up  until  they  were  fairly  crazy  at  the  mere  mention 
of  paper-money  banks. 

Jackson,  however,  not  daunted  by  the  fate  of 
the  bill,  got  Benton  to  draw  up  a  treasury  order, 
and  had  it  issued.  This  served  the  same  purpose, 
as  it  forbade  the  land  offices  to  receive  anything 
but  gold  and  silver  in  payment  for  land.  It  was 
not  issued  until  Congress  had  adjourned,  for  fear 
that  body  might  counteract  it  by  a  law ;  and  this 
was  precisely  what  was  attempted  at  the  next 


148  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

session,  when  a  joint  resolution  was  passed  rescind 
ing  the  order,  and  practically  endeavoring  to  im 
pose  the  worthless  paper  currency  of  the  States 
upon  the  federal  government.  Benton  stood 
almost  alone  in  the  fight  he  made  against  this 
resolution,  although  the  right  of  the  matter  was 
so  plainly  on  his  side.  In  his  speech  he  foretold 
clearly  the  coming  of  the  great  financial  crisis  that 
was  then  near  at  hand.  The  resolution,  however, 
amounted  to  nothing,  as  it  turned  out,  for  it  was 
passed  so  late  in  the  session  that  the  President,  by 
simply  withholding  his  signature  from  it,  was 
enabled  to  prevent  it  from  having  effect. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE    SLAVE    QUESTION    APPEARS    IN    POLITICS. 

TOWARD  the  close   of    Jackson's   adminis 
tration,  slavery  for  the  first  time  made  its 
permanent  appearance  in  national  politics ; 
although  for  some  years  yet  it  had  little  or  no  in 
fluence  in  shaping  the  course  of  political  move 
ments.     In   1833   the  abolition  societies  of  the 
North  came   into   prominence;    they  had  been 
started  a  couple  of  years  previously. 

Black  slavery  was  such  a  grossly  anachronistic 
and  un-American  form  of  evil,  that  it  is  difficult 
to  discuss  calmly  the  efforts  to  abolish  it,  and  to 
remember  that  many  of  these  efforts  were  calcu 
lated  to  do,  and  actually  did,  more  harm  than 
good.  We  are  also  very  apt  to  forget  that  it  was 
perfectly  possible  and  reasonable  for  enlightened 
and  virtuous  men,  who  fully  recognized  it  as  an 
evil,  yet  to  prefer  its  continuance  to  having  it 
interfered  with  in  a  way  that  would  produce  even 
worse  results.  Black  slavery  in  Hayti  was  char 
acterized  by  worse  abuse  than  ever  was  the  case 
in  the  United  States ;  yet,  looking  at  the  condition 
of  that  republic  now,  it  may  well  be  questioned 
whether  it  would  not  have  been  greatly  to  her 
benefit  in  the  end  to  have  had  slavery  continue  a 

149 


150  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

century  or  so  longer, — its  ultimate  extinction 
being  certain, — rather  than  to  have  had  her  attain 
freedom  as  she  actually  did,  with  the  results  that 
have  flowed  from  her  action.  When  an  evil  of 
colossal  size  exists,  it  is  often  the  case  that  there 
is  no  possible  way  of  dealing  with  it  that  will  not 
itself  be  fraught  with  baleful  results.  Nor  can 
the  ultra-philanthropic  method  be  always,  or  even 
often,  accepted  as  the  best.  If  there  is  one  ques 
tion  upon  which  the  philanthropists  of  the  present 
day,  especially  the  more  emotional  ones,  are 
agreed,  it  is  that  any  law  restricting  Chinese  im 
migration  is  an  outrage ;  yet  it  seems  incredible 
that  any  man  of  even  moderate  intelligence  should 
not  see  that  no  greater  calamity  could  now  befall 
the  United  States  than  to  have  the  Pacific  slope 
fill  up  with  a  Mongolian  population. 

The  cause  of  the  Abolitionists  has  had  such  a 
halo  shed  round  it  by  the  after  course  of  events, 
which  they  themselves  in  reality  did  very  little  to 
shape,  that  it  has  been  usual  to  speak  of  them 
with  absurdly  exaggerated  praise.  Their  cour 
age,  and  for  the  most  part  their  sincerity,  cannot 
be  too  highly  spoken  of,  but  their  share  in  abolish 
ing  slavery  was  far  less  than  has  commonly  been 
represented ;  any  single  non-abolitionist  politician, 
like  Lincoln  or  Seward,  did  more  than  all  the 
professional  Abolitionists  combined  really  to  bring 
about  its  destruction.  The  abolition  societies 


Slave  Question  in  Politics         151 

were  only  in  a  very  restricted  degree  the  causes 
of  the  growing  feeling  in  the  North  against  slav 
ery  ;  they  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as  themselves 
manifestations  or  accompaniments  of  that  feeling. 
The  anti-slavery  outburst  in  the  Northern  States 
over  the  admission  of  Missouri  took  place  a  dozen 
years  before  there  was  an  abolition  society  in 
existence;  and  the  influence  of  the  professional 
Abolitionists  upon  the  growth  of  the  anti-slavery 
sentiment  as  often  as  not  merely  warped  it  and 
twisted  it  out  of  proper  shape, — as  when  at  one 
time  they  showed  a  strong  inclination  to  adopt 
disunion  views,  although  it  was  self-evident  that 
by  no  possibility  could  slavery  be  abolished  unless 
the  Union  was  preserved.  Their  tendency  toward 
impracticable  methods  was  well  shown  in  the  posi 
tion  they  assumed  toward  him  who  was  not  only 
the  greatest  American,  but  also  the  greatest  man, 
of  the  nineteenth  century ;  for  during  all  the  ter 
rible  four  years  that  sad,  strong,  patient  Lincoln 
worked  and  suffered  for  the  people,  he  had  to 
dread  the  influence  of  the  extreme  Abolitionists 
only  less  than  that  of  the  Copperheads.  Many 
of  their  leaders  possessed  no  good  qualities  beyond 
their  fearlessness  and  truth — qualities  that  were 
also  possessed  by  the  Southern  fire-eaters.  They 
belonged  to  that  class  of  men  that  is  always  en 
gaged  in  some  agitation  or  other;  only  it  hap 
pened  that  in  this  particular  agitation  they  were 


152  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

right.  Wendell  Phillips  may  be  taken  as  a  very 
good  type  of  the  whole.  His  services  against 
slavery  prior  to  the  war  should  always  be  remem 
bered  with  gratitude ;  but  after  the  war,  and  until 
the  day  of  his  death,  his  position  on  almost  every 
public  question  was  either  mischievous  or  ridicu 
lous,  and  usually  both. 

When  the  abolitionist  movement  started  it  was 
avowedly  designed  to  be  cosmopolitan  in  charac 
ter  ;  the  originators  looked  down  upon  any  merely 
national  or  patriotic  feeling.  This  again  deserv 
edly  took  away  from  their  influence.  In  fact,  it 
would  have  been  most  unfortunate  had  the  major 
ity  of  the  Northerners  been  from  the  beginning  in 
hearty  accord  with  the  Abolitionists ;  at  the  best 
it  would  have  resulted  at  that  time  in  the  disrup 
tion  of  the  Union  and  the  perpetuation  of  slavery 
in  the  South. 

But  after  all  is  said,  the  fact  remains,  that  on 
the  main  issue  the  Abolitionists  were  at  least 
working  in  the  right  direction.  Sooner  or  later, 
by  one  means  or  another,  slavery  had  to  go.  It 
is  beyond  doubt  a  misfortune  that  in  certain  dis 
tricts  the  bulk  of  the  population  should  be  com 
posed  of  densely  ignorant  negroes,  often  criminal 
or  vicious  in  their  instincts ;  but  such  is  the  case, 
and  the  best,  and  indeed  the  only  proper  course  to 
pursue,  is  to  treat  them  with  precisely  the  same 
justice  that  is  meted  out  to  whites.  The  effort  to 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          153 

do  so  in  time  immediately  past  has  not  resulted  so 
successfully  as  was  hoped  and  expected;  but 
nevertheless  no  other  way  would  have  worked  as 
well. 

Slavery  was  chiefly  responsible  for  the  streak  of 
coarse  and  brutal  barbarism  which  ran  through 
the  Southern  character,  and  which  marked  the 
ferocious  outcry  instantly  raised  by  the  whole 
Southern  press  against  the  Abolitionists.  There 
had  been  an  abortive  negro  rising  in  Virginia 
almost  at  the  same  time  that  the  abolitionist 
movement  first  came  into  prominence;  and  this 
fact  added  to  the  rage  and  terror  with  which  the 
South  regarded  the  latter.  The  clamor  against 
the  North  was  deafening ;  and  though  it  soon  sub 
sided  for  the  time  being,  it  never  afterward  en 
tirely  died  away.  As  has  been  shown  already, 
there  had  always  been  a  strong  separatist  feeling 
in  the  South ;  but  hitherto  its  manifestations  had 
been  local  and  sporadic,  never  affecting  all  the 
States  at  the  same  time;  for  it  had  never  hap 
pened  that  the  cause  which  called  forth  any  par 
ticular  manifestation  was  one  bearing  on  the 
whole  South  alike.  The  alien  and  sedition  laws 
were  more  fiercely  resented  in  Virginia  and  Ken 
tucky  than  in  South  Carolina ;  the  tariff,  which  so 
angered  the  latter,  pleased  Louisiana;  and 
Georgia  and  Alabama  alone  were  affected  by  the 
presence  of  great  Indian  communities  within  their 


154  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

borders.  But  slavery  was  an  interest  common  to 
the  whole  South.  When  it  was  felt  to  be  in  any 
way  menaced,  all  Southerners  came  together  for 
its  protection;  and,  from  the  time  of  the  rise  of 
the  Abolitionists  onward,  the  separatist  move 
ment  throughout  the  South  began  to  identify  itself 
with  the  maintenance  of  slavery,  and  gradually  to 
develop  greater  and  greater  strength.  Its  growth 
was  furthered  and  hastened  by  the  actions  of  the 
more  ambitious  and  unscrupulous  of  the  Southern 
politicians,  who  saw  that  it  offered  a  chance  for 
them  to  push  themselves  forward,  and  who  were 
perfectly  willing  to  wreak  almost  irreparable  harm 
to  the  nation  if  by  so  doing  they  could  advance 
their  own  selfish  interests.  It  was  in  reference 
to  these  politicians  that  Benton  quoted  with 
approval  a  letter  from  ex-President  Madison, 
which  ran: 

The  danger  is  not  to  be  concealed,  that  the  sym 
pathy  arising  from  known  causes,  and  the  inculcated 
impression  of  a  permanent  incompatibility  of  interests 
between  the  South  and  the  North  may  put  it  in  the 
power  of  popular  leaders,  aspiring  to  the  highest  sta 
tions,  to  unite  the  South,  on  some  critical  occasion, 
in  a  course  that  will  end  by  creating  a  new  theatre  of 
great,  though  inferior,  interest.  In  pursuing  this 
course  the  first  and  most  obvious  step  is  nullification, 
the  next  secession,  and  the  last  a  farewell  separation. 

This  was  a  pretty  good  forecast  of  the  crisis 
that  was  precipitated  by  the  greedy  and  reckless 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          155 

ambition  of  the  secessionist  leaders  in  1860.  The 
moral  difference  between  Benedict  Arnold  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Aaron  Burr  or  Jefferson  Davis  on 
the  other,  is  precisely  the  difference  that  obtains 
between  a  politician  who  sells  his  vote  for  money 
and  one  who  supports  a  bad  measure  in  consider 
ation  of  being  given  some  high  political  position. 

The  Abolitionists  immediately  contrived  to 
bring  themselves  before  the  notice  of  Congress  in 
two  ways ;  by  the  presentation  of  petitions  for  the 
abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
and  by  sending  out  to  the  Southern  States  a  shoal 
of  abolition  pamphlets,  newspapers,  and  rather 
ridiculous  illustrated  cuts.  What  the  precise 
point  of  the  last  proceeding  was  no  one  can  tell; 
the  circulation  of  such  writings  as  theirs  in  the 
South  could  not  possibly  serve  any  good  purpose. 
But  they  had  a  right  to  send  what  they  wished, 
and  the  conduct  of  many  of  the  Southerners  in 
trying  to  get  a  federal  law  passed  to  prohibit  their 
writings  from  being  carried  in  the  mail  was  as 
wrong  as  it  was  foolish;  while  the  brutal  clamor 
raised  in  the  South  against  the  whole  North  as 
well  as  against  the  Abolitionists,  and  the  conduct 
of  certain  Southern  legislatures,  in  practically 
setting  prices  on  the  heads  of  the  leaders  in  the 
objectionable  movement,  in  turn  angered  the 
North  and  gave  the  Abolitionists  tenfold  greater 
strength  than  they  would  otherwise  have  had. 


156  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

The  question  first  arose  upon  the  presentation 
of  a  perfectly  proper  and  respectful  petition  sent 
to  the  Senate  by  a  society  of  Pennsylvania  Qua 
kers,  and  praying  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia.  The  District  was  solely 
under  the  control  of  Congress,  and  was  the  prop 
erty  of  the  nation  at  large,  so  that  Congress  was 
the  proper  and  the  only  body  to  which  any  peti 
tion  concerning  the  affairs  of  the  District  could  be 
sent ;  and  if  the  right  of  petition  meant  anything, 
it  certainly  meant  that  the  people,  or  any  portion 
thereof,  should  have  the  right  to  petition  their 
representatives  in  regard  to  their  own  affairs.  Yet 
certain  Southern  extremists,  under  the  lead  of  Cal- 
houn,  were  anxious  to  refuse  to  receive  the  paper. 
Benton  voted  in  favor  of  receiving  it,  and  was 
followed  in  his  action  by  a  number  of  other  South 
ern  senators.  He  spoke  at  length  on  the  subject, 
and  quite  moderately,  even  crediting  the  petition 
ers,  or  many  of  them,  with  being  "good  people, 
aiming  at  benevolent  objects,  and  endeavoring  to 
ameliorate  the  condition  of  one  part  of  the  human 
race,  without  inflicting  calamities  on  another 
part,"  which  was  going  very  far  indeed  for  a  slave- 
holding  senator  of  that  time.  He  was  of  course 
totally  opposed  to  abolition  and  the  Abolitionists, 
and  showed  that  the  only  immediate  effect  of  the 
movement  had  been  to  make  the  lot  of  the  slaves 
still  worse,  and  for  the  moment  to  do  away  with 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          157 

any  chance  of  intelligently  discussing  the  question 
of  emancipation.  For,  like  many  other  South 
erners,  he  fondly  cherished  the  idea  of  gradual 
peaceful  emancipation, — an  idea  which  the  course 
of  events  made  wholly  visionary,  but  which,  under 
the  circumstances,  might  well  have  been  realized. 
He  proceeded  to  give  most  questionable  praise  to 
the  North  for  some  acts  as  outrageous  and  dis 
graceful  as  were  ever  perpetrated  by  its  citizens, 
stating  that — 

Their  conduct  was  above  all  praise,  above  all 
thanks,  above  all  gratitude.  They  had  chased  off 
the  foreign  emissaries,  silenced  the  gabbling  tongues 
of  female  dupes,  and  dispersed  the  assemblages, 
whether  fanatical,  visionary,  or  incendiary,  of  all  that 
congregated  to  preach  against  evils  that  affected 
others,  not  themselves;  and  to  propose  remedies  to 
aggravate  the  disease  which  they  had  pretended  to 
cure.  They  had  acted  with  a  noble  spirit.  They 
had  exerted  a  vigor  beyond  all  law.  They  had 
obeyed  the  enactments,  not  of  the  statute-book,  but 
of  the  heart. 

These  fervent  encomiums  were  fully  warranted 
by  the  acts  of  various  Northern  mobs,  that  had 
maltreated  abolitionist  speakers,  broken  up  anti- 
slavery  meetings,  and  committed  numerous  other 
deeds  of  lawless  violence.  But  however  flattered 
the  Northerners  of  that  generation  may  have  been, 
in  feeling  that  they  thoroughly  deserved  Benton's 
eulogy,  it  is  doubtful  if  their  descendants  will 


158  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

take  quite  the  same  pride  in  looking  back  to  it. 
An  amusing  incident  of  the  debate  was  Calhoun's 
attack  upon  one  of  the  most  subservient  allies  the 
South  ever  had  in  the  Northern  States ;  he  caused 
to  be  sent  up  to  the  desk  and  read  an  abolition 
paper  published  in  New  Hampshire,  which  con 
tained  a  bitter  assault  upon  Franklin  Pierce,  then 
a  member  of  Congress.  Nominally  he  took  this 
course  to  show  that  there  was  much  greater 
strength  in  the  abolition  movement,  and  therefore 
much  greater  danger  to  the  South,  than  the  North 
ern  senators  were  willing  to  admit;  in  reality  he 
seems  to  have  acted  partly  from  wanton  malice, 
partly  from  overbearing  contempt  for  the  truck 
ling  allies  and  apologists  of  slavery  in  the  North, 
and  partly  from  a  desire  not  to  see  the  discussion 
die  out,  but  rather,  in  spite  of  his  continual  profes 
sion  to  the  contrary,  to  see  it  maintained  as  a 
standing  subject  of  irritation.  He  wished  to  refuse 
to  receive  the  petitions,  on  the  ground  that  they 
touched  a  subject  that  ought  not  even  to  be  dis 
cussed  ;  yet  he  must  have  known  well  that  he  was 
acting  in  the  very  way  most  fitted  to  give  rise  to 
discussion, — a  fact  that  was  pointed  out  to  him  by 
Benton,  in  a  caustic  speech.  He  also  took  the 
ground  that  the  question  of  emancipation  affected 
the  States  exclusively,  and  that  Congress  had  no 
more  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  in  the  District 
of  Columbia  than  she  had  in  the  State  of  North 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          159 

Carolina.  This  precious  contribution  to  the  true 
interpretation  of  the  Constitution  was  so  farcically 
and  palpably  false  that  it  is  incredible  that  he 
should  himself  have  believed  what  he  was  saying. 
He  was  still  smarting  from  the  nullification  con 
troversy  ;  he  had  seceded  from  his  party,  and  was 
sore  with  disappointed  ambition;  and  it  seems 
very  improbable  that  he  was  honest  in  his  profes 
sions  of  regret  at  seeing  questions  come  up  which 
would  disturb  the  Union.  On  the  contrary,  much 
of  the  opposition  he  was  continually  making  to 
supposititious  federal  and  Northern  encroach 
ments  on  the  rights  of  the  South  must  have  been 
merely  factious,  and  it  seems  likely  that,  partly 
from  a  feeling  of  revenge  and  partly  with  the  hope 
of  gratifying  his  ambition,  he  was  anxious  to  do 
all  he  could  to  work  the  South  up  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  irritation,  and  keep  her  there  until  there 
was  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Benton  evidently 
thought  that  this  was  the  case ;  and  in  reading  the 
constant  threats  of  nullification  and  secession 
which  run  through  all  Calhoun's  speeches,  and  the 
innumerable  references  he  makes  to  the  alleged 
fact  that  he  had  come  off  victorious  in  his  treason 
able  struggle  over  the  tariff  in  1833,  it  is  difficult 
not  to  accept  Benton's  view  of  the  matter.  He 
always  spoke  of  Calhoun  with  extreme  aversion, 
and  there  were  probably  moments  when  he  was 
inclined  heartily  to  sympathize  with  Jackson's 


160  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

death-bed  regret  that  he  had  not  hung  the  South 
Carolina  Nullifier.  Doubtless  in  private  life,  or 
as  regards  any  financial  matters,  Calhoun's  con 
duct  was  always  blameless;  but  it  may  well  be 
that  he  has  received  far  more  credit  for  purity  of 
motive  in  his  public  conduct  than  his  actions  fairly 
entitle  him  to. 

Calhoun  was  also  greatly  exercised  over  the  cir 
culation  of  abolition  documents  in  the  South.  At 
his  request  a  committee  of  five  was  appointed  to 
draft  a  bill  on  the  subject ;  he  was  chairman,  and 
three  of  the  other  four  members  were  from  the 
slave  States;  yet  his  report  was  so  extreme  that 
only  one  of  the  latter  would  sign  it  with  him.  He 
introduced  into  it  a  long  argument  to  the  effect 
that  the  Constitution  was  a  mere  compact  between 
sovereign  states,  and  inferentially  that  nullifica 
tion  and  secession  were  justifiable  and  constitu 
tional;  and  then  drew  a  vivid  picture  of  the 
unspeakable  horrors  with  which,  as  he  contended, 
the  action  of  the  Northern  Abolitionists  menaced 
the  South.  The  bill  subjected  to  penalties  any 
postmaster  who  should  knowingly  receive  and 
put  into  the  mail  any  publication  touching  slavery, 
to  go  into  any  State  which  had  forbidden  by  law 
the  circulation  of  such  a  publication.  In  discuss 
ing*  this  bill  he  asserted  that  Congress,  in  refusing 
to  pass  it,  would  be  cooperating  with  the  Aboli 
tionists  ;  and  then  he  went  on  to  threaten  as  usual 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          161 

that  in  such  case  nullification  or  secession  would 
become  necessary.  Benton  had  become  pretty 
well  tired  of  these  threats,  his  attachment  to  the 
Union  even  exceeding  his  dislike  to  seeing  slavery 
meddled  with;  and  he  headed  the  list  of  half  a 
dozen  Southern  senators  who  joined  with  the  bulk 
of  the  Northerners  in  defeating  the  bill,  which 
was  lost  by  a  vote  of  twenty-five  to  nineteen.  A 
few  of  the  Northern  " dough-faces"  voted  with 
Calhoun.  There  is  a  painfully  striking  contrast 
between  the  courage  shown  by  Benton,  a  slave 
holder  with  a  slaveholding  constituency,  in  op 
posing  this  bill,  and  the  obsequious  subserviency 
to  the  extreme  Southern  feeling  shown  on  the 
same  occasion  by  Wright,  Van  Buren,  and  Bu 
chanan — fit  representatives  of  the  sordid  and 
odious  political  organizations  of  New  York  and 
Pennsylvania. 

Several  other  questions  came  up  toward  the  end 
of  Jackson's  administration  which  were  more  or 
less  remotely  affected  by  the  feeling  about  slavery. 
Benton  succeeded  in  getting  a  bill  through  to 
extend  the  boundaries  of  the  State  of  Missouri  so 
as  to  take  in  territory  lying  northwest  of  her  pre 
vious  limit,  the  Indian  title  to  which  was  extin 
guished  by  treaty.  This  annexed  land  lay  north 
of  the  boundary  for  slave  territory  established  by 
the  Missouri  Compromise ;  but  Benton  experi 
enced  no  difficulty  in  getting  his  bill  through.  It 
ii 


i6a  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

was  not,  however,  in  the  least  a  move  designed  in 
the  interests  of  the  slave  power.  Missouri's  feeling 
was  precisely  that  which  would  actuate  Oregon  or 
Washington  Territory  to-day,  if  either  wished  to 
annex  part  of  northern  Idaho. 

The  territories  of  Arkansas  and  Michigan  had 
applied  for  admission  into  the  Union  as  States; 
and  as  one  would  be  a  free  and  the  other  a  slave 
State,  it  was  deemed  proper  that  they  should  come 
in  together.  Benton  himself  urged  the  admission 
of  the  free  State  of  Michigan,  while  the  interests 
of  Arkansas  were  confided  to  Buchanan  of  Penn 
sylvania.  The  slavery  question  entered  but  little 
into  the  matter;  although  some  objections  were 
raised  on  that  score,  as  well  as  on  account  of  the 
irregular  manner  in  which  the  would-be  States 
had  acted  in  preparing  for  admission.  The  real 
ground  of  opposition  to  the  admission  of  the  two 
new  States  was  political,  as  it  was  known  that 
they  could  both  be  relied  upon  for  Democratic 
majorities  at  the  approaching  presidential  election. 
Many  Whigs,  therefore,  both  from  the  North  and 
the  South,  opposed  it. 

The  final  removal  of  the  Cherokees  from  Georgia 
and  Alabama  was  brought  about  in  1836  by  means 
of  a  treaty  with  those  Indians.  Largely  through 
the  instrumentality  of  Benton,  and  in  spite  of  the 
opposition  of  Clay,  Calhoun,  and  Webster,  this 
instrument  was  ratified  in  the  Senate  by  the  close 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          163 

vote  of  thirty-one  to  fifteen.  Although  new  slave 
territory  was  thus  acquired,  the  vote  on  the  treaty 
was  fractional  and  not  sectional,  being  equally 
divided  between  the  Northern  and  the  Southern 
States,  Calhoun  and  six  other  Southern  senators 
opposing  it,  chiefly  from  hostility  to  the  adminis 
tration.  The  removal  of  the  Indians  was  prob 
ably  a  necessity ;  undoubtedly  it  worked  hardship 
in  individual  instances,  but  on  the  whole  it  did  not 
in  the  least  retard  the  civilization  of  the  tribe, 
which  was  fully  paid  for  its  losses ;  and  moreover, 
in  its  new  home,  continued  to  make  progress  in 
every  way  until  it  became  involved  in  the  great 
Civil  War,  and  received  a  setback  from  which  it 
has  not  yet  recovered.  These  Cherokees  were 
almost  the  last  Indians  left  in  any  number  east  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  their  removal  solved  the 
Indian  problem  so  far  as  the  old  States  were  con 
cerned. 

Later  on,  Benton  went  to  some  trouble  to  dis 
prove  the  common  statement  that  we  have  robbed 
the  original  Indian  occupants  of  their  lands.  He 
showed  by  actual  statistics  that  up  to  1840  we  had 
paid  to  the  Indians  eighty-five  millions  of  dollars 
for  land  purchases,  which  was  over  five  times  as 
much  as  the  United  States  gave  the  great  Napo 
leon  for  Louisiana ;  and  about  three  times  as  much 
as  we  paid  France,  Spain,  and  Mexico  together  for 
the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  Florida,  and  California ; 


164  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

while  the  amount  of  land  received  in  return  would 
not  equal  any  one  of  these  purchases,  and  was  but 
a  fractional  part  of  Louisiana  or  California.  We 
paid  the  Cherokee s  for  their  territory  exactly  as 
much  as  we  paid  the  French,  at  the  height  of  their 
power,  for  Louisiana;  while  as  to  the  Creek  and 
Choctaw  nations,  we  paid  each  more  for  their  lands 
than  we  paid  for  Louisiana  and  Florida  combined. 
The  dealings  of  the  government  with  the  Indian 
have  often  been  unwise,  and  sometimes  unjust; 
but  they  are  very  far  indeed  from  being  so  black 
as  is  commonly  represented,  especially  when  the 
tremendous  difficulties  of  the  case  are  taken  into 
account. 

Far  more  important  than  any  of  these  matters 
was  the  acknowledgment  of  the  independence  of 
Texas ;  and  in  this,  as  well  as  in  the  troubles  with 
Mexico  which  sprang  from  it,  slavery  again  played 
a  prominent  part,  although  not  nearly  so  impor 
tant  at  first  as  has  commonly  been  represented. 
Doubtless  the  slaveholders  worked  hard  to  secure 
additional  territory  out  of  which  to  form  new 
slave  States ;  but  Texas  and  California  would  have 
been  in  the  end  taken  by  us,  had  there  not  been  a 
single  slave  in  the  Mississippi  valley.  The  greed 
for  the  conquest  of  new  lands  which  characterized 
the  Western  people  had  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  the  fact  that  some  of  them  owned  slaves. 
Long  before  there  had  been  so  much  as  the  faintest 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          165 

foreshadowing  of  the  importance  which  the 
slavery  question  was  to  assume,  the  West  had 
been  eagerly  pressing  on  to  territorial  conquest, 
and  had  been  chafing  and  fretting  at  the  restraint 
put  upon  it,  and  at  the  limits  set  to  its  strivings  by 
the  treaties  established  with  foreign  powers.  The 
first  settlers  beyond  the  Alleghanies,  and  their 
immediate  successors,  who  moved  down  along  the 
banks  of  the  Ohio,  the  Cumberland,  and  the  Ten 
nessee,  and  thence  out  to  the  Mississippi  itself, 
were  not  generally  slaveholders;  but  they  were 
all  as  anxious  to  wrest  the  Mississippi  valley  from 
the  control  of  the  French  as  their  descendants 
were  to  overrun  the  Spanish  lands  lying  along  the 
Rio  Grande.  In  other  words,  slavery  had  very 
little  to  do  with  the  Western  aggressions  on  Mex 
ican  territory,  however  it  might  influence  the 
views  of  Southern  statesmen  as  to  lending  support 
to  the  Western  schemes. 

The  territorial  boundaries  of  all  the  great  powers 
originally  claiming  the  soil  of  the  West — France, 
Spain,  and  the  United  States — were  very  ill- 
defined,  there  being  no  actual  possession  of  the 
lands  in  dispute,  and  each  power  making  a  great 
showing  on  its  own  map.  If  the  extreme  views  of 
any  one  were  admitted,  its  adversary,  for  the  time 
being,  would  have  had  nothing.  Thus  before  the 
treaty  of  1819  with  Spain  our  nominal  boundaries 
and  those  of  the  latter  power  in  the  West  over- 


166  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

lapped  each  other ;  and  the  extreme  Western  men 
persisted  in  saying  that  we  had  given  up  some  of 
the  territory  which  belonged  to  us  because  we  had 
consented  to  adopt  the  middle  line  of  division,  and 
had  not  insisted  upon  being  allowed  the  full  extent 
of  our  claims.  Benton  always  took  this  view  of  it, 
insisting  that  we  had  given  up  our  rights  by  the 
adoption  of  this  treaty.  Many  Southerners  im 
proved  on  this  idea,  and  spoke  of  the  desirability 
of  "  reannexing"  the  territory  we  had  surrendered, 
endeavoring  by  the  use  of  this  very  inappropriate 
word  to  give  a  color  of  right  to  their  proceedings. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  inevitable,  as  well  as  in 
the  highest  degree  desirable  for  the  good  of  human 
ity  at  large,  that  the  American  people  should  ulti 
mately  crowd  out  the  Mexicans  from  their  sparsely 
populated  northern  provinces.  But  it  was  quite 
as  desirable  that  this  should  not  be  done  in  the 
interests  of  slavery. 

American  settlers  had  begun  to  press  into  the 
outlying  Spanish  province  of  Texas  before  the 
treaty  of  1819  was  ratified.  Their  numbers  went 
on  increasing,  and  at  first  the  Mexican  govern 
ment,  having  achieved  independence  of  Spain, 
encouraged  their  incoming.  But  it  soon  saw  that 
their  presence  boded  danger,  and  forbade  further 
immigration ;  without  effect,  however,  as  the  set 
tlers  and  adventurers  came  thronging  in  as  fast  as 
ever.  The  Americans  had  brought  their  slaves 


Slave  Question  in  Politics         167 

with  them,  and  when  the  Mexican  government 
issued  a  decree  liberating  all  slaves,  they  refused 
to  be  bound  by  it ;  and  this  decree  was  among  the 
reasons  alleged  for  their  revolt.  It  has  been  repre 
sented  as  the  chief  if  not  the  sole  cause  of  the 
rebellion;  but  in  reality  it  was  not  the  cause  at 
all;  it  was  merely  one  of  the  occasions.  Long 
before  slavery  had  been  abolished  in  Mexico,  and 
before  it  had  become  an  exciting  question  in  the 
United  States,  the  infant  colony  of  Texas,  when 
but  a  few  months  old,  had  made  an  abortive 
attempt  at  insurrection.  Any  one  who  has  ever 
been  on  the  frontier,  and  who  knows  anything 
whatever  of  the  domineering,  masterful  spirit  and 
bitter  race  prejudices  of  the  white  frontiersmen, 
will  acknowledge  at  once  that  it  was  out  of  the 
question  that  the  Texans  should  long  continue 
under  Mexican  rule;  and  it  would  have  been  a 
great  misfortune  if  they  had.  It  was  out  of  the 
question  to  expect  them  to  submit  to  the  mastery 
of  the  weaker  race,  which  they  were  supplanting. 
Whatever  might  be  the  pretexts  alleged  for  revolt 
the  real  reasons  were  to  be  found  in  the  deeply 
marked  difference  of  race,  and  in  the  absolute 
unfitness  of  the  Mexicans  then  to  govern  them 
selves,  to  say  nothing  of  governing  others.  During 
the  dozen  years  that  the  American  colony  in  Texas 
formed  part  of  Mexico,  the  government  of  the 
latter  went  through  revolution  after  revolution, — 


168  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

republic,  empire,  and  military  dictatorship  fol 
lowing  one  another  in  bewildering  succession. 
A  state  of  things  like  this  in  the  central  govern 
ment,  especially  when  the  latter  belonged  to  a  race 
alien  in  blood,  language,  religion,  and  habits  of 
life,  would  warrant  any  community  in  determining 
to  shift  for  itself.  Such  would  probably  have  been 
the  result  even  on  people  as  sober  and  peaceable 
as  the  Texan  settlers  were  warlike,  reckless,  and 
overbearing. 

But  the  majority  of  those  who  fought  for  Texan 
independence  were  not  men  who  had  already  set 
tled  in  that  territory,  but,  on  the  contrary,  were 
adventurers  from  the  States,  who  had  come  to  help 
their  kinsmen  and  to  win  for  themselves,  by  their 
own  prowess,  homes  on  what  was  then  Mexican 
soil.  It  may  as  well  be  frankly  admitted  that  the 
conduct  of  the  American  frontiersmen  all  through 
this  contest  can  be  justified  on  no  possible  plea  of 
international  morality  or  law.  Still,  we  cannot 
judge  them  by  the  same  standard  we  should  apply 
to  the  dealings  between  highly  civilized  powers  of 
approximately  the  same  grade  of  virtue  and  intel 
ligence.  Two  nations  may  be  contemporaneous 
so  far  as  mere  years  go,  and  yet,  for  all  that,  may 
be  existing  among  surroundings  which  practically 
are  centuries  apart.  The  nineteenth  century  on 
the  banks  of  the  Thames,  the  Seine,  and  the  Rhine, 
or  even  of  the  Hudson  and  the  Potomac,  was  one 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          169 

thing ;  the  nineteenth  century  in  the  valley  of  the 
Rio  Grande  was  another  and  quite  a  different 
thing. 

The  conquest  of  Texas  should  properly  be  classed 
with  conquests  like  those  of  the  Norse  sea-rovers. 
The  virtues  and  faults  alike  of  the  Texans  were 
those  of  a  barbaric  age .  They  were  restless,  brave , 
and  eager  for  adventure,  excitement,  and  plunder; 
they  were  warlike,  resolute,  and  enterprising ;  they 
had  all  the  marks  of  a  young  and  hardy  race, 
flushed  with  the  pride  of  strength  and  self-confi 
dence.  On  the  other  hand,  they  showed  again  and 
again  the  barbaric  vices  of  boastfulness,  ignorance, 
and  cruelty ;  and  they  were  utterly  careless  of  the 
rights  of  others,  looking  upon  the  possessions  of 
all  weaker  races  as  simply  their  natural  prey.  A 
band  of  settlers  entering  Texas  was  troubled  by  no 
greater  scruples  of  conscience  than,  a  thousand 
years  before,  a  shipload  of  Knut's  followers  might 
have  felt  at  landing  in  England;  and  when  they 
were  engaged  in  warfare  with  the  Mexicans  they 
could  count  with  certainty  upon  assistance  from 
their  kinsfolk  who  had  been  left  behind,  and  for 
the  same  reasons  that  had  enabled  Rolf's  Norse 
men  on  the  seacoast  of  France  to  rely  confidently 
on  Scandinavian  help  in  their  quarrels  with  their 
Karling  over-lords.  The  great  Texan  hero,  Hous 
ton,  who  drank  hard  and  fought  hard,  who  was 
mighty  in  battle  and  crafty  in  council,  with  his 


170  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

reckless,  boastful  courage  and  his  thirst  for 
changes  and  risks  of  all  kinds,  his  propensity 
for  private  brawling,  and  his  queerly  blended 
impulses  for  good  and  evil,  might,  with  very 
superficial  alterations  of  character,  stand  as  the 
type  of  an  old  world  Viking — plus  the  virtue  of  a 
deep  and  earnestly  patriotic  attachment  to  his 
whole  country.  Indeed  his  career  was  as  pic 
turesque  and  romantic  as  that  of  Harold  Hard- 
raada  himself,  and,  to  boot,  was  much  more  im 
portant  in  its  results. 

Thus  the  Texan  struggle  for  independence  stirred 
up  the  greatest  sympathy  and  enthusiasm  in  the 
United  States.  The  administration  remained 
nominally  neutral,  but  obviously  sympathized 
with  the  Texan s,  permitting  arms  and  men  to  be 
sent  to  their  help,  without  hindrance,  and  indeed 
doing  not  a  little  discreditable  bullying  in  the 
diplomatic  dealing  with  Mexico,  which  that  un 
fortunate  community  had  her  hands  too  full  to 
resent.  Still  we  did  not  commit  a  more  flagrant 
breach  of  neutrality  than,  for  instance,  England 
was  at  the  same  time  engaged  in  committing  in 
reference  to  the  civil  wars  in  Spain.  The  victory 
of  San  Jacinto,  in  which  Houston  literally  anni 
hilated  a  Mexican  force  twice  the  strength  of  his 
own,  virtually  decided  the  contest ;  and  the  Senate 
at  once  passed  a  resolution  recognizing  the  inde 
pendence  of  Texas.  Calhoun  wished  that  body 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          171 

to  go  farther,  and  forthwith  admit  Texas  as  a  State 
into  the  Union;  but  Benton  and  his  colleagues 
were  not  prepared  to  take  such  a  step  at  so  early 
a  date,  although  intending  of  course  that  in  the 
end  she  should  be  admitted.  There  was  little 
opposition  to  the  recognition  of  Texan  independ 
ence,  although  a  few  members  of  the  lower  house, 
headed  by  Adams,  voted  against  it.  While  a 
cabinet  officer,  and  afterward  as  president, 
Adams  had  done  all  that  he  could  to  procure  by 
purchase  or  treaty  the  very  land  which  was  after 
ward  the  cause  of  our  troubles  with  Mexico. 

Much  the  longest  and  most  elaborate  speech  in 
favor  of  the  recognition  of  Texan  independence 
was  made  by  Benton,  to  whom  the  subject  ap 
pealed  very  strongly.  He  announced  emphatically 
that  he  spoke  as  a  Western  senator,  voicing  the 
feeling  of  the  West ;  and  he  was  right.  The  op 
position  to  the  growth  of  our  country  on  its  south 
western  frontier  was  almost  confined  to  the 
Northeast;  the  West  as  a  whole,  free  States  as 
well  as  slave,  heartily  favored  the  movement. 
The  settlers  of  Texas  had  come  mainly,  it  is  true, 
from  the  slave  States;  but  there  were  also  many 
who  had  been  born  north  of  the  Ohio.  It  was  a 
matter  of  comment  that  the  guns  used  at  San 
Jacinto  had  come  from  Cincinnati — and  so  had 
some  of  those  who  served  them. 

In  Benton's  speech  he  began  by  pointing  out  the 


172  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

impropriety  of  doing  what  Calhoun  had  done  in 
attempting  to  complicate  the  question  of  the  recog 
nition  of  Texan  independence  with  the  admission 
of  Texas  as  a  State.  He  then  proceeded  to  claim 
for  us  a  good  deal  more  credit  than  we  were  en 
titled  to  for  our  efforts  to  preserve  neutrality; 
drew  a  very  true  picture  of  the  commercial  bonds 
that  united  us  to  Mexico,  and  of  the  necessity  that 
they  should  not  be  lightly  broken ;  gave  a  spirited 
sketch  of  the  course  of  the  war  hitherto,  condemn 
ing  without  stint  the  horrible  butcheries  com 
mitted  by  the  Mexicans,  but  touching  gingerly  on 
the  savage  revenge  taken  by  the  Americans  in 
their  turn ;  and  ended  by  a  eulogy  of  the  Texans 
themselves,  and  their  leaders. 

It  was  the  age  of  "spread-eagle"  speeches,  and 
many  of  Benton's  were  no  exception  to  the  rule. 
As  a  people  we  were  yet  in  a  condition  of  raw, 
crude  immaturity;  and  our  very  sensitiveness  to 
foreign  criticism — a  sensitiveness  which  we  now 
find  it  difficult  to  understand — and  the  realiza 
tion  of  our  own  awkwardness  made  us  inclined  to 
brag  about  and  exaggerate  our  deeds.  Our  public 
speakers  and  writers  acquired  the  abominable 
habit  of  speaking  of  everything  and  everybody 
in  the  United  States  in  the  superlative ;  and  there 
fore,  as  we  claimed  the  highest  rank  for  all  our 
fourth-rate  men,  we  put  it  out  of  our  power  to 
do  justice  to  the  really  first-rate  ones;  and  on 


Slave  Question  in  Politics          173 

account  of  our  continual  exaggerations  we  were 
not  believed  by  others,  and  hardly  even  believed 
ourselves,  when  we  presented  estimates  that  were 
truthful.  When  every  public  speaker  was  de 
clared  to  be  a  Demosthenes  or  a  Cicero,  people 
failed  to  realize  that  we  actually  had,  in  Webster, 
the  greatest  orator  of  the  century;  and  when 
every  general  who  whipped  an  Indian  tribe  was 
likened  to  Napoleon,  we  left  ourselves  no  words 
with  which  properly  to  characterize  the  really 
heroic  deeds  done  from  time  to  time  in  the  grim 
frontier  warfare.  All  Benton's  oratory  took  on 
this  lurid  coloring ;  and  in  the  present  matter  his 
final  eulogy  of  the  Texan  warriors  was  greatly 
strained,  though  it  would  hardly  have  been  in  his 
power  to  pay  too  high  a  tribute  to  some  of  the 
deeds  they  had  done.  It  was  the  heroic  age  of 
the  Southwest ;  though,  as  with  every  other  heroic 
age,  there  were  plenty  of  failings,  vices,  and  weak 
nesses  visible,  if  the  standpoint  of  observation  was 
only  close  enough. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  CHILDREN'S  TEETH  ARE  SET  ON  EDGE. 

IN  his  dealings  with  the  Bank  and  his  disposal 
of  the  deposits  Jackson  ate  sour  grapes  to  his 
heart's  content;    and  now  the  teeth  of  his 
adopted  child  Van  Buren  were  to  be  set  on  edge. 

Van  Buren  was  the  first  product  of  what  are 
now  called  ''machine  politics"  that  was  put  into 
the  presidential  chair.  He  owed  his  elevation 
solely  to  his  own  dexterous  political  manipulation, 
and  to  the  fact  that,  for  his  own  selfish  ends,  and 
knowing  perfectly  well  their  folly,  he  had  yet 
favored  or  connived  at  all  the  actions  into  which 
the  administration  had  been  led  either  through 
Jackson's  ignorance  and  violence,  or  by  the  crafty 
unscrupulousness  and  limited  knowledge  of  the 
kitchen  cabinet.  The  people  at  large  would  never 
have  thought  of  him  for  president  of  their  own 
accord;  but  he  had  become  Jackson's  political 
legatee,  partly  because  he  had  personally  endeared 
himself  to  the  latter,  and  partly  because  the  poli 
ticians  felt  that  he  was  a  man  whom  they  could 
trust.  The  Jacksonian  Democracy  was  already 
completely  ruled  by  a  machine,  of  which  the  most 
important  cogs  were  the  countless  office-holders, 
whom  the  spoils  system  had  already  converted 

174 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  175 

into  a  band  of  well-drilled  political  mercenaries. 
A  political  machine  can  only  be  brought  to  a  state 
of  high  perfection  in  a  party  containing  very 
many  ignorant  and  uneducated  voters;  and  the 
Jacksonian  Democracy  held  in  its  ranks  the  mass 
of  the  ignorance  of  the  country.  Besides  this, 
such  an  organization  requires,  in  order  that  it 
may  do  its  most  effective  work,  to  have  as  its 
leader  and  figurehead,  a  man  who  really  has  a 
great  hold  on  the  people  at  large,  and  who  yet  can 
be  managed  by  such  politicians  as  possess  the 
requisite  adroitness;  and  Jackson  fulfilled  both 
these  conditions.  The  famous  kitchen  cabinet 
was  so  called  because  its  members  held  no  official 
positions,  and  yet  were  known  to  have  Jackson 
more  under  their  influence  than  was  the  case  with 
his  nominal  advisers.  They  stood  as  the  first 
representatives  of  a  type  common  enough  after 
ward,  and  of  which  Thurlow  Weed  was  perhaps 
the  best  example.  They  were  men  who  held  no 
public  position,  and  yet  devoted  their  whole  time 
to  politics,  and  pulled  the  strings  in  obedience  to 
which  the  apparent  public  leaders  moved. 

Jackson  liked  Van  Buren  because  the  latter  had 
served  him  both  personally  and  politically — 
indeed  Jackson  was  incapable  of  distinguishing  be 
tween  a  political  and  a  personal  service.  This  lik 
ing,  however,  would  not  alone  have  advanced  Van 
Buren's  interests,  if  the  latter,  who  was  himself 


176  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

a  master  in  the  New  York  state  machine,  had 
not  also  succeeded  in  enlisting  the  good-will  and 
self-interest  of  the  members  of  the  kitchen  cabi 
net  and  the  other  intimate  advisers  of  the  Presi 
dent.  These  first  got  Jackson  himself  thoroughly 
committed  to  Van  Buren,  and  then  used  his  name 
and  enormous  influence  with  the  masses,  coupled 
with  their  own  mastery  of  machine  methods,  to 
bring  about  the  New  Yorker's  nomination.  In 
both  these  moves  they  had  been  helped,  and  Van 
Buren's  chances  had  been  immensely  improved, 
by  an  incident  that  had  seemed  at  the  time  very 
unfortunate  for  the  latter.  When  he  was  secre 
tary  of  state,  in  carrying  on  negotiations  with 
Great  Britain  relative  to  the  West  India  trade,  he 
had  so  far  forgotten  what  was  due  to  the  dignity  of 
the  nation  as  to  allude  disparagingly,  while  thus 
communicating  with  a  foreign  power,  to  the  course 
pursued  by  the  previous  administration.  This 
extension  of  party  lines  into  our  foreign  diplo 
macy  was  discreditable  to  the  whole  country.  The 
anti-administration  men  bitterly  resented  it,  and 
emphasized  their  resentment  by  rejecting  the 
nomination  of  Van  Buren  when  Jackson  wished  to 
make  him  minister  to  England.  Their  action  was 
perfectly  proper,  and  Van  Buren,  by  right,  should 
have  suffered  for  his  undignified  and  unpatriotic 
conduct.  But  instead  of  this,  and  in  accordance 
with  the  eternal  unfitness  of  things,  what  really 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  177 

happened  was  that  his  rejection  by  the  Senate 
actually  helped  him ;  for  Jackson  promptly  made 
the  quarrel  his  own,  and  the  masses  blindly  fol 
lowed  their  idol.  Ben  ton  exultingly  and  truth 
fully  said  that  the  President's  foes  had  succeeded 
in  breaking  a  minister  only  to  make  a  president. 

Van  Buren  faithfully  served  the  mammon  of 
unrighteousness,  both  in  his  own  State  and,  later 
on,  at  Washington ;  and  he  had  his  reward,  for  he 
was  advanced  to  the  highest  offices  in  the  gift  of 
the  nation.  He  had  no  reason  to  blame  his  own 
conduct  for  his  final  downfall ;  he  got  just  as  far 
along  as  he  could  possibly  get;  he  succeeded  be 
cause  of,  and  not  in  spite  of,  his  moral  shortcom 
ings  ;  if  he  had  always  governed  his  actions  by  a 
high  moral  standard  he  would  probably  never  have 
been  heard  of.  Still,  there  is  some  comfort  in 
reflecting  that,  exactly  as  he  was  made  president 
for  no  virtue  of  his  own,  but  simply  on  account 
of  being  Jackson's  heir,  so  he  was  turned  out  of  the 
office,  not  for  personal  failure,  but  because  he  was 
taken  as  scapegoat,  and  had  the  sins  of  his  political 
fathers  visited  on  his  own  head. 

The  opposition  to  the  election  of  Van  Buren 
was  very  much  disorganized,  the  Whig  party  not 
yet  having  solidified, — indeed  it  always  remained 
a  somewhat  fluid  body.  The  election  did  not  have 
the  slightest  sectional  significance,  slavery  not 
entering  into  it,  and  both  Northern  and  Southern 

12 


178  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

States  voting  without  the  least  reference  to  the 
geographical  belongings  of  the  candidates.  He 
was  the  last  true  Jacksonian  Democrat — Union 
Democrat — who  became  president;  the  South 
Carolina  separatists  and  many  of  their  fellows 
refused  to  vote  for  him.  The  Democrats  who 
came  after  him,  on  the  contrary,  all  had  leanings 
to  the  separatist  element  which  so  soon  obtained 
absolute  control  of  the  party,  to  the  fierce  indigna 
tion  of  men  like  Benton,  Houston,  and  the  other 
old  Jacksonians,  whose  sincere  devotion  to  the 
Union  will  always  entitle  them  to  the  gratitude  of 
every  true  American.  As  far  as  slavery  was  con 
cerned,  however,  the  Southerners  had  hitherto  had 
nothing  whatever  to  complain  of  in  Van  Buren's 
attitude.  He  was  careful  to  inform  them  in  his 
inaugural  address  that  he  would  not  sanction  any 
attempt  to  interfere  with  the  institution,  whether 
by  abolishing  it  in  the  District  of  Columbia  or  in 
any  other  way  distasteful  to  the  South.  He  also 
expressed  a  general  hope  that  he  would  be  able 
throughout  to  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  Jackson. 

He  had  hardly  been  elected  before  the  ruinous 
financial  policy  to  which  he  had  been  party,  but 
of  which  the  effects,  it  must  in  justice  be  said, 
were  aggravated  by  many  of  the  actions  of  the 
Whigs,  began  to  bear  fruit  after  its  kind.  The 
use  made  of  the  surplus  was  bad  enough,  but  the 
withdrawal  of  the  United  States  deposits  from  one 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  179 

responsible  bank  and  their  distribution  among 
scores  of  others,  many  of  which  were  in  the  most 
rickety  condition,  was  a  step  better  calculated 
than  any  other  to  bring  about  a  financial  crash. 
It  gave  a  stimulus  to  extravagance,  and  evoked 
the  wildest  spirit  of  speculation  that  the  country 
had  yet  seen.  The  local  banks,  to  whom  the  cus 
tody  of  the  public  moneys  had  been  entrusted, 
used  them  as  funds  which  they  and  their  custom 
ers  could  hazard  for  the  chance  of  gain ;  and  the 
gambling  spirit,  always  existent  in  the  American 
mercantile  community,  was  galvanized  into  furious 
life.  The  public  dues  were  payable  in  the  paper 
of  these  deposit  banks  and  of  the  countless  others 
that  were  even  more  irresponsible.  The  deposit 
banks  thus  became  filled  up  with  a  motley  mass 
of  more  or  less  worthless  bank  paper,  which  thus 
formed  the  "surplus,"  of  which  the  distribution, 
had  caused  Congress  so  much  worry.  Their  condi 
tion  was  desperate,  as  they  had  been  managed  with 
the  most  reckless  disregard  for  the  morrow.  Many 
of  them  had  hardly  kept  as  much  specie  in  hand 
as  would  amount  to  one-fiftieth  of  the  aggregate 
of  their  deposits  and  other  immediate  liabilities. 

The  people  themselves  were  of  course  primarily 
responsible  for  the  then  existing  state  of  affairs; 
but  the  government  had  done  all  in  its  power  to 
make  matters  worse .  Panics  were  certain  to  occur 
more  or  less  often  in  so  speculative  and  venture- 


i8o  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

some  a  mercantile  community,  where  there  was 
such  heedless  trust  in  the  future  and  such  reck 
lessness  in  the  use  of  credit.  But  the  government, 
by  its  actions,  immensely  increased  the  severity  of 
this  particular  panic,  and  became  the  prime  factor 
in  precipitating  its  advent.  Be-nton  tried  to  throw 
the  blame  mainly  on  the  bankers  and  politicians, 
who,  he  alleged,  had  formed  an  alliance  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  administration ;  but  he  made  the 
plea  more  half-heartedly  than  usual,  and  probably 
in  his  secret  soul  acknowledged  its  puerility. 

The  mass  of  the  people  were  still  happy  in  the 
belief  that  all  things  were  working  well,  and  that 
their  show  of  unexampled  prosperity  and  business 
activity  denoted  a  permanent  and  healthy  condi 
tion.  Yet  all  the  signs  pointed  to  a  general  col 
lapse  at  no  distant  date ;  an  era  of  general  bank 
suspensions,  of  depreciated  currency,  and  of  insol 
vency  of  the  federal  treasury  was  at  hand.  No 
one  but  Benton,  however,  seemed  able  to  read  the 
signs  aright,  and  his  foreboding  utterances  were 
laughed  at  or  treated  with  scorn  by  his  fellow 
statesmen.  He  recalled  the  memory  of  the  times 
of  1818-19,  when  the  treasury  reports  of  one  year 
showed  a  superfluity  of  revenue  of  which  there 
was  no  want,  and  those  of  the  next  showed  a 
deficit  which  required  to  be  relieved  by  a  loan; 
and  he  foretold  an  infinitely  worse  result  from  the 
inflation  of  the  paper  system,  saying : 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  iSi 

Are  we  not  at  this  moment,  and  from  the  same 
cause,  realizing  the  first  part — the  elusive  and  treach 
erous  part — of  this  picture?  and  must  not  the  other, 
the  sad  and  real  sequel,  speedily  follow?  The  day  of 
revulsion  in  its  effects  may  be  more  or  less  disastrous ; 
but  come  it  must.  The  present  bloat  in  the  paper 
system  cannot  continue;  violent  contraction  must 
follow  enormous  expansion;  a  scene  of  distress  and 
suffering  must  ensue — to  come  of  itself  out  of  the 
present  state  of  things,  without  being  stimulated  and 
helped  on  by  our  unwise  legislation.  .  .  .  7  am  one 
of  those  who  promised  gold,  not  paper;  7  did  not  join 
in  putting  down  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  to  put  up 
a  wilderness  of  local  banks.  7  did  not  join  in  putting 
down  the  currency  of  a  national  bank  to  put  up  a 
national  paper  currency  of  a  thousand  local  banks.  I 
did  not  strike  Caesar  to  make  Antony  master  of  Rome. 

These  last  sentences  referred  to  the  passage  of 
the  act  repealing  the  specie  circular  and  making 
the  notes  of  the  banks  receivable  in  payment  of 
federal  dues.  The  act  was  most  mischievous,  and 
Benton's  criticisms  both  of  it  and  of  the  great 
Whig  senator  who  pressed  it  were  perfectly  just; 
but  they  apply  with  quite  as  much  weight  to  Jack 
son's  dealings  with  the  deposits,  which  Benton  had 
defended. 

Benton  foresaw  the  coming  of  the  panic  so 
clearly,  and  was  so  particularly  uneasy  about  the 
immediate  effects  upon  the  governmental  treasury, 
that  he  not  only  spoke  publicly  on  the  matter  in 
the  Senate,  but  even  broached  the  subject  in  the 


i82  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

course  of  a  private  conversation  with  the  Presi 
dent-elect,  to  get  him  to  try  to  make  what  prep 
aration  he  could.  Van  Buren,  cool,  skilful,  and 
far-sighted  politician  though  he  was,  on  this  occa 
sion  showed  that  he  was  infected  with  the  com 
mon  delusion  as  to  the  solidity  of  the  country's 
business  prosperity.  He  was  very  friendly  with 
Benton,  and  was  trying  to  get  him  to  take  a  posi 
tion  in  his  cabinet,  which  the  latter  refused,  pre 
ferring  service  in  the  Senate ;  but  now  he  listened 
with  scant  courtesy  to  the  warning,  and  paid  no 
heed  to  it.  Benton,  an  intensely  proud  man, 
would  not  speak  again ;  and  everything  went  on 
as  before .  The  law  distributing  the  surplus  among 
the  States  began  to  take  effect ;  under  its  opera 
tions  drafts  for  millions  of  dollars  were  made  on 
the  banks  containing  the  deposits,  and  these  banks, 
already  sinking,  were  utterly  unable  to  honor 
them.  It  would  have  been  impossible,  under  any 
circumstances,  for  the  President  to  ward  off  the 
blow,  but  he  might  at  least,  by  a  little  forethought 
and  preparation,  have  saved  the  government  from 
some  galling  humiliations.  Had  Benton 's  advice 
been  followed,  the  moneys  called  for  by  the  appro 
priation  acts  might  have  been  drawn  from  the 
banks,  and  the  disbursing  officers  might  have  been 
prevented  from  depositing  in  them  the  sums 
which  they  drew  from  the  treasury  to  provide 
for  their  ordinary  expenses ;  thus  the  government 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  183 

would  have  been  spared  the  disgrace  of  being 
obliged  to  stop  the  actual  daily  payments  to  the 
public  servants;  and  the  nation  would  not  have 
seen  such  a  spectacle  as  its  rulers  presented  when 
they  had  not  a  dollar  with  which  to  pay  even  a 
day  laborer,  while  at  the  same  time  a  law  was 
standing  on  the  statute-book  providing  for  the 
distribution  of  forty  millions  of  nominal  surplus. 

No  effort  was  made  to  stave  off  even  so  much  of 
the  impending  disaster  as  was  at  that  late  date 
preventable;  and  a  few  days  after  Van  Buren's 
inauguration  the  country  was  in  the  throes  of  the 
worst  and  most  widespread  financial  panic  it  has 
ever  seen.  The  distress  was  fairly  appalling  both 
in  its  intensity  and  in  its  universal  distribution. 
All  the  banks  stopped  payment,  and  bankruptcy 
was  universal.  Bank  paper  depreciated  with 
frightful  rapidity,  especially  in  the  West;  specie 
increased  in  value  so  that  all  the  coin  in  the  coun 
try,  down  to  the  lowest  denomination,  was  almost 
immediately  taken  out  of  circulation,  being  either 
hoarded  or  gathered  for  shipment  abroad  as  bul 
lion.  For  small  change  every  kind  of  device  was 
made  use  of, — tokens,  bank-bills  for  a  few  cents 
each,  or  brass  and  iron  counters. 

Benton  and  others  pretended  to  believe  that  the 
panic  was  the  result  of  a  deep-laid  plot  on  the  part 
of  the  rich  classes,  who  controlled  the  banks,  to 
excite  popular  hostility  against  the  Jacksonian 


184  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Democracy,  on  account  of  the  caste  antagonism 
which  these  same  richer  classes  were  supposed  to 
feel  toward  the  much- vaunted  "  party  of  the 
people;"  and  as  Benton 's  mental  vision  was 
singularly  warped  in  regard  to  some  subjects, 
it  is  possible  that  the  belief  was  not  altogether  a 
pretense.  It  is  entirely  unnecessary  now  seri 
ously  to  discuss  the  proposition  that  it  would  be 
possible  to  drag  the  commercial  classes  into  so 
widespread  and  profoundly  secret  a  conspiracy, 
with  such  a  vague  end  in  view,  and  the  certainty 
that  they  themselves  would  be,  from  a  business 
standpoint,  the  main  sufferers. 

The  efforts  made  by  Benton  and  the  other  Jack- 
sonians  to  stem  the  tide  of  public  feeling  and 
direct  it  through  the  well-worn  channel  of  sus 
picious  fear  of,  and  anger  at,  the  banks,  as  the  true 
authors  of  the  general  wretchedness,  were  unavail 
ing  ;  the  stream  swelled  into  a  torrent  and  ran  like 
a  mill-race  in  the  opposite  way.  The  popular 
clamor  against  the  administration  was  deafening; 
and  if  much  of  it  was  based  on  good  grounds,  much 
of  it  was  also  unreasonable.  But  a  very  few  years 
before  the  Jacksonians  had  appealed  to  a  senseless 
public  dislike  of  the  so-called  " money  power,"  in 
order  to  help  themselves  to  victory ;  and  now  they 
had  the  chagrin  of  seeing  an  only  less  irrational 
outcry  raised  against  themselves  in  turn,  and  used 
to  oust  them  from  their  places,  with  the  same 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  185 

effectiveness  which  had  previously  attended  their 
own  frothy  and  loud-mouthed  declamations.  The 
people  were  more  than  ready  to  listen  to  any  one 
who  could  point  out,  or  pretend  to  point  out,  the 
authors  of,  and  the  reasons  for,  the  calamities  that 
had  befallen  them.  Their  condition  was  pitiable ; 
and  this  was  especially  true  in  the  newer  and  West 
ern  States,  where  in  many  places  there  was  abso 
lutely  no  money  at  all  in  circulation,  even  the  men 
of  means  not  being  able  to  get  enough  coin  or  its 
equivalent  to  make  the  most  ordinary  purchases. 
Trade  was  at  a  complete  standstill ;  laborers  were 
thrown  out  of  employment  and  left  almost  starv 
ing  ;  farmers,  merchants,  mechanics,  craftsmen  of 
every  sort, — all  alike  were  in  the  direst  distress. 
They  naturally,  in  seeking  relief,  turned  to  the 
government,  it  being  almost  always  the  case  that 
the  existing  administration  receives  more  credit  if 
the  country  is  prosperous,  and  greater  blame  if  it 
is  not,  than  in  either  case  it  is  rightfully  entitled 
to.  The  Democracy  was  now  held  to  strict  reck 
oning,  not  only  for  some  of  its  numerous  real  sins, 
but  also  for  a  good  many  imaginary  ones ;  and  the 
change  in  the  political  aspect  of  many  of  the  com 
monwealths  was  astounding.  Jackson's  own  home 
State  of  Tennessee  became  strongly  Whig;  and 
Van  Buren  had  the  mortification  of  seeing  New 
York  follow  suit ;  two  stinging  blows  to  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  ex-President.  The  distress  was  a 


1 86  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

godsend  to  the  Whig  politicians.  They  fairly 
raved  in  their  anger  against  the  administration, 
and  denounced  all  its  acts,  good  and  bad  alike, 
with  fluent  and  incoherent  impartiality.  Indeed, 
in  their  speeches,  and  in  the  petitions  which  they 
circulated  and  then  sent  to  the  President,  they 
used  language  that  was  to  the  last  degree  absurd 
in  its  violence  and  exaggeration,  and  drew  descrip 
tions  of  the  iniquities  of  the  rulers  of  the  country 
which  were  so  overwrought  as  to  be  merely  ridicu 
lous.  The  speeches  about  the  panic,  and  in  refer 
ence  to  the  proposed  laws  to  alleviate  it,  were 
remarkable  for  their  inflation,  even  in  that  age 
of  windy  oratory. 

Van  Buren,  Benton,  and  their  associates  stood 
bravely  up  against  the  storm  of  indignation  which 
swept  over  the  whole  country,  and  lost  neither 
head  nor  nerve.  They  needed  both  to  extricate 
themselves  with  any  credit  from  the  position  in 
which  they  were  placed.  In  deference  to  the 
urgent  wish  of  almost  all  the  people  an  extra  ses 
sion  of  Congress  was  called  especially  to  deal  with 
the  panic.  Van  Buren's  message  to  this  oody  was 
a  really  statesmanlike  document,  going  exhaust 
ively  into  the  subject  of  the  national  finances. 
The  Democrats  still  held  the  majority  in  both 
houses,  but  there  was  so  large  a  floating  vote,  and 
the  margins  were  so  narrow,  as  to  make  the  admin 
istration  feel  that  its  hold  was  precarious. 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  187 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  provide  for 
the  immediate  wants  of  the  government,  which 
had  not  enough  money  to  pay  even  its  most  neces 
sary  running  expenses.  To  make  this  temporary 
provision  two  plans  were  proposed.  The  fourth 
instalment  of  the  surplus — ten  millions — was  due 
to  the  States.  As  there  was  really  no  surplus,  but 
a  deficit  instead,  it  was  proposed  to  repeal  the 
deposit  law  so  far  as  it  affected  their  fourth  pay 
ment;  and  treasury  notes  were  to  be  issued  to 
provide  for  immediate  and  pressing  needs. 

The  Whigs  frantically  attacked  the  President's 
proposals,  and  held  him  and  his  party  accountable 
for  all  the  evils  of  the  panic ;  and  in  truth  it  was 
right  enough  to  hold  them  so  accountable  for  part ; 
but,  after  all,  the  harm  was  largely  due  to  causes 
existing  throughout  the  civilized  world,  and  espe 
cially  to  the  speculative  folly  rife  among  the  whole 
American  people.  But  it  is  always  an  easy  and  a 
comfortable  thing  to  hold  others  responsible  for 
what  is  primarily  our  own  fault. 

Benton  did  not  believe,  as  a  matter  of  principle, 
in  the  issue  of  treasury  notes,  but  supported  the 
bill  for  that  purpose  on  account  of  the  sore  straits 
the  administration  was  in,  and  its  dire  need  of 
assistance  from  any  source.  He  treated  it  as  a 
disagreeable  but  temporary  makeshift,  only  allow 
able  on  the  ground  of  the  sternest  and  most  grind 
ing  necessity.  He  stated  that  he  supported  the 


IBS  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

issue  only  because  the  treasury  notes  were  made 
out  in  such  a  form  that  they  could  not  become 
currency;  they  were  merely  loan  notes.  Their 
chief  characteristic  was  that  they  bore  interest; 
they  were  transferable  only  by  indorsement ;  were 
payable  at  a  fixed  time ;  were  not  reissuable,  nor 
of  small  denominations ;  and  were  to  be  canceled 
when  paid.  Such  being  the  case  he  favored  their 
issue,  but  expressly  stated  that  he  only  did  so  on 
account  of  the  urgency  of  the  governmental  wants ; 
and  that  he  disapproved  of  any  such  issue  until 
the  ordinary  resources  of  taxes  and  loans  had  been 
tried  to  the  utmost  and  failed.  "I  distrust,  dis 
like,  and  would  fain  eschew  this  treasury-note 
resource;  I  prefer  the  direct  loans  of  1820-21.  I 
could  only  bring  myself  to  support  this  present 
measure  when  it  was  urged  that  there  was  not 
time  to  carry  a  loan  through  in  its  forms ;  nor  even 
then  would  I  consent  to  it  until  every  feature  of  a 
currency  character  had  been  eradicated  from  the 
bill." 

A  sharp  struggle  took  place  over  the  bill  brought 
in  by  the  friends  of  the  administration  and  advo 
cated  by  Benton,  to  repeal  the  obligation  to  de 
posit  the  fourth  instalment  of  the  surplus  with  the 
States.  This  scheme  of  a  distribution,  thinly 
disguised  under  the  name  of  deposit  to  soothe 
the  feelings  of  Calhoun  and  the  other  strict  con- 
structionist  pundits,  had  worked  nothing  but 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  189 

mischief  from  the  start ;  and  now  that  there  was 
no  surplus  to  distribute,  it  would  seem  incredible 
that  there  should  have  been  opposition  to  its 
partial  repeal.  Yet  Webster,  Clay,  and  their 
followers  strenuously  opposed  even  such  repeal. 
It  is  possible  that  their  motives  were  honest,  but 
much  more  probable  that  they  were  actuated 
by  partisan  hostility  to  the  administration, 
or  that  they  believed  they  would  increase  their 
own  popularity  by  favoring  a  plan  that  seem 
ingly  distributed  money  as  a  gift  among  the 
States.  The  bill  was  finally  amended  so  as  to 
make  it  imperative  to  pay  this  fourth  instalment 
in  a  couple  of  years;  yet  it  was  not  then  paid, 
since  on  the  date  appointed  the  national  treasury 
was  bankrupt  and  the  States  could  therefore  never 
get  the  money, — which  was  the  only  satisfactory 
incident  in  the  whole  proceeding.  The  financial 
theories  of  Jackson  and  Benton  were  crude  and 
vicious,  it  is  true,  but  Webster,  Clay,  and  most 
other  public  men  of  the  day  seem  to  have  held 
ideas  on  the  subject  that  were  almost,  if  not  quite, 
as  mischievous. 

The  great  financial  measures  advocated  by  the 
administration  of  Van  Buren,  and  championed 
with  especial  zeal  by  Benton,  were  those  provid 
ing  for  an  independent  treasury  and  for  hard- 
money  payments;  that  is,  providing  that  the 
government  should  receive  nothing  but  gold  and 


Thomas  Hart  Benton 


silver  for  its  revenues,  and  that  this  gold  and  silver 
should  be  kept  by  its  own  officers  in  real,  not  con 
structive,  treasuries,  —  in  strong  buildings,  with 
special  officers  to  hold  the  keys.  The  treasury 
was  to  be  at  Washington,  with  branches  or  sub- 
treasuries  at  the  principal  points  of  collection  and 
disbursement. 

These  measures,  if  successful,  meant  that  there 
would  be  a  total  separation  of  the  federal  govern 
ment  from  all  banks  ;  in  the  political  language  of 
the  times  they  became  known  as  those  for  the 
divorce  of  bank  and  state.  Hitherto  the  local 
banks  chosen  by  Jackson  to  receive  the  deposits 
had  been  actively  hostile  to  Biddle's  great  bank 
and  to  its  friends;  but  self-interest  now  united 
them  all  in  violent  opposition  to  the  new  scheme. 
Webster,  Clay,  and  the  Whigs  generally  fought  it 
bitterly  in  the  Senate  ;  but  Calhoun  now  left  his 
recent  allies  and  joined  with  Benton  in  securing 
its  passage.  However,  it  was  for  the  time  being 
defeated  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  Most 
of  the  opposition  to  it  was  characterized  by  sheer 
loud-mouthed  demagogy  —  cries  that  the  govern 
ment  was  too  aristocratic  to  accept  the  money  that 
was  thought  good  enough  for  the  people,  and  simi 
lar  claptrap.  Benton  made  a  very  earnest  plea 
for  hard  money,  and  especially  denounced  the  doc 
trine  that  it  was  the  government's  duty  to  inter 
fere  in  any  way  in  private  business  ;  for,  as  usual 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  191 

in  times  of  general  distress,  a  good  many  people 
had  a  vague  idea  that  in  some  way  the  govern 
ment  ought  to  step  in  and  relieve  them  from  the 
consequences  of  their  own  folly. 

Meanwhile  the  banks  had  been  endeavoring  to 
resume  specie  payment.  Those  of  New  York  had 
taken  steps  in  that  direction  but  little  more  than 
three  months  after  the  suspension.  Their  weaker 
Western  neighbors,  however,  were  not  yet  in  con 
dition  to  follow  suit ;  and  the  great  bank  at  Phila 
delphia  also  at  first  refused  to  come  in  with  them. 
But  the  New  York  banks  persisted  in  their  pur 
pose,  resumed  payment  a  year  after  they  had  sus 
pended,  and  eventually  the  others  had  to  fall  into 
line ;  the  reluctance  to  do  so  being  of  course  at 
tributed  by  Ben  ton  to  "the  factious  and  wicked 
machinations"  of  a  "powerful  combined  political 
and  moneyed  confederation" — a  shadowy  and 
spectral  creation  of  vivid  Jacksonian  imaginations, 
in  the  existence  of  which  he  persisted  in  believing. 

Clay,  always  active  as  the  friend  of  the  banks, 
introduced  a  resolution,  nominally  to  quicken  the 
approach  of  resumption,  but  really  to  help  out  pre 
cisely  those  weak  banks  which  did  not  deserve 
help,  making  the  notes  of  the  resuming  banks 
receivable  in  payment  of  all  dues  to  the  federal 
government.  This  was  offered  after  the  banks  of 
New  York  had  resumed,  and  when  all  the  other 
solvent  banks  were  on  the  point  of  resuming  also ; 


i92  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

so  its  nominal  purpose  was  already  accomplished, 
as  Benton,  in  a  caustic  speech,  pointed  out.  He 
then  tore  the  resolution  to  shreds,  showing  that  it 
would  be  of  especial  benefit  to  the  insolvent  and 
unsound  banks,  and  would  insure  a  repetition  of 
the  worst  evils  under  which  the  country  was 
already  suffering.  He  made  it  clear  that  the 
proposition  practically  was  to  force  the  govern 
ment  to  receive  paper  promises  to  pay  from  banks 
that  were  certain  to  fail,  and  therefore  to  force 
the  government  in  turn  to  pay  out  this  worthless 
paper  to  its  honest  creditors.  Benton's  speech 
was  an  excellent  one,  and  Clay's  resolution  was 
defeated. 

All  through  this  bank  controversy,  and  the 
other  controversies  relating  to  it,  Benton  took  the 
leading  part,  as  mouthpiece  of  the  administration. 
He  heartily  supported  the  suggestion  of  the  Presi 
dent,  that  a  stringent  bankrupt  law  against  the 
banks  should  be  passed.  Webster  stood  out  as 
the  principal  opponent  of  this  measure,  basing  his 
objections  mainly  upon  constitutional  grounds; 
that  is,  questioning  the  right,  rather  than  the 
expediency,  of  the  proposed  remedy.  Benton 
answered  him  at  length  in  a  speech  showing  an 
immense  amount  of  careful  and  painstaking  study 
and  a  wide  range  of  historical  reading  and  legal 
knowledge;  he  replied  point  by  point,  and  more 
than  held  his  own  with  his  great  antagonist.  His 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  193 

speech  was  an  exhaustive  study  of  the  history  and 
scope  of  bankruptcy  laws  against  corporations. 
Benton's  capacity  for  work  was  at  all  times  im 
mense;  he  delighted  in  it  for  its  own  sake,  and 
took  a  most  justifiable  pride  in  his  wide  reading, 
and  especially  in  his  full  acquaintance  with  his 
tory,  both  ancient  and  modern.  He  was  very 
fond  of  illustrating  his  speeches  on  American 
affairs  with  continual  allusions  and  references  to 
events  in  foreign  countries  or  in  old  times  which 
he  considered  to  be  more  or  less  parallel  to  those 
he  was  discussing ;  and  indeed  he  often  dragged  in 
these  comparisons  when  there  was  no  particular 
need  for  such  a  display  of  his  knowledge.  He 
could  fairly  be  called  a  learned  man,  for  he  had 
studied  very  many  subjects  deeply  and  thor 
oughly;  and  though  he  was  too  self-conscious 
and  pompous  in  his  utterances  not  to  incur  more 
than  the  suspicion  of  pedantry,  yet  the  fact 
remains  that  hardly  any  other  man  has  ever  sat 
in  the  Senate  whose  range  of  information  was  as 
wide  as  his. 

He  made  another  powerful  and  carefully 
wrought  speech  in  favor  of  what  he  called  the 
act  to  provide  for  the  divorce  of  bank  and  state. 
This  bill,  as  finally  drawn,  consisted  of  two  dis 
tinct  parts,  one  portion  making  provision  for  the 
keeping  of  the  public  moneys  in  an  independent 
treasury,  and  the  other  for  the  hard  money 


194  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

currency,  which  was  all  that  the  government  was 
to  accept  in  payment  of  revenue  dues.  This  last 
provision,  however,  was  struck  out,  and  the  bill 
thereby  lost  the  support  of  Calhoun,  who,  with 
Webster,  Clay,  and  the  other  Whigs,  voted  against 
it ;  but,  mainly  through  Benton's  efforts,  it  passed 
the  Senate,  although  by  a  very  slender  majority. 
Benton,  in  his  speech,  dwelt  with  especial  admira 
tion  on  the  working  of  the  monetary  system  of 
France,  and  held  it  up  as  well  worthy  to  be  copied 
by  us.  Most  of  the  points  he  made  were  certainly 
good  ones,  although  he  overestimated  the  benefi 
cent  results  that  would  spring  from  the  adoption 
of  the  proposed  system,  believing  that  it  would 
put  an  end  for  the  future  to  all  panics  and  com 
mercial  convulsions.  In  reality  it  would  have 
removed  only  one  of  the  many  causes  which  go  to 
produce  the  latter,  leaving  the  others  free  to  work 
as  before;  the  people  at  large,  not  the  govern 
ment,  were  mainly  to  blame,  and  even  with  them 
it  was  in  some  respects  their  misfortune  as  much  as 
their  fault.  Benton's  error,  however,  was  natural ; 
like  most  other  men  he  was  unable  fully  to  realize 
that  hardly  any  phenomenon,  even  the  most  sim 
ple,  can  be  said  to  spring  from  one  cause  only,  and 
not  from  a  complex  and  interwoven  tissue  of  causa 
tion — and  a  panic  is  one  of  the  least  simple  and 
most  complex  of  mercantile  phenomena.  Ben- 
ton's  deep-rooted  distrust  of  and  hostility  to  such 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  195 

banking  as  then  existed  in  the  United  States  cer 
tainly  had  good  grounds  for  existence. 

This  distrust  was  shown  again  when  the  bill  for 
the  recharter  of  the  district  banks  came  up.  The 
specie  basis  of  many  of  them  had  been  allowed  to 
become  altogether  too  low;  and  Benton  showed 
himself  more  keenly  alive  than  any  other  public 
man  to  the  danger  of  such  a  state  of  things,  and 
argued  strongly  that  a  basis  of  specie  amounting 
to  one-third  the  total  of  liabilities  was  the  only 
safe  proportion,  and  should  be  enforced  by  law. 
He  made  a  most  forcible  argument,  using  numer 
ous  and  apt  illustrations  to  show  the  need  of  his 
amendment. 

Nor  was  the  tireless  Missouri  senator  satisfied 
even  yet;  for  he  introduced  a  resolution  asking 
leave  to  bring  in  a  bill  to  tax  the  circulation  of 
banks  and  bankers,  and  of  all  corporations,  com 
panies,  or  individuals,  issuing  paper  currency. 
One  object  of  the  bill  was  to  raise  revenue;  but 
even  more  he  aimed  at  the  regulation  of  the  cur 
rency  by  the  suppression  of  small  notes ;  and  for 
this  end  the  tax  was  proposed  to  be  made  heaviest 
on  notes  under  twenty  dollars,  and  to  be  annually 
augmented  until  it  had  accomplished  its  object 
and  they  had  been  driven  out  of  circulation.  In 
advocating  his  measure  he  used,  as  was  per 
haps  unavoidable,  some  arguments  that  savored 
strongly  of  demagogy ;  but  on  the  whole  he  made 


196  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

a  strong  appeal,  using  as  precedents  for  the  law 
he  wished  to  see  enacted  both  the  then  existing 
banking  laws  in  England  and  those  that  had  ob 
tained  previously  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States. 

Taken  altogether,  while  the  Jacksonians,  dur 
ing  the  period  of  Van  Buren's  presidency,  rightly 
suffered  for  their  previous  financial  misdeeds,  yet 
so  far  as  their  actions  at  the  time  were  concerned, 
they  showed  to  greater  advantage  than  the  Whigs. 
Nor  did  they  waver  in  their  purpose  even  when 
the  tide  of  popular  feeling  changed.  The  great 
financial  measure  of  the  administration,  in  which 
Benton  was  most  interested,  the  independent 
treasury  bill,  he  succeeded  in  getting  through 
the  Senate  twice ;  the  first  time  it  was  lost  in  the 
House  of  Representatives;  but  on  the  second 
occasion,  toward  the  close  of  Van  Buren's  term, 
firmness  and  perseverance  met  their  reward.  The 
bill  passed  the  Senate  by  an  increased  majority, 
scraped  through  the  House  after  a  bitter  contest, 
and  became  a  law.  It  developed  the  system 
known  as  that  of  the  Sub-Treasury,  which  has 
proved  satisfactory  to  the  present  day. 

It  was  during  Van  Buren's  term  that  Biddle's 
great  bank,  so  long  the  pivot  on  which  turned  the 
fortunes  of  political  parties,  finally  tottered  to  its 
fall.  It  was  ruined  by  unwise  and  reckless  man 
agement;  and  Benton  sang  a  paean  over  its 


Teeth  are  Set  on  Edge  197 

downfall,  exulting  in  its  fate  as  a  justification  of 
all  that  he  had  said  and  done.  Yet  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  its  mismanagement  became  gross 
only  after  all  connection  with  the  national  govern 
ment  had  ceased;  and  its  end,  attributable  to 
causes  not  originally  existent  or  likely  to  exist,  can 
hardly  be  rightly  considered  in  passing  judgment 
upon  the  actions  of  the  Jacksonians  in  reference 
to  it. 


CHAPTER  X. 

LAST   DAYS    OP   THE   JACKSONIAN   DEMOCRACY. 

THE  difficulty  and  duration  of  a  war  with  an 
Indian  tribe  depend  less  upon  the  numbers 
of  the  tribe  itself  than  upon  the  nature  of 
the  ground  it  inhabits.  The  two  Indian  tribes 
that  have  caused  the  most  irritating  and  pro 
longed  struggle  are  the  Apaches,  who  live  in  the 
vast,  waterless  mountainous  deserts  of  Arizona 
and  New  Mexico,  and  whom  we  are  at  this  present 
moment  engaged  in  subduing,  and  the  Seminoles, 
who,  from  among  the  impenetrable  swamps  of 
Florida,  bade  the  whole  United  States  army 
defiance  for  seven  long  years;  and  this  although 
neither  Seminoles  nor  Apaches  ever  brought  much 
force  into  the  field,  nor  inflicted  such  defeats  upon 
us  as  have  other  Indian  tribes,  like  the  Creeks  and 
Sioux. 

The  conflict  with  the  Seminoles  was  one  of  the 
legacies  left  by  Jackson  to  Van  Buren;  it  lasted 
as  long  as  the  Revolutionary  War,  cost  thirty  mil 
lions  of  dollars,  and  baffled  the  efforts  of  several 
generals  and  numerous  troops,  who  had  previ 
ously  shown  themselves  equal  to  any  in  the  world. 
The  expense,  length,  and  ill-success  of  the  strug 
gle,  and  a  strong  feeling  that  the  Seminoles  had 

198 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      199 

been  wronged,  made  it  a  great  handle  for  attack 
on  the  administration ;  and  the  defense  was  taken 
up  by  Benton,  who  always  accepted  completely 
the  Western  estimate  of  any  form  of  the  Indian 
question. 

As  is  usually  the  case  in  Indian  wars,  there  had 
been  much  wrong  done  by  each  side ;  but  in  this 
instance  we  were  the  more  to  blame,  although  the 
Indians  themselves  were  far  from  being  merely 
harmless  and  suffering  innocents.  The  Seminoles 
were  being  deprived  of  their  lands  in  pursuance  of 
the  general  policy  of  removing  all  the  Indians 
west  of  the  Mississippi.  They  had  agreed  to  go, 
under  pressure,  and  influenced,  probably,  by 
fraudulent  representations;  but  they  declined  to 
fulfil  their  agreement.  If  they  had  been  treated 
wisely  and  firmly  they  might  probably  have  been 
allowed  to  remain  without  serious  injury  to  the 
surrounding  whites.  But  no  such  treatment  was 
attempted,  and  as  a  result  we  were  plunged  in 
one  of  the  most  harassing  Indian  wars  we  ever 
waged.  In  their  gloomy,  tangled  swamps,  and 
among  the  unknown  and  untrodden  recesses  of 
the  everglades  the  Indians  found  a  secure  asylum ; 
and  they  issued  from  their  haunts  to  burn  and 
ravage  almost  all  the  settled  parts  of  Florida, 
fairly  depopulating  five  counties;  while  the  sol 
diers  could  rarely  overtake  them,  and  when  they 
did,  were  placed  at  such  a  disadvantage  that  the 


200  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Indians  repulsed  or  cut  off  detachment  after  de 
tachment,  generally  making  a  merciless  and  com 
plete  slaughter  of  each.  The  great  Seminole 
leader,  Osceola,  was  captured  only  by  deliberate 
treachery  and  breach  of  faith  on  our  part,  and  the 
Indians  were  worn  out  rather  than  conquered. 
This  was  partly  owing  to  their  remarkable  capaci 
ties  as  bush-fighters,  but  infinitely  more  to  the 
nature  of  their  territory. 

Our  troops  generally  fought  with  great  bravery ; 
but  there  is  very  little  else  in  the  struggle,  either 
as  regards  its  origin  or  the  manner  in  which  it  was 
carried  on,  to  which  an  American  can  look  back 
with  any  satisfaction.  We  usually  group  all  our 
Indian  wars  together,  in  speaking  of  their  justice 
or  injustice ;  and  thereby  show  flagrant  ignorance. 
The  Sioux  and  Cheyennes,  for  instance,  have  more 
often  been  sinning  than  sinned  against ;  for  exam 
ple,  the  so-called  Chivington  or  Sandy  Creek  Mas 
sacre,  in  spite  of  certain  most  objectionable  details, 
was  on  the  whole  as  righteous  and  beneficial  a  deed 
as  ever  took  place  on  the  frontier.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  most  cruel  wrongs  have  been  perpe 
trated  by  whites  upon  perfectly  peaceable  and 
unoffending  tribes  like  those  of  California,  or  the 
Nez  Perces.  Yet  the  emasculated  professional 
humanitarians  mourn  as  much  over  one  set  of 
Indians  as  over  the  other — and  indeed,  on  all 
points  connected  with  Indian  management,  are 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      201 

as  untrustworthy  and  unsafe  leaders  as  would  be 
an  equal  number  of  the  most  brutal  white  border 
ers.  But  the  Seminole  War  was  one  of  those 
where  the  Eastern  or  humanitarian  view  was  more 
nearly  correct  than  was  any  other ;  although  even 
here  the  case  was  far  from  being  entirely  onesided. 
Ben  ton  made  an  elaborate  but  not  always  can 
did  defense  of  the  administration,  both  as  to  the 
origin  and  as  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  He 
attempted  to  show  that  the  Seminoles  had  agreed 
to  go  West,  had  broken  their  treaty  without  any 
reason,  had  perpetrated  causeless  massacres,  had 
followed  up  their  successes  with  merciless  butch 
eries,  which  last  statement  was  true;  and  that 
Osceola  had  forfeited  all  claim  or  right  to  have  a 
flag  of  truce  protect  him.  There  was  a  certain 
justice  in  his  position  even  on  these  questions,  and 
when  he  came  to  defend  the  conduct  of  our  soldiers 
he  had  the  right  entirely  with  him.  They  were 
led  by  the  same  commander,  and  belonged  to  the 
same  regiments,  that  in  Canada  had  shown  them 
selves  equal  to  the  famous  British  infantry ;  they 
had  to  contend  with  the  country,  rather  than  with 
their  enemies,  as  the  sweltering  heat,  the  stagnant 
lagoons,  the  quaking  morasses,  and  the  dense  for 
ests  of  Florida  made  it  almost  impossible  for  an 
army  to  carry  on  a  successful  campaign.  More 
over,  the  Seminoles  were  well  armed;  and  many 
tribes  of  North  American  Indians  show  them- 


202  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

selves,  when  with  good  weapons  and  on  their  own 
ground,  more  dangerous  antagonists  than  would 
be  an  equal  number  of  the  best  European  troops. 
Indeed,  under  such  conditions  they  can  only  be 
contended  with  on  equal  terms  if  the  opposing 
white  force  is  made  up  of  frontiersmen  who  are  as 
good  woodsmen  and  riflemen  as  themselves,  and 
who,  moreover,  have  been  drilled  by  some  man 
like  Jackson,  who  knows  how  to  handle  them  to 
the  best  advantage,  both  in  disciplining  their 
lawless  courage  and  in  forcing  them  to  act  under 
orders  and  together, — the  lack  of  which  discipline 
and  power  of  supporting  each  other  has  often 
rendered  an  assemblage  of  formidable  individual 
border-fighters  a  mere  disorderly  mob  when 
brought  into  the  field. 

The  war  dragged  on  tediously.  The  troops — 
regulars,  volunteers,  and  militia  alike — fought 
the  Indians  again  and  again;  there  were  pitched 
battles,  surprises,  ambuscades,  and  assaults  on 
places  of  unknown  strength ;  hundreds  of  soldiers 
were  slain  in  battle  or  by  treachery ;  hundreds  of 
settlers  were  slaughtered  in  their  homes,  or  as 
they  fled  from  them;  the  bloody  Indian  forays 
reached  even  to  the  outskirts  of  Tallahatchee  and 
to  within  sight  of  the  walls  of  quaint  old  St. 
Augustine.  Little  by  little,  however,  the  power  of 
the  Seminoles  was  broken ;  their  war  bands  were 
scattered  and  driven  from  the  field,  hundreds 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      203 

of  their  number  were  slain  in  fight,  and  five 
times  as  many  surrendered  and  were  taken  west 
of  the  Mississippi.  The  white  troops  marched 
through  Florida  down  to  and  into  the  everglades, 
and  crossed  it  backward  and  forward,  from  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean ;  they  hunted 
their  foes  from  morass  to  morass  and  from  hum 
mock  to  hummock;  they  mapped  out  the  whole 
hitherto  unknown  country;  they  established 
numerous  posts;  opened  hundreds  of  miles  of 
wagon  road ;  and  built  very  many  causeways  and 
bridges.  But  they  could  not  end  the  war.  The 
bands  of  Indians  broke  up  and  entirely  ceased  to 
offer  resistance  to  bodies  of  armed  whites ;  but  as 
individuals  they  continued  as  dangerous  to  the 
settlers  as  ever,  prowling  out  at  night  like  wild 
beasts  from  their  fastnesses  in  the  dark  and  fetid 
swamps,  murdering,  burning,  and  ravaging  in  all 
the  outlying  settlements,  and  destroying  every 
lonely  farmhouse  or  homestead. 

There  was  but  one  way  in  which  the  war  could 
be  finally  ended,  and  that  was  to  have  the  terri 
tory  occupied  by  armed  settlers ;  in  other  words, 
to  have  it  won  and  held  exactly  as  almost  all  the 
land  of  the  United  States  has  been  in  the  begin 
ning.  Benton  introduced  a  bill  to  bring  this  about, 
giving  to  every  such  settler  a  good  inheritance 
in  the  soil  as  a  reward  for  his  enterprise,  toil,  and 
danger;  and  the  war  was  finished  only  by  the 


204  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

adoption  of  this  method.  He  supported  his  bill 
in  a  very  effective  speech,  showing  that  the  pro 
posed  way  was  the  only  one  by  which  a  permanent 
conquest  could  be  effected ;  he  himself  had,  when 
young,  seen  it  put  into  execution  in  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky,  where  the  armed  settlers,  with  their 
homesteads  in  the  soil,  formed  the  vanguard  of 
the  white  advance ;  where  the  rifle-bearing  back 
woodsmen  went  forth  to  fight  and  to  cultivate, 
living  in  assemblages  of  blockhouses  at  first  and 
separating  into  individual  settlements  afterward. 
The  work  had  to  be  done  with  axe,  spade,  and  rifle 
alike.  Benton  rightly  insisted  that  there  was  no 
longer  need  of  a  large  army  in  Florida : 

Why,  the  men  who  are  there  now  can  find  nobody 
to  fight!  It  is  two  years  since  a  fight  has  been  had. 
Ten  men  who  will  avoid  surprises  and  ambuscades  can 
now  go  from  one  end  of  Florida  to  the  other.  As  war 
riors,  these  Indians  no  longer  appear;  it  is  only  as 
assassins,  as  robbers,  as  incendiaries,  that  they  lurk 
about.  What  is  now  wanted  is  not  an  army  to  fight, 
but  settlers  and  cultivators  to  take  possession  and 
keep  possession ;  and  the  armed  cultivator  is  the  man 
for  that.  The  blockhouse  is  the  first  house  to  be 
built  in  an  Indian  country;  the  stockade  the  first 
fence  to  be  put  up.  Within  that  blockhouse,  or 
within  a  hollow  square  of  blockhouses,  two  miles  long 
on  each  side,  two  hundred  yards  apart,  and  enclosing 
a  good  field,  safe  habitations  are  to  be  found  for  fami 
lies.  Cultivation  and  defense  then  go  hand  in  hand. 
The  heart  of  the  Indian  sickens  when  he  hears  the 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy     205 

crowing  of  the  cock,  the  barking  of  the  dog,  the  sound 
of  the  axe,  and  the  crack  of  the  rifle.  These  are  the 
true  evidences  of  the  dominion  of  the  white  man; 
these  are  the  proofs  that  the  owner  has  come  and 
means  to  stay,  and  then  the  Indians  feel  it  to  be  time 
for  them  to  go.  While  soldiers  alone  are  in  the  coun 
try  they  feel  their  presence  to  be  temporary ;  that  they 
are  mere  sojourners  in  the  land,  and  sooner  or  later 
must  go  away.  It  is  the  settler  alone,  the  armed  set 
tler,  whose  presence  announces  the  dominion,  the 
permanent  dominion,  of  the  white  man. 

Benton's  ideas  were  right,  and  were  acted  upon. 
It  is  impossible  even  to  subdue  an  Indian  tribe  by 
the  army  alone ;  the  latter  can  only  pave  the  way 
for  and  partially  protect  the  armed  settlers  who 
are  to  hold  the  soil. 

Benton  continued  to  take  a  great  interest  in  the 
disposal  of  the  public  lands,  as  was  natural  in  a 
senator  from  the  West,  where  the  bulk  of  these 
lands  lay.  He  was  always  a  great  advocate  of  a 
homestead  law.  During  Van  Buren's  administra 
tion,  he  succeeded  in  getting  two  or  three  bills 
on  the  subject  through  the  Senate.  One  of  these 
allowed  lands  that  had  been  five  years  in  the  mar 
ket  to  be  reduced  in  price  to  a  dollar  an  acre,  and 
if  they  stood  five  years  longer  to  go  down  to 
seventy-five  cents.  The  bill  was  greatly  to  the 
interest  of  the  Western  farmer  in  the  newer, 
although  not  necessarily  the  newest,  parts  of  the 
country.  The  man  who  went  on  the  newest  land 


206  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

was  in  turn  provided  for  by  the  preemption  bill, 
which  secured  the  privilege  of  first  purchase  to 
the  actual  settler  on  any  lands  to  which  the  Indian 
title  had  been  extinguished ;  to  be  paid  for  at  the 
minimum  price  of  public  lands  at  the  time.  An 
effort  was  made  to  confine  the  benefits  of  this  pro 
posed  law  to  citizens  of  the  United  States,  exclud 
ing  unnaturalized  foreigners  from  its  action. 
Benton,  as  representing  the  new  States,  who 
desired  immigrants  of  every  kind,  whether  foreign 
or  native,  successfully  opposed  this.  He  pointed 
out  that  there  was  no  question  of  conferring  politi 
cal  rights,  which  involved  the  management  of  the 
government,  and  which  should  not  be  conferred 
until  the  foreigner  had  become  a  naturalized  citi 
zen  ;  it  was  merely  a  question  of  allowing  the  alien  a 
right  to  maintain  himself  and  to  support  his  family. 
He  especially  opposed  the  amendment  on  account 
of  the  class  of  foreigners  it  would  affect.  Aliens 
who  wished  to  take  up  public  lands  were  not 
paupers  or  criminals,  and  did  not  belong  to  the 
shiftless  and  squalid  foreign  mob  that  drifted  into 
the  great  cities  of  the  seaboard  and  the  interior; 
but  on  the  contrary  were  among  our  most  enter 
prising,  hardy,  and  thrifty  citizens,  who  had 
struck  out  for  themselves  into  the  remote  parts 
of  the  new  States  and  had  there  begun  to  bring 
the  wilderness  into  subjection.  Such  men  de 
served  to  be  encouraged  in  every  way,  and  should 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      207 

receive  from  the  preemption  laws  the  same  benefits 
that  would  inure  to  native-born  citizens.  The 
third  bill  introduced,  which  passed  the  Senate  but 
failed  in  the  House,  was  one  to  permit  the  public 
lands  sold  to  be  immediately  taxed  by  the  States 
in  which  they  lay.  Originally  these  lands  had 
been  sold  upon  credit,  the  total  amount  not  being 
paid,  nor  the  title  passed,  until  five  years  after  the 
sale;  and  during  this  time  it  would  have  been 
unjust  to  tax  them,  as  failure  in  paying  the  instal 
ments  to  the  government  would  have  let  the  lands 
revert  to  the  latter;  but  when  the  cash  system 
was  substituted  for  credit  Ben  ton  believed  that 
there  was  no  longer  reason  why  the  new  lands 
should  not  bear  their  share  of  the  state  burdens. 

During  Van  Buren's  administration  the  stand 
ard  of  public  honesty,  which  had  been  lowering 
with  frightful  rapidity  ever  since,  with  Adams, 
the  men  of  high  moral  tone  had  gone  out  of  power, 
went  almost  as  far  down  as  it  could  go ;  although 
things  certainly  did  not  change  for  the  better 
under  Tyler  and  Polk.  Not  only  was  there  the 
most  impudent  and  unblushing  rascality  among 
the  public  servants  of  the  nation,  but  the  people 
themselves,  through  their  representatives  in  the 
state  legislatures,  went  to  work  to  swindle  their 
honest  creditors.  Many  States,  in  the  rage  for 
public  improvements,  had  contracted  debts  which 
they  now  refused  to  pay ;  in  many  cases  they  were 


208  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

unable,  or  at  least  so  professed  themselves,  even 
to  pay  the  annual  interest.  The  debts  of  the 
States  were  largely  held  abroad;  they  had  been 
converted  into  stock  and  held  in  shares,  which  had 
gone  into  a  great  number  of  hands,  and  now,  of 
course,  became  greatly  depreciated  in  value.  It 
is  a  painful  and  shameful  page  in  our  history ;  and 
every  man  connected  with  the  repudiation  of  the 
States'  debts  ought,  if  remembered  at  all,  to  be 
remembered  with  scorn  and  contempt.  However, 
time  has  gradually  shrouded  from  our  sight  both 
the  names  of  the  leaders  in  the  repudiation  and 
the  names  of  the  victims  whom  they  swindled. 
Two  alone,  one  in  each  class,  will  always  be  kept 
in  mind.  Before  Jefferson  Davis  took  his  place 
among  the  arch-traitors  in  our  annals  he  had 
already  long  been  known  as  one  of  the  chief  re- 
pudiators;  it  was  not  unnatural  that  to  dishon 
esty  toward  the  creditors  of  the  public  he  should 
afterward  add  treachery  toward  the  public  itself. 
The  one  most  prominent  victim  was  described  by 
Benton  himself:  "The  Rev.  Sydney  Smith,  of 
witty  memory,  but  amiable  withal,  was  accus 
tomed  to  lose  all  his  amiability,  but  no  part  of  his 
wit,  when  he  spoke  of  his  Pennsylvania  bonds— 
which,  in  fact,  was  very  often." 

Many  of  the  bondholders,  however,  did  not 
manifest  their  grief  by  caustic  wit,  but  looked  to 
more  substantial  relief;  and  did  their  best  to 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      209 

bring  about  the  assumption  of  the  state  debts, 
in  some  form,  whether  open  or  disguised,  by 
the  federal  government.  The  British  capitalists 
united  with  many  American  capitalists  to  work 
for  some  such  action;  and  there  were  plenty  of 
people  in  the  States  willing  enough  to  see  it  done. 
Of  course  it  would  have  been  criminal  folly  on  the 
part  of  the  federal  government  to  take  any  such 
step;  and  Benton  determined  to  meet  and  check 
the  effort  at  the  very  beginning.  The  London 
Bankers'  Circular  had  contained  a  proposition 
recommending  that  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  should  guarantee,  or  otherwise  provide  for, 
the  ultimate  payment  of  the  debts  which  the 
States  had  contracted  for  state  or  local  purposes. 
Benton  introduced  a  series  of  resolutions  declaring 
utter  opposition  to  the  proposal,  both  on  the 
ground  of  expediency  and  on  that  of  constitution 
ality.  The  resolutions  were  perfectly  proper  in 
their  purpose,  but  were  disfigured  by  that  cheap 
species  of  demagogy  which  consists  in  denouncing 
purely  supposititious  foreign  interference,  com 
plicated  by  an  allusion  to  Benton's  especial  pet 
terror,  the  inevitable  money  power.  As  he  put  it : 
"Foreign  interference  and  influence  are  far  more 
dangerous  in  the  invidious  intervention  of  the 
moneyed  power  than  in  the  forcible  invasions  of 
fleets  and  armies." 

An  attempt  was  made  directly  to  reverse  the 
14 


210  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

effect  of  the  resolutions  by  amending  them  so  as 
to  provide  that  the  public  land  revenue  should  be 
divided  among  the  States,  to  help  them  in  the 
payment  of  these  debts.  Both  Webster  and  Clay 
supported  this  amendment,  but  it  was  fortunately 
beaten  by  a  large  vote. 

Benton's  speech,  like  the  resolutions  in  support 
of  which  he  spoke,  was  right  in  its  purpose,  but 
contained  much  matter  that  was  beside  the  mark. 
He  had  worked  himself  into  such  a  condition  over 
the  supposititious  intrigues  of  the  "money  power" 
— an  attack  on  which  is  almost  always  sure  to 
be  popular — that  he  was  very  certain  to  discover 
evidence  of  their  existence  on  all,  even  the  most 
unlikely,  occasions ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  think  that 
he  was  not  himself  aware  how  overdrawn  was  his 
prophecy  of  a  probable  interference  of  foreign 
powers  in  our  affairs,  if  the  resolutions  he  had 
presented  were  not  adopted. 

The  tariff  had  once  more  begun  to  give  trouble, 
and  the  South  was  again  complaining  of  its  work 
ings,  aware  that  she  was  falling  always  more  to 
the  rear  in  the  race  for  prosperity,  and  blindly 
attributing  her  failure  to  everything  but  the  true 
reason, — the  existence  of  slavery.  Even  Benton 
himself  showed  a  curiously  pathetic  eagerness  to 
prove  both  to  others  and  himself  that  the  cause  of 
the  increasing  disparity  in  growth,  and  incompati 
bility  in  interest  between  the  two  sections,  must 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      211 

be  due  to  some  temporary  and  artificial  cause,  and 
endeavored  to  hide  from  all  eyes,  even  from  his 
own,  the  fact  that  the  existence  of  slavery  was 
working,  slowly  but  surely,  and  with  steadily  in 
creasing  rapidity,  to  rend  in  sunder  the  Union 
which  he  loved  and  served  with  such  heartfelt 
devotion.  He  tried  to  prove  that  the  main  cause 
of  discontent  was  to  be  found  in  the  tariff  and 
other  laws,  which  favored  the  North  at  the  ex 
pense  of  the  South.  At  the  same  time  he  entered 
an  eloquent  plea  for  a  warmer  feeling  between  the 
sections,  and  pointed  out  the  absolute  hopeless 
ness  of  attempting  to  better  the  situation  in  any 
way  by  disunion.  The  great  Missourian  could 
look  back  with  fond  pride  and  regret  to  the  con 
dition  of  the  South  as  it  was  during  and  immedi 
ately  after  the  colonial  days,  when  it  was  the  seat 
of  wealth,  power,  high  living,  and  free-handed 
hospitality,  and  was  filled  to  overflowing  with  the 
abounding  life  of  its  eager  and  turbulent  sons. 
The  change  for  the  worse  in  its  relative  condition 
was  real  and  great.  He  reproved  his  fellow 
Southerners  for  attributing  this  change  to  a  single 
cause, — the  unequal  working  of  the  federal  gov 
ernment,  "  which  gave  all  the  benefits  of  the 
Union  to  the  South  and  all  its  burdens  to  the 
North;"  he  claimed  that  it  was  due  to  many 
other  causes  as  well.  Yet  those  whom  he  re 
buked  were  as  near  right  as  he  was ;  for  the  change 


212  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

was  due  in  the  main  to  only  one  cause — but  that 
cause  was  slavery.  It  is  almost  pitiful  to  see  the 
strong,  stern,  self-reliant  statesman  refusing,  with 
nervous  and  passionate  wilfulness,  to  look  the 
danger  in  the  face,  and,  instead  thereof,  trying  to 
persuade  himself  into  the  belief  that  ' '  the  remedy 
lies  in  the  right  working  of  the  Constitution;  in 
the  cessation  of  unequal  legislation ;  in  the  reduc 
tion  of  the  inordinate  expenses  of  the  government ; 
in  its  return  to  the  simple,  limited,  and  economical 
machine  it  was  intended  to  be ;  and  in  the  revival 
of  fraternal  feelings  and  respect  for  each  other's 
rights  and  just  complaints."  Like  many  another 
man  he  thought,  or  tried  to  think,  that  by  sweep 
ing  the  dust  from  the  door-sill  he  could  somehow 
stave  ofl  the  whirling  rush  of  the  sand-storm. 

The  compromise  tariff  of  1833  had  abolished  all 
specific  duties,  establishing  ad  valorem  ones  in 
their  place ;  and  the  result  had  been  great  uncer 
tainty  and  injustice  in  its  working.  Now  whether 
a  protective  tariff  is  right  or  wrong  may  be  open  to 
question ;  but  if  it  exists  at  all,  it  should  work  as 
simply  and  with  as  much  certainty  and  exactitude 
as  possible ;  if  its  interpretation  varies,  or  if  it  is 
continually  meddled  with  by  Congress,  great  dam 
age  ensues.  It  is  in  reality  of  far  less  importance 
that  a  law  should  be  ideally  right  than  that  it 
should  be  certain  and  steady  in  its  workings. 
Even  supposing  that  a  high  tariff  is  all  wrong,  it 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      213 

would  work  infinitely  better  for  the  country  than 
would  a  series  of  changes  between  high  and  low 
duties.  Benton  strongly  advocated  a  return  to 
specific  duties,  as  being  simpler,  surer,  and  better 
on  every  account.  In  commenting  on  the  ad 
valorem  duties,  he  showed  how  they  had  been 
adopted  blindly  and  without  discussion  by  the 
frightened,  silent  multitude  of  congressmen  and 
senators,  who  jumped  at  Clay's  compromise  bill 
in  1833  as  giving  them  a  loophole  of  escape  from  a 
situation  where  they  would  have  had  to  face  evil 
consequences,  no  matter  what  stand  they  took. 
Benton's  comment  on  men  of  this  stamp  deserves 
chronicling,  from  its  justice  and  biting  severity: 
' '  It  (the  compromise  act)  was  passed  by  the  aid  of 
the  votes  of  those — always  a  considerable  per 
centum  in  every  public  body — to  whom  the  name 
of  compromise  is  an  irresistible  attraction;  ami 
able  men,  who  would  do  no  wrong  of  themselves, 
and  without  whom  the  designing  could  also  do 
but  little  wrong." 

He  not  only  devoted  himself  to  the  general  sub 
ject  of  the  tariff  in  relation  to  specific  duties,  but 
he  also  took  up  several  prominent  abuses.  One 
subject,  on  which  he  was  never  tired  of  harping 
with  monotonous  persistency,  was  the  duty  on 
salt.  The  idea  of  making  salt  free  had  become 
one  which  he  was  almost  as  fond  of  bringing  into 
every  discussion,  no  matter  how  inappropriate  to 


214  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

the  matter  in  hand,  as  he  was  of  making  irrelevant 
and  abusive  allusions  to  his  much-enduring  and 
long-suffering  hobby,  the  iniquitous  "money 
power."  Benton  had  all  the  tenacity  of  a  snap 
ping  turtle,  and  was  as  firm  a  believer  in  the  policy 
of  "continuous  hammering"  as  Grant  himself. 
His  tenacity  and  his  pertinacious  refusal  to  aban 
don  any  contest,  no  matter  what  the  odds  were 
against  him,  and  no  matter  how  often  he  had  to 
return  to  the  charge,  formed  two  of  his  most  in 
valuable  qualities,  and  when  called  into  play  on 
behalf  of  such  an  object  as  the  preservation  of  the 
Union,  cannot  receive  too  high  praise  at  our  hands ; 
for  they  did  the  country  services  so  great  and  last 
ing  that  they  should  never  be  forgotten.  It  would 
have  been  fortunate  indeed  if  Clay  and  Webster 
had  possessed  the  fearless,  aggressive  courage  and 
iron  will  of  the  rugged  Missourian,  who  was  so 
often  pitted  against  them  in  the  political  arena. 
But  when  Benton 's  attention  was  firmly  fixed  on 
the  accomplishment  of  something  comparatively 
trivial,  his  dogged,  stubborn,  and  unyielding 
earnestness  drew  him  into  making  efforts  of  which 
the  disproportion  to  the  result  aimed  at  was  rather 
droll.  Nothing  could  thwart  him  or  turn  him 
aside;  and  though  slow  to  take  up  an  idea,  yet, 
if  it  was  once  in  his  head,  to  drive  it  out  was  a  sim 
ply  hopeless  task.  These  qualities  were  of  such 
invaluable  use  to  the  State  on  so  many  great 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      215 

occasions  that  we  can  well  afford  to  treat  them 
merely  with  a  good-humored  laugh,  when  we  see 
them  exercised  on  behalf  of  such  a  piece  of  fool 
ishness  as,  for  example,  the  expunging  resolution. 
The  repeal  of  the  salt  tax,  then,  was  a  particular 
favorite  in  Ben  ton's  rather  numerous  stable  of 
hobbies,  because  it  gave  free  scope  for  the  use  of 
sentimental  as  well  as  of  economic  arguments. 
He  had  the  right  of  the  question,  and  was  not  in 
the  least  daunted  by  his  numerous  rebuffs  and  the 
unvarying  ill  success  of  his  efforts.  Speaking  in 
1840,  he  stated  that  he  had  been  urging  the  repeal 
for  twelve  years ;  and  for  the  purpose  of  furnishing 
data  with  which  to  compare  such  a  period  of  time, 
and  without  the  least  suspicion  that  there  was  any 
thing  out  of  the  way  in  the  comparison,  he  added, 
in  a  solemn  parenthesis,  that  this  was  two  years 
longer  than  the  siege  of  Troy  lasted.  In  the  same 
speech  was  a  still  choicer  morsel  of  eloquence 
about  salt:  "The  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  Universe 
has  done  everything  to  supply  His  creatures  with 
it;  man,  the  fleeting  shadow  of  an  instant,  in 
vested  with  his  little  brief  authority,  has  done 
much  to  deprive  them  of  it."  After  which  he 
went  on  to  show  a  really  extensive  acquaintance 
with  the  history  of  salt  taxes  and  monopolies,  and 
with  the  uses  and  physical  structure  and  surround 
ings  of  the  mineral  itself — all  which  might  have 
taught  his  hearers  that  a  man  may  combine  much 


216  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

erudition  with  a  total  lack  of  the  sense  of  humor. 
The  salt  tax  is  dragged,  neck  and  heels,  into  many 
of  Benton's  speeches  much  as  Cooper  manages,  on 
all  possible  occasions,  throughout  his  novels,  to 
show  the  unlikeness  of  the  Bay  of  Naples  to  the 
Bay  of  New  York — not  the  only  point  of  resem 
blance,  by  the  way,  between  the  characters  of  the 
Missouri  statesman  and  the  New  York  novelist. 
Whether  the  subject  under  discussion  was  the  tax 
ation  of  bank-notes,  or  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
made  very  little  difference  to  Benton  as  to  intro 
ducing  an  allusion  to  the  salt  monopoly.  One  of 
his  happy  arguments  in  favor  of  the  repeal,  which 
was  addressed  to  an  exceedingly  practical  and 
commonplace  Congress,  was  that  the  early  Chris 
tian  disciples  had  been  known  as  the  salt  of  the 
earth — a  biblical  metaphor,  which  Benton  kindly 
assured  his  hearers  was  very  expressive;  and 
added  that  a  salt  tax  was  morally  as  well  as  politi 
cally  wrong,  and  in  fact  "was  a  species  of  im 
piety." 

But  in  attacking  some  of  the  abuses  which  had 
developed  out  of  the  tariff  of  1833  Benton  made 
a  very  shrewd  and  practical  speech,  without  per 
mitting  himself  to  indulge  in  any  such  intellec 
tual  pranks  as  accompanied  his  salt  orations.  He 
especially  aimed  at  reducing  the  drawbacks  on 
sugar,  molasses,  and  one  or  two  other  articles. 
In  accordance  with  our  whole  clumsy,  haphazard 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      217 

system  of  dealing  with  the  tariff  we  had  originally 
put  very  high  duties  on  the  articles  in  question, 
and  then  had  allowed  correspondingly  heavy 
drawbacks;  and  yet,  when  in  1833,  by  Clay's 
famous  compromise  tariff  bill,  the  duties  were 
reduced  to  a  fractional  part  of  what  they  had  pre 
viously  been,  no  parallel  reduction  was  made  in  the 
drawbacks,  although  Benton  (supported  by  Web 
ster)  made  a  vain  effort  even  then,  while  the  com 
promise  bill  was  on  its  passage,  to  have  the  injustice 
remedied.  As  a  consequence,  the  exporters  of 
sugar  and  rum,  instead  of  drawing  back  the  exact 
amounts  paid  into  the  treasury,  drew  back  several 
times  as  much ;  and  the  ridiculous  result  was  that 
certain  exporters  were  paid  a  naked  bounty  out  of 
the  treasury,  and  received  pay  for  doing  and  suf 
fering  nothing.  In  1839  the  drawback  paid  on  the 
exportation  of  refined  sugar  exceeded  the  amount 
of  revenue  derived  from  imported  sugar  by  over 
twenty  thousand  dollars.  Benton  showed  this 
clearly,  by  unimpeachable  statistics,  and  went  on 
to  prove  that  in  that  year  the  whole  amount  of  the 
revenue  from  brown  and  clayed  sugar,  plus  the 
above-mentioned  twenty  thousand  dollars,  was 
paid  over  to  twenty-nine  sugar  refiners ;  and  that 
these  men  thus  "drew  back"  from  the  treasury 
what  they  had  never  put  into  it.  Abuses  equally 
gross  existed  in  relation  to  various  other  articles. 
But  in  spite  of  the  clear  justice  of  his  case,  Benton 


218  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

was  able  at  first  to  make  but  little  impression  on 
Congress;  and  it  was  some  time  before  matters 
were  straightened  out,  as  all  the  protective  in 
terests  felt  obliged  to  make  common  cause  with 
each  other,  no  matter  what  evils  might  be  perpe 
trated  by  their  taking  such  action. 

Toward  the  close  of  Van  Buren's  administra 
tion,  when  he  was  being  assailed  on  every  side,  as 
well  for  what  Jackson  as  for  what  he  himself  had 
done  or  left  undone,  one  of  the  chief  accusations 
brought  against  him  was  that  he  had  squandered 
the  public  money,  and  that,  since  Adams  had  been 
ousted  from  the  presidency,  the  expenses  of  run 
ning  the  government  had  increased  out  of  all  pro 
portion  to  what  was  proper.  There  was  good 
ground  for  their  complaint,  as  the  waste  and  pecu 
lation  in  some  of  the  departments  had  been  very 
great ;  but  Benton,  in  an  elaborate  defense  of  both 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren,  succeeded  in  showing 
that  at  least  certain  of  the  accusations  were  un 
founded — although  he  had  to  stretch  a  point  or 
two  in  trying  to  make  good  his  claim  that  the 
administration  was  really  economical,  being  re 
duced  to  the  rather  lame  expedient  of  ruling  out 
about  two-thirds  of  the  expenditures  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  ''extraordinary." 

The  charge  of  extravagance  was  one  of  the  least 
of  the  charges  urged  against  the  Jacksonian  Demo 
crats  during  the  last  days  of  their  rule.  While 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      219 

they  had  been  in  power  the  character  of  the  public 
service  had  deteriorated  frightfully,  both  as  re 
garded  its  efficiency  and  infinitely  more  as  regarded 
its  honesty ;  and  under  Van  Buren  the  amount  of 
money  stolen  by  the  public  officers,  compared  to 
the  amount  handed  in  to  the  treasury,  was  greater 
than  ever  before  or  since.  For  this  the  Jacksoni- 
ans  were  solely  and  absolutely  responsible;  they 
drove  out  the  merit  system  of  making  appoint 
ments,  and  introduced  the  "spoils"  system  in  its 
place ;  and  under  the  latter  they  chose  a  peculiarly 
dishonest  and  incapable  set  of  officers,  whose  sole 
recommendation  was  to  be  found  in  the  knavish 
trickery  and  low  cunning  that  enabled  them  to 
manage  the  ignorant  voters  who  formed  the  back 
bone  of  Jackson's  party.  The  statesmen  of  the 
Democracy  in  after  days  forgot  the  good  deeds  of 
the  Jacksonians ;  they  lost  their  attachment  to  the 
Union,  and  abandoned  their  championship  of  hard 
money:  but  they  never  ceased  to  cling  to  the 
worst  legacy  their  predecessors  had  left  them. 
The  engrafting  of  the  "spoils'*  system  on  our 
government  was,  of  all  the  results  of  Jacksonian 
rule,  the  one  which  was  most  permanent  in  its 
effects. 

All  these  causes — the  corruption  of  the  public 
officials,  the  extravagance  of  the  government,  and 
the  widespread  distress,  which  might  be  regarded 
as  the  aftermath  of  its  ruinous  financial  policy — 


220  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

combined  with  others  that  were  as  little  to  the  dis 
credit  of  the  Jacksonians  as  they  were  to  the  credit 
of  the  Whigs,  brought  about  the  overthrow  of  the 
former.  There  was  much  poetic  justice  in  the  fact 
that  the  presidential  election  which  decided  their 
fate  was  conducted  on  as  purely  irrational  princi 
ples,  and  was  as  merely  one  of  sound  and  fury,  as 
had  been  the  case  in  the  election  twelve  years  pre 
viously,  when  they  came  into  power.  The  Whigs, 
having  exhausted  their  language  in  denouncing 
their  opponents  for  nominating  a  man  like  Andrew 
Jackson,  proceeded  to  look  about  in  their  own 
party  to  find  one  who  should  come  as  near  him  as 
possible  in  all  the  attributes  that  had  given  him 
so  deep  a  hold  on  the  people ;  and  they  succeeded 
perfectly  when  they  pitched  on  the  old  Indian 
fighter,  Harrison.  "Tippecanoe"  proved  quite  as 
effective  a  war-cry  in  bringing  about  the  downfall 
of  the  Jacksonians  as  "Old  Hickory"  had  shown 
itself  to  be  a  dozen  years  previously  in  raising 
them  up.  General  Harrison  had  already  shown 
himself  to  be  a  good  soldier,  and  a  loyal  and  hon 
est  public  servant,  although  by  no  means  standing 
in  the  first  rank  either  as  regards  war-craft  or 
state-craft ;  but  the  mass  of  his  supporters  appar 
ently  considered  the  facts,  or  supposed  facts,  that 
he  lived  in  a  log-cabin  the  walls  of  which  were 
decorated  with  coon-skins,  and  that  he  drank  hard 
cider  from  a  gourd,  as  being  more  important  than 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy     221 

his  capacity  as  a  statesman  or  his  past  services  to 
the  nation. 

The  Whigs  having  thus  taken  a  shaft  from  the 
Jacksonians'  quiver,  it  was  rather  amusing  to  see 
the  latter,  in  their  turn,  hold  up  their  hands  in 
horror  at  the  iniquity  of  what  would  now  be  called 
a  ''hurrah"  canvass;  blandly  ignoring  the  fact 
that  it  was  simply  a  copy  of  their  own  successful 
proceedings.  Says  Benton,  with  amusing  gravity : 
"The  class  of  inducements  addressed  to  the  pas 
sions  and  imaginations  of  the  people  was  such  as 
history  blushes  to  record,"  a  remark  that  provokes 
criticism,  when  it  is  remembered  that  Benton  had 
been  himself  a  prominent  actor  on  the  Jacksonian 
side  in  the  campaigns  of  '28  and  '32,  when  it  was 
exclusively  to  "the  passions  and  imaginations  of 
the  people"  that  all  arguments  were  addressed. 

The  Democrats  did  not  long  remain  out  of 
power;  and  they  kept  the  control  of  the  govern 
mental  policy  in  their  hands  pretty  steadily  until 
the  time  of  the  Civil  War;  nevertheless  it  is  true 
that  with  the  defeat  of  Van  Buren  the  Jacksonian 
Democracy,  as  such,  lost  forever  its  grip  on  the 
direction  of  national  affairs.  When,  under  Polk, 
the  Democrats  came  back,  they  came  under  the 
lead  of  the  very  men  whom  the  original  Jacksoni 
ans  had  opposed  and  kept  down.  With  all  their 
faults,  Jackson  and  Benton  were  strong  Union 
men,  and  under  them  their  party  was  a  Union 


222  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

party.  Calhoun  and  South  Carolina,  and  the  dis- 
unionists  in  the  other  Southern  States  were  their 
bitter  foes.  But  the  disunion  and  extreme  slav 
ery  elements  within  the  Democratic  ranks  were 
increasing  rapidly  all  the  time;  and  they  had 
obtained  complete  and  final  control  when  the 
party  reappeared  as  victors  after  their  defeat  in 
1840.  Until  Van  Buren's  overthrow  the  national 
ists  had  held  the  upper  hand  in  shaping  Demo 
cratic  policy ;  but  after  that  event  the  leadership 
of  the  party  passed  completely  into  the  hands  of 
the  separatists. 

The  defeat  of  Van  Buren  marks  an  era  in  more 
ways  than  one.  During  his  administration  slavery 
played  a  less  prominent  part  in  politics  than  did 
many  other  matters ;  this  was  never  so  again.  His 
administration  was  the  last  in  which  this  question, 
or  the  question  springing  from  it,  did  not  overtop 
and  dwarf  in  importance  all  others.  Again,  the 
presidential  election  of  1840  was  the  last  into 
which  slavery  did  not  enter  as  a  most  important, 
and  in  fact  as  the  vital  and  determining  factor. 
In  the  contest  between  Van  Buren  and  Harrison 
it  did  not  have  the  least  influence  upon  the  result. 
Moreover,  Van  Buren  was  the  last  Democratic 
president  who  ruled  over  a  Union  of  States;  all 
his  successors,  up  to  the  time  of  Lincoln's  election, 
merely  held  sway  over  a  Union  of  sections.  The 
spirit  of  separation  had  identified  itself  with  the 


Last  of  Jacksonian  Democracy      223 

maintenance  of  slavery,  and  the  South  was  rapidly 
uniting  into  a  compact  array  of  States  with  inter 
ests  that  were  hostile  to  the  North  on  the  point 
most  vitally  affecting  the  welfare  of  the  whole 
country. 

No  great  question  involving  the  existence  of 
slavery  was  brought  before  the  attention  of  Con 
gress  during  Van  Buren's  term  of  office ;  nor  was 
the  matter  mooted  except  in  the  eternal  wrangles 
over  receiving  the  abolitionist  petitions.  Benton 
kept  silent  in  these  discussions,  although  voting  to 
receive  the  petitions.  As  he  grew  older  he  con 
tinually  grew  wiser,  and  better  able  to  do  good 
legislative  work  on  all  subjects;  but  he  was  not 
yet  able  to  realize  that  the  slavery  question  was 
one  which  could  not  be  kept  down,  and  which  was 
bound  to  force  itself  into  the  sphere  of  national 
politics.  He  still  insisted  that  it  was  only  dragged 
before  Congress  by  a  few  fanatics  at  the  North, 
and  that  in  the  South  it  was  made  the  instrument 
by  which  designing  and  unscrupulous  men  wished 
to  break  up  the  federal  republic.  His  devotion  to 
the  Union,  ever  with  him  the  chief  and  overmas 
tering  thought,  made  him  regard  with  horror  and 
aversion  any  man,  at  the  North  or  at  the  South, 
who  brought  forward  a  question  so  fraught  with 
peril  to  its  continuance.  He  kept  trying  to  delude 
himself  into  the  belief  that  the  discussion  and  the 
danger  would  alike  gradually  die  away,  and  the 


224  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

former  state  of  peaceful  harmony  between  the  sec 
tions,  and  freedom  from  disunion  excitement, 
would  return. 

But  the  time  for  such  an  ending  already  lay 
in  the  past;  thereafter  the  outlook  was  to  grow 
steadily  darker  year  by  year.  Slavery  lowered 
like  a  thunderstorm  on  the  horizon ;  and  though 
sometimes  it  might  seem  for  a  moment  to  break 
away,  yet  in  reality  it  had  reached  that  stage 
when,  until  the  final  all-engulfing  outburst  took 
place,  the  clouds  were  bound  for  evermore  to 
return  after  the  rain. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE    PRESIDENT    WITHOUT    A    PARTY. 

THE  Whigs  in  1 840  completely  overthrew  the 
Democrats,  and  for  the  first  time  elected  a 
president  and  held  the  majority  in  both 
houses  of  Congress.     Yet,  as  it  turned  out,  all  that 
they  really  accomplished  was  to  elect  a  president 
without  a  party,  for  Harrison  died  when  he  had 
hardly  more  than  sat  in  the  presidential  chair,  and 
was  succeeded  by  the  Vice-President,  Tyler  of  Vir 
ginia. 

Harrison  was  a  true  Whig ;  he  was,  when  nomi 
nated,  a  prominent  member  of  the  Whig  party, 
although  of  course  not  to  be  compared  with  its 
great  leader,  Henry  Clay,  or  with  its  most  mighty 
intellectual  chief  and  champion  in  the  Northeast, 
Daniel  Webster,  whose  mutual  rivalry  had  done 
much  to  make  his  nomination  possible.  Tyler, 
however,  could  hardly  be  called  a  Whig  at  all ;  on 
the  contrary,  he  belonged  rightfully  in  the  ranks 
of  those  extreme  Democrats  who  were  farthest  re 
moved  from  the  Whig  standard,  and  who  were  as 
much  displeased  with  the  Union  sentiments  of  the 
Jacksonians  as  they  were  with  the  personal  tyranny 
of  Jackson  himself.  He  was  properly  nothing 
but  a  dissatisfied  Democrat,  who  hated  the  Jack 
sonians,  and  had  been  nominated  only  because  the 
15  225 


226  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Whig  politicians  wished  to  strengthen  their  ticket 
and  insure  its  election  by  bidding  for  the  votes  of 
the  discontented  in  the  ranks  of  their  foes.  Now 
a  chance  stroke  of  death  put  the  presidency  in  the 
hands  of  one  who  represented  this,  the  smallest, 
element  in  the  coalition  that  overthrew  Van  Buren. 

The  principles  of  the  Whigs  were  hazily  outlined 
at  the  best,  and  the  party  was  never  a  very  credit 
able  organization;  indeed,  throughout  its  career 
it  could  be  most  easily  defined  as  the  opposition 
to  the  Democracy.  It  was  a  free  constructionist 
party,  believing  in  giving  a  liberal  interpretation 
to  the  doctrines  of  the  Constitution ;  otherwise,  its 
principles  were  purely  economic,  as  it  favored  a 
high  tariff,  internal  improvements,  a  bank,  and 
kindred  schemes;  and  its  leaders,  however  they 
might  quarrel  among  themselves,  agreed  thor 
oughly  in  their  devout  hatred  of  Jackson  and  all 
his  works. 

It  was  on  this  last  point  only  that  Tyler  came 
in.  His  principles  had  originally  been  ultra- 
Democratic.  He  had  been  an  extreme  strict  con 
structionist,  had  belonged  to  that  wing  of  the 
Democracy  which  inclined  more  and  more  toward 
separation,  and  had  thus,  on  several  grounds, 
found  himself  opposed  to  Jackson,  Benton, 
and  their  followers.  Indeed,  he  went  into  op 
position  to  his  original  party  for  reasons  akin 
to  those  that  influenced  Calhoun;  and  Se ward's 


The  President  Without  a  Party    227 

famous  remark  about  the  "ill-starred  coalition 
between  Whigs  and  Nullifiers"  might  with  certain 
changes  have  been  applied  to  the  presidential 
election  of  1840  quite  as  well  as  to  the  senatorial 
struggles  to  which  it  had  reference. 

Tyler,  however,  had  little  else  in  common  with 
Calhoun,  and  least  of  all  his  intellect.  He  has 
been  called  a  mediocre  man;  but  this  is  unwar 
ranted  flattery.  He  was  a  politician  of  monu 
mental  littleness.  Owing  to  the  nicely  divided 
condition  of  parties,  and  to  the  sheer  accident 
which  threw  him  into  a  position  of  such  promi 
nence  that  it  allowed  him  to  hold  the  balance  of 
power  between  them,  he  was  enabled  to  turn  poli 
tics  completely  topsy-turvy ;  but  his  chief  mental 
and  moral  attributes  were  peevishness,  fretful 
obstinacy,  inconsistency,  incapacity  to  make  up 
his  own  mind,  and  the  ability  to  quibble  indefi 
nitely  over  the  most  microscopic  and  hair-split 
ting  plays  upon  words,  together  with  an  inordinate 
vanity  that  so  blinded  him  to  all  outside  feeling 
as  to  make  him  really  think  that  he  stood  a  chance 
to  be  renominated  for  the  presidency. 

The  Whigs,  especially  in  the  Senate,  under 
Henry  Clay,  prepared  at  once  to  push  through 
various  measures  that  should  undo  the  work  of  the 
Jacksonians.  Clay  was  boastfully  and  domineer 
ingly  sure  of  the  necessity  of  applying  to  actual 
governmental  work  the  economic  theories  that 


228  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

formed  the  chief  stock  in  trade  of  his  party.  But 
it  was  precisely  on  these  economic  theories  that 
Tyler  split  off  from  the  Whigs.  The  result  was 
that  very  shortly  the  real  leader  of  the  dominant 
party,  backed  by  almost  all  his  fellow  party  men 
in  both  houses  of  Congress,  was  at  daggers  drawn 
with  the  nominal  Whig  president,  who  in  his  turn 
was  supported  only  by  a  " corporal's  guard"  of 
followers  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  by  all 
the  office-holders  whom  fear  of  removal  reduced  to 
obsequious  subserviency,  and  by  a  knot  of  obscure 
politicians  who  used  him  for  their  own  ends,  and 
worked  alternately  on  his  vanity  and  on  his  fears. 
The  Democrats,  led  by  Benton,  played  out  their 
own  game,  and  were  the  only  parties  to  the  three- 
cornered  fight  who  came  out  of  it  with  profit. 
The  details  now  offer  rather  dry  reading,  as  the 
economic  theories  of  all  the  contestants  were  more 
or  less  crude,  the  results  of  the  conflict  indecisive, 
and  the  effects  upon  our  history  ephemeral. 

Clay  began  by  a  heated  revival  of  one  of  Jack 
son's  worst  ideas,  namely,  that  when  the  people 
elect  a  president  they  thereby  mark  with  the  seal 
of  their  approval  any  and  every  measure  with 
which  that  favored  mortal  or  his  advisers  may 
consider  themselves  identified,  and  indorse  all  his 
and  their  previous  actions.  He  at  once  declared 
that  the  people  had  shown,  by  the  size  of  Harri 
son's  majority,  that  they  demanded  the  repeal  of 


The  President  Without  a  Party    229 

the  independent  treasury  act,  and  the  passage  of 
various  other  laws  in  accordance  with  some  of  his 
own  favorite  hobbies,  two  out  of  three  voters,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  probably  never  having  given  a 
second  thought  to  any  of  them.  Accordingly  he 
proceeded  to  introduce  a  whole  batch  of  bills, 
which  he  alleged  that  it  was  only  yielding  due 
respect  to  the  spirit  of  Democracy  to  pass  forth 
with. 

Benton,  however,  even  outdid  Clay  in  paying 
homage  to  what  he  was  pleased  to  call  the  "demo 
cratic  idea."  At  this  time  he  speaks  of  the  last 
session  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Congress  as  being 
"barren  of  measures,  and  necessarily  so,  as  being 
the  last  of  an  administration  superseded  by  the 
popular  voice  and  soon  to  expire;  and  therefore 
restricted  by  a  sense  of  propriety,  during  the  brief 
remainder  of  its  existence,  to  the  details  of  busi 
ness  and  the  routine  of  service . ' '  According  to  this 
theory  an  interregnum  of  some  sixteen  weeks 
would  intervene  between  the  terms  of  service  of 
every  two  presidents.  He  also  speaks  of  Tyler 
as  having,  when  the  legislature  of  Virginia  disap 
proved  of  a  course  he  wished  to  follow,  resigned  his 
seat  "in  obedience  to  the  democratic  principle," 
which,  according  to  his  views,  thus  completely  nul 
lified  the  section  of  the  Constitution  providing  for 
a  six  years'  term  of  service  in  the  Senate.  In 
truth  Benton,  like  most  other  Jacksonian  and 


230  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Jeffersonian  leaders,  became  both  foolish  and 
illogical  when  he  began  to  talk  of  the  bundle  of 
vague  abstractions,  which  he  knew  collectively  as 
the  ' '  democratic  principle . ' '  Although  not  so  bad 
as  many  of  his  school,  he  had  yet  gradually  worked 
himself  up  to  a  belief  that  it  was  almost  impious  to 
pay  anything  but  servile  heed  to  the  ' '  will  of  the 
majority;"  and  was  quite  unconscious  that  to 
surrender  one's  own  manhood  and  judgment  to  a 
belief  in  the  divine  right  of  kings  was  only  one 
degree  more  ignoble,  and  was  not  a  shadow  more 
logical,  and  but  little  more  defensible,  than  it  was 
blindly  to  deify  a  majority — not  of  the  whole  peo 
ple,  but  merely  of  a  small  fraction  consisting  of 
those  who  happened  to  be  of  a  certain  sex,  to 
have  reached  a  certain  age,  to  belong  to  a  certain 
race,  and  to  fulfil  some  other  conditions.  In  fact 
there  is  no  natural  or  divine  law  in  the  matter  at 
all ;  how  large  a  portion  of  the  population  should 
be  trusted  with  the  control  of  the  government  is  a 
question  of  expediency  merely.  In  any  purely 
native  American  community  manhood  suffrage 
works  infinitely  better  than  would  any  other  sys 
tem  of  government,  and  throughout  our  country 
at  large,  in  spite  of  the  large  number  of  ignorant 
foreign-born  or  colored  voters,  it  is  probably  prefer 
able  as  it  stands  to  any  modification  of  it;  but 
there  is  no  more  "natural  right "  why  a  white  man 
over  twenty-one  should  vote  than  there  is  why  a 


The  President  Without  a  Party     231 

negro  woman  under  eighteen  should  not.  "  Civil 
rights"  and  "personal  freedom"  are  not  terms 
that  necessarily  imply  the  right  to  vote.  People 
make  mistakes  when  governing  themselves,  ex 
actly  as  they  make  mistakes  when  governing 
others ;  all  that  can  be  said  is,  that  in  the  former 
case  their  self-interest  is  on  the  side  of  good  gov 
ernment,  whereas  in  the  latter  it  always  may  be, 
and  often  must  be,  the  reverse ;  so  that,  when  any 
people  reaches  a  certain  stage  of  mental  develop 
ment  and  of  capacity  to  take  care  of  its  own  con 
cerns,  it  is  far  better  that  it  should  itself  take  the 
reins.  The  distinctive  features  of  the  American 
system  are  its  guarantees  of  personal  independence 
and  individual  freedom ;  that  is,  as  far  as  possible, 
it  guarantees  to  each  man  his  right  to  live  as  he 
chooses  and  to  regulate  his  own  private  affairs  as 
he  wishes,  without  being  interfered  with  or  tyran 
nized  over  by  an  individual,  or  by  an  oligarchic 
minority,  or  by  a  democratic  majority;  while, 
when  the  interests  of  the  whole  community  are  at 
stake,  it  is  found  best  in  the  long  run  to  let  them 
be  managed  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the 
majority  of  those  presumably  concerned. 

Clay's  flourish  of  trumpets  foreboded  trouble 
and  disturbance  to  the  Jacksonian  camp.  At  last 
he  stood  at  the  head  of  a  party  controlling  both 
branches  of  the  legislative  body,  and  devoted  to 
his  behests;  and,  if  a  little  doubtful  about  the 


232  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

President,  he  still  believed  he  could  frighten  him 
into  doing  as  he  was  bid.  He  had  long  been  in  the 
minority,  and  had  seen  his  foes  ride  roughshod 
over  all  he  most  believed  in ;  and  now  he  prepared 
to  pay  them  back  in  their  own  coin  and  to  leave  a 
heavy  balance  on  his  side  of  the  reckoning.  Nor 
could  any  Jacksonian  have  shown  himself  more 
domineering  and  influenced  by  a  more  insolent 
disregard  for  the  rights  of  others  than  Clay  did 
in  his  hour  of  triumph.  On  the  other  side,  Ben- 
ton  braced  himself  with  dogged  determination  for 
the  struggle;  for  he  was  one  of  those  men  who 
fight  a  losing  or  winning  battle  with  equal  resolu 
tion. 

Tyler's  first  message  to  Congress  read  like  a 
pretty  good  Whig  document.  It  did  not  display 
any  especial  signs  of  his  former  strict  construction 
theories,  and  gave  little  hope  to  the  Democrats. 
The  leader  of  the  latter,  indeed,  Benton,  com 
mented  upon  both  it  and  its  author  with  rather 
grandiloquent  severity,  on  account  of  its  latitudi- 
narian  bias,  and  of  its  recommendation  of  a  bank 
of  some  sort.  However,  the  ink  with  which  the 
message  was  written  could  hardly  have  been  dry 
before  the  President's  mind  began  to  change.  He 
himself  probably  had  very  little  idea  what  he  in 
tended  to  do,  and  so  contrived  to  give  the  Whigs 
the  impression  that  he  would  act  in  accordance 
with  their  wishes;  but  the  leaven  had  already 


The  President  Without  a  Party     233 

begun  working  in  his  mind,  and,  not  having  much 
to  work  on,  soon  changed  it  so  completely  that  he 
was  willing  practically  to  eat  his  own  words. 

Shortly  after  Tyler  had  sent  in  his  message  out 
lining  what  legislation  he  deemed  proper,  he  being 
by  virtue  of  his  position  the  nominal  and  titular 
leader  of  the  Whigs,  Clay,  who  was  their  real  and 
very  positive  chief,  and  who  was,  moreover,  deter 
mined  to  assert  his  chieftainship,  in  his  turn  laid 
down  a  programme  for  his  party  to  follow,  intro 
ducing  a  series  of  resolutions  declaring  it  necessary 
to  pass  a  bill  to  repeal  the  sub-treasury  act,  an 
other  to  establish  a  bank,  another  to  distribute  the 
proceeds  of  the  public  land  sales,  and  one  or  two 
more,  to  which  was  afterward  added  a  bank 
ruptcy  measure. 

The  sub-treasury  bill  was  first  taken  up  and 
promptly  passed  and  signed.  Benton,  of  course, 
led  the  hopeless  fight  against  it,  making  a  long  and 
elaborate  speech,  insisting  that  the  finances  were  in 
excellent  shape  as  they  were,  showing  the  advan 
tages  of  hard  money,  and  denouncing  the  bill  on 
account  of  the  extreme  suddenness  with  which  it 
took  effect,  and  because  it  made  no  provision  for 
any  substitute.  He  also  alluded  caustically  to  the 
curious  and  anomalous  bank  bill,  which  was  then 
being  patched  up  by  the  Whig  leaders  so  as  to  get 
it  into  some  such  shape  that  the  President  would 
sign  it. 


234  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

The  other  three  important  measures,  that  is,  the 
bank,  distribution,  and  bankruptcy  bills,  were  all 
passed  nearly  together;  as  Benton  pointed  out, 
they  were  got  through  only  by  a  species  of  bargain 
and  sale,  the  chief  supporters  of  each  agreeing  to 
support  the  other,  so  as  to  get  their  own  pet 
measure  through.  "All  must  go  together  or  fall 
together.  This  is  the  decree  out  of  doors.  When 
the  sun  dips  below  the  horizon  a  private 
congress  is  held;  the  fate  of  the  measures  is 
decided;  a  bundle  is  tied  together;  and  while 
one  goes  ahead  as  a  bait,  another  is  held  back 
as  a  rod." 

The  bankruptcy  bill  went  through  and  was 
signed.  It  was  urged  by  all  the  large  debtor  class, 
whose  ranks  had  been  filled  to  overflowing  by  the 
years  of  wild  speculation  and  general  bank  suspen 
sion  and  insolvency.  These  debtors  were  quite 
numerous  enough  to  constitute  an  important  fac 
tor  in  politics,  but  Benton  disregarded  them,  never 
theless,  and  fought  the  bill  as  stoutly  as  he  did  its 
companions,  alleging  that  it  was  a  gross  outrage 
on  honesty  and  on  the  rights  of  property,  and  was 
not  a  bankrupt  law  at  all,  but  practically  an  in 
solvent  law  for  the  abolition  of  debts  at  the  will  of 
the  debtor.  He  pointed  out  grave  and  numerous 
defects  of  detail,  and  gave  an  exhaustive  abstract 
of  bankruptcy  legislation  in  general;  the  speech 
gave  evidence  of  the  tireless  industry  and  wide 


The  President  Without  a  Party     235 

range  of  learning  for  which  Benton  was  preemi 
nently  distinguished. 

The  third  bill  to  be  taken  up  and  passed  was 
that  providing  for  the  distribution  of  the  public 
lands  revenue,  and  thus  indirectly  for  assuming  the 
debts  of  the  States.  Tyler,  in  his  message,  had 
characteristically  stated  that,  though  it  would  be 
wholly  unconstitutional  for  the  federal  govern 
ment  to  assume  the  debts  of  the  States,  yet  it 
would  be  highly  proper  for  it  to  give  the  latter 
money  wherewith  to  pay  them.  Clay  had  always 
been  an  enthusiastic  advocate  of  a  distribution 
bill;  and  accordingly  one  was  now  passed  and 
signed  with  the  least  possible  delay.  It  was  an 
absolutely  indefensible  measure.  The  treasury 
was  empty,  and  loan  and  tax  bills  were  pending 
at  the  very  moment,  in  order  to  supply  money  for 
the  actual  running  of  the  government.  As  Ben- 
ton  pointed  out,  Congress  had  been  called  together 
(a  special  session  having  been  summoned  by  Har 
rison  before  his  death)  to  raise  revenue,  and  the 
first  thing  done  was  to  squander  it.  The  distribu 
tion  took  place  when  the  treasury  reports  showed 
a  deficit  of  sixteen  millions  of  dollars.  The  bill  was 
pushed  through  mainly  by  the  States  which  had 
repudiated  their  debts  in  whole  or  in  part ;  and  as 
these  debts  were  largely  owed  abroad,  many  prom 
inent  foreign  banking-houses  and  individuals  took 
an  active  part  in  lobbying  for  the  bill.  Benton 


236  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

was  emphatically  right  in  his  opposition  to  the 
measure,  but  he  was  very  wrong  in  some  of  the 
grounds  he  took.  Thus  he  inveighed  vigorously 
against  the  foreign  capitalists  who  had  come  to 
help  push  the  bill  through  Congress;  but  he  did 
not  have  anything  to  say  against  the  scoundrelly 
dishonesty  displayed  by  certain  States  toward 
their  creditors,  which  had  forced  these  capitalists 
into  the  endeavor  to  protect  themselves.  He  also 
incidentally  condemned  the  original  assumption 
by  the  national  government  of  the  debts  of  the 
States  at  the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  Consti 
tution,  which  was  an  absolute  necessity;  and  his 
constitutional  views  throughout  seemed  rather 
strained.  But  he  was  right  beyond  cavil  on  the 
main  point.  It  was  criminal  folly  to  give  the 
States  the  impression  that  they  would  be  allowed 
to  create  debts  over  which  Congress  could  have  no 
control,  yet  which  Congress  in  the  end  would  give 
them  the  money  to  pay.  To  reward  a  State  for 
repudiating  a  debt  by  giving  her  the  wherewithal 
to  pay  it  was  a  direct  and  unequivocal  encourage 
ment  of  dishonesty.  In  every  respect  the  bill  was 
wholly  improper;  and  Benton 's  attitude  toward 
it  and  toward  similar  schemes  was  incomparably 
better  than  the  position  of  Clay,  Webster,  and  the 
other  Whigs. 

Both  the  bankrupt  bill  and  the  distribution  bill 
were  repealed  very  shortly;    the  latter  before  it 


The  President  Without  a  Party     237 

had  time  to  take  effect.  This  was  an  emphatic 
indorsement  by  the  public  of  Benton's  views,  and 
a  humiliating  rebuke  to  the  Whig  authors  of  the 
measures.  Indeed,  the  whole  legislation  of  the 
session  was  almost  absolutely  fruitless  in  its  results. 
One  feature  of  the  struggle  was  an  attempt  by 
Clay,  promptly  and  successfully  resisted  by  Ben- 
ton  and  Calhoun,  to  institute  the  hour  limit  for 
speeches  in  the  Senate.  There  was  a  good  deal  of 
excuse  for  Clay's  motion.  The  House  could  cut 
off  debate  by  the  previous  question,  which  the 
Senate  could  not,  and  nevertheless  had  found  it 
necessary  to  establish  the  hour  limit  in  addition. 
Of  course  it  is  highly  undesirable  that  there  should 
not  be  proper  freedom  of  debate  in  Congress ;  but 
it  is  quite  as  hurtful  to  allow  a  minority  to  exer 
cise  their  privileges  improperly.  The  previous 
question  is  often  abused  and  used  tyrannically; 
but  on  the  whole  it  is  a  most  invaluable  aid  to 
legislation.  Benton,  however,  waxed  hot  and 
wrathful  over  the  proposed  change  in  the  Senate 
rules.  He,  with  Calhoun  and  their  followers,  had 
been  consuming  an  immense  amount  of  time  in 
speech-making  against  the  Whig  measures,  and  in 
offering  amendments ;  not  with  any  hopes  of  bet 
tering  the  bills,  but  for  outside  effect,  and  to  annoy 
their  opponents.  He  gives  an  amusingly  naive 
account  of  their  course  of  action,  and  the  reasons 
for  it,  substantially  as  follows : 


238  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

The  Democratic  senators  acted  upon  a  system,  and 
with  a  thorough  organization  and  a  perfect  under 
standing.  Being  a  minority,  and  able  to  do  nothing, 
they  became  assailants,  and  attacked  incessantly;  not 
by  formal  orations  against  the  whole  body  of  a 
measure,  but  by  sudden,  short,  and  pungent  speeches 
directed  against  the  vulnerable  parts,  and  pointed 
by  proffered  amendments.  Amendments  were  con 
tinually  offered — a  great  number  being  prepared 
every  night  and  placed  in  suitable  hands  for  use  the 
next  day — always  commendably  calculated  to  expose 
an  evil  and  to  present  a  remedy.  Near  forty  propo 
sitions  of  amendment  were  offered  to  the  first  fiscal 
agent  bill  alone — the  yeas  and  nays  were  taken  upon 
them  seven  and  thirty  times.  All  the  other  promi 
nent  bills — distribution,  bankrupt,  fiscal  corporation, 
new  tariff  act,  called  revenue — were  served  the  same 
way;  every  proposed  amendment  made  an  issue. 
There  were  but  twenty-two  of  us,  but  every  one  was 
a  speaker  and  effective.  The  Globe  newspaper  was  a 
powerful  ally,  setting  out  all  we  did  to  the  best  advan 
tage  in  strong  editorials,  and  carrying  out  our  speeches, 
fresh  and  hot,  to  the  people;  and  we  felt  victorious  in 
the  midst  of  unbroken  defeats. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  such  rank  filibustering, 
coupled  with  the  exasperating  self-complacency 
of  its  originators,  should  have  excited  in  Whig 
bosoms  every  desperate  emotion  short  of  homi 
cidal  mania. 

Clay,  to  cut  off  such  useless  talk,  gave  notice 
that  he  would  move  to  have  the  time  for  debate  for 
each  individual  restricted ;  remarking  very  truth- 


The  President  Without  a  Party     239 

fully  that  he  did  not  believe  the  people  at  large 
would  complain  of  the  abridgment  of  speeches  in 
Congress.  But  the  Democratic  senators,  all  rather 
fond  of  windy  orations,  fairly  foamed  at  the  mouth 
at  what  they  affected  to  deem  such  an  infringement 
of  their  liberties;  and  actually  took  the  inex 
cusable  resolution  of  bidding  defiance  to  the  rule  if 
it  was  adopted,  and  refusing  to  obey  it,  no  matter 
what  degree  of  violence  their  conduct  might  bring 
about — a  resolution  that  was  wholly  unpardon 
able.  Benton  was  selected  to  voice  their  views 
upon  the  matter,  which  he  did  in  a  long  and  not 
very  wise  speech;  while  Calhoun  was  quite  as 
emphatic  in  his  threats  of  what  would  happen  if 
attempt  should  be  made  to  enforce  the  proposed 
rule.  Clay  was  always  much  bolder  in  opening  a 
campaign  than  in  carrying  it  through ;  and  when 
it  came  to  putting  his  words  into  deeds,  he  wholly 
lacked  the  nerve  which  would  have  enabled  him  to 
contend  with  two  such  men  as  the  senators  from 
Missouri  and  South  Carolina.  Had  he  possessed  a 
temperament  like  that  of  either  of  his  opponents, 
he  would  have  gone  on  and  have  simply  forced 
acquiescence;  for  any  legislative  body  can  cer 
tainly  enforce  what  rules  it  may  choose  to  make  as 
to  the  conduct  of  its  own  members  in  addressing  it ; 
but  his  courage  failed  him,  and  he  withdrew  from 
the  contest,  leaving  the  victory  with  the  Demo 
crats. 


240  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

When  the  question  of  the  recharter  of  the  dis 
trict  banks  came  up,  it  of  course  gave  Benton 
another  chance  to  attack  his  favorite  foe.  He 
offered  a  very  proper  amendment,  which  was  voted 
down,  to  prohibit  the  banks  from  issuing  a  cur 
rency  of  small  notes,  fixing  upon  twenty  dollars  as 
being  the  lowest  limit.  This  he  supported  in  a 
strong  speech,  wherein  he  once  again  argued  at 
length  in  favor  of  a  gold  and  silver  currency,  and 
showed  the  evil  effects  of  small  bank-notes,  which 
might  not  be,  and  often  were  not,  redeemable  at 
par.  He  very  properly  pointed  out  that  to  have 
a  sound  currency,  especially  in  all  the  smaller  de 
nominations,  was  really  of  greater  interest  to  the 
working-men  than  to  any  one  else. 

The  great  measure  of  the  session,  however,  and 
the  one  that  was  intended  to  be  the  final  crown 
and  glory  of  the  Whig  triumph,  was  the  bill  to 
establish  a  new  national  bank.  Among  the  politi 
cal  theories  to  which  Clay  clung  most  closely,  only 
the  belief  in  a  bank  ranked  higher  in  his  estima 
tion  than  his  devotion  to  a  protective  tariff.  The 
establishment  of  a  national  bank  seemed  to  him 
to  be  the  chief  object  of  a  Whig  success ;  and  that 
it  would  work  immediate  and  immense  benefit  to 
the  country  was  with  him  an  article  of  faith.  With 
both  houses  of  Congress  under  his  control,  he  at 
once  prepared  to  push  his  pet  measure  through, 
impatiently  brushing  aside  all  resistance. 


The  President  Without  a  Party     241 

But  at  the  very  outset  difficulty  was  feared  from 
the  action  of  the  President.  Tyler  could  not  at 
first  make  up  his  mind  what  to  do ;  or  rather,  he 
made  it  up  in  half  a  dozen  different  ways  every 
day.  His  peevishness,  vacillation,  ambitious  van 
ity,  and  sheer  puzzle -headedness  made  him  incline 
first  to  the  side  of  his  new  friends  and  present 
supporters,  the  Whigs,  and  then  to  that  of  his 
old  Democratic  allies,  whose  views  on  the  bank,  as 
on  most  other  questions,  he  had  so  often  openly 
expressed  himself  as  sharing.  But  though  his 
mind  oscillated  like  a  pendulum,  yet  each  time  it 
swung  farther  and  farther  over  to  the  side  of  the 
Democracy,  and  it  began  to  look  as  if  he  would 
certainly  in  the  end  come  to  a  halt  in  the  camp  of 
the  enemies  of  the  Whigs;  his  approach  to  this 
destination  was  merely  hastened  by  Clay's  over 
bearing  violence  and  injudicious  taunts. 

However,  at  first  Tyler  did  not  dare  to  come  out 
openly  against  any  and  all  bank  laws,  but  tried  to 
search  round  for  some  compromise  measure ;  and 
as  he  could  not  invent  a  compromise  in  fact,  he 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  one  in  words  would  do 
just  as  well.  He  said  that  his  conscience  would 
not  permit  him  to  sign  a  bill  to  establish  a  bank 
that  was  called  a  bank,  but  that  he  was  willing  to 
sign  a  bill  establishing  such  an  institution  pro 
vided  that  it  was  called  something  else,  though  it 
should  possess  all  the  properties  of  a  bank.  Such 

16 


242  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

a  proposal  opened  a  wide  field  for  the  endless  quib 
bling  in  which  his  soul  delighted. 

The  secretary  of  the  treasury,  in  response  to  a 
call  from  the  Senate,  furnished  a  plan  for  a  bank, 
having  modeled  it  studiously  so  as  to  overcome 
the  President's  scruples;  and  a  select  committee 
of  the  Senate  at  once  shaped  a  bill  in  accordance 
with  the  plans.  Said  Benton:  "Even  the  title 
was  made  ridiculous  to  please  the  President, 
though  not  so  much  so  as  he  wished.  He  ob 
jected  to  the  name  of  bank  either  in  the  title  or 
the  body  of  the  charter,  and  proposed  to  style  it 
*  Fiscal  Institute;'  and  afterward  the  'Fiscal 
Agent,'  and  finally  the '  Fiscal  Corporation.'  "  Such 
preposterous  folly  on  the  President's  part  was 
more  than  the  hot-blooded  and  overbearing  Ken- 
tuckian  could  stand ;  and,  in  spite  of  his  absorbing 
desire  for  the  success  of  his  measure,  and  of  the 
vital  necessity  for  conciliating  Tyler,  Clay  could 
not  bring  himself  to  adopt  such  a  ludicrous  title, 
even  though  he  had  seen  that  the  charter  provided 
that  the  institution,  whatever  it  might  be  styled 
in  form,  should  in  fact  have  all  the  properties  of  a 
bank.  After  a  while,  however,  a  compromise  title 
was  agreed  on,  but  only  a  shadow  less  imbecile 
than  the  original  one  proposed  by  the  President; 
and  it  was  agreed  to  call  the  measure  the  "Fiscal 
Bank  "bill. 

The  President  vetoed  it,  but  stated  that  he  was 


The  President  Without  a  Party    243 

ready  to  approve  any  similar  bill  that  should  be 
free  from  the  objections  he  named.  Clay  could 
not  resist  reading  Tyler  a  lecture  on  his  miscon 
duct,  during  the  course  of  a  speech  in  the  Senate ; 
but  the  Whigs  generally  smothered  their  resent 
ment,  and  set  about  preparing  something  which 
the  President  would  sign,  and  this  time  concluded 
that  they  would  humor  him  to  the  top  of  his  bent, 
even  by  choosing  a  title  as  ridiculous  as  he  wished ; 
so  they  styled  their  bill  one  to  establish  a  "  Fiscal 
Corporation."  Benton  held  the  title  up  to  well- 
deserved  derision,  and  showed  that,  though  there 
had  been  quite  an  elaborate  effort  to  disguise  the 
form  of  the  measure,  and  to  make  it  purport  to 
establish  a  bank  that  should  have  the  properties  of 
a  treasury,  yet  that  in  reality  it  was  simply  a 
revival  of  the  old  scheme  under  another  name. 
The  Whigs  swallowed  the  sneers  of  their  oppo 
nents  as  best  they  could,  and  passed  their  bill. 

The  President  again  interposed  his  veto.  An 
intrigue  was  going  on  among  a  few  unimportant 
congressmen  and  obscure  office-holders  to  form  a 
new  party  with  Tyler  at  its  head ;  and  the  latter 
willingly  entered  into  the  plan,  his  mind,  which 
was  not  robust  at  the  best,  being  completely  daz 
zled  by  his  sudden  elevation  and  his  wild  hopes 
that  he  could  continue  to  keep  the  place  which  he 
had  reached.  He  had  given  the  Whigs  reason  to 
expect  that  he  would  sign  the  bill,  and  had  taken 


244  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

none  of  his  cabinet  into  his  confidence.  So,  when 
his  veto  came  in,  it  raised  a  perfect  whirlwind  of 
wrath  and  bitter  disappointment.  His  cabinet  all 
resigned,  except  Webster,  who  stayed  to  finish  the 
treaty  with  Great  Britain;  and  the  Whigs  for 
mally  read  him  out  of  the  party.  The  Democrats 
looked  on  with  huge  enjoyment,  and  patted  Tyler 
on  the  back,  for  they  could  see  that  he  was  bring 
ing  their  foes  to  ruin;  but  nevertheless  they  de 
spised  him  heartily,  and  abandoned  him  wholly 
when  he  had  served  their  turn.  Left  without  any 
support  among  the  regulars  of  either  side,  and  his 
own  proposed  third  party  turning  out  a  still-born 
abortion,  he  simply  played  out  his  puny  part  until 
his  term  ended,  and  then  dropped  noiselessly  out 
of  sight.  It  is  only  the  position  he  filled,  and  not 
in  the  least  his  ability,  for  either  good  or  bad,  in 
filling  it,  that  prevents  his  name  from  sinking  into 
merciful  oblivion. 

There  was  yet  one  more  brief  spasm  over  the 
bank,  however;  the  President  sending  in  a  plan 
for  a  "  Fiscal  Agent,"  to  be  called  a  Board  of  Ex 
chequer.  Congress  contemptuously  refused  to  pay 
any  attention  to  the  proposition,  Benton  showing 
its  utter  unworthiness  in  an  excellent  speech,  one 
of  the  best  that  he  made  on  the  whole  financial 
question. 

Largely  owing  to  the  cross  purposes  at  which 
the  President  and  his  party  were  working,  the  con- 


The  President  Without  a  Party    245 

dition  of  the  treasury  became  very  bad.  It  sought 
to  provide  for  its  immediate  wants  by  the  issue  of 
treasury  notes,  differing  from  former  notes  of  the 
kind  in  that  they  were  made  reissuable.  Benton 
at  once,  and  very  properly,  attacked  this  proceed 
ing.  He  had  a  check  drawn  for  a  few  days'  com 
pensation  as  senator,  demanded  payment  in  hard 
money,  and  when  he  was  given  treasury  notes  in 
stead,  made  a  most  emphatic  protest  in  the  Senate, 
which  was  entirely  effectual,  the  practically  com 
pulsory  tender  of  the  paper  money  being  forthwith 
stopped. 

It  was  at  this  time,  also,  that  bills  to  subsidize 
steamship  lines  were  first  passed,  and  that  the  en 
larging  and  abuse  of  the  pension  system  began, 
which  in  our  own  day  threatens  to  become  a  really 
crying  evil.  Benton  opposed  both  sets  of  measures ; 
and  in  regard  to  the  pension  matter  showed  that  he 
would  not  let  himself,  by  any  specious  plea  of  ex 
ceptional  suffering  or  need  for  charity,  be  led  into 
vicious  special  legislation,  sure  in  the  end  to  bring 
about  the  breaking  down  of  some  of  the  most  im 
portant  principles  of  government. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

BOUNDARY  TROUBLES  WITH  ENGLAND. 

TWO  important  controversies  with  foreign 
powers  became  prominent  during  Tyler's 
presidency ;  but  he  had  little  to  do  with  the 
settlement  of  either,  beyond  successively  placing 
in  his  cabinet  the  two  great  statesmen  who  dealt 
with  them.  Webster,  while  secretary  of  state, 
brought  certain  of  the  negotiations  with  England 
to  a  close;  and  later  on,  Calhoun,  while  holding 
the  same  office,  took  up  Webster's  work  and  also 
grappled  with — indeed  partly  caused — the  troubles 
on  the  Mexican  border,  and  turned  them  to  the 
advantage  of  the  South  and  slavery. 

Our  boundaries  were  still  very  ill-defined,  ex 
cept  where  they  were  formed  by  the  Gulf  and  the 
Ocean,  the  Great  Lakes,  and  the  river  St.  John. 
Even  in  the  Northeast,  where  huge  stretches  of 
unbroken  forest  land  separated  the  inhabited  por 
tions  of  Canada  from  those  of  New  England,  it  was 
not  yet  decided  how  much  of  this  wilderness 
belonged  to  us  and  how  much  to  the  Canadians; 
and  in  the  vast,  unsettled  regions  of  the  far  West 
our  claims  came  into  direct  conflict  with  those 
of  Mexico  and  of  Great  Britain.  The  ownership  of 
these  little  known  and  badly  mapped  regions 

246 


Boundary  Troubles  247 

could  with  great  difficulty  be  decided  on  grounds 
of  absolute  and  abstract  right;  the  title  of  each 
contestant  to  the  land  was  more  or  less  plausible, 
and  at  the  same  time  more  or  less  defective.  The 
matter  was  sure  to  be  decided  in  favor  of  the 
strongest ;  and,  say  what  we  will  about  the  justice 
and  right  of  the  various  claims,  the  honest  truth 
is,  that  the  comparative  might  of  the  different 
nations,  and  not  the  comparative  righteousness 
of  their  several  causes,  was  the  determining  factor 
in  the  settlement.  Mexico  lost  her  northern  prov 
inces  by  no  law  of  right,  but  simply  by  the  law  of 
the  longest  sword — the  same  law  that  gave  India 
to  England.  In  both  instances  the  result  was 
greatly  to  the  benefit  of  the  conquered  peoples 
and  of  every  one  else;  though  there  is  this  wide 
difference  between  the  two  cases:  that  whereas 
the  English  rule  in  India,  while  it  may  last  for 
decades  or  even  for  centuries,  must  eventually 
come  to  an  end  and  leave  little  trace  of  its  exist 
ence;  on  the  other  hand  our  conquests  from 
Mexico  determined  for  all  time  the  blood,  speech, 
and  law  of  the  men  who  should  fill  the  lands  we 
won. 

The  questions  between  Great  Britain  and  our 
selves  were  compromised  by  each  side  accepting 
about  half  what  it  claimed,  only  because  neither 
was  willing  to  push  the  other  to  extremities.  Eng 
lishmen  like  Palmerston  might  hector  and  ruffle, 


248  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

and  Americans  like  Benton  might  swagger  and 
bully ;  but  when  it  came  to  be  a  question  of  actual 
fighting,  each  people  recognized  the  power  of  the 
other,  and  preferred  to  follow  the  more  cautious 
and  peaceful,  not  to  say  timid,  lead  of  such  states 
men  as  Webster  and  Lord  Melbourne.  Had  we 
been  no  stronger  than  the  Sikhs,  Oregon  and 
Washington  would  at  present  be  British  posses 
sions;  and  if  Great  Britain  had  been  as  weak  as 
Mexico,  she  would  not  now  hold  a  foot  of  territory 
on  the  Pacific  coast.  Either  nation  might  perhaps 
have  refused  to  commit  a  gross  and  entirely  un 
provoked  and  uncalled-for  act  of  aggression ;  but 
each,  under  altered  conditions,  would  have  readily 
found  excuses  for  showing  much  less  regard  for  the 
claims  of  the  other  than  actually  was  shown.  It 
would  be  untrue  to  say  that  nations  have  not  at 
times  proved  themselves  capable  of  acting  with 
great  disinterestedness  and  generosity  toward 
other  peoples ;  but  such  conduct  is  not  very  com 
mon  at  the  best,  and  although  it  often  may  be 
desirable,  it  certainly  is  not  always  so.  If  the 
matter  in  dispute  is  of  great  importance,  and  if 
there  is  a  doubt  as  to  which  side  is  right,  then  the 
strongest  party  to  the  controversy  is  pretty  sure 
to  give  itself  the  benefit  of  that  doubt ;  and  inter 
national  morality  will  have  to  take  tremendous 
strides  in  advance  before  this  ceases  to  be  the  case. 
It  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of 


Boundary  Troubles  249 

the  treaties  and  wars  by  means  of  which  we  finally 
gave  definite  bounds  to  our  territory  beyond  the 
Mississippi.  Contemporary  political  writers  and 
students,  of  the  lesser  sort,  are  always  painfully 
deficient  in  the  sense  of  historic  perspective ;  and 
to  such  the  struggles  for  the  possession  of  the  un 
known  and  dimly  outlined  western  wastes  seemed 
of  small  consequence  compared  to  similar  Euro 
pean  contests  for  territorial  aggrandizement.  Yet, 
in  reality,  when  we  look  at  the  far-reaching  nature 
of  the  results,  the  questions  as  to  what  kingdom 
should  receive  the  fealty  of  Holstein  or  Lorraine, 
of  Savoy  or  the  Dobrudscha,  seem  of  absolutely 
trivial  importance  compared  to  the  infinitely  more 
momentous  ones  as  to  the  future  race  settlement 
and  national  ownership  of  the  then  lonely  and 
unpeopled  lands  of  Texas,  California,  and  Oregon. 
Benton,  greatly  to  the  credit  of  his  foresight, 
and  largely  in  consequence  of  his  strong  national 
ist  feeling,  thoroughly  appreciated  the  importance 
of  our  geographical  extensions.  He  was  the  great 
champion  of  the  West  and  of  western  development, 
and  a  furious  partisan  of  every  movement  in  the 
direction  of  the  enlargement  of  our  western  bound 
aries.  Many  of  his  expressions,  when  talking  of 
the  greatness  of  our  country  and  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  interests  which  were  being  decided,  not  only 
were  grandiloquent  in  manner,  but  also  seem  exag 
gerated  and  overwrought  even  as  regards  matter. 


250  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

But  when  we  think  of  the  interests  for  which  he 
contended,  as  they  were  to  become,  and  not  as  they 
at  the  moment  were,  the  appearance  of  exaggera 
tion  is  lost,  and  the  intense  feeling  of  his  speeches 
no  longer  seems  out  of  place  or  disproportionate  to 
the  importance  of  the  subject  with  which  he  dealt. 
Without  clearly  formulating  his  opinions,  even  to 
himself,  and  while  sometimes  prone  to  attribute 
to  his  country  at  the  moment  a  greatness  she  was 
not  to  possess  for  two  or  three  generations  to 
come,  he,  nevertheless,  had  engrained  in  his  very 
marrow  and  fiber  the  knowledge  that  inevitably, 
and  beyond  all  doubt,  the  coming  years  were  to  be 
hers.  He  knew  that,  while  other  nations  held  the 
past,  and  shared  with  his  own  the  present,  yet  that 
to  her  belonged  the  still  formless  and  unshaped 
future .  More  clearly  than  almost  any  other  states 
man  he  beheld  the  grandeur  of  the  nation  loom  up, 
vast  and  shadowy,  through  the  advancing  years. 

He  was  keenly  alive  to  the  need  of  our  having 
free  chance  to  spread  toward  the  northwest;  he 
very  early  grasped  the  idea  that  in  that  direction 
we  ought  to  have  room  for  continental  develop 
ment.  In  his  earliest  years,  to  be  sure,  when  the 
Mississippi  seemed  a  river  of  the  remote  western 
border,  when  nobody,  not  even  the  hardiest  trap 
per,  had  penetrated  the  boundless  and  treeless 
plains  that  stretch  to  the  foothills  of  the  Rockies, 
and  when  the  boldest  thinkers  had  not  dared  to 


Boundary  Troubles  251 

suppose  that  we  could  ever  hold  together  as  a  peo 
ple,  when  once  scattered  over  so  wide  a  territory, 
he  had  stated  in  a  public  speech  that  he  considered 
the  mountains  to  be  our  natural  frontier  line  to  the 
west,  and  the  barrier  beyond  which  we  ought  not 
to  pass,  and  had  expressed  his  trust  that  on  the 
Pacific  coast  there  would  grow  up  a  kindred  and 
friendly  republic.  But  very  soon,  as  the  seem 
ingly  impossible  became  the  actual,  he  himself 
changed,  and  ever  afterward  held  that  we  should 
have,  wherever  possible,  no  boundaries  but  the 
two  oceans. 

Benton's  violent  and  aggressive  patriotism  un 
doubtedly  led  him  to  assume  positions  toward 
foreign  powers  that  were  very  repugnant  to  the 
quiet,  peaceable,  and  order-loving  portion  of  the 
community,  especially  when  he  gave  vent  to  the 
spirit  of  jealous  antagonism  which  he  felt  toward 
Great  Britain,  the  power  that  held  sway  over  the 
wilderness  bordering  us  on  the  north.  Yet  the 
arrogant  attitude  he  assumed  was  more  than  justi 
fied  by  the  destiny  of  the  great  republic;  and  it 
would  have  been  well  for  all  America  if  we  had  in 
sisted  even  more  than  we  did  upon  the  extension 
northward  of  our  boundaries.  Not  only  the 
Columbia  but  also  the  Red  River  of  the  North — 
and  the  Saskatchewan  and  Frazer  as  well — should 
lie  wholly  within  our  limits,  less  for  our  own  sake 
than  for  the  sake  of  the  men  who  dwell  along  their 


252  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

banks.  Columbia,  Saskatchewan,  and  Manitoba 
would,  as  States  of  the  American  Union,  hold  posi 
tions  incomparably  more  important,  grander,  and 
more  dignified  than  they  can  ever  hope  to  reach 
either  as  independent  communities  or  as  provin 
cial  dependencies  of  a  foreign  power  that  regards 
them  with  a  kindly  tolerance  somewhat  akin  to 
contemptuous  indifference.  Of  course  no  one 
would  wish  to  see  these,  or  any  other  settled  com 
munities,  now  added  to  our  domain  by  force ;  we 
want  no  unwilling  citizens  to  enter  our  Union ;  the 
time  to  have  taken  the  lands  was  before  settlers 
came  into  them.  European  nations  war  for  the 
possession  of  thickly  settled  districts  which,  if  con 
quered,  will  for  centuries  remain  alien  and  hostile 
to  the  conquerors;  we,  wiser  in  our  generation, 
have  seized  the  waste  solitudes  that  lay  near  us, 
the  limitless  forests  and  never-ending  plains,  and 
the  valleys  of  the  great,  lonely  rivers;  and  have 
thrust  our  own  sons  into  them  to  take  possession ; 
and  a  score  of  years  after  each  conquest  we  see 
the  conquered  land  teeming  with  a  people  that  is 
one  with  ourselves. 

Benton  felt  that  all  the  unoccupied  land  to  the 
northwest  was  by  right  our  heritage,  and  he  was 
willing  to  do  battle  for  it  if  necessary.  He  was  a 
perfect  type  of  western  American  statesmanship 
in  his  way  of  looking  at  our  foreign  relations ;  he 
was  always  unwilling  to  compromise,  being  of  that 


Boundary  Troubles  253 

happy  temperament  which  is  absolutely  certain 
that  its  claims  are  just  and  righteous  in  their  en 
tirety,  and  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  accept  any 
thing  less  than  all  that  is  demanded ;  he  was  will 
ing  to  bully  if  our  rights,  as  he  deemed  them,  were 
not  granted  us ;  and  he  was  perfectly  ready  to  fight 
if  the  bullying  was  unsuccessful.  True,  he  did  not 
consistently  carry  through  all  his  theories  to  their 
logical  consequences;  but  it  may  well  be  ques 
tioned  whether,  after  all,  his  original  attitude 
toward  Great  Britain  was  not  wiser,  looking  to 
its  probable  remote  results,  than  that  which  was 
finally  taken  by  the  national  government,  whose 
policy  was  on  this  point  largely  shaped  by  the  feel 
ing  among  the  richer  and  more  educated  classes  of 
the  Northeast.  These  classes  have  always  been 
more  cautious  and  timid  than  any  others  in  the 
Union,  especially  in  their  way  of  looking  at  pos 
sible  foreign  wars,  and  have  never  felt  much  of 
the  spirit  which  made  the  West  stretch  out  im 
patiently  for  new  lands.  Fortunately  they  have 
rarely  been  able  to  control  our  territorial  growth. 

No  foot  of  soil  to  which  we  had  any  title  in  the 
Northwest  should  have  been  given  up;  we  were 
the  people  who  could  use  it  best,  and  we  ought  to 
have  taken  it  all.  The  prize  was  well  worth  win 
ning,  and  would  warrant  a  good  deal  of  risk  being 
run.  We  had  even  then  grown  to  be  so  strong 
that  we  were  almost  sure  eventually  to  win  in  any 


254  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

American  contest  for  continental  supremacy.  We 
were  near  by,  our  foes  far  away — for  the  contest 
over  the  Columbia  would  have  been  settled  in 
Canada.  We  should  have  had  hard  fighting  to  be 
sure,  but  sooner  or  later  the  result  would  have  been 
in  our  favor.  There  were  no  better  soldiers  in  the 
world  than  the  men  of  Balaclava  and  Inkerman, 
but  the  victors  of  Buena  Vista  and  Chapultepec 
were  as  good.  Scott  and  Taylor  were  not  great 
generals,  but  they  were,  at  least,  the  equals  of  Lord 
Raglan ;  and  we  did  not  have  in  our  service  any 
such  examples  of  abnormal  military  inaptitude  as 
Lords  Lucan  and  Cardigan  and  their  kind. 

It  was  of  course  to  be  expected  that  men  like 
Benton  would  bitterly  oppose  the  famous  Ashbur- 
ton  treaty,  which  was  Webster's  crowning  work 
while  secretary  of  state,  and  the  only  conspicuous 
success  of  Tyler's  administration.  The  Ashburton 
treaty  was  essentially  a  compromise  between  the 
extreme  claims  of  the  two  contestants,  as  was 
natural  where  the  claims  were  based  on  very  un 
substantial  grounds  and  the  contestants  were  of 
somewhat  the  same  strength.  It  was  most  benefi 
cial  in  its  immediate  effects ;  and  that  it  was  a  per 
fectly  dignified  and  proper  treaty  for  America  to 
make  is  best  proved  by  the  virulent  hostility  with 
which  Palmerston  and  his  followers  assailed  it  as 
a  "  surrender"  on  the  part  of  England,  while  Eng 
lishmen  of  the  same  stamp  are  to  this  day  never 


Boundary  Troubles  255 

tired  of  lamenting  the  fact  that  they  have  allowed 
our  western  boundaries  to  be  pushed  so  far  to  the 
north.  But  there  appears  to  be  much  excuse  for 
Benton's  attitude,  when  we  look  at  the  treaty  as 
one  in  a  chain  of  incidents,  and  with  regard  to  its 
future  results.  Our  territorial  quarrels  with  Great 
Britain  were  not  like  those  between  most  other 
powers.  It  was  for  the  interest  of  the  whole  west 
ern  hemisphere  that  no  European  nation  should 
have  extensive  possessions  between  the  Altantic 
and  the  Pacific;  and  by  right  we  should  have 
given  ourselves  the  benefit  of  every  doubt  in  all 
territorial  questions,  and  have  shown  ourselves 
ready  to  make  prompt  appeal  to  the  sword  when 
ever  it  became  necessary  as  a  last  resort. 

Still,  as  regards  the  Ashburton  treaty  itself,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  much  of  Benton's  opposi 
tion  was  merely  factious  and  partisan,  on  account 
of  its  being  a  Whig  measure ;  and  his  speeches  on 
the  subject  contain  a  number  of  arguments  that 
are  not  very  creditable  to  him. 

Some  of  his  remarks  referred  to  a  matter  which 
had  been  already  a  cause  of  great  excitement  dur 
ing  Van  Buren's  administration,  and  on  which  he 
had  spoken  more  than  once.  This  was  the  de 
struction  of  the  steamer  Caroline  by  the  British 
during  the  abortive  Canadian  insurrection  of  1837. 
Much  sympathy  had  been  felt  for  the  rebels  by 
the  Americans  along  the  border,  and  some  of  them 


256  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

had  employed  the  Caroline  in  conveying  stores  to 
the  insurgents ;  and  in  revenge  a  party  of  British 
troops  surprised  and  destroyed  her  one  night  while 
she  was  lying  in  an  American  port.  This  was  a 
gross  and  flagrant  violation  of  our  rights,  and  was 
promptly  resented  by  Van  Buren,  who  had  done 
what  he  could  to  maintain  order  along  the  border, 
and  had  been  successful  in  his  efforts.  Benton  had 
supported  the  President  in  preventing  a  breach  of 
neutrality  on  our  part,  and  was  fiercely  indignant 
when  the  breach  was  committed  by  the  other  side. 
Reparation  was  demanded  forthwith.  The  British 
government  at  first  made  evasive  replies.  After  a 
while  a  very  foolish  personage  named  McLeod,  a 
British  subject,  who  boasted  that  he  had  taken 
part  in  the  affair,  ventured  into  New  York  and  was 
promptly  imprisoned  by  the  state  authorities.  His 
boastings,  fortunately  for  him,  proved  to  be  totally 
unfounded,  and  he  was  acquitted  by  the  jury  before 
whom  he  was  taken,  after  a  detention  of  several 
months  in  prison.  But  meanwhile  the  British  gov 
ernment  demanded  his  release — adopting  a  very 
different  tone  with  Tyler  and  the  Whigs  from  that 
which  they  had  been  using  toward  Van  Buren, 
who  still  could  conjure  with  Jackson's  terrible 
name.  The  United  States  agreed  to  release  Mc 
Leod,  but  New  York  refused  to  deliver  him  up; 
and  before  the  question  was  decided  he  was  ac 
quitted,  as  said  above.  It  was  clearly  wrong  for 


Boundary  Troubles  257 

a  State  to  interfere  in  a  disagreement  between  the 
nation  and  a  foreign  power ;  and  on  the  other  hand 
the  federal  authorities  did  not  show  as  much  firm 
ness  in  their  dealings  with  England  as  they  should 
have  shown.  Benton,  true  to  certain  of  his  states'- 
rights  theories  and  in  pursuance  of  his  policy  of 
antagonism  to  Great  Britain,  warmly  supported 
the  attitude  of  New  York,  alleging  that  the  United 
States  had  no  right  to  interfere  with  her  disposal 
of  McLeod ;  and  asserting  that  while  if  the  citizens 
of  one  country  committed  an  outrage  upon  another 
it  was  necessary  to  apply  to  the  sovereign  for  re 
dress,  yet  that  if  the  wrong-doers  came  into  the 
country  which  had  been  aggrieved  they  might  be 
seized  and  punished ;  and  he  exultingly  referred  to 
Jackson's  conduct  at  the  time  of  the  first  Seminole 
war,  when  he  hung  off-hand  two  British  subjects 
whom  he  accused  of  inciting  the  Indians  against 
us,  Great  Britain  not  making  any  protest.  The 
Caroline  matter  was  finally  settled  in  the  Ashbur- 
ton  treaty,  the  British  making  a  formal  but  very 
guarded  apology  for  her  destruction — an  apology 
which  did  not  satisfy  Benton  in  the  least.  It  is 
little  to  Benton's  credit,  however,  that,  while  thus 
courting  foreign  wars,  he  yet  opposed  the  efforts 
of  the  Whigs  to  give  us  a  better  navy.  Our  navy 
was  then  good  of  its  kind,  but  altogether  too  small. 
Benton's  opposition  to  its  increase  seems  to  have 
proceeded  partly  from  mere  bitter  partisanship, 
17 


258  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

partly  from  sheer  ignorance  and  partly  from  the 
doctrinaire  dread  of  any  kind  of  standing  military 
or  naval  force,  which  he  had  inherited,  with  a 
good  many  similar  ideas,  from  the  Jeffersonians. 

He  attacked  the  whole  treaty,  article  by  article, 
when  it  came  up  for  ratification  in  the  Senate, 
making  an  extremely  lengthy  and  elaborate  speech 
or  rather  set  of  speeches,  against  it.  Much  of  his 
objection,  especially  to  the  part  compromising  the 
territorial  claims  of  the  two  governments,  was  well 
founded ;  but  much  was  also  factious  and  ground 
less.  The  most  important  point  of  all  that  was 
in  controversy,  the  ownership  of  Oregon,  was  left 
unsettled;  but,  as  will  be  shown  farther  on,  this 
was  wise.  He  made  this  omission  a  base  or  pre 
text  for  the  charge  that  the  treaty  was  gotten  up 
in  the  interests  of  the  East, — although  with  frank 
lack  of  logic  he  also  opposed  it  because  it  sacri 
ficed  the  interests  of  Maine, — and  that  it  was  det 
rimental  to  the  South  and  West;  and  he  did  his 
best  to  excite  sectional  feeling  against  it.  He  also 
protested  against  the  omission  of  all  reference  to 
the  impressment  of  American  sailors  by  British 
vessels ;  and  this  was  a  valid  ground  of  opposition, 
—although  Webster  had  really  settled  the  matter 
by  writing  a  formal  note  to  the  British  govern 
ment,  in  which  he  practically  gave  official  notice 
that  any  attempt  to  revive  the  practice  would  be 
repelled  by  force  of  arms. 


Boundary  Troubles  259 

Benton  occupied  a  much  less  tenable  position 
when  he  came  to  the  question  of  slavery,  and 
inveighed  against  the  treaty  because  it  did  not 
provide  for  the  return  of  fugitive  slaves,  or  of 
slaves  taken  from  American  coasting  vessels  when 
the  latter  happened  to  be  obliged  to  put  into  West 
Indian  ports,  and  because  it  did  contain  a  provi 
sion  that  we  ourselves  should  keep  in  commission 
a  squadron  on  the  coast  of  Africa  to  cooperate 
with  the  British  in  the  suppression  of  the  slave 
trade.  Benton's  object  in  attacking  the  treaty 
on  this  point  was  to  excite  the  South  to  a  degree 
that  would  make  the  senators  from  that  section 
refuse  to  join  in  ratifying  it ;  but  the  attempt  was 
a  flat  failure.  It  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  he 
himself  was  as  indignant  over  this  question  as 
he  pretended  to  be.  He  must  have  realized  that, 
so  long  as  we  had  among  ourselves  an  institution 
so  wholly  barbarous  and  out  of  date  as  slavery, 
just  so  long  we  should  have  to  expect  foreign 
powers  to  treat  us  rather  cavalierly  on  that  one 
point.  Whatever  we  might  say  among  ourselves 
as  to  the  rights  of  property  or  the  necessity  of 
preserving  the  Union  by  refraining  from  the  dis 
turbance  of  slavery,  it  was  certain  that  foreign 
nations  would  place  the  manhood  and  liberty  of 
the  slave  above  the  vested  interest  of  the  master — 
all  the  more  readily  because  they  were  jealous  of 
the  Union  and  anxious  to  see  it  break  up,  and 


260  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

were  naturally  delighted  to  take  the  side  of  ab 
stract  justice  and  humanity,  when  to  do  so  was  at 
the  expense  of  outsiders  and  redounded  to  their 
own  credit,  without  causing  them  the  least  pecu 
niary  loss  or  personal  inconvenience.  The  attitude 
of  slaveholders  toward  freedom  in  the  abstract 
was  grotesque  in  its  lack  of  logic ;  but  the  attitude 
of  many  other  classes  of  men,  both  abroad  and  at 
home,  toward  it  was  equally  full  of  a  grimly 
unconscious  humor.  The  Southern  planters,  who 
loudly  sympathized  with  Kossuth  and  the  Hunga 
rians,  were  entirely  unconscious  that  their  tyranny 
over  their  own  black  bondsmen  made  their  attacks 
upon  Austria's  despotism  absurd;  and  Germans, 
who  were  shocked  at  our  holding  the  blacks  in 
slavery,  could  not  think  of  freedom  in  their  own 
country  without  a  shudder.  On  one  night  the 
Democrats  of  the  Northern  States  would  hold  a 
mass  meeting  to  further  the  cause  of  Irish  free 
dom,  on  the  next  night  the  same  men  would  break 
up  another  meeting  held  to  help  along  the  freeing 
of  the  negroes ;  while  the  English  aristocracy  held 
up  its  hands  in  horror  at  American  slavery  and 
set  its  face  like  a  flint  against  all  efforts  to  do 
Ireland  tardy  and  incomplete  justice. 

Again,  in  his  opposition  to  the  extradition  clause 
of  the  treaty,  Benton  was  certainly  wrong.  Noth 
ing  is  clearer  than  that  nations  ought  to  combine 
to  prevent  criminals  from  escaping  punishment 


Boundary  Troubles  261 

merely  by  fleeing  over  an  imaginary  line;  the 
crime  is  against  all  society,  and  society  should 
unite  to  punish  it.  Especially  is  there  need  of  the 
most  stringent  extradition  laws  between  countries 
whose  people  have  the  same  speech  and  legal  sys 
tem,  as  with  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 
Indeed,  it  is  a  pity  that  our  extradition  laws  are 
not  more  stringent.  But  Benton  saw,  or  affected 
to  see,  in  the  extradition  clause,  a  menace  to  politi 
cal  refugees,  and  based  his  opposition  to  it  mainly 
on  this  ground.  He  also  quoted  on  his  side  the 
inevitable  Jefferson;  for  Jefferson,  or  rather  the 
highly  idealized  conception  of  what  Jefferson  had 
been,  shared  with  the  "demos  krateo  principle" 
the  honor  of  being  one  of  the  twin  fetiches  to 
which  Benton,  in  common  with  most  of  his  fellow 
Democrats,  especially  delighted  to  bow  down. 

But  when  he  came  to  the  parts  of  the  treaty 
that  denned  our  northeastern  boundary  and  so 
much  of  our  northwestern  boundary  as  lay  near 
the  Great  Lakes,  Benton  occupied  far  more  de 
fensible  ground ;  and  the  parts  of  his  speech  refer 
ring  to  these  questions  were  very  strong  indeed. 
He  attempted  to  show  that  in  the  matter  of  the 
Maine  frontier  we  had  surrendered  very  much 
more  than  there  was  any  need  of  our  doing,  and 
that  the  British  claim  was  unfounded;  and  there 
seems  now  to  be  good  reason  for  thinking  him 
right,  although  it  must  be  admitted  that  in 


262  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

agreeing  to  the  original  line  in  earlier  treaties  the 
British  had  acted  entirely  tinder  a  misapprehen 
sion  as  to  where  it  would  go.  Benton  was  also 
able  to  make  a  good  point  against  Webster  for 
finally  agreeing  to  surrender  so  much  of  Maine's 
claim  by  showing  the  opposition  the  latter  had 
made,  while  in  the  Senate,  to  a  similar  but  less 
objectionable  clause  in  a  treaty  which  Jackson's 
administration  had  then  been  trying  to  get 
through.  Again  Webster  had,  in  defending  the 
surrender  of  certain  of  our  claims  along  the 
boundary  west  of  Lake  Superior,  stated  that 
the  country  was  not  very  valuable,  as  it  was  use 
less  for  agricultural  purposes;  and  Benton  had 
taken  him  up  sharply  on  this  point,  saying  that 
we  wanted  the  land  anyhow,  whether  it  produced 
corn  and  potatoes  or  only  furs  and  lumber.  The 
amounts  of  territory  as  to  which  our  claims  were 
compromised  were  not  very  large  compared  to 
the  extent  of  the  Pacific  coast  lands  which  were 
still  left  in  dispute ;  and  it  was  perhaps  well  that 
the  treaty  was  ratified;  but  certainly  there  is 
much  to  be  said  on  Ben  ton's  side  so  far  as  his 
opposition  to  the  proposed  frontier  was  concerned. 
However,  he  was  only  able  to  rally  eight  other 
senators  to  his  support,  and  the  treaty  went 
through  the  Senate  triumphantly.  It  encoun 
tered  an  even  more  bitter  opposition  in  Parlia 
ment,  where  Palmerston  headed  a  series  of  furious 


Boundary  Troubles  263 

attacks  upon  it,  for  reasons  the  precise  opposite 
of  those  which  Benton  alleged,  arguing  that  Eng 
land  received  much  less,  instead  of  much  more, 
than  her  due,  and  thereby  showing  Webster's 
position  in  a  very  much  better  light  than  that  in 
which  it  would  otherwise  have  appeared.  Even 
tually  the  British  government  ratified  the  treaty. 
The  Ashburton  treaty  did  not  touch  on  the 
Oregon  matter  at  all;  nor  was  this  dealt  with  by 
Webster  while  he  was  secretary  of  state.  But  it 
came  before  the  Senate  at  that  time,  and  later  on 
Calhoun  took  it  up,  when  filling  Webster's  place 
in  the  cabinet,  although  a  final  decision  was  not 
reached  until  during  Folk's  presidency.  Webster 
did  not  appreciate  the  importance  of  Oregon  in 
the  least,  and  moreover  came  from  a  section  of 
the  country  that  was  not  inclined  to  insist  on 
territorial  expansion  at  the  hazard  of  a  war,  in 
which  the  merchants  of  the  seaboard  would  be 
the  chief  sufferers.  Calhoun,  it  is  true,  came  from 
a  peculiarly  militant  and  bellicose  State,  but  on 
the  other  hand  from  a  section  that  was  not  very 
anxious  to  see  the  free  North  acquire  new  terri 
tory.  So  it  happened  that  neither  of  Tyler's  two 
great  secretaries  felt  called  upon  to  insist  too 
vehemently  upon  going  to  extremes  in  defense  of 
our  rights,  or  supposed  rights,  along  the  Pacific 
coast;  and  though  in  the  end  the  balance  was 
struck  pretty  evenly  between  our  claims  and 


264  Thomas  Hart  Bentbn 

those  of  our  neighbor,  yet  it  is  to  be  regretted 
that  we  did  not  stand  out  stiffly  for  the  whole  of 
our  demand.  Our  title  was  certainly  not  perfect, 
but  it  was  to  the  full  as  good  as,  or  better  than, 
Great  Britain's ;  and  it  would  have  been  better 
in  the  end  had  we  insisted  upon  the  whole  terri 
tory  being  given  to  us,  no  matter  what  price  we 
had  to  pay. 

The  politico-social  line  of  division  between  the 
East  and  the  West  had  been  gradually  growing 
fainter  as  that  between  the  North  and  the  South 
grew  deeper ;  but  on  the  Oregon  question  it  again 
became  prominent.  Southeastern  Democrats,  like 
the  Carolinian  McDuffie,  spoke  as  slightingly  of 
the  value  of  Oregon,  and  were  as  little  inclined  to 
risk  a  war  for  its  possession,  as  the  most  peace- 
loving  Whigs  of  New  England ;  while  the  intense 
Western  feeling  against  giving  up  any  of  our 
rights  on  the  Pacific  coast  was  best  expressed  by 
the  two  senators  from  the  slave  State  of  Mis 
souri.  Benton  was  not  restrained  in  his  desire 
to  add  to  the  might  of  the  Union  by  any  fear  of 
the  possible  future  effect  upon  the  political  power 
of  the  slave  States.  Although  a  slaveholder  and 
the  representative  of  slaveholders,  he  was  fully 
alive  to  the  evils  of  slavery,  though  as  yet  not 
seeing  clearly  how  all-important  a  question  it  had 
become.  The  preservation  and  extension  of  the 
Union  and  obedience  to  the  spirit  of  Democracy 


Boundary  Troubles  265 

were  the  chief  articles  of  his  political  creed,  and 
to  these  he  always  subordinated  all  others.  When, 
in  speaking  of  slavery,  he  made  use,  as  he  some 
times  did,  of  expressions  that  were  not  far  re 
moved  from  those  of  men  really  devoted  to  the 
slave  interests,  it  was  almost  always  because  he 
had  some  ulterior  object  in  view,  or  for  factional 
ends ;  for  unfortunately  his  standard  of  political 
propriety  was  not  sufficiently  high  to  prevent  his 
trying  to  make  use  of  any  weapon,  good  or  bad, 
with  which  to  overturn  his  political  foes.  In  pro 
testing  against  the  Ashburton  treaty,  he  outdid 
even  such  slavery  champions  as  Calhoun  in  the 
extravagance  of  his  ideas  as  to  what  we  should 
demand  of  foreign  powers  in  reference  to  their 
treatment  of  our  " peculiar  institution;"  but  he 
seems  to  have  done  this  merely  because  thereby 
he  got  an  additional  handle  of  attack  against  the 
Whig  measures.  The  same  thing  was  true  earlier 
of  his  fulmination  against  Clay's  proposed  Pan 
ama  Congress ;  and  even  before  that,  in  attacking 
Adams  for  his  supposed  part  in  the  treaty  whereby 
we  established  the  line  of  our  Spanish  frontier,  he 
dragged  slavery  into  the  question,  not,  apparently, 
because  he  really  particularly  wished  to  see  our 
slave  territory  extended,  but  because  he  thought 
that  he  might  use  the  slavery  cry  to  excite  in  one 
other  section  of  the  country  a  feeling  as  strong 
as  that  which  the  West  already  felt  in  regard  to 


266  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

territorial  expansion  generally.  Indeed,  his  whole 
conduct  throughout  the  Oregon  controversy,  espe 
cially  when  taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that 
he  stood  out  for  Maine's  frontier  rights  more 
stoutly  than  the  Maine  representatives  them 
selves,  shows  how  free  from  sectional  bias  was 
his  way  of  looking  at  our  geographical  growth. 

The  territory  along  the  Pacific  coast  lying  be 
tween  California  on  the  south  and  Alaska  on  the 
north — "Oregon,"  as  it  was  comprehensively 
called — had  been  a  source  of  dispute  for  some 
time  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 
After  some  negotiations  both  had  agreed  with  Rus 
sia  to  recognize  the  line  of  54°  40'  as  the  southern 
boundary  of  the  latter 's  possessions ;  and  Mexico's 
undisputed  possession  of  California  gave  an  equally 
well  marked  southern  limit,  at  the  forty-second 
parallel.  All  between  was  in  dispute.  The  British 
had  trading  posts  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia, 
which  they  emphatically  asserted  to  be  theirs ;  we, 
on  the  other  hand,  claimed  an  absolutely  clear  title 
up  to  the  forty-ninth  parallel,  a  couple  of  hundred 
miles  north  of  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia,  and 
asserted  that  for  all  the  balance  of  the  territory  up 
to  the  Russian  possessions  our  title  was  at  any  rate 
better  than  that  of  the  British.  In  1818  a  treaty 
had  been  made  providing  for  the  joint  occupation 
of  the  territory  by  the  two  powers,  as  neither  was 
willing  to  give  up  its  claim  to  the  whole,  or  at  the 


Thomas  Hart  Benton 

' :  -'T*  tonal  expansion  generally.  Indeed,  his  >.vhole 
Conduct  throughout  the  Oregon  controversy,  »>>pe- 
oially  when  taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that 
he  stood  out  for  Maine's  frontier  rig! its  more 
stoutly  than  the  Maine  representatives  them 
selves,  shows  bow  free  from  sectional  bias  was 
his  wny  <>{  Vxiktfcg  at  our  geographical  growth. 

ng  the  Pacific  coast  lying  be- 
twce  / ;  i  &   '  \  south  arid  Alaska  on  the 

north*-  us    comprehensively 

calkv;     A  .--..'       •  ':spute  for  some 

1  Great  Britain. 


n  was  in  dispute.    The  British 
.  -.5  at  the.rnoutli  of  the  Columbia, 

-.vhirh  tl  ..'latically  asserted  to  be  theirs ;  we, 

.'U  the  other  hand,  claime-i  an  absolutely  clear  title 
Mp  to  the  forty *ninth  {Xi.rallel,  a.  couple  of  hundred 
miles  north  of  the  ITIO-;'*.  of  the  Columbia,  and 
asserted  that  for  all  th;  :>.t»ance  of  the  territory. up 
to  the  Russian  possess! -HS  our  title  was  at  any  rate 
hi- tier  than  that  of  the  British.  In  1818  a  treaty 
had  been  made  providing  for  the  joint  occupation 
of  the  territory  by  the  two  powers,  as  neither  was 
wilhttft  U>  eive  uv  its  claim  to  the  whole,  or  at  the 


- 


John  C .  Fremont. 


Boundary  Troubles  267 

time  at  all  understood  the  value  of  the  possession, 
then  entirely  unpeopled.  This  treaty  of  joint  oc 
cupancy  had  remained  in  force  ever  since.  Under 
it  the  British  had  built  great  trading  stations,  and 
used  the  whole  country  in  the  interests  of  certain 
fur  companies.  The  Americans,  in  spite  of  some 
vain  efforts,  were  unable  to  compete  with  them  in 
this  line ;  but,  what  was  infinitely  more  important, 
had  begun,  even  prior  to  1840,  to  establish  actual 
settlers  along  the  banks  of  the  rivers,  some  mis 
sionaries  being  the  first  to  come  in.  As  long,  how 
ever,  as  the  territory  remained  sparsely  settled, 
and  the  communication  with  it  chiefly  by  sea,  the 
hold  of  Great  Britain  gave  promise  of  being  the 
stronger.  But  the  aspect  of  affairs  was  totally 
changed  when  in  1842  a  huge  caravan  of  over  a 
thousand  Americans  made  the  journey  overland 
from  the  frontiers  of  Missouri,  taking  with  them 
their  wives  and  their  children,  their  flocks  and 
herds,  carrying  their  long  rifles  on  their  shoulders, 
and  their  axes  and  spades  in  the  great  canvas- 
topped  wagons.  The  next  year,  two  thousand 
more  settlers  of  the  same  sort  in  their  turn  crossed 
the  vast  plains,  wound  their  way  among  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  through  the  pass  explored  by 
Fremont,  Benton's  son-in-law,  and  after  suffering 
every  kind  of  hardship  and  danger,  and  warding 
off  the  attacks  of  hostile  Indians,  descended  the 
western  slope  of  the  great  watershed  to  join  their 


268  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

fellows  by  the  banks  of  the  Columbia.  When 
American  settlers  were  once  in  actual  possession 
of  the  disputed  territory,  it  became  evident  that 
the  period  of  Great  Britain's  undisputed  sway  was 
over. 

The  government  of  the  United  States,  mean 
while,  was  so  far  from  helping  these  settlers  that 
it  on  the  contrary  rather  threw  obstacles  in  their 
way.  As  usual  with  us,  the  individual  activity  of 
the  citizens  themselves,  who  all  acted  independ 
ently  and  with  that  peculiar  self-reliance  that  is 
the  chief  American  characteristic,  outstripped  the 
activity  of  their  representatives,  who  were  obliged 
all  to  act  together,  and  who  were  therefore  held 
back  by  each  other, — our  Constitution,  while 
giving  free  scope  for  individual  freedom,  wisely 
providing  such  checks  as  to  make  our  governmen 
tal  system  eminently  conservative  in  its  workings. 
Tyler's  administration  did  not  wish  to  embroil 
itself  with  England ;  so  it  refused  any  aid  to  the 
settlers,  and  declined  to  give  them  grants  of  land, 
as  under  the  joint  occupancy  treaty  that  would 
have  given  England  offense  and  cause  for  com 
plaint.  But  Benton  and  the  other  Westerners 
were  perfectly  willing  to  offend  England,  if  by  so 
doing  they  could  help  America  to  obtain  Oregon, 
and  were  too  rash  and  headstrong  to  count  the 
cost  of  their  actions.  Accordingly,  a  bill  was  in 
troduced  providing  for  the  settlement  of  Oregon, 


Boundary  Troubles  269 

and  giving  each  settler  six  hundred  and  forty 
acres,  and  additional  land  if  he  had  a  family;  so 
that  every  inducement  was  held  out  to  the  emi 
grants,  the  West  wanting  to  protect  and  encour 
age  them  by  all  the  means  in  its  power.  The 
laws  and  jurisdiction  of  the  Territory  of  Iowa 
were  to  be  extended  to  all  the  settlers  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  who  hitherto  had  governed  them 
selves  merely  by  a  system  of  mutual  agreements. 

The  bill  was,  of  course,  strongly  opposed,  espe 
cially  on  account  of  the  clause  giving  land  to  the 
settlers.  It  passed  the  Senate  by  a  close  vote,  but 
failed  in  the  House.  Naturally  Benton  was  one 
of  its  chief  supporters,  and  spoke  at  length  in  its 
favor.  He  seized  the  kernel  of  the  matter  when, 
in  advocating  the  granting  of  land,  he  spoke  of 
immigration  as  "the  only  thing  which  can  save 
the  country  from  the  British,  acting  through  their 
powerful  agent,  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company." 
He  then  blew  a  lusty  note  of  defiance  to  Great 
Britain  herself: 

I  think  she  will  take  offense,  do  what  we  may  in 
relation  to  this  territory.  She  wants  it  herself,  and 
means  to  quarrel  for  it,  if  she  does  not  fight  for  it.  ... 
I  grant  that  she  will  take  offense,  but  that  is  not  the 
question  with  me.  Has  she  a  right  to  take  offense? 
That  is  my  question!  And  this  being  decided  in  the 
negative,  I  neither  fear  nor  calculate  consequences. 
.  .  .  Courage  will  keep  her  off,  fear  will  bring  her 
upon  us.  The  assertion  of  our  rights  will  command 


270  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

her  respect ;  the  fear  to  assert  them  will  bring  us  her 
contempt.  .  .  .  Neither  nations  nor  individuals  ever 
escaped  danger  by  fearing  it.  They  must  face  it  and 
defy  it.  An  abandonment  of  a  right  for  fear  of  bring 
ing  on  an  attack,  instead  of  keeping  it  off,  will  inevit 
ably  bring  on  the  outrage  that  is  dreaded. 

He  was  right  enough  in  his  disposition  to  resent 
the  hectoring  spirit  which,  at  that  time,  character 
ized  Great  Britain's  foreign  policy ;  but  he  was  all 
wrong  in  condemning  delay,  and  stating  that  if 
things  were  left  as  they  were,  time  would  work 
against  us,  and  not  for  us. 

In  this  respect  Calhoun,  who  opposed  the  bill, 
was  much  wiser.  He  advocated  a  policy  of  "  mas 
terly  inactivity,"  foreseeing  that  time  was  every 
thing  to  us,  inasmuch  as  the  land  was  sure  in  the 
end  to  belong  to  that  nation  whose  people  had  set 
tled  in  it,  and  we  alone  were  able  to  furnish  a  con 
stantly  increasing  stream  of  immigrants.  Later 
on,  however,  Calhoun  abandoned  this  policy,  prob 
ably  mainly  influenced  by  fear  of  the  extension 
of  free  territory,  and  consented  to  a  compromise 
with  Great  Britain.  The  true  course  to  have  pur 
sued  would  have  been  to  have  combined  the  ideas 
of  both  Benton  and  Calhoun,  and  to  have  gone 
farther  than  either ;  that  is,  we  should  have  allowed 
the  question  to  remain  unsettled  as  long  as  was 
possible,  because  every  year  saw  an  increasing 
American  population  in  the  coveted  lands,  and 


Boundary  Troubles  271 

rendered  the  ultimate  decision  surer  to  be  for  us. 
When  it  was  impossible  to  postpone  the  question 
longer,  we  should  have  insisted  upon  its  being  set 
tled  entirely  in  our  favor,  no  matter  at  what  cost. 
The  unsuccessful  attempts,  made  by  Benton  and 
his  supporters,  to  persuade  the  Senate  to  pass  a 
resolution,  requiring  that  notice  of  the  termination 
of  the  joint  occupancy  treaty  should  forthwith  be 
given,  were  certainly  ill-advised. 

However,  even  Benton  was  not  willing  to  go  to 
the  length  to  which  certain  Western  men  went, 
who  insisted  upon  all  or  nothing.  He  had  become 
alarmed  and  angry  over  the  intrigue  for  the  ad 
mission  of  Texas  and  the  proposed  forcible  taking 
away  of  Mexican  territory.  The  Northwestern 
Democrats  wanted  all  Texas  and  all  Oregon ;  the 
Southeastern  ones  wished  all  the  former  and  part 
of  the  latter.  Benton  then  concluded  that  it  would 
be  best  to  take  part  of  each;  for,  although  no 
friend  to  compromises,  yet  he  was  unwilling  to 
jeopardize  the  safety  of  the  Union  as  it  was  by 
seeking  to  make  it  still  larger.  Accordingly,  he 
sympathized  with  the  effort  made  by  Calhoun 
while  secretary  of  state  to  get  the  British  to  accept 
the  line  of  49°  as  the  frontier;  but  the  British 
government  then  rejected  this  proposition.  In 
1844  the  Democrats  made  their  campaign  upon 
the  issue  of  "fifty-four  forty  or  fight;"  and  Polk, 
when  elected,  felt  obliged  to  insist  upon  this 


272  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

campaign  boundary.  To  this,  however,  Great  Brit 
ain  naturally  would  not  consent;  it  was,  indeed, 
idle  to  expect  her  to  do  so,  unless  things  should  be 
kept  as  they  were  until  a  fairly  large  American 
population  had  grown  up  along  the  Pacific  coast, 
and  had  thus  put  her  in  a  position  where  she  could 
hardly  do  anything  else.  Folk's  administration 
was  neither  capable  nor  warlike,  however  well- 
disposed  to  bluster;  and  the  secretary  of  state, 
the  timid,  shifty,  and  selfish  politician,  Buchanan, 
naturally  fond  of  facing  both  ways,  was  the  last 
man  to  force  a  quarrel  on  a  high-spirited  and  de 
termined  antagonist  like  England.  Accordingly, 
he  made  up  his  mind  to  back  down  and  try  for 
the  line  of  49°,  as  proposed  by  Calhoun,  when  in 
Tyler's  cabinet;  and  the  English,  for  all  their 
affected  indifference,  had  been  so  much  impressed 
by  the  warlike  demonstrations  in  the  United 
States,  that  they  in  turn  were  delighted,  singing 
in  a  much  lower  key  than  before  the  "fifty-four 
forty  "  cry  had  been  raised ;  accordingly  they  with 
drew  their  former  pretensions  to  the  Columbia 
River  and  accepted  the  offered  compromise.  Now, 
however,  came  the  question  of  getting  the  treaty 
through  the  Senate ;  and  Buchanan  sounded  Ben- 
ton,  to  see  if  he  would  undertake  this  task. 

Benton,  worried  over  the  Texas  matter,  was 
willing  to  recede  somewhat  from  the  very  high 
ground  he  had  taken, — although,  of  course,  he 


Boundary  Troubles  273 

insisted  that  he  had  been  perfectly  consistent 
throughout,  and  that  the  forty-ninth  parallel  was 
the  line  he  had  all  along  been  striving  for.  Under 
his  lead  the  proposal  for  a  treaty  on  the  basis  in 
dicated  was  carried  through  the  Senate,  and  the 
line  in  consequence  ultimately  became  our  fron 
tier,  in  spite  of  the  frantic  opposition  of  the  North 
western  Democrats,  the  latter  hurling  every  sort 
of  charge  of  bad  faith  and  treachery  at  their  South 
ern  associates,  who  had  joined  with  the  Whigs  in 
defeating  them.  Benton's  speech  in  support  of 
the  proposal  was  pitched  much  lower  than  had 
been  his  previous  ones;  and,  a  little  forgetful  of 
some  of  his  own  remarks,  he  was  especially  severe 
upon  those  members  who  denounced  England  and 
held  up  a  picture  of  her  real  or  supposed  designs 
to  excite  and  frighten  the  people  into  needless 
opposition  to  her. 

In  its  immediate  effects  the  adoption  of  the 
forty-ninth  parallel  as  the  dividing  line  between 
the  two  countries  was  excellent,  and  entailed  no 
loss  of  dignity  on  either.  Yet,  as  there  was  no 
particular  reason  why  we  should  show  any  gen 
erosity  in  our  diplomatic  dealings  with  England, 
it  may  well  be  questioned  whether  it  would  not 
have  been  better  to  have  left  things  as  they  were 
until  we  could  have  taken  all.  Wars  are,  of 
course,  as  a  rule  to  be  avoided ;  but  they  are  far 
better  than  certain  kinds  of  peace.  Every  war 

18 


274  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

in  which  we  have  been  engaged,  except  the  one 
with  Mexico,  has  been  justifiable  in  its  origin ;  and 
each  one,  without  any  exception  whatever,  has 
left  us  better  off,  taking  both  moral  and  material 
considerations  into  account,  than  we  should  have 
been  if  we  had  not  waged  it. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  ABOLITIONISTS  DANCE  TO  THE  SLAVE 
BARONS'  PIPING. 

IN  1844  the  Whig  candidate  for  the  presidency, 
Henry  Clay,  was  defeated  by  a  Mr.  Polk,  the 
nominee  of  the  Democracy.     The  majorities 
in  several  of  the  States  were  very  small ;  this  was 
the  case,  for  example,  in  New  York,  the  change  in 
whose  electoral  vote  would  have  also  changed  the 
entire  result. 

Up  to  1860  there  were  very  few  political  con 
tests  in  which  the  dividing  lines  between  right  and 
wrong  so  nearly  coincided  with  those  drawn  be 
tween  the  two  opposing  parties  as  in  that  of  1844. 
The  Democrats  favored  the  annexation  of  Texas, 
and  the  addition  of  new  slave  territory  to  the 
Union;  the  Whigs  did  not.  Almost  every  good 
element  in  the  country  stood  behind  Clay;  the 
vast  majority  of  intelligent,  high-minded,  upright 
men  supported  him.  Polk  was  backed  by  rabid 
Southern  fire-eaters  and  slavery  extensionists,  who 
had  deified  negro  bondage  and  exalted  it  beyond 
the  Union,  the  Constitution,  and  everything  else ; 
by  the  almost  solid  foreign  vote,  still  unfit  for  the 
duties  of  American  citizenship ;  by  the  vicious  and 
criminal  classes  in  all  the  great  cities  of  the  North 

275 


276  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

and  in  New  Orleans;  by  the  corrupt  politicians, 
who  found  ignorance  and  viciousness  tools  ready 
forged  to  their  hands,  wherewith  to  perpetrate  the 
gigantic  frauds  without  which  the  election  would 
have  been  lost;  and,  lastly,  he  was  also  backed 
indirectly  but  most  powerfully  by  the  political 
Abolitionists. 

These  Abolitionists  had  formed  themselves  into 
the  Liberty  party,  and  ran  Birney  for  president; 
and  though  they  polled  but  little  over  sixty  thou 
sand  votes,  yet  as  these  were  drawn  almost  en 
tirely  from  the  ranks  of  Clay's  supporters,  they 
were  primarily  responsible  for  his  defeat ;  for  the 
defections  were  sufficiently  large  to  turn  the  scale 
in  certain  pivotal  and  closely  contested  States, 
notably  New  York.  Their  action  in  this  case  was 
wholly  evil,  alike  in  its  immediate  and  its  remote 
results ;  they  simply  played  into  the  hands  of  the 
extreme  slavery  men  like  Calhoun,  and  became, 
for  the  time  being,  the  willing  accomplices  of  the 
latter.  Yet  they  would  have  accomplished  noth 
ing  had  it  not  been  for  the  frauds  and  outrages 
perpetrated  by  the  gangs  of  native  and  foreign- 
born  ruffians  in  the  great  cities,  under  the  leader 
ship  of  such  brutal  rowdies  as  Isaiah  Rynders. 

These  three  men,  Calhoun,  Birney,  and  Isaiah 
Rynders,  may  be  taken  as  types  of  the  classes  that 
were  chiefly  instrumental  in  the  election  of  Polk, 
and  that  must,  therefore,  bear  the  responsibility 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     277 

for  all  the  evils  attendant  thereon,  including 
among  them  the  bloody  and  unrighteous  war  with 
Mexico.  With  the  purpose  of  advancing  the  cause 
of  abstract  right,  but  with  the  result  of  sacrificing 
all  that  was  best,  most  honest,  and  most  high- 
principled  in  national  politics,  the  Abolitionists 
joined  hands  with  Northern  roughs  and  Southern 
slaveocrats  to  elect  the  man  who  was,  excepting 
Tyler,  the  very  smallest  of  the  line  of  small  presi 
dents  who  came  in  between  Jackson  and  Lincoln. 
Owing  to  a  variety  of  causes  the  Abolitionists 
have  received  an  immense  amount  of  hysterical 
praise,  which  they  do  not  deserve,  and  have  been 
credited  with  deeds  done  by  other  men,  whom  they 
in  reality  hampered  and  opposed  rather  than  aided. 
After  1840  the  professed  Abolitionists  formed  but 
a  small  and  comparatively  unimportant  portion  of 
the  forces  that  were  working  toward  the  restriction 
and  ultimate  destruction  of  slavery;  and  much 
of  what  they  did  was  positively  harmful  to  the 
cause  for  which  they  were  fighting.  Those  of  their 
number  who  considered  the  Constitution  as  a 
league  with  death  and  hell,  and  who  therefore 
advocated  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  acted  as 
rationally  as  would  anti-polygamists  nowadays 
if,  to  show  their  disapproval  of  Mormonism,  they 
should  advocate  that  Utah  should  be  allowed  to 
form  a  separate  nation.  The  only  hope  of  ulti 
mately  suppressing  slavery  lay  in  the  preservation 


278  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

of  the  Union,  and  every  Abolitionist  who  argued 
or  signed  a  petition  for  its  dissolution  was  doing 
as  much  to  perpetuate  the  evil  he  complained  of  as 
if  he  had  been  a  slaveholder.  The  Liberty  party, 
in  running  Birney,  simply  committed  a  political 
crime,  evil  in  almost  all  its  consequences ;  they  in 
no  sense  paved  the  way  for  the  Republican  party, 
or  helped  forward  the  anti-slavery  cause,  or  hurt 
the  existing  organizations.  Their  effect  on  the 
Democracy  was  nil;  and  all  they  were  able  to 
accomplish  with  the  Whigs  was  to  make  them  put 
forward  for  the  ensuing  campaign  a  slaveholder 
from  Louisiana,  with  whom  they  were  successful. 
Such  were  the  remote  results  of  their  conduct ;  the 
immediate  evils  they  produced  have  already  been 
alluded  to.  They  bore  considerable  resemblance 
— except  that,  after  all,  they  really  did  have  a 
principle  to  contend  for — to  the  political  prohibi 
tionists  of  the  present  day,  who  go  into  the  third 
party  organizations,  and  are,  not  even  excepting 
the  saloon-keepers  themselves,  the  most  efficient 
allies  on  whom  intemperance  and  the  liquor  traffic 
can  count. 

Anti-slavery  men  like  Giddings,  who  supported 
Clay,  were  doing  a  thousandfold  more  effective 
work  for  the  cause  they  had  at  heart  than  all  the 
voters  who  supported  Birney;  or,  to  speak  more 
accurately,  they  were  doing  all  they  could  to  ad 
vance  the  cause,  and  the  others  were  doing  all  they 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     279 

could  to  hold  it  back.  Lincoln  in  1860  occupied 
more  nearly  the  ground  held  by  Clay  than  that 
held  by  Birney;  and  the  men  who  supported  the 
latter  in  1844  were  the  prototypes  of  those  who 
wished  to  oppose  Lincoln  in  1860,  and  only  worked 
less  hard  because  they  had  less  chance.  The  ultra- 
Abolitionists  discarded  expediency,  and  claimed  to 
act  for  abstract  right,  on  principle,  no  matter  what 
the  results  might  be ;  in  consequence  they  accom 
plished  very  little,  and  that  as  much  for  harm  as 
for  good,  until  they  ate  their  words,  went  counter 
to  their  previous  course,  thereby  acknowledging  it 
to  be  bad,  and  supported  in  the  Republican  party 
the  men  and  principles  they  had  so  fiercely  con 
demned.  The  Liberty  party  was  not  in  any  sense 
the  precursor  of  the  Republican  party,  which  was 
based  as  much  on  expediency  as  on  abstract  right, 
and  was  therefore  able  to  accomplish  good  instead 
of  harm.  To  say  that  the  extreme  Abolitionists 
triumphed  in  Republican  success  and  were  causes 
of  it,  is  as  absurd  as  it  would  be  to  call  prohibition 
ists  successful  if,  after  countless  futile  efforts 
totally  to  prohibit  the  liquor  traffic,  and  after 
savage  denunciation  of  those  who  try  to  regulate 
it,  they  should  then  turn  round  and  form  a  com 
paratively  insignificant  portion  of  a  victorious 
high-license  party. 

Many  people  in  speaking  of  the  Abolitionists 
apparently  forget  that  the  national  government, 


280  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

even  under  Republican  rule,  would  never  have 
meddled  with  slavery  in  the  various  States  unless 
as  a  war  measure,  made  necessary  by  the  rebellion 
into  which  the  South  was  led  by  a  variety  of 
causes,  of  which  slavery  was  chief,  but  among 
which  there  were  others  that  were  also  prominent ; 
such  as  the  separatist  spirit  of  certain  of  the  com 
munities  and  the  unscrupulous,  treacherous  am 
bition  of  such  men  as  Davis,  Floyd,  and  the  rest. 
The  Abolitionists'  political  organizations,  such  as 
the  Liberty  party,  generally  produced  very  little 
effect  either  way,  and  were  scarcely  thought  of 
during  the  contests  waged  for  freedom  in  Congress. 
The  men  who  took  a  great  and  effective  part  in  the 
fight  against  slavery  were  the  men  who  remained 
within  their  respective  parties ;  like  the  Democrats 
Benton  and  Wilmot,  or  the  Whigs  Seward  and  Ste 
vens.  When  a  new  party  with  more  clearly  de 
fined  principles  was  formed,  they,  for  the  most 
part,  went  into  it ;  but,  like  all  other  men  who  have 
ever  had  a  really  great  influence,  whether  for  good 
or  bad,  on  American  politics,  they  did  not  act  in 
dependently  of  parties,  but  on  the  contrary  kept 
within  party  lines — although,  of  course,  none  of 
them  were  mere  blind  and  unreasoning  partisans. 
The  plea  that  slavery  was  a  question  of  princi 
ple,  on  which  no  compromise  could  be  accepted, 
might  have  been  made  and  could  still  be  made  on 
twenty  other  points, — woman  suffrage,  for  in- 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     281 

stance.  Of  course,  to  give  women  their  just  rights 
does  not  by  any  means  imply  that  they  should 
necessarily  be  allowed  to  vote,  any  more  than  the 
bestowal  of  the  rights  of  citizenship  upon  blacks 
and  aliens  must  of  necessity  carry  with  it  the  same 
privilege.  But  there  were  until  lately,  and  in 
some  States  there  are  now,  laws  on  the  statute- 
book  in  reference  to  women  that  are  in  principle 
as  unjust,  and  that  are  quite  as  much  the  rem 
nants  of  archaic  barbarism  as  was  the  old  slave 
code ;  and  though  it  is  true  that  they  do  not  work 
anything  like  the  evil  of  the  latter,  they  yet  cer 
tainly  work  evil  enough.  The  same  laws  that  in 
one  Southern  State  gave  a  master  a  right  to  whip 
a  slave  also  allowed  him  to  whip  his  wife,  pro 
vided  he  used  a  stick  no  thicker  than  his  little 
finger;  the  legal  permission  to  do  the  latter  was 
even  more  outrageous  than  that  to  do  the  former, 
yet  no  one  considered  it  a  ground  for  wishing  a 
dissolution  of  the  Union  or  for  declaring  against 
the  existing  parties.  The  folly  of  voting  the 
Liberty  ticket  in  1844  differed  in  degree,  but  not 
at  all  in  kind,  from  the  folly  of  voting  the  Woman 
Suffrage  ticket  in  1884. 

The  intrigue  for  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and 
for  thereby  extending  the  slave  territory  of  the 
Union,  had  taken  shape  toward  the  close  of  Tyler's 
term  of  office,  while  Calhoun  was  secretary  of 
state.  Benton,  as  an  aggressive  Western  man, 


282  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

desirous  of  seeing  our  territorial  possessions  ex 
tended  in  any  direction,  north  or  south,  always 
hoped  that  in  the  end  Texas  might  be  admitted 
into  the  Union ;  but  he  disliked  seeing  any  prema 
ture  steps  taken,  and  was  no  party  to  the  scheme 
of  forcing  an  immediate  annexation  in  the  inter 
ests  of  slavery.  Such  immediate  annexation  was 
certain,  among  other  things,  to  bring  us  into  grave 
difficulties  not  only  with  Mexico,  but  also  with 
England,  which  was  strongly  inclined  to  take 
much  interest  of  a  practical  sort  in  the  fate  of 
Texas,  and  would,  of  course,  have  done  all  it  could 
to  bring  about  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  that 
State.  The  Southerners,  desirous  of  increasing 
the  slave  domain,  and  always  in  a  state  of  fierce 
alarm  over  the  proximity  of  any  free  State  that 
might  excite  a  servile  insurrection,  were  impatient 
to  add  the  Lone  Star  Republic  of  the  Rio  Grande 
to  the  number  of  their  States ;  the  Southwestern- 
ers  fell  in  with  them,  influenced,  though  less 
strongly,  by  the  same  motives,  and  also  by  the 
lust  for  new  lands  and  by  race  hatred  toward  the 
Mexicans  and  traditional  jealousy  of  Great  Britain ; 
and  these  latter  motives  induced  many  North- 
westerners  to  follow  suit.  By  a  judicious  harping 
on  all  these  strings  Jackson  himself,  whose  name 
was  still  a  mighty  power  among  the  masses,  was 
induced  to  write  a  letter  favoring  instant  and 
prompt  annexation. 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     283 

This  letter  was  really  procured  for  political  pur 
poses.  Tyler  had  completely  identified  himself 
with  the  Democracy,  and  especially  with  its  ex 
treme  separatist  wing,  to  which  Calhoun  also  be 
longed,  and  which  had  grown  so  as  to  be  already 
almost  able  to  take  the  reins.  The  separatist 
chiefs  were  intriguing  for  the  presidency,  and  were 
using  annexation  as  a  cry  that  would  help  them; 
and,  failing  in  this  attempt,  many  of  the  leaders 
were  willing  to  break  up  the  Union,  and  turn  the 
Southern  States,  together  with  Texas,  into  a 
slave-holding  confederacy.  After  Benton,  the  great 
champion  of  the  old-style  Union  Democrats  was 
Van  Buren,  who  was  opposed  to  immediate  annex 
ation,  sharing  the  feeling  that  prevailed  through 
out  the  Northeast  generally;  although  in  certain 
circles  all  through  the  country  there  were  men  at 
work  in  its  favor,  largely  as  a  mere  matter  of  job 
bery  and  from  base  motives,  on  account  of  specu 
lations  in  Texan  land  and  scrip,  into  which  various 
capitalists  and  adventurers  had  gone  rather  exten 
sively  Jackson,  though  a  Southerner,  warmly 
favored  Van  Buren,  and  was  bitterly  opposed  to 
separatists ;  but  the  latter,  by  cunningly  working 
on  his  feelings,  without  showing  their  own  hands, 
persuaded  him  to  write  the  letter  mentioned,  and 
promptly  used  it  to  destroy  the  chances  of  Van 
Buren,  who  was  the  man  they  chiefly  feared;  and 
though  Jackson,  at  last  roused  to  what  was  going 


284  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

on,  immediately  announced  himself  as  in  favor  of 
Van  Buren's  candidacy,  it  was  too  late  to  undo  the 
mischief. 

Benton  showed  on  this,  as  on  many  other  occa 
sions,  much  keener  political  ideas  than  his  great 
political  chief.  He  was  approached  by  a  politi 
cian,  who  himself  was  either  one  of  those  con 
cerned  in  the  presidential  intrigues,  or  else  one  of 
their  dupes,  and  who  tried  to  win  him  over  to  take 
the  lead  on  their  side,  complimenting  him  upon  his 
former  services  to  the  cause  of  territorial  expan 
sion  toward  the  Southwest.  Ordinarily  the  great 
Missourian  was  susceptible  enough  to  such  flat 
tery;  but  on  this  occasion,  preoccupied  with  the 
idea  of  an  intrigue  for  the  presidency,  and  indig 
nant  that  there  should  be  an  effort  made  to  impli 
cate  him  in  it,  especially  as  it  was  mixed  up  with 
schemes  of  stock- jobbing  and  of  disloyalty  to  the 
Union,  he  took  fire  at  once,  and  answered  with  hot 
indignation,  in  words  afterward  highly  resented 
by  his  questioner,  "  that  it  was  on  the  part  of  some 
an  intrigue  for  the  presidency,  and  a  plot  to  dis 
solve  the  Union;  on  the  part  of  others,  a  Texas 
scrip  and  land  speculation;  and  that  he  was 
against  it."  The  answer  was  published  in  the 
papers,  and  brought  about  a  total  break  between 
Benton  and  the  annexation  party. 

He  was  now  thoroughly  on  the  alert,  and 
actively  opposed  at  all  points  the  schemes  of 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     285 

those  whom  he  regarded  as  concerned  in  or  in 
stigating  the  intrigue.  He  commented  harshly  on 
Tyler's  annual  message,  which  made  a  strong  plea 
for  annexation,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  war  both  with 
Great  Britain  and  Mexico ;  also  on  Calhoun's  letter 
to  Lord  Aberdeen,  which  was  certainly  a  remark 
able  diplomatic  document, — being  a  thesis  on  slav 
ery  and  the  benefits  resulting  from  it.  Tyler's 
object  was  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  secret  treaty, 
which  should  secure  the  desired  object.  Benton, 
in  the  course  of  some  severe  strictures  on  his  acts, 
said,  very  truly,  that  it  was  evidently  the  intention 
to  keep  the  whole  matter  as  secret  as  possible  until 
the  treaty  was  concluded,  "and  then  to  force  its 
adoption  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  area  of 
slave  territory,  or  to  make  its  rejection  a  cause  for 
the  secession  of  the  Southern  States ;  and  in  either 
event  and  in  all  cases  to  make  the  question  of 
annexation  a  controlling  one  in  the  nomination 
of  presidential  candidates,  and  also  in  the  election 
itself." 

When  the  treaty  proposed  by  the  administration 
was  rejected,  and  when  it  became  evident  that 
neither  Tyler  nor  Calhoun,  the  two  most  promi 
nent  champions  of  the  extreme  separatists,  had 
any  chance  for  the  Democratic  nomination,  the 
disunion  side  of  the  intrigue  was  brought  to  the 
front  in  many  of  the  Southern  States,  beginning, 
of  course,  with  South  Carolina.  A  movement  was 


286  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

made  for  a  convention  of  the  Southern  States,  to 
be  held  in  the  interest  of  the  scheme;  the  key 
note  being  struck  in  the  cry  of  "Texas  or  dis 
union!"  But  this  convention  was  given  up,  on 
account  of  the  strong  opposition  it  excited  in  the 
so-called  "Border  States," — an  opposition  largely 
stirred  up  and  led  by  Benton.  Once  more  the 
haughty  slave  leaders  of  the  Southeast  had  found 
that  in  the  Missouri  senator  they  had  an  opponent 
whose  fearlessness  quite  equaled  their  own,  and 
whose  stubborn  temper  and  strength  of  purpose 
made  him  at  least  a  match  for  themselves,  in  spite 
of  all  their  dash  and  fiery  impetuosity.  It  must 
have  sounded  strange,  indeed,  to  Northern  ears, 
accustomed  to  the  harsh  railings  and  insolent 
threats  of  the  South  Carolina  senators,  to  hear  one 
of  the  latter  complaining  that  Benton's  tone  in  the 
debate  was  arrogant,  overbearing,  and  dictatorial 
toward  those  who  were  opposed  to  him.  This 
same  senator,  McDuffie,  had  been  speaking  of  the 
proposed  Southern  meeting  at  Nashville;  and 
Benton  warned  him  that  such  a  meeting  would 
never  take  place,  and  that  he  had  mistaken  the 
temper  of  the  Tennesseans;  and  also  reminded 
him  that  General  Jackson  was  still  alive,  and  that 
the  South  Carolinians  in  particular  must  needs  be 
careful  if  they  hoped  to  agree  with  his  followers, 
whose  name  was  still  legion,  because  he  would  cer 
tainly  take  the  same  position  toward  a  disunion 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     287 

movement  in  the  interests  of  slavery  that  he  had 
already  taken  toward  a  nullification  movement  in 
the  interests  of  free  trade.  "  Preservation  of  the 
Federal  Union  is  as  strong  in  the  old  Roman's 
heart  now  as  ever;  and  while,  as  a  Christian,  he 
forgives  all  that  is  past  (if  it  were  past) ,  yet  no  old 
tricks  tinder  new  names !  Texas  disunion  will  be 
to  him  the  same  as  tariff  disunion ;  and  if  he  de 
tects  a  Texas  disunionist  nestling  into  his  bed,  I 
say  again :  Woe  unto  the  luckless  wight ! "  Boldly 
and  forcibly  he  went  on  to  paint  the  real  motives 
of  the  promoters  of  the  scheme,  and  the  real  char 
acter  of  the  scheme  itself;  stating  that,  though 
mixed  up  with  various  speculative  enterprises  and 
other  intrigues,  yet  disunion  was  at  the  bottom  of 
it  all,  and  that  already  the  cry  had  become, 
"  Texas  without  the  Union,  rather  than  the  Union 
without  Texas!"  "Under  the  pretext  of  getting 
Texas  into  the  Union  the  scheme  is  to  get  the 
South  out  of  it.  A  Southern  Confederacy  stretch 
ing  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Calif ornias  ...  is  the 
cherished  vision  of  disappointed  ambition."  He 
bitterly  condemned  secession,  as  simply  disunion 
begat  by  nullification,  and  went  on  to  speak  of  his 
own  attitude  in  apparently  opposing  the  admission 
of  Texas,  which  he  had  always  desired  to  see 
become  a  part  of  the  Union,  and  which  he  had 
always  insisted  rightfully  belonged  to  us,  and  to 
have  been  given  away  by  Monroe's  treaty  with 


288  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Spain.  "All  that  is  intended  and  foreseen.  The 
intrigue  for  the  presidency  was  the  first  act  in  the 
drama;  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  the  second. 
And  I,  who  hate  intrigue  and  love  the  Union,  can 
only  speak  of  the  intriguers  and  disunionists  with 
warmth  and  indignation.  The  oldest  advocate  for 
the  recovery  of  Texas,  I  must  be  allowed  to  speak 
in  just  terms  of  the  criminal  politicians  who  prosti 
tuted  the  question  of  its  recovery  to  their  own  base 
purposes,  and  delayed  its  success  by  degrading  and 
disgracing  it.  A  Western  man,  and  coming  from 
a  State  more  than  any  other  interested  in  the  re 
covery  of  this  country,  so  unaccountably  thrown 
away  by  the  treaty  of  1819,  I  must  be  allowed  to 
feel  indignant  at  seeing  Atlantic  politicians  seizing 
upon  it,  and  making  it  a  sectional  question  for  the 
purposes  of  ambition  and  disunion.  I  have  spoken 
warmly  of  these  plotters  and  intriguers;  but  I 
have  not  permitted  their  conduct  to  alter  my  own, 
or  to  relax  my  zeal  for  the  recovery  of  the  sacri 
ficed  country.  I  have  helped  to  reject  the  dis 
union  treaty ;  and  that  obstacle  being  removed,  I 
have  brought  in  the  bill  which  will  insure  the  re 
covery  of  Texas,  with  peace  and  honor,  and  with 
the  Union." 

It  is  important  to  remember,  in  speaking  of  his 
afterward  voting  to  admit  Texas,  that  this  was 
what  he  had  all  along  favored,  and  that  he  now 
opposed  it  only  on  account  of  special  circum- 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     289 

stances.  In  both  cases  he  was  right ;  for,  slavery 
or  no  slavery,  it  would  have  been  a  most  unfor 
tunate  thing  for  us,  and  still  worse  for  the  Texans, 
if  the  latter  had  been  allowed  to  develop  into  an 
independent  nation.  Benton  deserves  the  great 
est  credit  for  the  way  in  which  he  withstood  the 
ignorant  popular  feeling  of  his  own  section  in 
regard  to  Tyler's  proposed  treaty;  and  not  only 
did  he  show  himself  able  to  withstand  pressure 
from  behind  him,  but  also  prompt  in  resenting 
threats  made  by  outsiders.  When  McDuffie  told 
him  that  the  remembrance  of  his  attitude  on  the 
bill  would,  to  his  harm,  meet  him  on  some  future 
day,  like  the  ghost  that  appeared  to  Brutus  at 
Philippi,  he  answered: 

I  can  promise  the  ghost  and  his  backers  that  if  the 
fight  goes  against  me  at  this  new  Philippi,  with  which 
I  am  threatened,  and  the  enemies  of  the  American 
Union  triumph  over  me  as  the  enemies  of  Roman  lib 
erty  triumphed  over  Brutus  and  Cassius,  I  shall  not 
fall  upon  my  sword,  as  Brutus  did,  though  Cassius  be 
killed,  and  run  it  through  my  own  body;  but  I  shall 
save  it  and  save  myself  for  another  day  and  another 
use, — for  the  day  when  the  battle  of  the  disunion  of 
these  States  is  to  be  fought,  not  with  words  but  with 
iron,  and  for  the  hearts  of  the  traitors  who  appear  in 
arms  against  their  country. 

Such  a  stern,  defiant,  almost  prophetic  warning 
did  more  to  help  the  Union  cause  than  volumes  of 
elaborate  constitutional  argument,  and  it  would 
19 


290  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

have  been  well  for  the  Northern  States  had  they 
possessed  men  as  capable  of  uttering  it  as  was  the 
iron  Westerner.  Benton  always  showed  at  his 
best  when  the  honor  or  integrity  of  the  nation  was 
menaced,  whether  by  foes  from  without  or  by  foes 
from  within.  On  such  occasions  his  metal  always 
rang  true.  When  there  was  any  question  of  break 
ing  faith  with  the  Union,  or  of  treachery  toward 
it,  his  figure  always  loomed  up  as  one  of  the  chief 
in  the  ranks  of  its  defenders;  and  his  follies  and 
weaknesses  sink  out  of  sight  when  we  think  of  the 
tremendous  debt  which  the  country  owes  him  for 
his  sorely  tried  and  unswerving  loyalty. 

The  treaty  alluded  to  by  Benton  in  his  speech 
against  the  abortive  secession  movement  was  the 
one  made  with  Texas  while  Calhoun  was  secretary 
of  state,  and  submitted  to  the  Senate  by  Tyler, 
with  a  message  as  extraordinary  as  some  of  his 
secretary's  utterances.  The  treaty  was  preposter 
ously  unjust  and  iniquitous.  It  provided  for  the 
annexation  of  Texas,  and  also  of  a  very  large  por 
tion  of  Mexico,  to  which  Texas  had  no  possible 
title,  and  this  without  consulting  Mexico  in  any 
way  whatever ;  Calhoun  advancing  the  plea  that  it 
was  necessary  to  act  immediately  on  account  of  the 
danger  that  Texas  was  in  of  falling  under  the 
control  of  England,  and  therefore  having  slavery 
abolished  within  its  borders ;  while  Tyler  blandly 
announced  that  we  had  acquired  title  to  the  ceded 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     291 

territory — which  belonged  to  one  power  and  was 
ceded  to  us  by  another — through  his  signature  to 
the  treaty,  and  that,  pending  its  ratification  by 
the  Senate,  he  had  despatched  troops  to  the  scene 
of  action  to  protect  the  ceded  land  "from  inva 
sion," — the  territory  to  be  thus  protected  from 
Mexican  invasion  being  then  and  always  having 
been  part  and  parcel  of  Mexico. 

Benton  opposed  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  in 
a  very  strong  speech,  during  which  he  mercilessly 
assailed  both  Tyler  and  Calhoun.  The  conduct  of 
the  former  he  dismissed  with  the  contemptuous 
remark  that  he  had  committed  "a  caper  about 
equal  to  the  mad  freaks  with  which  the  unfor 
tunate  Emperor  Paul,  of  Russia,  was  accustomed 
to  astonish  Europe;"  and  roughly  warned  him  to 
be  careful  how  he  tried  to  imitate  Jackson's 
methods,  because  in  heroic  imitations  there  was 
no  middle  ground,  and  if  he  failed  to  fill  the  role  of 
hero  he  would  then  perforce  find  himself  playing 
that  of  harlequin.  Calhoun  received  more  atten 
tion,  for  he  was  far  more  worthy  of  a  foeman's 
steel  than  was  his  nominal  superior,  and  Benton 
exposed  at  length  the  wilful  exaggeration  and  the 
perversion  of  the  truth  of  which  the  Carolinian 
had  been  guilty  in  trying  to  raise  the  alarm  of 
English  interference  in  Texas,  for  the  purpose 
of  excusing  the  haste  with  which  the  treaty  was 
carried  through. 


292  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

He  showed  at  length  the  outrage  we  should  in 
flict  upon  Mexico  by  seizing  "two  thousand  miles 
of  her  territory,  without  a  word  of  explanation 
with  her,  and  by  virtue  of  a  treaty  with  Texas  to 
which  she  was  no  party;"  and  he  conclusively 
proved,  making  use  of  his  own  extensive  acquaint 
ance  with  history,  especially  American  history, 
that  the  old  Texas,  the  only  territory  that  the 
Texans  themselves  or  we  could  claim  with  any 
shadow  of  right,  made  but  a  fraction  of  the  terri 
tory  now  "ceded"  to  us.  He  laughed  at  the  idea 
of  calling  the  territory  Texas,  and  speaking  of  its 
forcible  cutting  off  as  re-annexation,  "Humboldt 
calls  it  New  Mexico,  Chihuahua,  Coahuila,  and 
Nuevo  Santander;  and  the  civilized  world  may 
qualify  this  r^-annexation  by  some  odious  and 
terrible  epithet  .  .  .  robbery;"  then  he  went  on 
to  draw  a  biting  contrast  between  our  treatment 
of  Mexico  and  our  treatment  of  England.  "Would 
we  take  two  thousand  miles  of  Canada  in  the  same 
way?  I  presume  not.  And  why  not?  Why  not 
treat  Great  Britain  and  Mexico  alike?  Why  not 
march  up  to  '  fifty-four  forty '  as  courageously  as 
we  march  upon  the  Rio  Grande?  Because  Great 
Britain  is  powerful  and  Mexico  weak, — a  reason 
which  may  fail  in  policy  as  much  as  in  morals." 
Also  he  ridiculed  the  flurry  of  fear  into  which  the 
Southern  slaveholders  affected  to  be  cast  by  the 
dread  of  England's  hostility  to  slavery,  when  they 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     293 

had  just  acquiesced  in  making  a  treaty  with  her 
by  which  we  bound  ourselves  to  help  to  put  down 
the  slave  trade.  He  then  stated  his  own  position, 
showing  why  he  wished  us  to  have  the  original 
Texan  lands,  if  we  could  get  them  honorably,  and 
without  robbing  Mexico  of  new  territory ;  and  at 
the  same  time  sneered  at  Calhoun  and  Tyler  be 
cause  they  had  formerly  favored  the  Monroe 
treaty,  by  which  we  abandoned  our  claims  to 
them: 

We  want  Texas,  that  is  to  say,  the  Texas  of  La 
Salle;  and  we  want  it  for  great  natural  reasons, 
obvious  as  day,  and  permanent  as  nature.  We  want 
it  because  it  is  geographically  appurtenant  to  our 
division  of  North  America,  essential  to  our  political, 
commercial,  and  social  system,  and  because  it  would 
be  detrimental  and  injurious  to  us  to  have  it  fall  into 
the  hands  or  sink  under  the  domination  of  any  foreign 
power.  For  these  reasons  I  was  against  sacrificing 
the  country  when  it  was  thrown  away, — and  thrown 
away  by  those  who  are  now  so  suddenly  possessed  of 
a  fury  to  get  it  back.  For  these  reasons,  I  am  for 
getting  it  back  whenever  it  can  be  done  with  peace 
and  honor,  or  even  at  the  price  of  just  war  against  any 
intrusive  European  power;  but  I  am  against  all  dis 
guise  and  artifice, — against  all  pretexts, — and  espe 
cially  against  weak  and  groundless  pretexts,  discredit 
able  to  ourselves  and  offensive  to  others,  too  thin  and 
shallow  not  to  be  seen  through  by  every  beholder,  and 
merely  invented  to  cover  unworthy  purposes. 

The  treaty  was  rejected  by  an  overwhelming 


294  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

vote,  although  Buchanan  led  a  few  of  his  time 
serving  comrades  from  the  North  to  the  support 
of  the  extreme  Southern  element.  Benton  then 
tried,  but  failed,  to  get  through  a  bill  providing 
for  a  joint  agreement  between  Mexico,  Texas,  and 
the  United  States  to  settle  definitely  all  boundary 
questions.  Meanwhile  the  presidential  election 
occurred,  with  the  result  already  mentioned.  The 
separatist  and  annexationist  Democrats,  the  ex 
treme  slavery  wing  of  the  party,  defeated  Van 
Buren  and  nominated  Polk,  who  was  their  man; 
the  Whigs  nominated  Clay,  who  was  heartily 
opposed  to  all  the  schemes  of  the  disunion  and 
extreme  slavery  men,  and  who,  if  elected,  while 
he  might  very  properly  have  consented  to  the 
admission  of  Texas  with  its  old  boundaries,  would 
never  have  brought  on  a  war  nor  have  attempted 
to  add  a  vast  extent  of  new  slave  territory  to 
the  Union.  Clay  would  have  been  elected,  and 
the  slavery  disunionists  defeated,  if  in  the  very 
nick  of  time  the  Abolitionists  had  not  stepped  in 
to  support  the  latter,  and  by  their  blindness  in 
supporting  Birney  given  the  triumph  to  their  own 
most  bitter  opponents.  Then  the  Abolitionists, 
having  played  their  only  card,  and  played  it  badly, 
had  to  sit  still  and  see  what  evil  their  acts  had  pro 
duced;  they  had  accomplished  just  as  much  as 
men  generally  do  accomplish  when  they  dance  to 
the  tune  that  their  worst  foes  play. 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     295 

Folk's  election  gave  an  enormous  impulse  to  the 
annexation  movement,  and  made  it  doubly  and 
trebly  difficult  for  any  one  to  withstand  it.  The 
extreme  disunion  and  slavery  men,  of  course, 
hated  Benton,  himself  a  South  westerner  from  a 
slaveholding  State,  with  peculiar  venom,  on  ac 
count  of  his  attitude,  very  justly  regarding  him 
as  the  main  obstacle  in  their  path;  and  the  din 
and  outcry  raised  against  all  who  opposed  the 
schemes  of  the  intriguers  was  directed  with  espe 
cial  fury  against  the  Missourian  He  was  accused 
of  being  allied  to  the  Whigs,  of  wishing  to  break 
up  the  Democracy,  and  of  many  other  things. 
Indeed,  Benton' s  own  people  were  very  largely 
against  him,  and  it  must  always  be  remembered 
that  whereas  Northeastern  statesmen  were  certain 
to  be  on  the  popular  side  in  taking  a  stand  against 
the  extreme  pro-slavery  men,  Benton 's  position 
was  often  just  the  reverse.  With  them  it  was 
politic  to  do  right ;  with  him  it  was  not ;  and  for 
this  reason  the  praise  awarded  the  latter  should 
be  beyond  measure  greater  than  that  awarded  to 
the  former. 

Still,  there  can  be  little  question  that  he  was 
somewhat,  even  although  only  slightly,  influenced 
by  the  storm  of  which  he  had  to  bear  the  brunt ; 
indeed,  he  would  have  been  more  than  human  if 
he  had  not  been ;  and  probably  this  outside  pres 
sure  was  one  among  the  causes  that  induced  him 


296  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

to  accept  a  compromise  in  the  matter,  which  took 
effect  just  before  Polk  was  inaugurated.  The 
House  of  Representatives  had  passed  a  resolution 
giving  the  consent  of  Congress  to  the  admission 
of  Texas  as  a  State,  and  allowing  it  the  privilege  of 
forming  four  additional  States  out  of  its  territory, 
whenever  it  should  see  fit.  The  line  of  the  Mis 
souri  Compromise,  36°  30',  was  run  through  this 
new  territory,  slavery  being  prohibited  in  the  lands 
lying  north  of  it,  and  permissible  or  not,  according 
to  the  will  of  the  State  seeking  admission,  in  those 
lying  south  of  it.  Benton  meanwhile  had  intro 
duced  a  bill  merely  providing  that  negotiations 
should  be  entered  into  with  Texas  for  its  admis 
sion,  the  proposed  treaty  or  articles  of  agreement 
to  be  submitted  to  the  Senate  or  to  Congress.  He 
thereby  kept  the  control  in  the  hands  of  the  legis 
lature,  which  the  joint  resolution  did  not;  and 
moreover,  as  he  said  in  his  speech,  he  wished  to 
provide  for  due  consideration  being  shown  Mexico 
in  the  arrangement  of  the  boundary,  and  for  the 
matter  being  settled  by  commissioners. 

Neither  resolution  nor  bill  could  get  through  by 
itself ;  and  accordingly  it  was  proposed  to  combine 
both  into  one  measure,  leaving  the  President  free 
to  choose  either  plan.  To  this  proposition  Benton 
finally  consented,  it  being  understood  that,  as  only 
three  days  of  Tyler's  term  remained,  the  execution 
of  the  act  would  be  left  to  the  incoming  President, 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     297 

and  that  the  latter  would  adopt  Benton's  plans. 
The  friends  of  the  admission  of  Texas  assured  the 
doubtful  voters  that  such  would  be  the  case.  Polk 
himself  gave  full  assurance  that  he  would  appoint 
a  commission,  as  provided  by  Benton's  bill,  if 
passed,  with  the  House  resolution  as  an  alterna 
tive;  and  McDuffie,  Calhoun's  friend,  and  the 
senator  from  South  Carolina,  announced  without 
reserve  that  Calhoun — for  Tyler  need  not  be  con 
sidered  in  the  matter,  after  it  had  been  committed 
to  the  great  nullifier — would  not  have  the  "  audac 
ity"  to  try  to  take  the  settlement  of  the  question 
away  from  the  President  who  was  to  be  inaugu 
rated  on  the  fourth  of  March.  On  the  strength  of 
these  assurances,  which,  if  made  good,  would,  of 
course,  have  rendered  the  "alternative"  a  merely 
nominal  one,  Benton  supported  the  measure,  which 
was  then  passed.  Contrary  to  all  expectation,  Cal 
houn  promptly  acted  upon  the  legislative  clause, 
and  Polk  made  no  effort  to  undo  what  the  former 
had  done.  This  caused  intense  chagrin  and  anger 
to  the  Bentonians ;  but  they  should  certainly  have 
taken  such  a  contingency  into  account,  and  though 
they  might  with  much  show  of  reason  say  that 
they  had  been  tricked  into  acting  as  they  had 
done,  yet  it  is  probable  that  the  immense  pressure 
from  behind  had  made  Benton  too  eager  to  follow 
any  way  he  could  find  that  would  take  him  out  of 
the  position  into  which  his  conscience  had  led  him. 


298  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

No  amount  of  pressure  would  have  made  him  de 
liberately  sanction  a  wrong ;  but  it  did  render  him 
a  little  less  wary  in  watching  to  see  that  the  right 
was  not  infringed  upon.  It  was  most  natural  that 
he  should  be  anxious  to  find  a  common  ground  for 
himself  and  his  constituents  to  stand  on ;  but  it  is 
to  be  regretted  that  this  anxiety  to  find  a  common 
ground  should  have  made  him  willing  to  trust 
blindly  to  vague  pledges  and  promises,  which  he 
ought  to  have  known  would  not  be  held  in  the 
least  binding  by  those  on  whose  behalf  they  were 
supposed  to  be  made. 

Acting  under  this  compromise  measure  Texas 
was  admitted,  and  the  foundation  for  our  war  with 
Mexico  was  laid.  Calhoun,  under  whom  this  was 
done,  nevertheless  sincerely  regretted  the  war 
itself,  and  freely  condemned  Folk's  administration 
for  bringing  it  on ;  his  own  position  being  that  he 
desired  to  obtain  without  a  war  what  it  was  im 
possible  we  should  get  except  at  the  cost  of  one. 
Benton,  who  had  all  along  consistently  opposed 
doing  a  wrong  to  Mexico,  attacked  the  whole  war 
party,  and  in  a  strong  and  bitter  speech  accused 
Calhoun  of  being  the  cause  of  the  contest ;  show 
ing  plainly  that,  whatever  the  ex-secretary  of  state 
might  say  in  regard  to  the  acts  immediately  pre 
cipitating  the  conflict,  he  himself  was  responsible 
as  being  in  truth  their  original  cause.  While 
stating  his  conviction,  however,  that  Calhoun  was 


Abolitionists  and  Slave  Barons     299 

the  real  author  of  the  war,  Benton  added  that  he 
did  not  believe  that  war  was  his  object,  although 
an  inevitable  incident  of  the  course  he  had  pur 
sued. 

Although  heartily  opposed  to  the  war  in  its 
origin,  Benton  very  properly  believed  in  prose 
cuting  it  with  the  utmost  vigor  when  once  we  were 
fairly  in;  and  it  was  mainly  owing  to  him  that 
the  proposed  policy  of  a  "masterly  inactivity" 
was  abandoned,  and  the  scheme  of  pushing 
straight  for  the  city  of  Mexico  adopted  in  its  stead. 
Indeed,  it  was  actually  proposed  to  make  him 
lieutenant-general,  and  therefore  the  commander- 
in -chief  of  our  forces  in  Mexico ;  but  this  was  de 
feated  in  the  Senate,  very  fortunately,  as  it  would 
have  been  a  great  outrage  upon  Scott,  Taylor,  and 
every  other  soldier  with  real  military  training.  It 
seems  extraordinary  that  Benton  himself  should 
not  have  seen  the  absurdity  and  wrong  of  such  a 
proposition. 

The  wonderful  hardihood  and  daring  shown  in 
the  various  expeditions  against  Mexico,  especially 
in  those  whereby  her  northwest  territory  was 
wrested  from  her,  naturally  called  forth  all  Ben- 
ton's  sympathy;  and  one  of  his  best  speeches  was 
that  made  to  welcome  Doniphan's  victorious  vol 
unteers  after  their  return  home  from  their  famous 
march  to  Chihuahua. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

SLAVERY    IN   THE    NEW   TERRITORIES. 

HARDLY  was  Polk  elected  before  it  became 
evident  to  Benton  and  the  other  Jack- 
sonians  that  the  days  of  the  old  Union 
or  Nationalist  Democracy  were  over,  and  that  the 
separatist  and  disunion  elements  within  the  party 
had  obtained  the  upper  hand.  The  first  sign  of 
the  new  order  of  things  was  the  displacement  of 
Blair,  editor  of  the  Globe,  the  Democratic  news 
paper  organ.  Blair  was  a  strong  Unionist,  and 
had  been  bitterly  hostile  to  Calhoun  and  the  Nulli- 
fiers.  He  had  also  opposed  Tyler,  the  representa 
tive  of  those  states'-rights  and  separatist  Demo 
crats,  who  by  their  hostility  to  Jackson  had  been 
temporarily  driven  into  the  Whig  camp,  and  who, 
finding  themselves  in  very  uncongenial  society, 
and  seeing,  moreover,  that  their  own  principles 
were  gradually  coming  to  the  front  in  the  old 
party,  had  begun  drifting  back  again  into  it. 
Polk's  chances  of  election  were  so  precarious  that 
he  was  most  anxious  to  conciliate  the  separatists ; 
besides  which  he  at  heart  sympathized  with  their 
views,  and  had  himself  been  brought  forward  in 
the  Democratic  convention  to  beat  the  National 
candidate,  Van  Buren.  Moreover,  Tyler  with- 

300 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     301 

drew  from  the  contest  in  his  favor;  in  part  pay 
ment  for  which  help,  soon  after  the  election,  Blair 
was  turned  out,  and  Ritchie,  of  Virginia,  a  man 
whose  views  suited  the  new  Democratic  leaders, 
was  put  in  his  place ;  to  the  indignation  not  only 
of  Benton,  but  also  of  Jackson  himself,  then  almost 
on  his  death-bed.  Of  course  the  break  between 
the  two  wings  was  as  yet  by  no  means  complete. 
Polk  needed  the  Union  Democrats,  and  the  latter 
were  still  in  good  party  standing.  Benton  him 
self,  as  has  been  seen,  was  offered  the  command  of 
all  the  forces  in  Mexico,  but  the  governmental 
policy  and  the  attitude  of  the  party  in  Congress 
after  1844  were  widely  different  from  what  they 
had  been  while  Jackson's  influence  was  supreme, 
or  while  the  power  he  left  behind  him  was  wielded 
by  a  knot  of  Union  men. 

From  this  time  the  slavery  question  dwarfed  all 
others,  and  was  the  one  with  which  Benton,  as  well 
as  other  statesmen,  had  mainly  to  deal.  He  had 
been  very  loath  to  acknowledge  that  it  was  ever  to 
become  of  such  overshadowing  importance ;  until 
late  in  his  life  he  had  not  realized  that,  interwoven 
with  the  disunionist  movement,  it  had  grown  so 
as  to  become  in  reality  the  one  and  only  question 
before  the  people ;  but,  this  once  thoroughly  under 
stood,  he  henceforth  devoted  his  tremendous  ener 
gies  to  the  struggle  with  it.  He  possessed  such 
phenomenal  power  of  application  and  of  study, 


302  Thomas  Hart  Beaton 

and  his  capacity  for  and  his  delight  in  work  were 
so  extraordinary,  that  he  was  able  at  the  same 
time  to  grapple  with  many  other  subjects  of  im 
portance,  and  to  present  them  in  a  way  that 
showed  he  had  thoroughly  mastered  them  both  in 
principle  and  detail, — as  witness  his  speech  in 
favor  of  giving  the  control  of  the  coast  survey  to 
the  navy;  but  henceforth  the  importance  of  his 
actions  lay  in  their  relation  to  the  slavery  exten 
sion  movements. 

He  had  now  entered  on  what  may  fairly  be 
called  the  heroic  part  of  his  career;  for  it  would 
be  difficult  to  choose  any  other  word  to  express 
our  admiration  for  the  unflinching  and  defiant 
courage  with  which,  supported  only  by  conscience 
and  by  his  loving  loyalty  to  the  Union,  he  bat 
tled  for  the  losing  side,  although  by  so  doing  he 
jeopardized  and  eventually  ruined  his  political 
prospects,  being  finally,  as  punishment  for  his 
boldness  in  opposing  the  dominant  faction  of  the 
Missouri  Democracy,  turned  out  of  the  Senate, 
wherein  he  had  passed  nearly  half  his  life.  In 
deed,  his  was  one  of  those  natures  that  show  better 
in  defeat  than  in  victory.  In  his  career  there  were 
many  actions  that  must  command  our  unqualified 
admiration;  such  were  his  hostility  to  the  Nulli- 
fiers,  wherein,  taking  into  account  his  geographical 
location  and  his  refusal  to  compromise,  he  did 
better  than  any  other  public  man,  not  even  except- 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     303 

ing  Jackson  and  Webster;  his  belief  in  honest 
money;  and  his  attitude  toward  all  questions 
involving  the  honor  or  the  maintenance  and  ex 
tension  of  the  Union.  But  in  all  these  matters  he 
was  backed  more  or  less  heartily  by  his  State,  and 
he  had  served  four  terms  in  the  federal  Senate  as 
the  leading  champion  and  representative,  not 
alone  of  Missouri,  but  also  of  the  entire  West. 
When,  however,  the  slavery  question  began  to 
enter  upon  its  final  stage,  Benton  soon  found  him 
self  opposed  to  a  large  and  growing  faction  of  the 
Missouri  Democracy,  which  increased  so  rapidly 
that  it  soon  became  dominant.  But  he  never  for 
an  instant  yielded  his  convictions,  even  when  he 
saw  the  ground  being  thus  cut  from  under  his  feet, 
fighting  for  the  right  as  sturdily  as  ever,  facing  his 
fate  fearlessly,  and  going  down  without  a  murmur. 
The  contrast  between  the  conduct  toward  the 
slavery  disunionists  of  this  Democrat  from  a  slave- 
holding  State,  with  a  hostile  majority  at  home 
against  him,  and  the  conduct  of  Webster,  a  Whig, 
enthusiastically  backed  by  his  own  free  State,  in 
the  same  issue,  is  a  painful  one  for  the  latter.  In 
deed,  on  any  moral  point,  Benton  need  have  no 
cause  to  fear  comparison  with  any  of  his  great 
rivals  in  the  political  arena.  During  his  career, 
the  United  States  Senate  was  perhaps  the  most 
influential,  and  certainly  the  ablest  legislative  body 
in  the  world;  and  after  Jackson's  presidency 


304  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

came  to  an  end  the  really  great  statesmen 
and  political  leaders  of  the  country  were  to  be 
found  in  it,  and  not  in  the  executive  chair.  The 
period  during  which  the  great  Missourian  was  so 
prominent  a  figure  in  our  politics,  and  which  lasted 
up  to  the  time  of  the  Civil  War,  might  very  appro 
priately  be  known  in  our  history  as  the  time  of  the 
supremacy  of  the  Senate.  Such  senators  as  Ben- 
ton,  Webster,  Clay,  and  Calhoun,  and  later  on 
Douglas,  Seward,  and  Sumner,  fairly  towered 
above  presidents  like  the  obscure  Southerners, 
Tyler  and  Polk,  or  the  truckling,  time-serving 
Northern  politicians,  Pierce  and  Buchanan.  Dur 
ing  the  long  interval  coming  between  the  two 
heroic  ages  of  American  history, — the  age  of  Wash 
ington  and  Franklin,  and  the  age  of  Lincoln  and 
Grant, — it  was  but  rarely  that  the  nation  gave  its 
greatest  gift  to  its  best  or  its  greatest  son. 

Benton  had  come  into  the  Senate  at  the  same 
time  that  Missouri  was  admitted  into  the  Union, 
with  thanks,  therefore,  to  the  same  measure,  the 
Missouri  Compromise  bill.  This  shut  out  slavery 
from  all  territory  north  of  the  line  of  36°  30',  and 
did  not  make  it  obligatory  even  where  it  was  per 
missible;  and  the  immediate  cause  of  Benton's 
downfall  was  his  courage  and  persistency  in  de 
fending  the  terms  of  this  compromise  from  the 
attacks  of  the  Southern  slavery  extensionists  and 
disunionists.  The  pro-slavery  feeling  was  running 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     305 

ever  higher  and  higher  throughout  the  South ;  and 
his  stand  on  this  question  aroused  the  most  furious 
anger  among  a  constantly  increasing  number  of 
his  constituents,  and  made  him  the  target  for 
bitter  and  savage  assaults  on  the  part  of  his  foes, 
the  spirit  of  hostility  against  him  being  carried  to 
such  length  as  finally  almost  to  involve  him  in  an 
open  brawl  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  with  one  of 
his  colleagues,  Foote,  who,  like  his  fellow  fire- 
eaters,  found  that  Benton  was  not  a  man  who 
could  be  bullied.  Indeed,  his  iron  will  and  mag 
nificent  physique  both  fitted  him  admirably  for 
such  a  contest  against  odds,  and  he  seems  to  have 
entered  into  it  with  a  positive  zest. 

The  political  Abolitionists  having  put  Polk  in 
power,  their  action  bore  fruit  after  its  kind,  and 
very  soon  the  question  had  to  be  faced,  as  to  what 
should  be  done  with  the  immense  tracts  of  terri 
tory  conquered  from  Mexico.  Benton  opposed,  as 
being  needless  and  harmful,  the  Wilmot  Proviso, 
which  forbade  the  introduction  of  slavery  into  any 
part  of  the  territory  so  acquired.  He  argued,  and 
produced  in  evidence  the  laws  and  Constitution  of 
Mexico,  that  the  soil  of  California  and  Mexico  was 
already  free,  and  that  as  slavery  would  certainly 
never  be,  and  indeed  could  never  be,  introduced 
into  either  territory,  the  agitation  of  the  question 
could  only  result  in  harm.  Calhoun  and  the  other 
extreme  slavery  leaders  welcomed  the  discussion 

20 


306  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

over  this  proviso,  which  led  Benton  to  remark  that 
the  Abolitionists  and  the  Nullifiers  were  necessary 
to  each  other, — the  two  blades  of  a  pair  of  shears, 
neither  of  which  could  cut  until  they  were  joined 
together. 

When  Calhoun  introduced  his  famous  resolutions 
declaring  that  Congress  had  no  power  to  interfere 
with  slavery  in  the  territories,  and  therefore  no 
power  to  prevent  the  admission  of  new  States  ex 
cept  on  the  condition  of  their  prohibiting  slavery 
within  their  limits,  Benton  promptly  and  strongly 
opposed  them  as  being  firebrands  needlessly  thrown 
to  inflame  the  passions  of  the  extremists,  and, 
moreover,  as  being  disunionist  in  tendency.  The 
following  is  his  own  account  of  what  then  took 
place :  "  Mr.  Calhoun  said  he  had  expected  the  sup 
port  of  Mr.  Benton  'as  the  representative  of  a 
slaveholding  State.'  Mr.  Benton  answered  that 
it  was  impossible  that  he  could  have  expected  such 
a  thing.  '  Then,'  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  '  I  shall  know 
where  to  find  that  gentleman/  To  which  Mr.  Ben- 
ton  said : '  I  shall  be  found  in  the  right  place, — on 
the  side  of  my  country  and  the  Union.'  This  an 
swer,  given  on  that  day  and  on  the  spot,  is  one  of 
the  incidents  of  his  life  which  Mr.  Benton  will  wish 
posterity  to  remember."  We  can  easily  pardon 
the  vanity  which  wishes  and  hopes  that  such  an 
answer,  given  under  such  conditions,  may  be  re 
membered.  Indeed,  Benton's  attitude  through- 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     307 

out  all  this  period  should  never  be  forgotten ;  and 
the  words  he  spoke  in  answer  to  Calhoun  marked 
him  as  the  leader  among  those  Southerners  who 
held  the  nation  above  any  section  thereof,  even 
their  own,  and  whose  courage  and  self-sacrifice  in 
the  cause  of  the  Union  entitled  them  to  more  praise 
than  by  right  belongs  to  any  equal  number  of 
Northerners;  those  Southerners  who  in  the  Civil 
War  furnished  Farragut,  Thomas,  Bristow,  and 
countless  others  as  loyal  as  they  were  brave.  The 
effect  of  Benton's  teachings  and  the  still  remaining 
influence  of  his  intense  personality  did  more  than 
aught  else  to  keep  Missouri  within  the  Union,  when 
her  sister  States  went  out  of  it. 

Benton  always  regarded  much  of  the  slavery 
agitation  in  the  South  as  being  political  in  char 
acter,  and  the  result  of  the  schemes  of  ambitious 
and  unscrupulous  leaders.  He  believed  that  Cal 
houn  had  introduced  a  set  of  resolutions  that  were 
totally  uncalled  for,  simply  for  the  purpose  of  car 
rying  a  question  to  the  slave  States  on  which  they 
could  be  formed  into  a  unit  against  the  free  States ; 
and  there  is  much  to  be  said  in  support  of  his  view. 
Certainly  the  resolutions  mark  the  beginning  of  the 
first  great  slavery  agitation  throughout  the  South 
ern  States,  which  was  engineered  and  guided  for 
their  own  ends  by  politicians  like  Jefferson  Davis. 
These  resolutions  were  absolutely  inconsistent  with 
many  of  Calhoun's  previous  declarations ;  and  that 


308  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

fact  was  also  sharply  commented  on  by  Benton  in 
his  speeches  and  writings.  He  also  criticized  with 
caustic  severity  Calhoun's  statements  that  he 
wished  to  save  the  Union  by  forcing  the  North  to 
take  a  position  so  agreeable  to  the  South  as  to 
make  the  latter  willing  not  to  separate .  He  showed 
that  Calhoun's  proposed  "constitutional"  and 
"peaceable"  methods  of  bringing  this  about  by 
prohibiting  commercial  intercourse  between  the' 
two  sections  would  themselves  be  flagrant  breaches 
of  the  Constitution  and  acts  of  disunion, — all  the 
more  so  as  it  was  proposed  to  discriminate  in  favor 
of  the  Northwest  as  against  the  Northeast.  Cal- 
houn  wished  to  bring  about  a  convention  of  the 
Southern  States,  in  order  to  secure  the  necessary 
unity  of  action ;  and  one  of  the  main  obstacles  to 
the  success  of  the  plan  was  Missouri's  refusal  to 
take  part  in  it.  Great  efforts  were  made  to  win 
her  over,  and  to  beat  down  Benton ;  the  extreme 
pro-slavery  men  honoring  him  with  a  hatred  more 
intense  than  that  they  harbored  toward  any  North 
erner.  Some  of  Calhoun's  recent  biographers  have 
credited  him  with  being  really  a  Union  man  at 
heart.  It  seems  absolutely  impossible  that  this 
could  have  been  the  case ;  and  the  supposition  is 
certainly  not  compatible  with  the  belief  that  he 
retained  his  right  senses.  Benton  characterizes 
his  system  of  slavery  agitation,  very  truthfully,  as 
being  one  ' '  to  force  issues  upon  the  North  under 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     309 

the  pretext  of  self-defense,  and  to  sectionalize  the 
South,  preparatory  to  disunion,  through  the  in 
strumentality  of  sectional  conventions,  composed 
wholly  of  delegates  from  the  slaveholding  States." 

When  the  question  of  the  admission  of  Oregon 
came  up,  Calhoun  attempted  to  apply  to  it  a 
dogma  wholly  at  variance  with  all  his  former  posi 
tions  on  the  subject.  This  was  the  theory  of  the 
self -extension  of  the  slavery  part  of  the  Constitu 
tion  to  the  territories;  that  is,  he  held  that  the 
exclusion  of  slavery  from  any  part  of  the  new  ter 
ritory  was  itself  a  subversion  of  the  Constitution. 
Such  a  dogma  was  so  monstrous  in  character,  so 
illogical,  so  inconsistent  with  all  his  former  theo 
ries,  and  so  absolutely  incompatible  with  the  pres 
ervation  of  the  Union,  that  it  renders  it  impossible 
to  believe  that  his  asseverations  of  devotion  to  the 
latter  were  uttered  honestly  or  in  good  faith.  Most 
modern  readers  will  agree  with  Benton  that  he 
deliberately  worked  to  bring  about  secession. 

Meanwhile  the  Missourian  had  gained  an  ally  of 
his  own  stamp  in  the  Senate.  This  was  Houston, 
from  the  new  State  of  Texas,  wrho  represented  in 
that  State,  like  Andrew  Jackson  in  Tennessee,  and 
Benton  himself  in  Missouri,  the  old  Nationalist 
Democracy,  which  held  the  preservation  of  the 
Union  dear  above  all  other  things.  Houston  was 
a  man  after  Benton's  own  heart,  and  was  thor 
oughly  Jacksonian  in  type.  He  was  rough,  honest, 


310  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

and  fearless,  a  devoted  friend  and  a  vengeful 
enemy,  and  he  promised  that  combination  of  stub 
born  courage  and  capacity  of  devotion  to  an  ideal 
that  renders  a  man  an  invaluable  ally  in  a  fight 
against  odds  for  principle. 

After  much  discussion  and  amendment,  the 
Oregon  bill,  containing  a  radical  anti-slavery 
clause,  passed  both  houses  and  became  a  law  in 
spite  of  the  violent  opposition  of  some  of  the 
Southerners,  headed  by  Calhoun,who  announced 
that  the  great  strife  between  the  North  and  the 
South  was  ended,  and  that  the  time  had  come  for 
the  South  to  show  that,  though  she  prized  the 
Union,  yet  there  were  matters  which  she  regarded 
as  of  greater  importance  than  its  preservation. 
His  ire  was  most  fiercely  excited  by  the  action  of 
Benton  and  Houston  in  supporting  the  bill,  and 
after  his  return  to  South  Carolina  he  denounced 
them  by  name  as  traitors  to  the  South, — "a 
denunciation,"  says  Benton,  "  which  they  took 
for  a  distinction ;  as  what  he  called  treason  to  the 
South  they  knew  to  be  allegiance  to  the  Union." 
When  it  was  proposed  to  extend  by  bill  the  Consti 
tution  of  the  United  States  into  the  territories, 
with  a  view  to  carrying  slavery  into  California, 
Utah,  and  New  Mexico,  Benton  was  again  opposed 
to  Calhoun.  As  a  matter  of  course,  too,  he  was 
the  stoutest  opponent  of  the  Southern  convention 
and  other  similar  disunion  movements  that  were 


Housi 


Thomas  Hart  Benton 

v-oted  friend  and  a  vengeful 

:  that  combination  of  stub- 

••;e  and  capacity  of  devotion  to  an  idea! 

s  a  man  an  invaluable  ally  in  a  fight 

•r  principle. 

discussion   and  amendment,   the 

.lining    a    radical    anti-slavery 

rouses  and  became  a  law  in 

«f  :  4  >n  of  some  of  the 

nn,  who  announced 

TJH<  £  ~n  the  North  and  the 

I:*-,  trrae  had  come  for 
•   •    .. •  she  prized  the 

rv  o.s  ,-•  •  he  r^j?"""-' 

..ttWfcr'. 

His  y  •  •  ^-v    iciion  of 

.rig  the  bill,  and 

•  >lina  he  denounced 

tie   as   traitors  to  the   South, — :'a 

says  Benton,  "which  they  took 

.  %  ;  as  what  he  called  treason  to  the 

w  to  be  allegiance  to  the  Union." 

VV  /  o  extend  by  bill  the  Consti- 

\*  1  v«  into  the  territories, 

wit  o  carrying  slavery  into  Calif oniia. 

Utah,  and  New  Mexico,  Benton  was  again  opposed 

to  Calhcmn.     As  a  matter  of  course,  too,  he  was 

the  stoutest  opponent  of  the  Southern  convention 

and  otlifct  ..similar  disunion  movements  that  w<;re 


Samuel  Houston. 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     311 

beginning  to  take  shape  throughout  the  South, 
instigated  by  the  two  rank  secession  States  of 
South  Carolina  and  Mississippi. 

Most  of  the  momentous  questions  springing  out 
of  the  war  with  Mexico  were  left  by  Polk  as  lega 
cies  to  his  successor,  when  the  former  went  out  of 
office,  after  an  administration  that  Benton  criti 
cized  with  extreme  sharpness,  although  he  tried  to 
shield  the  President  by  casting  the  blame  for  his 
actions  upon  his  cabinet  advisers ;  characterizing 
the  Mexican  War  as  one  of  "  speculation  and  in 
trigue,"  and  as  the  "great  blot"  of  his  four  years' 
term  of  office,  and  ridiculing  the  theory  that  we 
were  acting  in  self-defense,  or  that  our  soil  had 
been  invaded.  In  1 848  the  Democrats  nominated 
Cass,  a  Northern  pro-slavery  politician  of  mod 
erate  abilities,  and  the  Whigs  put  up  and  elected 
old  Zachary  Taylor,  the  rough  frontier  soldier  and 
Louisiana  slaveholder.  The  political  Abolitionists 
again  took  a  hand  in  the  contest,  but  this  time 
abandoned  their  abolition  theories,  substituting 
instead  thereof  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  the 
new  territories.  They  derived  much  additional 
importance  from  their  alliance  with  a  disap 
pointed  politician  in  the  pivotal  State  of  New 
York;  and  in  this  case,  in  sharp  contrast  to  the 
result  in  1844,  their  actions  worked  good,  and  not 
evil.  Van  Buren,  chagrined  and  angered  by  the 
way  he  was  treated  by  the  regular  Democrats, 


312  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

organized  a  revolt  against  them,  and  used  the 
banner  of  the  new  Free  Soil  party  as  one  tinder 
which  to  rally  his  adherents.  This  movement  was 
of  consequence  mainly  in  New  York,  ana-,  there  it 
soon  became  little  more  than  a  mere  fight  between 
the  two  sections  of  the  Democracy.  Benton  him 
self  visited  this  all-important  State  to  try  to  patch 
up  matters,  but  he  fortunately  failed.  The  fac 
tions  proved  very  nearly  equal  in  strength;  and 
as  a  consequence  the  Whigs  carried  the  State  and 
the  election,  and  once  more  held  the  reins  of  gov 
ernment. 

When  a  Louisiana  slaveholder  was  thus  installed 
in  the  White  House,  the  extreme  Southern  men 
may  have  thought  that  they  were  sure  of  him  as 
an  ally  in  their  fight  against  freedom.  But,  if  so, 
they  soon  found  they  had  reckoned  without  their 
host,  for  the  election  of  Taylor  affords  a  curious, 
though  not  solitary,  instance  in  which  the  Amer 
ican  people  builded  better  than  they  knew  in 
choosing  a  chief  executive.  Nothing  whatever 
was  known  of  his  political  theories,  and  the  Whigs 
nominated  him  simply  because  he  was  a  successful 
soldier,  likely  to  take  the  popular  fancy.  But 
once  elected  he  turned  out  to  have  the  very  quali 
ties  we  then  most  needed  in  a  president, — a  stout 
heart,  shrewd  common  sense,  and  thorough-going 
devotion  to  the  Union.  Although  with  widely 
different  training  from  Benton,  and  nominally  dif- 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     313 

fering  from  him  in  politics,  he  was  yet  of  the  same 
stamp  both  in  character  and  principles ;  both  were 
Union  Southerners,  not  in  the  least  afraid  of 
openly  asserting  their  opinions,  and,  if  necessary, 
of  making  them  good  by  their  acts.  In  his  first 
and  only  annual  message,  Taylor  expressed,  upon 
all  the  important  questions  of  the  day,  views  that 
were  exactly  similar  to  those  advanced  before  or 
after  by  Benton  himself  in  the  Senate ;  and  he  used 
similar  emphasis  and  plainness  of  speech.  He 
declared  the  Union  to  be  the  greatest  of  blessings, 
which  he  would  maintain  in  every  way  against 
whatever  dangers  might  threaten  it;  he  advised 
the  admission  of  California,  which  wished  to  come 
in  as  a  free  State ;  he  thought  that  the  Territories 
of  Utah  and  New  Mexico  should  be  left  as  they 
were ;  and  he  warned  the  Texans,  who  were  blus 
tering  about  certain  alleged  rights  to  New  Mexican 
soil,  and  threatening  to  take  them  by  force  of 
arms,  that  this  could  not  be  permitted,  and  that 
the  matter  would  have  to  be  settled  by  the  judicial 
authority  of  the  United  States.  Benton  heartily 
indorsed  the  message.  Naturally,  it  was  bitterly 
assailed  by  the  disunionists  under  Calhoun;  and 
even  Clay,  who  entirely  lacked  Taylor's  backbone, 
was  dissatisfied  with  it  as  being  too  extreme  in 
tone,  and  conflicting  with  his  proposed  compro 
mise  measures.  These  same  compromise  measures 
brought  the  Kentucky  leader  into  conflict  with 


314  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Benton  also,  especially  on  the  point  of  their  inter 
fering  with  the  immediate  admission  of  California 
into  the  Union. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  Clay's  proposed 
compromise,  which  was  not  satisfactory  to  the  ex 
treme  Southerners,  and  still  less  so  to  the  Union 
ists  and  anti-slavery  men.  It  consisted  of  five 
different  parts,  relating  to  the  recovery  of  fugitive 
slaves,  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  the  admission  of  California 
as  a  State,  and  the  territorial  condition  of  Utah 
and  New  Mexico.  Benton  opposed  it  as  mixing 
up  incongruous  measures ;  as  being  unjust  to  Cali 
fornia,  inasmuch  as  it  confounded  the  question  of 
her  admission  with  the  general  slavery  agitation  in 
the  United  States ;  and  above  all  as  being  a  con 
cession  or  capitulation  to  the  spirit  of  disunion 
and  secession,  and  therefore  a  repetition  of  the 
error  of  1833.  Benton  always  desired  to  meet 
and  check  any  disunion  movement  at  the  very 
outset,  and,  if  he  had  had  his  way,  would  have 
carried  matters  with  a  high  hand  whenever  it  came 
to  dealing  with  threats  of  such  a  proceeding ;  and 
therein  he  was  perfectly  right.  In  regard  to  the 
proposed  compromise  he  believed  in  dealing  with 
each  question  as  it  arose,  beginning  with  the  ad 
mission  of  California,  and  refusing  to  have  any 
compromise  at  all  with  those  who  threatened 
secession. 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     315 

The  slavery  extensionists  endeavored  to  have 
the  Missouri  compromise  line  stretched  on  to  the 
Pacific.  Benton,  avowing  his  belief  that  slavery 
was  an  evil,  opposed  this,  and  gave  his  reasons 
why  he  did  not  wish  to  see  the  line  which  had 
been  used  to  divide  free  and  slave  soil  in  the 
French  or  Louisiana  purchase  extended  into  the 
lands  won  from  Mexico.  Slavery  had  always  ex 
isted  in  Louisiana,  while  it  had  been  long  abol 
ished  in  Mexico.  The  Missouri  compromise  line, 
extending  to  New  Mexico  and  California,  though 
astronomically  the  same  as  that  in  Louisiana, 
would  be  politically  directly  the  opposite.  One 
went  through  a  territory  all  slave,  and  made  one 
half  free ;  the  other  would  go  through  territory  all 
free,  and  make  one  half  slave.  In  fact,  Benton, 
as  he  grew  older,  unlike  most  of  his  compatriots, 
gained  a  clearer  insight  into  the  effects  of  slavery. 
This  was  shown  in  his  comments  upon  Calhoun's 
statement,  made  in  the  latter's  last  speech,  in 
reference  to  the  unequal  development  of  the  North 
and  South ;  which,  Benton  said,  was  partly  owing 
to  the  existence  of  "slavery  itself,  which  he  (Cal- 
houn)  was  so  anxious  to  extend."  It  was  in  this 
same  speech  that  Calhoun  hinted  at  his  plan  for  a 
dual  executive, — one  president  from  the  free  and 
one  from  the  slave  States, — a  childish  proposi 
tion,  that  Benton  properly  treated  as  a  simple 
absurdity. 


Thomas  Hart  Ben  ton 


In  his  speech  against  the  compromise,  Benton 
discussed  it,  section  by  section,  with  great  force, 
and  with  his  usual  blunt  truthfulness.  His  main 
count  was  the  injustice  done  to  California  by  de 
laying  her  admittance,  and  making  it  dependent 
upon  other  issues  ;  but  he  made  almost  as  strong 
a  point  against  the  effort  to  settle  the  claims  of 
Texas  to  New  Mexican  territory.  The  Texan 
threats  to  use  force  he  treated  with  cavalier  indif 
ference,  remarking  that  as  long  as  New  Mexico 
was  a  territory,  and  therefore  belonged  to  the 
United  States,  any  controversy  with  her  was  a 
controversy  with  the  federal  government,  which 
would  know  how  to  play  her  part  by  "defending 
her  territory  from  invasion,  and  her  people  from 
violence,"  —  a  hint  that  had  a  salutary  effect  upon 
the  Texans;  in  fact  the  disunionists,  generally, 
were  not  apt  to  do  much  more  than  threaten  while 
a  Whig  like  Taylor  was  backed  up  by  a  Democrat 
like  Benton.  He  also  pointed  out  that  it  was  not 
necessary,  however  desirable,  to  make  a  compact 
with  Texas  about  the  boundaries,  as  they  could 
always  be  settled,  whether  she  wished  it  or  not,  by 
a  suit  before  the  Supreme  Court;  and  again  inti 
mated  that  a  little  show  of  firmness  would  remove 
all  danger  of  a  collision.  "As  to  anything  that 
Texas  or  New  Mexico  may  do  in  taking  or  relin 
quishing  possession,  that  is  all  moonshine.  New 
Mexico  is  the  property  of  the  United  States,  and 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     317 

she  cannot  dispose  of  herself  or  any  part  of  her 
self,  nor  can  Texas  take  her  or  any  part  of  her." 
He  showed  a  thorough  acquaintance  with  New 
Mexican  geography  and  history,  and  alluded  to 
the  bills  he  had  already  brought  in,  in  1844  and 
1850,  to  establish  a  divisional  line  between  the 
territory  and  Texas,  on  the  longitude  first  of  one 
hundred  and  then  of  one  hundred  and  two  degrees. 
He  recalled  the  fact  that  before  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  and  in  a  bill  proposing  to  settle  all  ques 
tions  with  her,  he  had  inserted  a  provision  forever 
prohibiting  slavery  in  all  parts  of  the  annexed 
territory  lying  west  of  the  hundredth  degree  of 
longitude.  He  also  took  the  opportunity  of  for 
mally  stating  his  opposition  to  any  form  of  slavery 
extension,  remarking  that  it  was  no  new  idea  with 
him,  but  dated  from  the  time  when  in  1804,  while 
a  law  student  in  Tennessee,  he  had  studied  Black- 
stone  as  edited  by  the  learned  Virginian,  Judge 
Tucker,  who,  in  an  appendix,  treated  of,  and 
totally  condemned,  black  slavery  in  the  United 
States.  The  very  difficulty,  or,  as  he  deemed  it, 
the  impossibility,  of  getting  rid  of  the  evil,  made 
Benton  all  the  more  determined  in  opposing  its 
extension.  "The  incurability  of  the  evil  is  the 
greatest  objection  to  the  extension  of  slavery.  If 
it  is  wrong  for  the  legislator  to  inflict  an  evil 
which  can  be  cured,  how  much  more  to  inflict  one 
that  is  incurable,  and  against  the  will  of  the 


Thomas  Hart  Benton 


people  who  are  to  endure  it  forever  !  I  quarrel  with 
no  one  for  deeming  slavery  a  blessing  ;  I  deem  it 
an  evil,  and  would  neither  adopt  it  nor  impose  it 
on  others."  The  solution  of  the  problem  of  dis 
posing  of  existent  slavery,  he  confessed,  seemed 
beyond  human  wisdom;  but  "there  is  a  wisdom 
above  human,  and  to  that  we  must  look.  In  the 
mean  time,  do  not  extend  the  evil."  In  justifica 
tion  of  his  position  he  quoted  previous  actions  of 
Congress,  done  under  the  lead  of  Southern  men,  in 
refusing  again  and  again,  down  to  1807,  to  allow 
slavery  to  be  introduced  into  Indiana,  when  that 
community  petitioned  for  it.  He  also  repudiated 
strongly  the  whole  spirit  in  which  Clay  had  gotten 
up  his  compromise  bill,  stating  that  he  did  not 
believe  in  geographical  parties  ;  that  he  knew  no 
North  and  no  South,  and  utterly  rejected  any 
slavery  compromises  except  those  to  be  found  in 
the  Constitution.  Altogether  it  was  a  great 
speech,  and  his  opposition  was  one  of  the  main 
causes  of  the  defeat  of  Clay's  measure. 

Benton  's  position  on  the  Wilmot  Proviso  is 
worth  giving  in  his  own  words:  "That  measure 
was  rejected  again  as  heretofore,  and  by  the  votes 
of  those  who  were  opposed  to  extending  slavery 
into  the  territories,  because  it  was  unnecessary  and 
inoperative,  —  irritating  to  the  slave  States,  with 
out  benefit  to  the  free  States,  a  mere  work  of 
supererogation,  of  which  the  fruit  was  discontent. 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     319 

It  was  rejected,  not  on  the  principle  of  non-inter 
vention;  not  on  the  principle  of  leaving  to  the 
territories  to  do  as  they  pleased  on  the  question, 
but  because  there  had  been  intervention ;  because 
Mexican  law  and  constitution  had  intervened, 
had  abolished  slavery  by  law  in  those  dominions ; 
which  law  would  remain  in  force  until  repealed  by 
Congress.  All  that  the  opponents  to  the  exten 
sion  of  slavery  had  to  do,  then,  was  to  do  nothing. 
And  they  did  nothing." 

Before  California  was  admitted  into  the  Union 
old  Zachary  Taylor  had  died,  leaving  behind  him 
a  name  that  will  always  be  remembered  among  our 
people.  He  was  neither  a  great  statesman  nor  yet 
a  great  commander ;  but  he  was  an  able  and  gal 
lant  soldier,  a  loyal  and  upright  public  servant, 
and  a  most  kindly,  honest,  and  truthful  man. 
His  death  was  a  greater  loss  to  the  country  than 
perhaps  the  people  ever  knew. 

The  bill  for  the  admission  of  California  as  a 
free  State,  heartily  sustained  by  Benton,  was  made 
a  test  question  by  the  Southern  disunionists ;  but 
on  this  occasion  they  were  thoroughly  beaten. 
The  great  struggle  was  made  over  a  proposition  to 
limit  the  southern  boundary  of  the  State  to  the 
line  of  36°  30',  and  to  extend  the  Missouri  line 
through  to  the  Pacific,  so  as  to  authorize  the  ex 
istence  of  slavery  in  all  the  territory  south  of  that 
latitude.  This  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  thirty- 


320  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

two  to  twenty-four.  Not  only  Benton,  but  also 
Spruance  and  Wales  of  Delaware,  and  Underwood 
of  Kentucky,  joined  with  the  representatives  from 
the  free  States  in  opposing  it.  Had  it  not  been 
for  the  action  of  these  four  slave  state  senators  in 
leaving  their  associates,  the  vote  would  have  been 
tie;  and  their  courage  and  patriotism  should  be 
remembered.  The  bill  was  then  passed  by  a  vote 
of  thirty-four  to  eighteen,  two  other  Southern  sen 
ators,  Houston  of  Texas  and  Bell  of  Tennessee, 
voting  for  it,  in  addition  to  the  four  already  men 
tioned.  After  its  passage,  ten  of  the  senators  who 
had  voted  against  it,  including,  of  course,  Jefferson 
Davis,  and  also  Benton's  own  colleague  from  Mis 
souri,  Atchison,  joined  in  a  protest  against  what 
had  been  done,  ending  with  a  thinly  veiled  threat 
of  disunion, — "dissolution  of  the  confederacy," 
as  they  styled  it.  Benton  stoutly  and  successfully 
opposed  allowing  this  protest  to  be  received  or 
entered  upon  the  journal,  condemning  it,  with  a 
frankness  that  very  few  of  his  fellow  senators 
would  have  dared  to  copy,  as  being  sectional  and 
disunion  in  form,  and  therefore  unfit  even  for 
preservation  on  the  records. 

When  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act  of  1850  was 
passed,  through  the  help  of  some  Northern  votes, 
Benton  refused  to  support  it;  and  this  was  the 
last  act  of  importance  that  he  performed  as  United 
States  senator.  He  had  risen  and  grown  steadily 


Slavery  in  the  New  Territories     321 

all  through  his  long  term  of  service ;  and  during 
its  last  period  he  did  greater  service  to  the  nation 
than  any  of  his  fellow  senators.  Compare  his 
stand  against  the  slavery  extremists  and  dis- 
unionists,  such  as  Calhoun,  with  the  position  of 
Webster  at  the  time  of  his  famous  seventh  of 
March  speech,  or  with  that  of  Clay  when  he 
brought  in  his  compromise  bill!  In  fact,  as  the 
times  grew  more  troublesome,  he  grew  steadily 
better  able  to  do  good  work  in  them. 

It  is  this  fact  of  growth  that  especially  marks 
his  career.  No  other  American  statesman,  except 
John  Quincy  Adams, — certainly  neither  of  his 
great  contemporaries,  Webster  and  Clay, — kept 
doing  continually  better  work  throughout  his  term 
of  public  service,  or  showed  himself  able  to  rise  to 
a  higher  level  at  the  very  end  than  at  the  begin 
ning.  Yet  such  was  the  case  with  Benton.  He 
always  rose  to  meet  a  really  great  emergency ;  and 
his  services  to  the  nation  grew  steadily  in  impor 
tance  to  the  very  close  of  his  life.  Whereas  Web 
ster  and  Clay  passed  their  zenith  and  fell,  he  kept 
rising  all  the  time. 


21 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE   LOSING   FIGHT. 

BENTON  had  now  finished  his  fifth  and  last 
term  in  the  United  States  Senate.  He  had 
been  chosen  senator  from  Missouri  before 
she  was  admitted  into  the  Union,  and  had  re 
mained  such  for  thirty  years.  During  all  that 
time  the  State  had  been  steadily  Democratic,  the 
large  Whig  minority  never  being  able  to  get  con 
trol  ;  but  on  the  question  of  the  extension  of  slav 
ery  the  dominant  party  itself  began  at  this  time  to 
break  into  two  factions.  Hitherto  Benton  had 
been  the  undisputed  leader  of  the  Democracy,  but 
now  the  pro-slavery  and  disunionist  Democrats 
organized  a  very  powerful  opposition  to  him ;  while 
he  still  received  the  enthusiastic  support  of  an 
almost  equally  numerous  body  of  followers.  Al 
though  the  extension  of  slavery  and  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  Union  were  the  two  chief  and  vital 
points  on  which  the  factions  differed,  yet  the 
names  by  which  they  designated  each  other  were 
adopted  in  consequence  of  their  differing  also  on  a 
third  and  only  less  important  one.  Benton  was 
such  a  firm  believer  in  hard  money,  and  a  cur 
rency  of  gold  and  silver,  as  to  have  received  the 
nickname  of  "  Old  Bullion,"  and  his  followers  were 

322 


The  Losing  Fight  323 

called  "hards;"  his  opponents  were  soft  money 
men,  in  addition  to  being  secessionists  and  pro- 
slavery  fanatics,  and  took  the  name  of  "softs." 
The  principles  of  the  Bentonians  were  right,  and 
those  of  their  opponents  wrong;  but  for  all  that 
the  latter  gradually  gained  upon  the  former. 
Finally,  in  the  midst  of  Benton's  fight  against 
the  extension  of  slavery  into  the  territories,  the 
"softs"  carried  the  Missouri  legislature,  and 
passed  a  series  of  resolutions  based  upon  those 
of  Calhoun.  These  were  most  truculent  and  dis 
loyal  in  tone,  demanding  that  slavery  be  per 
mitted  to  exist  in  all  the  new  States  to  be  ad 
mitted,  and  instructing  their  senators  to  vote 
accordingly.  These  resolutions  were  presented 
in  the  Senate  by  Benton's  colleague  from  Missouri, 
Atchison,  who  was  rather  hostile  to  him  and  to 
every  other  friend  of  the  Union,  and  later  on 
achieved  disreputable  notoriety  as  a  leader  of  the 
"border  ruffians"  in  the  affrays  on  the  soil  of 
Kansas.  Benton  at  once  picked  up  the  glove  that 
had  been  flung  down.  He  utterly  refused  to  obey 
the  resolutions,  denounced  them  savagely  as  being 
treasonable  and  offensive  in  the  highest  degree, 
asserted  that  they  did  not  express  the  true  opinions 
of  the  voters  of  the  State,  and  appealed  from  the 
Missouri  legislature  to  the  Missouri  people. 

The  issue  between  the  two  sides  was  now  sharply 
brought  out,  and  as  this  took  place  toward  the 


324  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

end  of  Benton's  fifth  term,  the  struggle  to  com 
mand  the  legislature  which  should  reelect  him  or 
give  him  a  successor  was  most  exciting.  Benton 
himself  took  an  active  part  in  the  preliminary  can 
vass  .  Neither  faction  was  able  to  get  a  ma j  ority  of 
the  members,  and  the  deadlock  was  finally  broken 
by  the  "  softs  "  coming  to  the  support  of  the  Whigs, 
and  helping  them  to  elect  Benton's  rival.  Thus, 
after  serving  his  State  faithfully  and  ably  for 
thirty  years,  he  was  finally  turned  out  of  the  posi 
tion  which  he  so  worthily  filled,  because  he  had 
committed  the  crime  of  standing  loyally  by  the 
Union. 

But  the  stout  old  Nationalist  was  not  in  the 
least  cast  down  or  even  shaken  by  his  defeat.  He 
kept  up  the  fight  as  bitterly  as  ever,  though  now 
an  old  man,  and  in  1852  went  to  Congress  as  a 
representative  Union  Democrat.  For  thirty  years 
he  had  been  the  autocrat  of  Missouri  politics,  and 
had  at  one  time  wielded  throughout  his  own  State 
a  power  as  great  as  Calhoun  possessed  in  South 
Carolina ;  greater  than  Webster  held  in  Massachu 
setts,  or  Clay  in  Kentucky.  But  the  tide  which  had 
so  long  flowed  in  his  favor  now  turned,  and  for 
the  few  remaining  years  of  his  life  set  as  steadily 
against  him;  yet  at  no  time  of  his  long  public 
career  did  he  stand  forth  as  honorably  and  promi 
nently  as  during  his  last  days,  when  he  was  show 
ing  so  stern  a  front  to  his  victorious  foes.  His  love 


The  Losing  Fight  325 

for  work  was  so  great  that,  when  out  of  the  Senate, 
he  did  not  find  even  his  incessant  political  occupa 
tions  enough  for  him.  During  his  contest  for  the 
senatorship  his  hands  had  been  full,  for  he  had 
spoken  again  and  again  throughout  the  entire 
State,  his  carefully  prepared  speeches  showing 
remarkable  power,  and  filled  with  scathing  denun 
ciation  and  invective,  and  biting  and  caustic  sar 
casm.  But  so  soon  as  his  defeat  was  assured  he 
turned  his  attention  immediately  to  literature, 
setting  to  work  on  his  great  "  Thirty  Years'  View," 
of  which  the  first  volume  was  printed  during  his 
congressional  term,  and  was  quoted  on  the  floor 
of  the  House,  both  by  his  friends  and  foes,  during 
the  debates  in  which  he  was  taking  part. 

In  1852,  when  he  was  elected  to  Congress  as  a 
member  of  the  House,  he  had  supported  Pierce  for 
the  presidency  against  Scott,  a  good  general,  but 
otherwise  a  wholly  absurd  and  flatulent  personage, 
who  was  the  Whig  nominee.  But  it  soon  became 
evident  that  Pierce  was  completely  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  secession  wing  of  the  party,  and  Benton 
thereafterward  treated  him  with  contemptuous 
hostility,  despising  him,  and  seeing  him  exactly  as 
he  was, — a  small  politician,  of  low  capacity  and 
mean  surroundings,  proud  to  act  as  the  servile 
tool  of  men  worse  than  himself  but  also  stronger 
and  abler.  He  was  ever  ready  to  do  any  work 
the  slavery  leaders  set  him,  and  to  act  as  their 


326  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

attorney  in  arguing  in  its  favor, — to  quote  Ben- 
ton's  phrase,  with  "  undaunted  mendacity,  moral 
callosity  [and]  mental  obliquity. ' '  His  last  message 
to  Congress  in  the  slavery  interest  Benton  spoke 
of  as  characteristic,  and  exemplifying  "all  the 
modes  of  conveying  untruths  which  long  ages  have 
invented, — direct  assertion,  fallacious  inference, 
equivocal  phrase,  and  false  innuendo."  As  he 
entertained  such  views  of  the  head  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party,  and  as  this  same  head  was  in  hearty 
accord  with,  and  a  good  representative  of  the  mass 
of  the  rank  and  file  politicians  of  the  organization, 
it  is  small  wonder  that  Benton  found  himself,  on 
every  important  question  that  came  up  while  he 
was  in  Congress,  opposed  to  the  mass  of  his  fellow 
Democrats. 

Although  the  great  questions  to  which  he  de 
voted  himself,  while  a  representative  in  Congress, 
were  those  relating  to  the  extension  of  slavery,  yet 
he  also  found  time  to  give  to  certain  other  sub 
jects,  working  as  usual  with  indomitable  energy, 
and  retaining  his  marvelous  memory  to  the  last. 
The  idea  of  desponding  or  giving  up,  for  any  cause 
whatever,  simply  never  entered  his  head.  When 
his  house,  containing  all  the  manuscript  and 
papers  of  the  nearly  completed  second  volume  of 
his  "Thirty  Years'  View,"  was  burned  up,  he  did 
not  delay  a  minute  in  recommencing  his  work,  and 
the  very  next  day  spoke  in  Congress  as  usual. 


The  Losing  Fight  327 

His  speeches  were  showing  a  steady  improve 
ment  ;  they  were  not  masterpieces,  even  at  the  last, 
but  in  every  way,  especially  in  style,  they  were 
infinitely  superior  to  those  that  he  had  made  on  his 
first  entrance  into  public  life.  Of  course,  a  man 
with  his  intense  pride  in  his  country,  and  charac 
terized  by  such  a  desire  to  see  her  become  greater 
and  more  united  in  every  way,  would  naturally 
support  the  proposal  to  build  a  Pacific  Railroad, 
and  accordingly  he  argued  for  it  at  great  length 
and  with  force  and  justness,  at  the  same  time 
opposing  the  propositions  to  build  northern  and 
southern  trans-continental  roads  as  substitutes  for 
the  proposed  central  route.  He  showed  the  char 
acter  of  the  land  through  which  the  road  would 
run,  and  the  easiness  of  the  passes  across  the 
Rockies,  and  prophesied  a  rapid  increase  of  States 
as  one  of  the  results  attendant  upon  its  building. 
At  the  end  of  his  speech  he  made  an  elaborate 
comparison  of  the  courses  of  trade  and  commerce 
at  different  periods  of  the  world's  history,  and 
showed  that,  as  we  had  reached  the  Pacific  coast, 
we  had  finally  taken  a  position  where  our  trade 
with  the  Oriental  kingdoms,  backed  up  by  our 
own  enormous  internal  development,  rendered  us 
more  than  ever  independent  of  Europe. 

In  another  speech  he  discussed  very  intelli 
gently,  and  with  his  usual  complete  command  of 
the  facts  of  the  case,  some  of  the  contemporary 


328  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

Indian  uprisings  in  the  far  West.  He  attacked  our 
whole  Indian  policy,  showing  that  the  corruption 
of  the  Indian  agents,  coupled  with  astute  aggres 
sions,  were  the  usual  causes  of  our  wars.  Further, 
he  criticized  our  regular  troops  as  being  unfit  to 
cope  with  the  savages,  and  advocated  the  forma 
tion  of  companies  of  frontier  rangers,  who  should 
also  be  settlers,  and  should  receive  from  the  gov 
ernment  a  bounty  in  land  as  part  reward  for  their 
service.  Many  of  his  remarks  on  our  Indian  policy 
apply  quite  as  well  now  as  they  did  then,  and  our 
regular  soldiers  are  certainly  not  the  proper  oppo 
nents  for  the  Indians ;  but  Benton's  military  views 
were,  as  a  rule,  the  reverse  of  sensible,  and  we 
cannot  accept  his  denunciations  of  the  army,  and 
especially  of  West  Point,  as  being  worth  serious 
consideration.  His  belief  in  the  marvelous  efficacy 
of  a  raw  militia,  especially  as  regards  war  with 
European  powers,  was  childish,  and  much  of  his 
feeling  against  the  regular  army  officer  was  dic 
tated  by  jealousy.  He  was,  by  all  the  peculiari 
ties  of  his  habits  and  education,  utterly  unfitted 
for  military  command;  and  it  would  have  been 
an  evil  day  for  his  good  fame  if  Polk  had  suc 
ceeded  in  having  him  made  lieutenant-general  of 
our  forces  in  Mexico. 

His  remarks  upon  our  Indian  policy  were  not 
the  only  ones  he  made  that  would  bear  study  even 
yet.  Certain  of  his  speeches  upon  the  different 


The  Losing  Fight  329 

land  bounty  and  pension  bills,  passed  nominally  in 
the  interests  of  veterans,  but  really  through  dema 
gogy  and  the  machination  of  speculators,  could  be 
read  with  profit  by  not  a  few  congressmen  at  the 
present  time.  One  of  his  utterances  was:  "  I  am 
a  friend  to  old  soldiers  .  .  .  but  not  to  old  specu 
lators;"  and  while  favoring  proper  pension  bills 
he  showed  the  foolishness  and  criminality  of  cer 
tain  others  very  clearly,  together  with  the  fact 
that,  when  passed  long  after  the  services  have  been 
rendered,  they  always  fail  to  relieve  the  real  suf 
ferers,  and  work  in  the  interests  of  unworthy  out 
siders. 

But  his  great  speech,  and  one  of  the  best  and 
greatest  that  he  ever  made,  was  the  one  in  opposi 
tion  to  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  which  was  being 
pushed  through  Congress  by  the  fire-eaters  and 
their  Northern  pro-slavery  followers.  His  own 
position  upon  the  measure  was  best  expressed  by 
the  words  he  used  in  commenting  on  the  remarks 
of  a  Georgian  member:  "He  votes  as  a  Southern 
man,  and  votes  sectionally ;  I  also  am  a  Southern 
man,  but  vote  nationally  on  national  questions." 

The  Missouri  Compromise  of  1820  had  expressly 
abolished  slavery  in  the  territory  out  of  which 
Kansas  and  Nebraska  were  carved.  By  the  pro 
posed  bill  this  compromise  was  to  be  repealed,  and 
the  famous  doctrine  of  non-intervention,  or  "squat 
ter  sovereignty,"  was  to  take  its  place,  the  people 


330  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

of  each  territory  being  allowed  to  choose  for  them 
selves  whether  they  did  or  did  not  wish  slavery. 
Benton  attacked  the  proposal  with  all  the  strength 
of  his  frank,  open  nature  as  "a  bungling  attempt 
to  smuggle  slavery  into  the  territory,  and  through 
out  all  the  country,  up  to  the  Canada  line  and  out 
to  the  Rocky  Mountains."  He  showed  exhaust 
ively  the  real  nature  of  the  original  Missouri 
Compromise,  which,  as  he  said,  was  forced  by  the 
South  upon  the  North,  and  which  the  South  now 
proposed  to  repeal,  that  it  might  humiliate  the 
North  still  further.  The  compromise  of  1820  was, 
he  justly  contended,  right ;  it  was  like  the  original 
compromises  of  the  Constitution,  by  which  the 
slave  States  were  admitted  to  the  formation  of 
the  Union ;  no  greater  concession  of  principle  was 
involved  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other;  and, 
had  either  compromise  failed,  the  Union  would  not 
now  be  in  existence.  But  the  day  when  compro 
mises  had  been  necessary,  or  even  harmless,  had 
passed.  The  time  had  come  when  the  extension 
of  slavery  was  to  be  opposed  in  every  constitu 
tional  way;  and  it  was  an  outrage  to  propose  to 
extend  its  domain  by  repealing  all  that  part  of  a 
compromise  measure  which  worked  against  it, 
when  the  South  had  already  long  taken  advantage 
of  such  parts  of  the  law  as  worked  in  its  favor. 
Said  Benton:  "The  South  divided  and  took  half, 
and  now  it  will  not  do  to  claim  the  other  half." 


The  Losing  Fight  331 

Exactly  as  a  proposition  to  destroy  the  slavery 
compromises  of  the  Constitution  would  be  an  open 
attempt  to  destroy  the  Union,  so,  he  said,  the 
attempt  to  abrogate  the  compromise  of  1820 
would  be  a  preparation  for  the  same  ending.  "  I 
have  stood  upon  the  Missouri  Compromise  for 
about  thirty  years,  and  mean  to  stand  upon  it  to 
the  end  of  my  life.  ...  [It  is]  a  binding  covenant 
upon  both  parties,  and  the  more  so  upon  the  South, 
as  she  imposed  it." 

The  squatter  sovereignty  theories  of  Douglas  he 
treated  with  deserved  ridicule,  laughing  at  the  idea 
that  the  territories  were  not  the  actual  property  of 
the  nation,  to  be  treated  as  the  latter  wished,  and 
having  none  of  the  rights  of  sovereign  states ;  and 
he  condemned  even  more  severely  the  theory  ad 
vanced  to  the  effect  that  Congress  had  no  power  to 
legislate  on  slavery  in  the  territories.  Thus,  he 
pointed  out  that  to  admit  any  such  theories  was 
directly  to  reverse  the  principles  upon  which  we 
had  acted  for  seventy  years  in  regard  to  the 
various  territories  that  from  time  to  time  grew  to 
such  size  as  entitled  them  to  come  into  the  Union 
as  States.  After  showing  that  there  was  no  excuse 
for  bringing  in  the  bill  on  the  plea  of  settling  the 
slavery  question,  since  there  was  not  a  foot  of  ter 
ritory  in  the  United  States  where  the  subject  of 
slavery  was  not  already  settled  by  law,  he  closed 
with  an  earnest  appeal  against  such  an  attempt  to 


332  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

break  up  the  Union  and  outrage  the  North  by 
forcing  slavery  into  a  land  where  its  existence  was 
already  forbidden  by  law.  His  speech  exceeded 
the  hour  allotted  to  it,  and  he  was  allowed  to  go  on 
only  by  the  courtesy  of  a  member  from  Illinois, 
who,  when  some  of  the  Southerners  protested 
against  his  being  heard  further,  gave  up  part  of  his 
own  time  to  the  grand  old  Missourian,  and  asked 
the  House  to  hear  him,  if  only  "  as  the  oldest  living 
man  in  Congress,  the  only  man  in  Congress  who 
was  present  at  the  passage  of  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  bill. * '  Many  a  man  at  the  North,  ashamed 
and  indignant  at  seeing  the  politicians  of  his  own 
section  cower  at  the  crack  of  the  Southern  whip, 
felt  a  glow  of  sincere  gratitude  and  admiration  for 
the  rugged  Westerner,  who  so  boldly  bade  defiance 
to  the  ruling  slave  party  that  held  the  reins  not 
only  in  his  own  section,  but  also  in  his  own  State, 
and  to  oppose  which  was  almost  certain  political 
death. 

The  Gadsden  treaty  was  also  strongly  opposed 
and  condemned  by  Benton,  who  considered  it  to 
be  part  of  a  great  scheme  or  movement  in  the  in 
terest  of  the  slavery  disunionists,  of  which  he  also 
believed  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  to  be  the  first 
development, — the  "  thin  end  of  the  wedge."  He 
opposed  the  acquirement  even  of  the  small  piece  of 
territory  we  were  actually  able  to  purchase  from 
Mexico;  and  showed  good  grounds  for  his  belief 


The  Losing  Fight  333 

that  the  administration,  acting  as  usual  only  in 
the  interest  of  the  secessionists,  had  tried  to  get 
enough  North-Mexican  territory  to  form  several 
new  States,  and  had  also  attempted  to  purchase 
Cuba,  both  efforts  being  for  the  purpose  of  en 
abling  the  South  either  to  become  again  dominant 
in  the  Union  or  else  to  set  up  a  separate  confed 
eracy  of  her  own.  For  it  must  be  kept  in  mind 
that  Benton  always  believed  that  the  Southern 
disunion  movements  were  largely  due  to  con 
spiracies  among  ambitious  politicians,  who  used 
the  slavery  question  as  a  handle  by  which  to  in 
fluence  the  mass  of  the  people.  This  view  has 
certainly  more  truth  in  it  than  it  is  now  the 
fashion  to  admit.  His  objection  to  the  actual 
treaty  was  mainly  based  on  its  having  been  done 
by  the  executive  without  the  consent  of  the  legis 
lature,  and  he  also  criticized  it  for  the  secrecy  with 
which  it  had  been  put  through.  In  bringing 
forward  the  first  objection,  however,  he  was  con 
fronted  with  Jefferson's  conduct  in  acquiring  Lou 
isiana,  which  he  endeavored,  not  very  successfully, 
to  show  had  nothing  in  common  with  the  actions  of 
Pierce,  who,  he  said,  simply  demanded  a  check 
from  the  House  with  which  to  complete  a  purchase 
undertaken  on  his  own  responsibility. 

Throughout  his  congressional  term  of  service, 
Benton  acted  so  as  to  deserve  well  of  the  Union  as 
a  whole,  and  most  well  of  Missouri  in  particular. 


334  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

But  he  could  not  stem  the  tide  of  folly  and  mad 
ness  in  this  State,  and  was  defeated  when  he  was 
a  candidate  for  reelection.  The  Whigs  had  now 
disappeared  from  the  political  arena,  and  the 
Know-Nothings  were  running  through  their  short 
and  crooked  lease  of  life ;  they  foolishly  nominated 
a  third  candidate  in  Benton 's  district,  who  drew  off 
enough  votes  from  him  to  enable  his  pro-slavery 
Democratic  competitor  to  win. 

No  sooner  had  he  lost  his  seat  in  Congress  than 
Benton,  indefatigable  as  ever,  set  to  work  to  finish 
his  "Thirty  Years'  View,"  and  produced  the 
second  volume  in  1856,  the  year  when  he  made 
his  last  attempt  to  regain  his  hold  in  politics,  and 
to  win  Missouri  back  to  the  old  Union  standard. 
Although  his  own  son-in-law,  Fremont,  the  daring 
Western  explorer,  was  running  as  the  first  presi 
dential  candidate  ever  nominated  by  the  Repub 
licans,  the  old  partisan  voted  for  the  Democrat, 
Buchanan.  He  did  not  like  Buchanan,  consider 
ing  him  weak  and  unsuitable,  but  the  Republican 
party  he  believed  to  be  entirely  too  sectional  in 
character  for  him  to  give  it  his  support.  For 
governor  there  was  a  triangular  fight,  the  Know- 
Nothings  having  nominated  one  candidate,  the 
secessionist  Democrats  a  second,  while  Benton 
himself  ran  as  the  choice  of  the  Union  Democracy. 
He  was  now  seventy-four  years  old,  but  his  mind 
was  as  vigorous  as  ever,  and  his  iron  will  kept  up 


The  Losing  Fight  335 

a  frame  that  had  hardly  even  yet  begun  to  give 
way.  During  the  course  of  the  campaign  he 
traveled  throughout  the  State,  going  in  all  twelve 
hundred  miles,  and  making  forty  speeches,  each 
one  of  two  or  three  hours'  length.  This  was  a 
remarkable  feat  for  so  old  a  man ;  indeed,  it  has 
very  rarely  been  paralleled,  except  by  Gladstone's 
recent  performances.  The  vote  was  quite  evenly 
divided  between  the  three  candidates ;  but  Benton 
came  in  third,  and  the  extreme  pro-slavery  men 
carried  the  day.  After  this,  during  the  few 
months  of  life  he  yet  had  left,  he  did  not  again 
mingle  in  the  politics  of  Missouri. 

But  in  the  days  of  his  defeat  at  home,  the  regard 
and  respect  in  which  he  was  held  in  the  other 
States,  especially  at  the  North,  increased  steadily ; 
and  in  the  fall  of  1856  he  made  by  request  a  lec 
turing  tour  in  New  England,  speaking  on  the  dan 
ger  of  the  political  situation  and  the  imperative 
necessity  of  preserving  the  Union,  which  he  now 
clearly  saw  to  be  gravely  threatened.  He  was 
well  received,  for  the  North  was  learning  to  respect 
him,  and  he  had  gotten  over  his  early  hostility  to 
New  England, — a  hostility  originally  shared  by 
the  whole  West.  The  New  Englanders  were  not 
yet  aware,  however,  of  the  importance  of  the  seces 
sion  movements,  and  paid  little  heed  to  the  warn 
ings  that  were  to  be  so  fully  justified  by  the  events 
of  the  next  few  years.  But  Benton,  in  spite  of  his 


336  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

great  age,  saw  distinctly  the  changes  that  were 
taking  place,  and  the  dangers  that  were  impend 
ing, — an  unusual  thing  for  a  man  whose  active  life 
has  already  been  lived  out  under  widely  different 
conditions. 

He  again  turned  his  attention  to  literature,  and 
produced  another  great  work,  the  "Abridgment  of 
the  Debates  of  Congress  from  1789  to  1856,"  in 
sixteen  volumes,  besides  writing  a  valuable  pam 
phlet  on  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  which  he  severely 
criticized.  The  amount  of  labor  all  this  required 
was  immense,  and  his  health  completely  gave  way ; 
yet  he  continued  working  to  the  very  end,  dictat 
ing  the  closing  portion  of  the  "Abridgment"  in  a 
whisper  as  he  lay  on  his  death-bed.  When  he 
once  began  to  fail  his  advanced  years  made  him 
succumb  rapidly;  and  on  April  10,  1858,  he  died, 
in  the  city  of  Washington.  As  soon  as  the  news 
reached  Missouri,  a  great  revulsion  of  feeling  took 
place,  and  all  classes  of  the  people  united  to  do 
honor  to  the  memory  of  the  dead  statesman,  real 
izing  that  they  had  lost  a  man  who  towered  head 
and  shoulders  above  both  friends  and  foes.  The 
body  was  taken  to  St.  Louis,  and  after  lying  in 
state  was  buried  in  Bellefontaine  Cemetery,  more 
than  forty  thousand  people  witnessing  the  funeral. 
All  the  public  buildings  were  draped  in  mourning ; 
all  places  of  business  were  closed,  and  the  flags 
everywhere  were  at  half-mast.  Thus  at  the  very 


The  Losing  Fight  337 

end  the  great  city  of  the  West  at  last  again  paid 
fit  homage  to  the  West's  mightiest  son. 

Benton's  most  important  writings  are  those 
mentioned  above.  The  "Thirty  Years'  View" 
("a  history  of  the  working  of  the  American  gov 
ernment  for  thirty  years,  from  1820  to  1850")  will 
always  be  indispensable  to  every  student  of  Amer 
ican  history.  It  deals  with  the  deeds  of  both 
houses  of  Congress,  and  of  some  of  the  higher 
federal  officials  during  his  thirty  years'  term  of 
service  in  the  Senate,  and  is  valuable  alike  for  the 
original  data  it  contains,  and  because  it  is  so  com 
plete  a  record  of  our  public  life  at  that  time.  The 
book  is  also  remarkable  for  its  courteous  and 
equable  tone,  even  toward  bitter  personal  and 
political  enemies.  It  shows  a  vanity  on  the  part 
of  the  author  that  is  too  frank  and  free  from  malice 
to  be  anything  but  amusing;  the  style  is  rather 
ponderous,  and  the  English  not  always  good,  for 
Benton  began  life,  and,  in  fact,  largely  passed  it, 
in  an  age  of  ornate  periods,  when  grandiloquence 
was  considered  more  essential  than  grammar.  In 
much  of  the  Mississippi  valley  the  people  had  their 
own  canons  of  literary  taste ;  indeed, in  a  recent  book 
by  one  of  Benton's  admirers,  there  is  a  fond  allusion 
to  his  statement,  anent  the  expunging  resolution, 
that  "solitary  and  alone"  he  had  set  the  ball  in 
motion,  the  pleonasm  being  evidently  looked  upon 
in  the  light  of  a  rather  fine  oratorical  outburst. 


338  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

"The  Abridgment  of  the  Debates  of  Congress 
from  1789  to  1856"  he  was  only  able  to  bring 
down  to  1850.  Sixteen  volumes  were  published. 
It  was  a  compilation  needing  infinite  labor,  and  is 
invaluable  to  the  historian.  While  in  the  midst 
of  the  vast  work  he  also  found  time  to  write  his 
"Examination  of  the  Dred  Scott  Case,"  in  so  far 
as  it  decided  the  Missouri  Compromise  law  to  be 
unconstitutional,  and  asserted  the  self -extension  of 
the  Constitution  into  the  territories,  carrying  slav 
ery  with  it, — the  decision  in  this  case  promulgated 
by  Judge  Taney,  of  unhappy  fame,  having  been 
the  last  step  taken  in  the  interests  of  slavery  and 
for  the  overthrow  of  freedom.  The  pamphlet  con 
tained  nearly  two  hundred  pages,  and  showed,  as 
was  invariably  the  case  with  anything  Benton  did, 
the  effects  of  laborious  research  and  wide  histori 
cal  and  legal  learning.  His  summing  up  was, 
"that  the  decision  conflicts  with  the  uniform 
action  of  all  the  departments  of  the  federal  gov 
ernment  from  its  foundation  to  the  present  time, 
and  cannot  be  accepted  as  a  rule  to  govern  Con 
gress  and  the  people,  without  severing  that  act  and 
admitting  the  political  supremacy  of  the  court  and 
accepting  an  altered  constitution  from  its  hands, 
and  taking  a  new  and  portentous  point  of  depar 
ture  in  the  working  of  the  government."  He 
denounced  the  new  party  theories  of  the  Democ 
racy,  which  had  abandoned  the  old  belief  of  the 


The  Losing  Fight  339 

founders  of  the  republic,  that  Congress  had  power 
to  legislate  upon  slavery  in  territories,  and  which 
had  gone  on  "from  the  abrogation  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise,  which  saved  the  Union,  to  squatter 
sovereignty,  which  killed  the  compromise,  and 
thence  to  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
which  kill  both."  In  closing  he  touched  briefly 
on  the  history  of  the  pro-slavery  agitation.  "  Up 
to  Mr.  Pierce's  administration  the  plan  had  been 
defensive,  that  is  to  say,  to  make  the  secession  of 
the  South  a  measure  of  self-defense  against  the 
abolition  encroachments  and  crusades  of  the 
North.  In  the  time  of  Mr.  Pierce  the  plan  became 
offensive,  that  is  to  say,  to  commence  the  expan 
sion  of  slavery,  and  the  acquisition  of  territory  to 
spread  it  over,  so  as  to  overpower  the  North  with 
new  slave  States,  and  drive  them  out  of  the 

Union The  rising  in  the  free   States,  in 

consequence  of  the  abrogation  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise,  checked  these  schemes,  and  limited 
the  success  of  the  disunionists  to  the  revival  of  the 
agitation  which  enables  them  to  wield  the  South 
against  the  North  in  all  the  federal  elections  and 
all  federal  legislation.  Accidents  and  events  have 
given  the  party  a  strange  preeminence, — under 
Jackson's  administration  proclaimed  for  treason; 
since  at  the  head  of  the  government  and  of  the 
Democratic  party.  The  death  of  Harrison,  and 
the  accession  of  Tyler,  was  their  first  great  lift ;  the 


340 


Thomas  Hart  Benton 


election  of  Mr.  Pierce  was  their  culminating  point." 
This  was  the  last  protest  of  the  last  of  the  old 
Jacksonian  leaders  against  that  new  generation 
of  Democrats  whose  delight  it  had  become  to  bow 
down  to  strange  gods. 

In  his  private  life  Benton's  relations  were  of  the 
pleasantest.  He  was  a  religious  man,  although, 
like  his  great  political  chief,  he  could  on  occasions 
swear  roundly.  He  was  rigidly  moral,  and  he  was 
too  fond  of  work  ever  to  make  social  life  a  busi 
ness.  But  he  liked  small  dinners,  with  just  a  few 
intimate  friends  or  noted  and  brilliant  public  men, 
and  always  shone  at  such  an  entertainment.  Al 
though  he  had  not  traveled  much,  he  gave  the 
impression  of  having  done  so,  by  reason  of  his 
wide  reading,  and  because  he  always  made  a  point 
of  knowing  all  explorers,  especially  those  who  had 
penetrated  our  great  western  wilds.  His  geo 
graphical  knowledge  was  wonderful ;  and  his  good 
nature,  as  well  as  his  delight  in  work  for  work's 
sake,  made  him  of  more  use  than  any  library  of 
reference,  if  his  friends  needed  information  upon 
some  abstruse  matter, — Webster  himself  acknowl 
edging  his  indebtedness  to  him  on  one  occasion, 
and  being  the  authority  for  the  statement  that 
Benton  knew  more  political  facts  than  any  other 
man  he  had  ever  met,  even  than  John  Quincy 
Adams,  and  possessed  a  wonderful  fund  of  general 
knowledge.  Although  very  gentle  in  his  dealings 


The  Losing  Fight  341 

with  those  for  whom  he  cared,  Benton  originally 
was  rather  quarrelsome  and  revengeful  in  charac 
ter.  His  personal  and  political  prejudices  were 
bitter,  and  he  denounced  his  enemies  freely  in 
public  and  from  the  stump ;  yet  he  always  declined 
to  take  part  in  joint  political  debates,  on  account 
of  the  personal  discourtesy  with  which  they  were 
usually  conducted.  He  gave  his  whole  time  to 
public  life,  rarely  or  never  attending  to  his  law 
practice  after  he  had  fairly  entered  the  political 
field. 

Benton  was  one  of  those  who  were  present  and 
escaped  death  at  the  time  of  the  terrible  accident 
on  board  the  Princeton,  during  Tyler's  administra 
tion,  when  the  bursting  of  her  great  gun  killed  so 
many  prominent  men.  Benton  was  saved  owing 
to  the  fact  that,  characteristically  enough,  he  had 
stepped  to  one  side  the  better  to  note  the  marks 
manship  of  the  gunner.  Ex-Governor  Gilmer  of 
Virginia,  who  had  taken  his  place,  was  instantly 
killed.  Tyler,  who  was  also  on  board,  was  like 
wise  saved  in  consequence  of  the  exhibition  of  a 
characteristic  trait ;  for,  just  as  the  gun  was  about 
to  be  fired,  something  occurred  in  another  part  of 
the  ship  which  distracted  the  attention  of  the 
fussy,  fidgety  President,  who  accordingly  ran  off 
to  see  what  it  was,  and  thus  escaped  the  fatal  ex 
plosion.  The  tragic  nature  of  the  accident  and 
his  own  narrow  escape  made  a  deep  impression 


342  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

upon  Benton ;  and  it  was  noticed  that  ever  after 
ward  he  was  far  more  forbearing  and  forgiving 
than  of  old.  He  became  good  friends  with  Web 
ster  and  other  political  opponents,  with  whom 
he  had  formerly  hardly  been  on  speaking  terms. 
Calhoun  alone  he  would  never  forgive.  It  was 
not  in  his  nature  to  do  anything  by  halves;  and 
accordingly,  when  he  once  forgave  an  opponent, 
he  could  not  do  enough  to  show  him  that  the  for 
giveness  was  real.  A  Missourian  named  Wilson, 
who  had  been  his  bitter  and  malignant  political 
foe  for  years,  finally  becoming  broken  in  fortune 
and  desirous  of  bettering  himself  by  going  to  Cali 
fornia,  where  Ben  ton's  influence,  through  his  son- 
in-law,  Fremont,  was  supreme,  was  persuaded  by 
Webster  to  throw  himself  on  the  generosity  of  his 
old  enemy.  The  latter  not  only  met  him  half  way, 
but  helped  him  with  a  lavish  kindness  that  would 
hardly  have  been  warranted  by  less  than  a  lifelong 
friendship.  Webster  has  left  on  record  the  fact 
that,  when  once  they  had  come  to  be  on  good 
terms  with  each  other,  there  was  no  man  in  the 
whole  Senate  of  whom  he  would  more  freely  have 
asked  any  favor  that  could  properly  be  granted. 

He  was  a  most  loving  father.  At  his  death  he 
left  four  surviving  daughters,— Mrs.  William 
Carey  Jones,  Mrs.  Sarah  Benton  Jacobs,  Madame 
Susan  Benton  Boilleau,  and  Mrs.  Jessie  Ann  Ben- 
ton  Fremont,  the  wife  of  the  great  explorer,  whose 


The  Losing  Fight  343 

wonderful  feats  and  adventures,  ending  with  the 
conquest  of  California,  where  he  became  a  sort  of 
viceroy  in  point  of  power,  made  him  an  especial 
favorite  with  his  father-in-law,  who  loved  daring 
and  hardihood.  Ben  ton  took  the  keenest  delight 
in  Fremont's  remarkable  successes,  and  was  never 
tired  of  talking  of  them,  both  within  and  without 
the  Senate.  He  records  with  very  natural  pride 
the  fact  that  it  was  only  the  courage  and  judgment 
displayed  in  a  trying  crisis  by  his  own  gifted 
daughter,  Fremont's  wife,  which  enabled  the  ad 
venturous  young  explorer  to  prosecute  one  of  the 
most  important  of  his  expeditions,  when  threat 
ened  with  fatal  interference  from  jealous  govern 
mental  superiors. 

He  was  an  exceptionally  devoted  husband.  His 
wife  was  Miss  Elizabeth  McDowell  of  Virginia, 
whom  he  married  after  he  had  entered  the  Senate. 
Their  life  was  most  happy  until  1844,  when  she 
was  struck  by  paralysis.  From  that  time  till  her 
death  in  1854,  he  never  went  out  to  a  public  place 
of  amusement,  spending  all  his  time  not  occupied 
with  public  duties  in  writing  by  her  bedside.  It 
is  scant  praise  to  say  that,  while  mere  acquiescence 
on  his  part  would  have  enabled  him  to  become  rich 
through  government  influence,  he  nevertheless 
died  a  poor  man.  In  public,  as  in  private  life,  he 
was  a  man  of  sensitive  purity  of  character;  he 
would  never  permit  any  person  connected  with 


344  Thomas  Hart  Benton 

him  by  blood  or  marriage  to  accept  office  under 
the  government,  nor  would  he  ever  favor  any 
applicant  for  a  government  contract  on  political 
grounds. 

During  his  last  years,  when  his  sturdy  independ 
ence  and  devotion  to  the  Union  had  caused  him 
the  loss  of  his  political  influence  in  his  own  State 
and  with  his  own  party,  he  nevertheless  stood 
higher  with  the  country  at  large  than  ever  before. 
He  was  a  faithful  friend  and  a  bitter  foe ;  he  was 
vain,  proud,  utterly  fearless,  and  quite  unable  to 
comprehend  such  emotions  as  are  expressed  by  the 
terms  despondency  and  yielding.  Without  being 
a  great  orator  or  writer,  or  even  an  original 
thinker,  he  yet  possessed  marked  ability ;  and  his 
abounding  vitality  and  marvelous  memory,  his  in 
domitable  energy  and  industry,  and  his  tenacious 
persistency  and  personal  courage,  all  combined  to 
give  him  a  position  and  influence  such  as  few 
American  statesmen  have  ever  held.  His  char 
acter  grew  steadily  to  the  very  last;  he  made 
better  speeches  and  was  better  able  to  face  new 
problems  when  past  threescore  and  ten  than  in  his 
early  youth  or  middle  age.  He  possessed  a  rich 
fund  of  political,  legal,  and  historical  learning,  and 
every  subject  that  he  ever  handled  showed  the 
traces  of  careful  and  thorough  study.  He  was 
very  courteous,  except  when  provoked ;  his  cour 
age  was  proof  against  all  fear,  and  he  shrank  from 


The  Losing  Fight  345 

no  contest,  personal  or  political.  He  was  some 
times  narrow-minded,  and  always  wilful  and 
passionate ;  but  he  was  honest  and  truthful.  At 
all  times  and  in  all  places  he  held  every  good  gift 
he  had  completely  at  the  service  of  the  American 
Federal  Union. 


INDEX 


Adams,  John  Quincy:  in 
presidential  election  of 
1824-5,  57,  58;  makes  Clay 
secretary  of  state,  58;  and 
is  assailed  therefor,  58,  59; 
outlines  Whig  policy  in  his 
inaugural,  60;  on  the 
Panama  mission,  60-6 1 ;  in 
election  of  1828,  66;  pre 
serves  purity  of  civil  ser 
vice,  78;  on  recognition  of 
Texas,  171 

"Albany  Regency,"  the, 
adopts  "spoils  system,"  77 

Arnold,  Benedict:"  compared 
with  Burr  and  J.  Davis, 

J55 

Atchison,  protests  against 
admission  of  California, 
320. 

Benton,  town  of,  founded,  24 
Benton,  Thomas  Hart:  local 
character  of  his  statesman 
ship,  12-13;  birth,  22; 
boyhood  and  education,  25 
et  seq.;  religious  training, 
25;  fights  a  duel,  26;  af 
fray  with  Jackson,  27;  ad 
mitted  to  the  bar,  28;  in 
legislature  of  Tennessee, 
28;  on  the  Hartford  Con 
vention,  29;  a  slaveholder, 
30;  favors  war  of  1812, 
30;  in  service,  30;  be 
friends  Jackson,  31 ;  asso 
ciations  in  Tennessee,  31 
et  seq.;  some  traits  of  char 


acter,  32-33;  settles  in 
Missouri,  34;  surroundings 
and  influences  there,  38; 
speech  on  treaty  with 
Spain  concerning  Florida, 
39—40;  first  position  con 
cerning  slavery,  40—41 ;  en 
ters  U.  S.  Senate,  42;  hon 
orable  financial  sacrifice, 
43 ;  position  on  the  Oregon 
question,  48-49,  62,  249— 
255,  258-264,  266-272;  bill 
to  establish  a  trading  road 
through  Missouri,  50;  on 
the  removal  of  the  In 
dians,  53;  votes  for  Clay's 
protective  tariff  bill,  55, 
60;  opposes  internal  im 
provements  and  Cumber 
land  Road  bill,  56;  con 
demns  election  of  John  Q. 
Adams  to  Presidency,  57; 
supports  Clay,  then  Jack 
son,  58;  will  not  join 
outcry  against  Adams  and 
Clay,  58;  a  leader  of  the 
opposition  to  Adams  in 
the  Senate,  60;  represents 
ultra-Southern  feeling  con 
cerning  revolted  Spanish 
colonies,  62;  vote  on  the 
protective  tariff  of  1828, 
63,  87,  97;  efforts  con 
cerning  disposal  of  public 
land,  65,  73,  141,  146,  205; 
hostility  to  the  North 
eastern  States,  72;  in  the 
Webster-Hayne  debate, 74; 


347 


348 


Index 


opposes  Jackson's  "spoils 
system,"  75-81;  leader  of 
the  Jacksonians  in  the 
Senate,  81,  82;  shows  that 

Erotective  tariff  has  not 
elped  the  West,  86 ;  urges 
repeal  of  the  tax  on  salt, 
88,  215;  vigorously  sus 
tains  Jackson  in  the  nulli 
fication  troubles,  95-100; 
sustains  the  Force  bill,  100; 
opposes  Clay's  compromise 
measure,  102-104;  remarks 
on  his  position  at  this 
period,  106;  campaign 
against  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States,  109,  121, 
129,  136;  speech  on  the 
currency,  117,  130,  240; 
conflict  with  Clay,  123;  on 
the  removal  of  the  de 
posits,  125;  opposes  the 
resolution  of  censure 
against  Jackson,  126;  and 
pushes  through  his  own 
expunging  resolution,  128— 
129,  133-135;  advocates 
establishment  of  mints  at 
the  South,  137;  opposes 
distribution  of  surplus,  138, 
142;  wishes  it  used  for 
fortifications,  138,  142- 
145 ;  advocates  insisting  on 
our  claims  against  France, 
140;  but  opposes  paying 
claims  of  American  citi 
zens,  141;  opposes  the  so- 
called  specie  circulars,  146; 
views  concerning  Southern 
slavery  politicians,  154; 
opposed  to  the  Abolition 
ists,  156;  criticises  Cal- 
houn,  159;  aids  to  defeat 
bill  prohibiting  circulation 
of  abolition  docaments 
through  U.  S.  mails,  160; 


carries  bill  extending  boun 
daries  of  Missouri,  161; 
urges  admission  of  Michi 
gan,  162;  carries  through 
treaty  with  Cherokees, 
162;  defends  governmental 
treatment  of  Indians,  163; 
condemns  treaty  estab 
lishing  Southwestern  boun 
dary,  1 66;  position  con 
cerning  annexation  of 
Texas,  171-173;  hostility 
to  separatist  doctrines,  178; 
blames  bankers  and  poli 
ticians  for  financial  crisis 
of  1837,  l8o,  183;  his  fore 
bodings  of  this  trouble, 
180-182;  demeanor  in  the 
crisis,  1 86;  supports  issue 
of  Treasury  notes,  187; 
opposes  payment  of  fur 
ther  instalment  of  surplus, 
1 88;  supports  scheme  for 
independent  Treasury,  189, 
196;  action  concerning  re 
sumption  by  bonds,  192;  a 
supporter  of  the  adminis 
tration  in  these  times,  192; 
his  knowledge,  192-193; 
hostile  to  paper  currency, 
195;  defends  administra 
tion  in  matters  of  Semi- 
nole  war,  201;  theory  for 
conducting  this  war,  203- 
204;  advocates  homestead 
law,  205;  opposes  assump 
tion  of  State  debts  by 
national  government,  209; 
explains  greater  rapidity 
of  progress  at  North  than 
at  South,  21 1 ;  on  the 
tariff  of  1833,  212-218; 
defends  Jackson  and  Van 
Buren  against  charges  of 
squandering  public  mon 
eys,  218;  in  the  Harrison 


Index 


349 


campaign,  221;  holds  the 
Democrats  for  the  Union, 
221-222;  feeling  concern 
ing  slavery  about  Van 
Buren's  time,  223;  leads 
the  Democrats  in  struggle 
between  President  Tyler 
and  Clay,  228-232;  exalts 
the  "Democratic  idea," 
229;  comments  on  Tyler's 
first  message  to  Congress, 
232;  opposes  sub-Treasury 
bill,  233;  also  the  bank, 
distribution  and  bank 
ruptcy  bills,  234-237;  op 
poses  the  hour  limit  for 
speeches  in  the  Senate, 
237-239;  speech  concern 
ing  the  district  banks  and 
the  currency,  240;  opposes 
effort  to  establish  a  na 
tional  bank  during  Tyler's 
administration,  242-244; 
opposes  new  form  of  Treas 
ury  notes,  245;  opposes 
subsidizing  steamship  lines, 
245;  also  the  abuse  of  the 
pension  system,  245;  al 
ways  an  advocate  of  ex 
tending  the  national  boun 
daries,  249,  252;  opposes 
the  Ashburton  treaty,  254, 
258-264;  remarks  concern 
ing  the  Caroline  imbroglio, 
255;  opposes  making  an 
efficient  navy,  257;  refer 
ences  to  slavery  in  speeches 
on  the  Ashburton  treaty, 
259,  265;  on  the  Oregon 
question,  266-273;  opposes 
the  South,  285-286;  op 
poses  Calhoun's  treaty, 
290-294;  hoodwinked  by 
the  annexationists,  297; 
attacks  Calhoun  and  op 
poses  the  Mexican  war, 


298;  offered  the  command 
of  the  army,  301;  awakes 
to  importance  of  slavery 
question,  301;  his  later 
position  concerning  it,  303, 
3 1 5-3 1 8 ;  contests  with  pro- 
slavery  Senators,  305,  306; 
opposes  Calhoun  as  to 
power  of  Congress  over 
slavery  in  territories,  306— 
310;  and  as  to  admission 
of  Oregon,  310;  criticises 
Folk's  administration,  311; 
visits  New  York  in  presi 
dential  campaign  in  1848, 
312;  defends  Taylor's  mes 
sage,  313;  opposes  Clay's 
compromise,  314,  315—318; 
more  antagonism  toward 
Calhoun,  315;  position  on 
the  Wilmot  Proviso,  318; 
advocates  admission  of 
California  as  a  Free  State, 
319;  refuses  to  support 
Fugitive  Slave  Act,  320; 
nickname  of  "Old  Bul 
lion,"  322;  opposition  to 
him  in  Missouri,  323;  de 
feated,  324;  goes  to  House 
of  Representatives,  324; 
begins  work  on  the  "Thirty 
Years'  View,"  325;  svtp- 
ports  Pierce  for  Presi 
dency,  325;  but  later  goes 
into  opposition,  325;  sup 
ports  scheme  for  Pacific 
Railroad,  326;  discusses 
the  Indian  policy,  327; 
speeches  on  land-bounty 
and  pension  bills,  328; 
opposes  Kansas- Nebraska 
bill,  329-332;  discusses  his 
torically  the  Missouri  Com 
promise,  329-330;  ridicules 
squatter  sovereignty,  331; 
opposes  the  Gladstone 


350 


Index 


treaty,  332 ;  view  of  South 
ern  disunion  scheme,  333; 
again  defeated  in  Missouri 
elections,  334;  returns  to 
labor  on  "Thirty  Years' 
View,"  334;  votes  for  Bu 
chanan,  334;  candidate  for 
governorship,  334;  stumps 
the  State,  335;  respected 
at  the  North,  335 ;  prepares 
his  "Abridgment  of  the 
Debates  of  Congress,"  336; 
death,  336;  value  of  his 
works,  337 ;  criticism  of  the 
Dred  Scott  case,  338;  and 
of  the  new  Democratic 
theories,  338;  domestic  re 
lations,  340;  extensive 
knowledge,  340;  on  board 
the  Princeton  at  time  of 
explosion  of  great  gun,  341 ; 
generous  temper,  342 

Biddle,  Nicholas:  president 
of  Bank  of  United  States, 
no;  his  errors,  118;  his 
bank  goes  to  pieces,  196 

Birney,  James  G. :  abolition 
ist  candidate  for  Presi 
dency,  276;  folly  of  nomi 
nating  him,  278,  294 

Blair,  Francis  C.,  displaced, 
300 

Buchanan,  James:  on  an 
nexation  of  Texas,  294; 
Benton  votes  for  him,  334 

Burr,  Aaron:  introduces 
"spoils  system"  in  New 
York,  77;  compared  with 
Benedict  Arnold,  155 

Calhoun,  John  C.:  rupture 
with  Jackson,  resignation 
from  Vice-Presidency,  82; 
position  concerning  tariff 
in  1816,  85;  position  as  a 
nullifier,  91;  introduces 
nullification  resolutions, 


98;  threatened  with  hang 
ing,  99;  arranges  compro 
mise  with  Clay,  101;  sub 
sequent  quarrel  with  Clay 
concerning  this,  104;  his 
purposes  at  this  time,  105; 
assails  Jackson,  126;  op 
poses  Webster's  bill  for 
rechartering  bank,  130;  on 
the  expunging  resolution, 
134;  proposes  constitu 
tional  amendment  for  dis 
tribution  of  Treasury  sur 
plus,  137;  opposes  appro 
priating  Treasury  surplus 
for  fortifications,  139;  at 
tack  on  President  Pierce, 
158;  his  honesty,  160;  on 
admission  of  Texas,  170; 
in  connection  with  trouble 
with  Mexico,  246;  on  the 
Oregon  question,  270;  in 
strumental  in  election  of 
Polk,  276;  letter  to  Lord 
Aberdeen,  285;  assailed  by 
Benton  as  to  annexation 
of  Texas  291,  293;  action 
as  to  legislation  about 
Texas,  297;  relations  as  to 
Mexican  war,  298;  and  the 
Wilmot  Proviso,  305;  reso 
lution  as  to  power  of  Con 
gress  over  slavery  in  the 
territories,  306—308;  not 
a  "Union  man,"  308;  on 
the  admission  of  Oregon, 
309,  310,  311;  dislikes 
Taylor's  message  to  Con 
gress,^  13 

California,  admission  of,  319 

Caroline,  affair  of  the,  255 

Cart wright,  Peter,  32 

Cass,  Lewis:  nominated  for 
Presidency,  311 

Cherokees,  treaty  for  their 
removal,  162 

Clay,  Henry:   introduces  his 


Index 


first  tariff  bill,  55;  secre 
tary  of  state  under  Adams, 
58;  assailed  therefor,  and 
fights  Randolph,  59;  de 
vises  the  Panama  mission, 
60;  leader  of  National  Re 
publican  or  Whig  party, 
82;  defies  "the  South,  the 
President,  and  the  devil," 
85;  erroneous  statement  as 
to  effect  of  tariff  in  the 
West,  86;  angers  the  milli 
ners,  95;  defeated  in  presi 
dential  election  in  1832, 
95;  alarmed  at  position  of 
Calhoun,  101;  and  pre 
pares  compromise,  101; 
afterward  quarrels  about  it 
with  Calhoun,  104;  be 
friends  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  119,  121,  123;  effect 
on  his  political  fortunes, 
119;  introduces  resolution 
for  return  of  deposits,  123 ; 
also  for  censuring  Presi 
dent  Jackson,  126;  opposes 
Webster's  bill  for  rechar- 
tering  Bank,  130;  on  the 
expunging  resolution,  134; 
opposes  establishment  of 
mints  at  the  South,  137; 
also  appropriating  surplus 
for  fortifications,  139;  in 
financial  crisis  of  1837,  l8.9J 
on  the  sub-Treasury  bill, 

190,  194;    on   resumption 

191,  192;  opposes  payment 
of  state  debts  by  national 
government,  210;  prepares 
financial    measures    upon 
Tyler's  accession,  227,  231; 
construction    of    a    presi 
dential  election,  228;  pro 
gramme  for  legislation  un 
der  Tyler,  233 ;  attempts  to 
introduce    hour-limits    for 
speeches   in    Senate,    237, 


239;  lectures  Tyler  in  the 
Bank  debate,  243;  de 
feated  by  Polk,  275 ;  causes 
thereof,  294;  attacks  Tay 
lor's  message  to  Congress, 
313;  proposes  compromise 
of  slavery  controversy, 
313;  defeated  by  Benton, 
318;  compared  with  Ben- 
ton,  321 

Crawford,  William  H. :  adopts 
the  "spoils  system,"  76 

Crockett,  David,  26,  33; 
berates  Jackson,  107 

Cumberland  Road,  Benton 
votes  against  bill  for,  56 

Davis,  Jefferson:  compared 
with  Benedict  Arnold,  155; 
a  repudiator,  208;  and  Cal- 
houn's  resolution  as  to 
slavery  in  the  territories, 
308;  protests  against  ad 
mission  of  California,  320 

Dray  ton,  family,  loyalty  of 
the  family  in  South  Caro 
lina,  92 

Florida,  the  treaty  securing 
it  to  the  United  States,  39 

Foote,  Senator  from  Missis 
sippi,  opposition  to  his 
public  land  scheme  by 
Benton  and  Webster,  73 

Fremont,  John  C. :  explores 
Rocky  Mountains,  263; 
Benton  will  not  vote  for, 
334;  Benton's  interest  in 
his  explorations,  343 

Giddings,  Joshua  R.,  sound 
policy  of,  278 

Harrison,  Wm.  Henry:  elec 
tion  not  affected  by  slavery 
question,  222;  death  and 
character,  225 

Hartford    Convention,    criti- 


352 


Index 


cized  by  Benton,   29,  75; 
causes  of,  47 

Houston,  Samuel,  32;  wins 
victory  of  San  Jacinto, 
1 70;  hates  Van  Buren,  178; 
description  of,  309;  votes 
to  admit  California,  320 

Indian  tribes,  Benton  on  the 
removal  of,  53 ;  criticism  on 
treatment  of,  55,  163,  328; 
removal    of    Cherokees   in  I 
1836,  162 

Jackson,  Andrew:  affray  with  ! 
Benton,  27;  befriended  by  | 
Benton  at  Washington,  31 ; 
in  presidential  election  of 
1824,  57;  incensed  against 
Adams  and  Clay,  59;  suc 
cess  in  election  of  1828,  66 ; 
character  of  his  following, 
68,  71,  72;  his  opponents, 
69;  his  victory  compared 
with  Jefferson's,  69;  com 
pared  with  Wellington,  70; 
foster-father  of  the  "spoils 
system,"  75,  78;  inferior 
character  of  his  cabinet, 
82;  relations  of  his  fol 
lowers  with  those  of  Clay 
and  Calhoun,  82;  struggles 
with  the  Bank  and  the 
nullifiers,  84;  expected  to 
support  nullification,  92; 
but  does  not,  92;  repudi 
ates  Calhoun  and  adopts 
Van  Buren,  92;  at  the  Jef 
ferson  birthday  banquet, 
93 ;  again  defines  his  posi 
tion,  94;  signs  new  tariff 
bill,  95;  re-elected  in  1832, 
95;  issues  proclamation 
against  nullification,  96; 
special  message  on  nulli 
fication,  97;  opinion  on 
tariff,  97;  threatens  to 
hang  Calhoun,  99;  signs 


"force  bill,"  also  Clay's 
compromise  bill,  103;  be 
haves  badly  in  case  of 
Georgia,  107;  attack  on 
U.  S.  Bank,  109  et  seq.; 
reasons  of  his  political  suc 
cess,  1 1 1 ;  opposes  re-char 
ter  of  Bank  in  message  of 
1829,  112;  vetoes  bill  for 
re-charter,  121;  re-elected, 
124;  removes  the  deposits, 
124;  protests  against  Clay's 
resolution  of  censure,  126; 
continued  assaults  on  the 
Bank,  132;  gives  a  dinner 
to  the  expungers,  134; 
signs  bill  for  distributing 
Treasury  surphis,  145;  is 
sues  Treasury  order  con 
cerning  payments  for  pub 
lic  lands,  147;  Kitchen 
Cabinet  and  "machine 
politics,"  174,  175;  liking 
for  Van  Buren,  176;  his 
nationalism,  221;  praised 
by  Benton  for  hanging 
Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister, 
257;  favors  annexation  of 
Texas,  282;  and  Van 
Buren,  283 

Jefferson, Thomas:  character 
of  his  following,  6  7  ;  his  vic 
tory  compared  with  Jack 
son's,  69;  his  pseudo- 
classicism,  88;  quoted  as 
authority  for  nullification, 
90;  celebration  of  birth 
day  of,  93 

Lee,     Robert    E.:      military 

standing  of,  36 
Lincoln,  Abraham:    services 

in  anti-slavery  cause,  150 
Livingston,     Edward:      aids 

in  preparing  proclamation 

against  nullification,  96 
Lucas,  Benton's  duel  with,  26 


Index 


353 


Madison,  James,  quoted,  154 

Marcy,  William  L.,  adopts 
"spoils  system,"  77; 
cringes  to  the  South,  102 

McDuffie,  passage  at  arms 
with  Benton,  289;  deceives 
Benton  as  to  taxes,  297 

McLeod,  Alexander,  case  of, 
256 

Missouri,  character  of  its 
population,  37;  admission 
to  the  Union,  42,  45;  land 
titles  in,  43 

Missouri  Compromise  bill,  42 ; 
not  the  beginning  of  the 
slavery  and  anti-slavery 
divisions  in  the  Union,  46 ; 
Benton  concerning  repeal 
of,  329 

Monroe,  James,  remarks.  45, 
55,  56,  signs  bill  for  trad 
ing  road, 50 

New  Orleans,  Benton' s  as 
tonishing  description  of,  88 

Oregon,  disputed  between 
Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  48;  Ben- 
ton's  remarks  concerning, 
50 ;  comes  into  notice  again 
in  J.  Q.  Adams's  term,  62; 
final  settlement  of  the 
matter,  246—258;  neglected 
in  Ashburton  treaty,  263, 
and  by  Calhoun,  263,  and 
others,  264;  Benton's  feel 
ing  about,  266,  268 ;  bill  for 
settlement  of,  269;  Cal 
houn  on  the  admission  of, 
309-311 

Panama     mission,     disputes 

concerning,  60-62 
Phillips,    Wendell,    estimate 

of,  152 
Pierce,  Franklin,  assailed  by 

23 


Calhoun,  158;  relations 
with  Benton,  325;  a  valua 
tion  of,  325-326;  Benton 
upon  pro-slavery  tenden 
cies  of,  339 

Polk,  James  K.,  character  of 
his  following,  221;  and  the 
Southwestern  boundary, 
271-272 ;  elected  President, 
275,  294;  estimate  of,  276; 
deceives  Benton  as  to 
Texas,  297 ;  displaces  Blair, 
300;  relations  with  various 
portions  of  Democratic 
party,  300,  301 

Randolph,  John:    duel  with 

Clay,  59 
Rynders,  Isaiah,  a  type,  276 

Seminoles,  war  with,  198-205 

Taney,  Roger  B.,  removes 
the  deposits,  124;  after 
ward  made  chief  justice, 
125;  criticized  by  Benton 
for  his  opinion  in  Dred 
Scott  case,  338 

Taylor,  Zachary,  elected 
President,  311;  character, 
312,  319;  message  to  Con 
gress,  313;  dies,  319 

Tyler,  John,  opposes  "Force 
Bill,"  100;  estimate  of,  on 
his  accession,  225;  his 
political  affiliations,  226- 
228;  first  message  to  Con 
gress,  232;  conduct  con 
cerning  bill  for  establishing 
a  bank,  241—244;  his  cabi 
net  resigns,  244;  identifies 
himself  with  the  separatist 
Democrats,  283;  schemes 
for  annexation  of  Texas, 
285,  291;  assailed  by  Ben- 
ton,  291,  293;  behavior  at 
time  of  explosion  of  gun  on 
board  the  Princeton,  341 


354 


Index 


Van  Buren,  Martin,  supports 
Crawford  for  Presidency  in 
1824,  58;  adopts  "spoils 
system,"  77;  adopted  by 
Jackson  as  his  heir,  92; 
Vice-President,  95;  pro 
duct  of  "machine  poli 
tics,"  174;  befriended  by 
Jackson,  175;  sketch  of, 
and  causes  of  his  elevation, 
176-178;  his  inaugural, 
178;  financial  crisis  and  his 
doings  therein,  178  et  seq., 
183,  185,  1 86;  financial 
measures,  189;  has  to  deal 
with  the  Seminoles,  198; 
public  dishonesty  under, 
207;  charged  with  squan 
dering  the  public  money, 
218;  significance  of  his 
defeat,  221-222;  slavery 
question  did  not  arise  in 
his  administration,  223; 
champion  of  old-style 
Union  Democrats,  and  op 
posed  to  annexation  of 
Texas,  283;  candidate  for 
Presidency,  283,  294;  and 
the  Free  Soil  party,  312 

War  of  1812,  a  cause  of  the, 
7;  political  influence  on 
Bent on,  29 

Warsaw,  social  habits  of  the 
town,  34 

Webster,  Daniel,  position  of, 
concerning  Clay's  first  tar 
iff  bill,  55;  position  on  the 
tariff  question  in  1828,  64; 
in  the  debate  on  Foote's 
resolution  concerning  sales 
of  public  land,  74,  93; 
leader  of  National  Repub 
lican,  or  Whig,  party,  82; 
aids  Jackson  in  nullifica 
tion  troubles,  99;  advo 


cates  the  "force  bill,"  100; 
resolute  in  opposition  to 
the  South,  101,  102,  103; 
remarks  as  to  his  services, 
1 06;  befriends  Bank  of 
United  States,  119,  120, 
121,  123;  personal  rela 
tions  with  the  Jackson- 
ians,  125;  introduces  bill 
for  re-charter  of  Bank, 
130;  on  the  expunging 
resolution,  134;  supports 
establishment  of  mints  at 
the  South,  137;  opposes 
appropriating  Treasury 
surplus  for  fortifications, 
139;  in  financial  crisis  of 
1837,  189;  on  sub-Treasury 
scheme,  190,  194;  opposes 
payment  of  state  debt  by 
national  government,  210; 
remains  in  Tyler's  cabinet, 
244;  negotiates  treaty  with 
England,  settling  boun 
daries  between  United 
States  and  British  pos 
sessions,  246,  248;  criti 
cized  by  Benton,  258-262; 
neglects  Oregon  contro 
versy,  263;  compared  with 
Benton  on  the  slavery 
question,  303,  321;  com 
pliments  Benton's  knowl 
edge,  340;  on  friendly 
terms  with  Benton,  342 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  com 
pared  with  Washington 
and  Jackson,  70 

Wilmot  Proviso,  Benton's 
remarks  upon,  305,  318 

Wright,  Silas,  adopts  "spoils 
system,"  77;  expresses  the 
"dough  face "  sentiment  at 
time  of  nullification  trou 
bles,  102 


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